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SUMMARY 
 
The purpose of this study is to investigate the sentencing practice of the military 
courts.  Since an independent and impartial military judiciary is essential to 
ensure that justice is done a further aim of this study is to investigate whether the 
military courts are impartial, independent and affords the accused his fair trial 
rights.  The sentences imposed by military courts are investigated and concerns 
regarding the imposition of these sentences are identified.  Finally the appeal and 
review procedures followed by the military courts are investigated with specific 
reference to the military accused’s right appeal and review to a higher court as 
provided for by the Constitution.  The sentencing phase of a trial forms an 
important part of the whole trial process.  This is also true for military trials, yet no 
research has been done on military sentencing practice.  Because of the 
potential influence of the draft Military Discipline Bill and the Law Reform 
Commission’s revision of the defence legislation on sentencing, research in this 
area is critical in the positive development of sentencing law in the military justice 
environment.  An extensive literature study is undertaken to evaluate current 
military sentencing practices against civilian practices.  The result of this study 
identifies certain concerns regarding the independence of the military courts, the 
treatment of military offenders and the appeal and review powers of the military 
reviewing authority.  To a large extent it is also found that many concerns are 
based on the apparent rather than the existence of any real dangers to the 
independence of the military courts or the rights of the military accused.  This 
thesis contributes to the accessibility of military law for a civilian audience, 
creating a platform for the development of future military sentences. 
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CHAPTER 1 
 
SENTENCING PRACTICE IN THE MILITARY COURTS 
 
1.1 Introduction 
 
South African military law is an area of the law that has shown scant 
development since the inception of the Union Defence Force in 1912.  Court 
martials were conducted in terms of legislation dating from 1881 with only minor 
changes effected when the Defence Act 44 of 1957 was adopted.   
 
For a long time South African military law with its unique offences and 
punishments was focused on maintaining discipline in a force consisting mainly 
of conscripted members.1  This was not a situation unique to South Africa.  Many 
armed forces consisted of military conscripts and this was acknowledged at an 
international level by the European Convention on Human Rights.2  
Consequently, conscription as such was not regarded as an unacceptable 
infringement on the human rights of those soldiers subject to compulsory military 
service.  Military discipline could also be harsh in order to instil the required 
discipline on individuals unwilling to submit to the discipline regime.   
 
Military law is a tool that may properly assist in the enforcement of discipline.3  
Yet, in the long run, it will only be effective if it is trusted by the subjects thereof.  
Therefore, military justice must involve a fair and just system. However, since 
military law applies only to a relatively small section of the population, namely in-
                                               
1
 See End Conscription Campaign v Minister of Defence 1989 (2) SA 180 (C) (justification by 
SADF for conscription and limiting the rights of individuals); End Conscription Campaign v 
Minister of Defence 1993 (1) SA 589 (T); Council of Review, South African Defence Force v 
Mönnig 1992 (3) SA 482 (A); Hutchinson v Grobler NO 1990 (2) SA 117 (T) (for the application of 
conscription); S v Toms; S v Bruce 1990 (2) SA 802 (A); Binga v Cabinet for South West Africa 
1988 (3) SA 155 (A). 
2
 Rowe P The Impact of Human Rights Law on Armed Forces (2006) at 12. 
3
 Morris L J Military Justice: A Guide to the Issues (2010) at 3. 
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service uniformed members of the South African National Defence Force 
(SANDF),4 it runs the risk of being overlooked.  Fohar says that5 
 
[t]o a great many lawyers…, the text of laws dealing with military criminal law, the 
procedure of courts martial, and the system of courts martial generally, represent 
a ‘closed book’ which they have never opened, whose contents they have never 
been interested in, and whose institutions and concepts are unfamiliar to them.  
Moreover, despite this lack of familiarity (or, perhaps, because of it), there is a 
tendency to assume towards that system of laws an attitude not free from 
disdain, and the view is occasionally expressed among lawyers that ‘military 
justice ought not to be considered justice at all’. 
 
It is against the background of this question – whether justice is done in military 
courts – that the research for this thesis was embarked upon. 
 
1.2 Research problem and purpose of this study 
 
Where the SANDF was in the past mainly perceived as an aggressor, the focus 
has now shifted to viewing it as a defensive force.  The SANDF now consists of 
an all-volunteer force.  Yet the same offences and punishments apply as in the 
time of conscription.  The advent of the Constitution influenced all aspects of the 
law, including military law.  Soldiers were no longer content with the military court 
system and in 1999 a number of them took the SANDF to the Constitutional 
Court in a case that would play a pivotal role in the changes to the military court 
system.6  The Court found in Freedom of Expression Institute v President, 
Ordinary Court Martial7 that  
 
                                               
4
 For the meaning of “military service” see Du Preez v Road Accident Fund 2002 (4) SA 209 (D) 
at 220D-227B. 
5
 Fohar, M. “Modern Trends in Military Law and Their Influence on Military Justice Law” in Studies 
in Law, Scripton Hierosolymitana: Vol V (1958) as quoted by Smart D “The Revision of South 
African Defence Legislation – A Personal View” (1994) African Defence Review 29 at 35. 
6
 For a specific discussion on the constitutional challenges see Freedom of Expression Institute v 
President, Ordinary Court Martial 1999 (2) SA 471 (C). 
7
 1999 (2) SA 471 (C) para 21. 
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 an ordinary court martial as presently constituted does not conform with the 
 concept of an ‘ordinary court’ as envisaged in s 35(3)(c) of the Constitution.  It is 
 simply a military court sui generis which can be presided over by a layman 
 notwithstanding that such court has the power to deprive a convicted accused of 
 his liberty. 
 
Subsequently, in 1999, a new democratic era dawned on the military justice 
system with the promulgation of the Military Discipline Supplementary Measures 
Act 16 of 1999 (MDSMA).  The aims of the MDSMA are to do away with the 
unfair and unconstitutional practices in the military courts and to provide for a 
constitutionally sound military court system, independent judges, the right of an 
accused to appeal and review, as well as access to the High Court of South 
Africa.   
 
The MDSMA addressed the procedural aspects of the military courts but did very 
little to address the military offences and punishments.8  In fact it only amended 
the maximum fines that the military courts may impose9 and it limited the 
sentencing jurisdiction of the Commanding Officer’s Disciplinary Hearing 
(CODH).10  The content and application of the sentences did not change.  
Therefore, in spite of developments in sentencing in the civilian environment, 
such as minimum sentencing legislation and correctional supervision, there have 
been no sentencing developments in the military despite the shift to an all 
                                               
8
 As the focus of this study is on sentencing any discussion on offences is limited to the extent it 
is deemed relevant to the context of sentencing. 
9
 Previously, the maximum fine that could be imposed at a summary trial was R75, extendable 
under certain circumstances to R250, and the maximum fines that could be imposed by a court 
martial were R5000 for officers, R1200 for warrant officers and non-commissioned officers and 
R600 for privates (62 of the MDC).  Currently the maximum fines are R600 for the CODH and 
R6000 for the Court of a Senior Military Judge (CSMJ) and Court of a Military Judge (CMJ), 
irrespective of the accused’s rank (see s 12 of the MDSMA). 
10
 Previously (s 62 of the MDC) the presiding officer at the summary trial, as the CODH used to be 
known, could impose a sentence of a reduction from a temporary to the accused’s substantive 
rank.  This sentence was not within the jurisdiction of the court martial.  Currently, reduction from 
a temporary to a substantive rank may only be imposed by a CSMJ and a CMJ (s 12 of the 
MDSMA).  Prior to 1994 the summary trial could also impose a sentence of detention but from 
June 1994 detention was limited to the jurisdiction of the court martial. 
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volunteer force, a more defensive mandate and the potential impact of the Bill of 
Rights.   
 
Sentencing and discussions on the different punishments available to the civilian 
courts is the subject of noted academic works and a substantial amount of case 
law.11  The same cannot be said of sentencing practice in military law.  To date 
no study has been done on military punishments.  The defence legislation 
prescribes the same sentences as a century ago, despite changes in the law 
necessitated by the Bill of Rights.  A further aim of this study is therefore to 
evaluate the different military punishments and determine whether these 
punishments raise constitutional concerns.  There is a lack of academic material 
on South African military law, hampering research in this field.  According to 
Smart12 
 
 [a] drawback is the non-existence of accessible military-law precedents or 
 research material…[t]he non-publication of charges, findings, comments by 
 confirming and reviewing authorities prevents a fuller development of military law 
 as well as the realisation of its potential for education and deterrence 
 
Because of this lack of material heavy reliance is placed on the Court of Military 
Appeal (CMA) judgments.  These decisions are not readily available to the 
civilian environment for purposes of research and hopefully this study makes 
these resources more readily available for future research in this area. 
 
The discussion so far highlights several issues: 
1. The first is whether the sentences that can be imposed by military courts 
are still relevant to the world in which we live.  These sentences date from 
                                               
11
 See Terblanche S S A Guide to Sentencing in South Africa 2 ed (2007); Joubert J J (ed) 
Criminal Procedure Handbook 9 ed (2009); Du Toit E et al Commentary on the Criminal 
Procedure Act (1997); Kruger A Hiemstra’s Criminal Procedure (2008); Krugel W F & Terblanche 
S S Praktiese Vonnisoplegging (1990); Rabie M A & Maré M Punishment: An Introduction to 
Principles 5 ed (1994); Van Zyl Smit D “Sentencing and Punishment” in Woolman S & Bishop M 
(eds) Constitutional Law of South Africa 2 ed (2002). 
12
 Smart at 33. 
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a previous century; formulated long before our Constitution.  An evaluation 
of current military sentences is long overdue.  Sentencing remains an 
integral part of the trial process, yet experience has shown that very little 
time is spent on this phase of the trial.  The training received by military 
judges in sentencing within the unique military environment in which they 
operate is non-existent.  This fact is more prominent in the case of the 
CODH, as the presiding officer has no legal training, apart from the six 
week military law course presented by the School for Military Justice, yet 
can still sentence an accused for offences committed in terms of military 
law. Therefore, the nature of military sentences and the way in which they 
are enforced raise concerns regarding compliance with the constitutional 
rights of the offender. 
 
2. The success of any sentence depends on how effectively it is executed, 
but this efficiency is not always obvious within the SANDF. For example, 
with respect to detention, the SANDF does have a military correctional 
facility but it cannot be used to its full potential because of outdated 
legislation and a lack of support structures. 
 
3. At a broader level, the sentencing court must be independent and 
impartial, in order to protect the accused’s constitutional rights to a fair trial 
and to ensure that justice will be done.  The questions are whether the 
MDSMA succeed in bringing about a fair and constitutional military court 
system, and whether the military justice system adequately protects the 
fair trial rights of an accused? 
 
4. Finally, it is also necessary to investigate the right to appeal and review in 
the military justice system, in order to determine whether sufficient 
provision is made for an accused’s constitutional rights to appeal and 
review. 
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1.3 Assumptions 
 
Certain assumptions are made throughout that will not specifically be 
researched, although certain aspects of the research may touch on the validity of 
these assumptions. 
 
One assumption is that there is a clear lack of understanding of military law and 
procedures.  The lack of research results in a belief that military procedures and 
sentences lack constitutional compliance.  Consequently civilians with little 
understanding of the military environment attempt to address the concerns by 
advocating the civilianization of the military justice system.  A perusal of the 
available literature shows that individual rights are often overemphasised without 
considering possible legitimate governmental concerns necessitating the 
limitation of these rights. 
 
A further assumption is that military judges receive insufficient training with 
respect to sentencing.  The result is a lack of awareness of other sentencing 
possibilities, complacency in exercising their sentencing discretion and a lack of 
awareness regarding developments in the law of sentencing.  It is further 
assumed that the judges’ perceived inability to formulate appropriate sentences 
is exacerbated by the lack of the proper publication of military court judgments.  
The CMA judgments are not published in a user-friendly format; no indexes are 
provided; and many judgments lack reasons for judgment, making it impossible 
for the military court to consider the decision in its own deliberations.13 
 
 
 
 
                                               
13
 See the High Court’s criticism in this regards in Zulu v Minister of Defence 2005 (6) SA 446; ch 
7 at para 7.5.3.1 below. 
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1.4 Literature and methodology 
 
The research method utilised for this thesis is a literature study.  Very little is 
published on military law in the South African context.  For this reason it is 
difficult to determine to what extent similarities exist between the civilian and 
military sentencing practice.  The lack of research material in South Africa 
necessitates extensive use of “civilian” sources on sentencing and criminal 
procedure to enable the researcher to find comparable systems against which to 
evaluate the military justice system.  Since an extensive search did not uncover 
recent sources on sentencing and military law, the CMA judgments available 
since 1999 are used extensively to investigate the military court’s approach to 
sentencing. 
 
The researcher also makes use of a historical research component to show the 
development of military law with specific reference to sentencing options through 
the ages.  A historical overview is necessary to understand the context of the 
current military justice system. 
 
Although the main focus is on South African military law, some comparative 
research will be done.  The extent to which the comparative material is relevant 
is limited.  South Africa is not the only country that has experienced changes to 
its military law system.14  The motivation behind the changes differs from country 
to country. These motivations range from the need to adapt to the development 
of human rights in the civilian environment, to improving the effectiveness of 
military justice and the re-organisation of armed forces in post-conflict 
situations.15  Consequently, the areas of concern pertaining to a particular 
military justice system will differ for each country, depending on the reason 
behind the changes to that military justice system.  Foreign development in 
                                               
14
 See in general Fidell E R “A World-Wide Perspective on Change in Military Justice” (2000) 48 
The Air Force Law Review 195. 
15
 Vashakmadze M Understanding Military Justice (2010) at 10; Dahl A W International Trends in 
Military Justice (2011). 
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military law is therefore only of limited assistance to this research as the 
motivation for changes to the South African system may differ from that in other 
jurisdictions, creating concerns unique to South Africa.  
 
The focus in the international context generally relates to the use of torture on 
terror suspects, fair trial guarantees of terror suspects, jurisdiction over civilians 
and the prosecution of perpetrators of gross human rights violations by military 
courts, as well as the treatment of juveniles.16  The available literature mainly 
elaborates on these concerns and is therefore generally not relevant to the 
current study. 
 
Comparative research is further hampered by the divergent systems that are 
applied in international military law. This issue is particularly complicated by the 
fact that many European countries no longer have military courts.  Development 
in the military law systems, according to the research done by Dahl,17 shows that 
military systems evolved from the traditional fully military court martial system18 to 
the standing military court system,19 followed by specialised civilian courts,20 then 
the use of general civilian courts in peacetime21 to the use of civilian courts in 
both peacetime and war.22  For the purposes of this thesis comparative material 
                                               
16
 See in general Rosales L A P “Summary and Recommendations Presented by the Rapporteur 
of the Seminar” in Johnson A B Law and Justice: The Case of Parliamentary Scrutiny: Seminar 
for Members of Parliamentary Human Rights Bodies (2006) at 18-19; Berne R A et al (eds) 
International Standard: Principles Governing the Administration of Justice Through Military 
Tribunals (2010) at 12-24; Vashakmadze at 15; Rowe at 81-88 (discussion limited to fair trial 
rights concerns). 
17
 Dahl at 2; Vashakmadze at 11. 
18
 The United States armed forces are still making use of this model. 
19
 The South African military court system is such an example. 
20
 The Netherlands make use of a specialised court in Arnhem District Court to conduct military 
trials (for a discussion see Besselink L F M “Military Law in the Netherlands” in Nolte G (ed) 
European Military Law Systems (2003) at 629-635). 
21
 Military courts were abolished in Belgium in times of peace.  For the approach in Germany see 
Nolte G & Krieger H “Military Law in Germany” in Nolte G (ed) in European Military Law Systems 
(2003) at 415-419. 
22
 The Czech Republic abolished its military court system due to the political and economic 
changes in the country.  All prosecutions of the armed forces are conducted by the civilian courts 
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is consequently limited to countries with a fully traditional courts martial system 
and those with a standing military court system. 
 
1.5 The value of the study 
 
Although military law only applies to a relatively small number of individuals, this 
study is important.  South Africa is playing a more and more prominent role within 
the international peacekeeping environment with soldiers deployed 
internationally.  The military courts are the only courts to have the extra-territorial 
jurisdiction to try military offenders on deployment.  Offences committed by South 
African soldiers have the potential to create international incidents and an 
effective military justice system is therefore critical in ensuring that the SANDF 
remains disciplined in the international arena. 
 
In a local context the study is of importance to researchers involved in the 
security sector by making previously unavailable information available to a 
broader community, thereby stimulating research in military law. 
 
Developments within the military and civilian environments are creating an ideal 
opportunity for this study to contribute to the further development of military law.  
The proposed Military Discipline Bill23 is being readied for submission to 
Parliament.  This Bill addresses, inter alia, military offences and proposed 
punishments.  The Law Reform Commission is busy investigating the defence 
legislation, raising concerns about military sentences.24  The timing is therefore 
excellent to address aspects regarding sentencing and influence the process 
towards a positive change in military law. 
                                                                                                                                            
(see Dahl at 3).  Denmark and Sweden also have civilian court jurisdiction over its armed forces 
(see Vashakmadze at 12). 
23
 The draft Military Discipline Bill (2005) has not yet been submitted to the National Assembly 
although GN 650 of 2008 in GG No 31078 of 23 May 2008 indicated that the Minister of Defence 
intended to introduce the Bill to the National Assembly during June 2008.  
24
 South African Law Reform Commission Discussion Paper 123: Statutory Law Revision: 
Legislation Administered by the Department of Defence, Project 25 (2011). 
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1.6 Definition of terms 
 
Although terminology is explained throughout the thesis, certain terms are used 
and applied throughout the text and need elaboration.  An understanding of what 
military law entails as well as the importance of this discipline in the justice 
system also serves as a background to the study. 
 
1.6.1 Defining military law 
 
Placing military law within a specific discipline of the law is difficult.  It is 
influenced by various branches of the law.  In addition, the historical definition 
may no longer be sufficient to describe military law.  The international theatre of 
conflict and the nature of these conflicts have played a role in shaping our 
understanding of military law.  The understanding of “military law” may also differ 
from one country to the next.  Although all armed services are subject to “a 
system of military discipline different armies treat their soldiers differently.”25  For 
the purposes of this study the terms “military law” and “military justice” are used 
interchangeably. 
 
A perusal of the definition of military law throughout the earlier development of 
this branch of the law indicates that “military law” was generally seen as the law 
that provided for the offences and punishments that were unique to soldiers’ 
environment.26  This means that the application of military law was basically 
                                               
25
 Rowe (2006) at 6. 
26
 Morrison C G Notes on Military Law, Organisation and Interior Economy (1897) at 1 ( “the law 
relating to and administered by military courts, and concerns itself with the trial and punishment of 
offences committed by officers, soldiers, and other persons,…, who are from circumstances 
subjected, for the time being, to the same law as soldiers”); War Office Manual of Military Law 
(1914) at 6; Pratt S C Military Law 18 ed (1910) at 1; Brand C E Roman Military Law (1968) at vii; 
Banning S T Military Law (1929) at 1 (“the law which governs Officers and Soldiers in peace and 
war, at home and abroad…it is the law relating to, and administered by, Military Courts, and is 
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limited to the sphere of criminal law and criminal procedure.  As a collection of 
rules of law that determined the behaviour of individuals subject to it, military law 
also formed part of the law of sentencing.27   
 
Military law however encompasses much more than criminal law and criminal 
procedure.  Because of the authoritative relationship that exists between the 
SANDF as an organ of state and the individual soldier, military law can primarily 
be seen as part of public law, specifically of administrative law.28 
 
The rules of procedure in terms of the MDSMA are generally based on criminal 
procedure and law of evidence as practised in civilian courts.29  The Bill of Rights 
now also plays a role in military law resulting in an extensive transformation of 
military law since 1999 - a process that is still incomplete.30  Many see the role 
played by the judgment in Freedom of Expression Institute v President, Ordinary 
Court Martial,31 in which the court declared the courts martial system to be 
unconstitutional, as pivotal to the transformation of the military law system.  This 
is however not the full story.  Prior to 1999 various other means of constitutional 
control over the military justice system existed.32  The importance of this decision 
                                                                                                                                            
chiefly concerned with the trial and punishment of offences against its enactments committed by 
Officers and Soldiers”). 
27
 Van der Westhuizen H “An Introduction to the Military Courts in South Africa and Some 
Recommended Changes” (1994) 14 African Defence Review 18 at 18. 
28
 Van der Westhuizen H at 18.  The impact of administrative law is generally felt in aspects of 
non-judicial punishment, redress of wrongs procedures and Boards of Inquiry.  These aspects fall 
outside the current research. 
29
 Military courts retained procedures that are unique to the military environment with many 
ceremonial traditions still practised by the military courts.  For a discussion on the ceremonial 
nature of military trials see Anderson G C The Legal Classification of Military Tribunals as Courts 
of Law (1988) at 104.  
30
 The transformation of military law started in earnest in 1999 with the finding of 
unconstitutionality in Freedom of Expression Institute v President, Ordinary Court Martial 1999 (2) 
SA 471 (C) and is still continuing (see the South African Law Reform Commission Discussion 
Paper 123: Statutory Law Revision: Legislation Administered by the Department of Defence, 
Project 25 (2011)).  The changes to the military court system was mainly focused on improving 
the independence of the military courts and ensuring the fair trial rights of the accused, including 
the right to appeal and review. 
31
 Freedom of Expression Institute v President, Ordinary Court Martial 1999 (2) SA 471 (C). 
32
 See Smart at 29, for a discussion on the existent systems of constitutional control. 
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lies in it bringing the constitutional weaknesses of the military justice system to 
the fore.  This was the first of many constitutional challenges and, as is 
discussed throughout this thesis, a number of other concerns related to military 
justice have served before the Constitutional Court.   
 
A further aspect from outside the domestic environment shapes the definition of 
“military law”.  Since the SANDF deploys internationally in the execution of its 
tasks, this means that military law includes aspects of international humanitarian 
law.33  South Africa is not immune to the influence of the international community.  
The Constitution requires the SANDF to execute its mandate in accordance with 
“the principles of International law regulating the use of force.”34    This aspect of 
military law has not yet received attention in the South African context.  Two 
areas are of concern, namely (1) the jurisdiction of military courts over civilians 
and (2) the jurisdiction of military courts over perpetrators of mass human rights 
violations.   
 
In South Africa only uniformed members of the SANDF are generally subject to 
military law and its jurisdiction.  Under certain circumstances civilians 
accompanying the armed forces may also be subjected to military jurisdiction and 
military law.35  The prosecution of civilians by military courts are of grave concern 
within the current military law debate at an international level.36  The Commission 
on Human Rights formulated certain principles that should govern the 
                                               
33
 In general see Rowe at 94-113 and 224-246. 
34
 Section 200(2) of the Constitution. 
35
 Section 104(5)(a) of the Defence Act 44 of 1957 read with s 3(1)(b) of the MDSMA; van der 
Westhuizen H at 18.  Civilians subject to military law would typically be civilian personnel in the 
employ of the Department of Defence and Military Veterans (DOD) who are accompanying the 
defence force on deployment, such as finance personnel responsible for the payments of 
advances.  No examples of the prosecution of such people could be found. The last time the 
armed forces prosecuted civilians in South Africa was during the Anglo-Boer war and this was 
done in terms of martial law (see in this regard Snyman J H Rebelle Verhoor in Kaapland 
Gedurende die Tweede-Vryheidsoorlog met Spesiale Verwysing na die Militêre Howe, 1899-1902 
(1960)). 
36
 Rosales at 19; Joinet L Issue of the Administration of Justice Through Military Tribunals 
(E/CN.4/Sub.2/2002/4) (2002); Berne R A et al (eds) International Standard: Principles Governing 
the Administration of Justice Through Military Tribunals (2010) at 14; Vashakmadze at 14. 
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administration of justice through military courts.37 Of particular importance is 
principle 5, which states that 
 
 [m]ilitary courts should, in principle, have no jurisdiction to try civilians. In all 
 circumstances, the State shall ensure that civilians accused of a criminal offence 
 of any nature are tried by civilian courts. 
 
The SANDF has no jurisdiction to try any civilian of any offence either nationally, 
or outside the borders of the Republic. 
 
Another aspect which raises concern in terms of international law is the 
jurisdiction of military courts over those members of the armed forces who 
commit serious human rights violations such as war crimes and crimes against 
humanity.38  Although the South African military courts do have the jurisdiction to 
hear offences such as murder, rape and culpable homicide committed outside 
the borders of the Republic by members of the SANDF, it is submitted that such 
offences, if committed on a scale qualifying them as war crimes or crimes against 
humanity, will not be prosecuted in the military courts.  In compliance with its 
obligations as a signatory of the Rome Statute, South Africa promulgated the 
Implementation of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court Act 27 of 
2002.  This Act now provides the National Prosecuting Authority with the power 
to prosecute cases against any person accused of committing genocide, crimes 
against humanity and war crimes in the High Court of South Africa.39 
 
                                               
37
 Berne et al at 14. 
38
 Joinet at 4; Johnson at 64. 
39
 Section 3 of the Implementation of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court Act 27 
of 2002.  In the event that South Africa is either unwilling or unable to do so, the International 
Criminal Court in The Hague may then exercise such jurisdiction (see ss 5(5)-(6) of the 
Implementation of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court Act). 
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The preceding discussion shows that the historical definition of military law, 
limiting it to the sphere of the criminal law and criminal procedure, is no longer 
sufficient.  Therefore, the more recent definitions, which provide for a wider 
application of military law than just to criminal law, are supported.  Vashakmadze 
defines military justice as “a distinct legal system that applies to members of 
armed forces.”40  This definition is a more accurate description of military law or 
justice as it is wide enough to include all the different legal disciplines that 
influence the military justice system. 
 
Although military law encompasses a wide field within the law, the focus of this 
thesis is on the criminal and procedural aspects of military law as it pertains to 
sentencing and other related aspects of the military courts. 
 
1.6.2 Understanding the purpose of military law: The importance of discipline 
 
The SANDF is governed by the Constitution.41  It requires the SANDF to be 
“structured and managed as a disciplined military force.”42  The Constitution 
therefore allows for a system within the SANDF to enforce such discipline as is 
required in terms of the Constitution.43  A separate system for soldiers can be 
justified because of the fact that the military environment as well as society have 
unique expectations of their soldiers, such as expecting soldiers to be willing to 
risk their life for their country.44  It is for this reason that Morris describes military 
law as “a jurisprudence which exists separate and apart from the law which 
                                               
40
 Vashakmadze at 10. 
41
 Sections 200-204 of the Constitution. 
42
 Section 200(1) of the Constitution.  Smart at 30 defines discipline as “the system of rules, 
training and punishment used to maintain control” and “the standard of conduct attained by those 
subjected to that system.” 
43
 Minister of Defence v Potsane; Legal Soldier (Pty) Ltd and Others v Minister of Defence 2002 
(1) SA 1 (CC) para 31; Smart at 30. 
44
 Morris at 3; Vashakmadze at 10. 
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governs in our federal judicial establishment.”45  To that end military law is 
governed by statute.  The relevant legislation in this regard is the Defence Act 42 
of 2002 which largely repealed the Defence Act 44 of 1957.  The part of Act 44 of 
1957 that has been retained, includes the First Schedule to the Defence Act, 
known as the Military Discipline Code (MDC).  The MDC provides, inter alia, for 
military offences while the MDSMA as well as the rules of procedure promulgated 
in terms of the MDSMA creates the military court system and provides for the 
relevant court procedures.46 
 
The primary purpose of military law is seen as maintaining discipline within the 
defence force.47  Discipline is necessary for an effective military force.48  Even 
offences traditionally viewed as criminal within the civilian environment ultimately 
reflect on the discipline of the offender.49  It is safe to say that throughout the 
history of the armed services this has been the position.50  The armed forces 
possess weapons and are highly trained and it is in the best interests of the state 
and society if they are highly disciplined.51  The military demands from its 
members that they conform to a certain set of rules and regulations.52  This is an 
important requirement for discipline amongst the ranks.  For a defence force to 
function properly, discipline is an essential element.  It has been said that it is 
often only discipline that overcomes an individual’s inherent fight for self-
                                               
45
 Morris at 3. 
46
 See also van der Westhuizen H at 18-21. 
47
 Morris at 3 (“[i]f there is a single reason for a code of military justice, it is the enforcement of 
discipline to manage the peculiar demands of maintaining an effective fighting force”); Morrison at 
1; Manual of Military Law (1914) at 6; Vashakmadze at 10; R v Géneréux [1992] 1 SCR 259; 
Smart at 30; Heinecken L et al “Military Discipline: Where Are We Going Wrong?” (2003) 25 
Strategic Review for Southern Africa 88 at 90; long title of the MDSMA (the aim of the MDSMA is 
to “provide for a new system of military courts with a view to improve the enforcement of military 
discipline”).  The importance of military discipline was confirmed by the Constitutional Court in 
South African National Defence Union v Minister of Defence 1999 (6) BCLR 615 (CC) para 28. 
48
 Morris at 3; Smart at 30. 
49
 Rowe at 80 opines that a “criminal offence committed by a soldier within a military context is no 
less a breach of discipline than a purely military offence.” 
50
 Morris at 1. 
51
 Rowe  at 60.  Smart at 30 states that “[t]he law by itself protects no one.  Compliance with the 
law is what protects.” 
52
 Osiel M J Obeying Orders:  Atrocity, Military Discipline and the Law of War (2002) at 26-31; 
Morris at 3; Heinecken et al at 89. 
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preservation and allows a soldier to stand and face the enemy, even in the face 
of death.53  Smart describes the importance of discipline as follows: 54 
 
A heap of building material is to a house as a mob is to an army.  Structured 
order and discipline elevate the army above the mob... The significance of 
discipline lies in the fact that it is the practical touchstone which determines 
whether or not a defence force will be reliable in its conduct, be it in the field of 
war or vis-à-vis the Constitution of the day.   
 
All soldiers remain subject to all the laws governing the country, but due to the 
fact that they belong to a particular group certain laws have evolved to tailor to 
the needs of this group.55  It is accepted that some acts and conduct are 
prohibited in the military that are not punishable in a civilian profession.56  Certain 
offences may also be regarded as more serious in the military than in the civilian 
environment.  It is for this reason that military law is designed to accommodate 
the strong emphasis on discipline, often resulting in procedures that would not 
always be considered fair by a civilian.57  This does not however mean that 
soldiers are not entitled to constitutional protection.  Although soldiers’ rights may 
be limited when joining the armed forces, they do not waive all their rights.58  The 
effectiveness of the military justice system in enforcing discipline can be 
dependent on the fairness of the system.59  Morris states that60 
 
                                               
53
 Brand at xii (referring to a saying attributed to Napoleon that “[d]iscipline is the first quality of 
the soldier; valor is only second”); Heinecken et al at 89. 
54
 Smart at 30.  
55
 Rowe at 63. 
56
 Rowe at 64; Morris at 4. 
57
 Morris at 4; Vashakmadze at 10. 
58
 Morris at 5. 
59
 Heinecken et al at 89. 
60
 Morris at 5. 
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 [i]f soldiers perceive that the system – popular or not – essentially produced just 
 results, then it would be an effective tool for leaders to enforce discipline and 
 produce a fighting force that is more cohesive and effective. 
 
The purpose of a defence force is to protect the territorial integrity of the country 
and to fight, where necessary, in armed conflicts.  All training and actions are 
concentrated on this purpose.  It is therefore to be expected that an individual’s 
needs and rights may be treated as subservient to this purpose.  As a volunteer it 
might be expected that he joined with this possibility in mind.61  
 
There are many reasons why a separate military justice system is necessary 
within this particular environment,62 but one reason stands out for purposes of 
punishments in particular.  Brand mentions the need for independent self-
efficiency of the armed forces where it may become necessary to protect its 
operations outside the borders of the country where the state does not have 
territorial jurisdiction.63  This sentiment is echoed by Smart where he opines  that 
due to the fact that war will be waged wherever service in defence of the 
Republic must be rendered, it is imperative that the armed force has the means 
to retain order and discipline in the field, irrespective of the nature of the war or 
geographical environment.64  This can only be done if the defence force is in a 
position to execute justice quickly and efficiently where the offence is committed.  
This entails that, where the soldier is deployed outside the borders of the 
Republic, military law will be the only justice system with the jurisdiction to do 
                                               
61
 Rowe at 6. 
62
 See Brand at x-xv for a more complete discussion on the reasoning for an independent military 
judicial system; Minister of Defence v Potsane; Legal Soldier (Pty) Ltd v Minister of Defence 2002 
(1) SA 1 (CC) para 31; Steyn v Minister of Defence [2004] JOL 13059 (T) paras 12-13; Mbambo v 
Minister of Defence 2005 (2) SA 226 (T) 233C-H; R v Genéréux [1992] 1 SCR 259.  
63
 Brand at x; R v Genéréux [1992] 1 SCR 259; Morris at 7.  Military courts have personal 
jurisdiction versus the territorial jurisdiction of civilian courts (see Smart at 34). 
64
 Smart at 35; Rowe at 64.  
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so.65  This also dictates a need for a variety of very specific military punishments 
to be executed within the area of deployment.66 
 
Military law is however not only applied in conflict situations or when on 
deployment.  In South Africa it is mostly applied in peace time.  Since it is 
postulated that military law is an important requirement in the process of instilling 
discipline, one cannot leave the application of military law only to times of 
conflict.  Training is done in peace time so that the armed forces may be ready in 
times of war.  A breakdown of discipline during a conflict situation may have 
disastrous consequences for all concerned.67  Discipline is therefore instilled in 
peacetime, supported by military law. 
 
Burroughs68 sums it up as follows: 
 
The aim of military law [is] to enforce the discipline deemed essential to military 
efficiency and victory in battle and to cultivation of high morale and esprit de 
corps… ‘the object of military law is not to punish moral delinquencies, in other 
words to make men virtuous and good, but to produce prompt and entire 
obedience; hence a military offence may not be crime in its moral sense.’ 
                                               
65
 Section 47 of the MDC (“[a]ny person who beyond the borders of the Republic commits or 
omits to do any act in circumstances under which he would, if he has committed or omitted to do 
that act in the Republic, has been guilty of a civil offence, shall be guilty of an offence under this 
Code and liable on conviction to any penalty which could under section twelve of the Military 
Discipline Supplementary Measures Act, 1999, be imposed by a military court in respect of such 
offence: Provided that no such penalty of such a nature that it could, if the offence in question had 
been committed within the Republic, have been imposed by any competent civil court, shall 
exceed the maximum penalty that could be imposed in respect of such offence by the civil court”); 
S v Madiba (CMA 202/2001) (referring with approval to Bishop and Others v Conrath 1947 (3) SA 
800 803 where the court found that a South African statute does not have extra-territorial 
application unless the intention appears clearly from the provision.  In casu the accused was tried 
by a military court for the contravention of the Arms and Ammunition Act 75 of 1969 and found 
guilty while on deployment in Lesotho.  The CMA set the judgment aside and held that the 
accused should have been charged in terms of s 47 of the MDC for extra-territorial jurisdiction to 
apply). 
66
 Morris at 7-8. 
67
 Rowe at 65. 
68
 Burroughs P “Crime and Punishment in the British Army, 1815-1870” (1985) 100 The English 
Historical Review 545 at 550. 
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1.7 Framework and outline 
 
This thesis looks at three main themes: (1) the status of the military judiciary, (2) 
military sentences and (3) military appeal and review. 
 
To this end it is important to understand the development of military law over the 
years – why soldiers have always been treated differently and why this should be 
so.  To evaluate whether the changes are merely rehashing age-old concerns or 
effecting actual change and to understand the specific nature of military law and 
punishment, it is important to peruse the development of military justice over 
time.69 To this end Chapter 2 gives a brief overview of Roman military law, which 
can be seen as the biggest influence on military law across the world.  This is 
followed by a short discussion on European military law during the Middle Ages, 
with specific reference to the Articles of War of the Swedish King, Gustavus 
Adolphus.  Because of its impact on the South African military law the 
development of British military law is traced.  The history of the armed forces in 
South Africa is examined from the time of the first European occupation of the 
Cape of Good Hope, the British occupation and the Anglo-Boer war.  The Anglo-
Boer war had an important influence on the development of the Union defence 
legislation and the changes are tracked up to the current defence legislation. 
 
Chapter 3 examines the different military courts, their jurisdiction and procedures.  
The military court structure is introduced, the composition is discussed and a 
brief overview is given of the court procedures followed in the CMA, the CSMJ, 
the CMJ and the CODH.  This chapter serves as a basis for understanding the 
difference in approach between the different courts in the subsequent chapters 
                                               
69
 See Hagan W R “Overlooked Textbooks Jettison Some Durable Military Law Legends” (1986) 
113 Military Law Review 163 at 164, where he states that there “is another, more practical reason 
to learn about our military legal heritage.  Legal links to history mean that we will better 
understand our present system and ensure that progress is progress; that is, improvement, not 
merely change.  In the law too, the “new” may have been tried before and discarded.” 
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when evaluating the status of the courts, the general principles regarding military 
punishments and the appeal and review processes. 
 
Chapter 4 looks at the status of the military courts, broadly addressing two 
aspects: (1) the independence of the military courts, and (2) the fair trial rights of 
the accused.  The independence of the military courts examines the concept of 
an independent judiciary, both personal and substantive independence, against 
the background of the rule of law, separation of powers and the meaning of 
judicial independence and impartiality. 
 
Judicial independence is however not enough.  The trial must also be fair and the 
military courts are evaluated against certain fair trial criteria.  Fair trial rights can 
only attach to an offender where he qualifies as “an accused charged with a 
criminal offence.”  To this end the status of the accused is investigated.  A 
selection of fair trial rights are discussed, examining the accused’s right to be 
sufficiently informed of the charges, to have sufficient time and facilities to 
prepare a defence, a public trial before an ordinary court and the right to choose 
and be represented by a legal practitioner of his choice. 
 
Chapter 5 addresses procedural aspects regarding sentencing in the military 
courts.  These aspects include the legal framework in which the military courts 
operate, the sentencing discretion of the military judges as well as the factors 
influencing their determination of an appropriate sentence.  Since various 
academic works on the subject are available, the focus of this discussion is 
limited to the principles applied by the military courts as can be gleaned from the 
CMA decisions.  The penalty clauses, pre-sentencing procedures and the 
different forms of punishment are investigated with specific reference to the 
concern regarding the right to equal treatment of the different ranks by the 
military justice system.  The discussion is concluded with suspended sentences 
and the post-sentence procedures applicable. 
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Chapter 6 deals with the different punishments as provided for in section 12 of 
the MDSMA.  Although all punishments are briefly discussed, specific attention is 
paid to cashiering as a sentence.  The mandatory nature of the punishment and 
its influence on an offender’s right to dignity is investigated.  Detention as a 
punishment is discussed with reference to the detention barracks and the 
application of the UN Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or 
Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CAT) as well as the Optional Protocol to 
CAT (OPCAT).  Confinement to barracks is evaluated against the right not to be 
punished or treated in a cruel, inhuman or degrading manner.  This chapter is 
concluded with a discussion on the various court orders that may be applicable to 
sentencing. 
 
Chapter 7 addresses appeals and reviews.  After a general discussion on the 
differences between appeal and review a brief overview is given of the review 
and appeal powers of the civilian courts as well as administrative review and 
appeal.  A historical perspective of the right to appeal a military court decision 
introduces the discussion on the military review and appeal procedures by 
Review Counsel and the CMA.  Specific attention is paid to concerns regarding 
non-judicial review of military court proceedings as well as the accused’s right to 
appeal and review by a higher court as provided for by section 35(3)(o) of the 
Constitution.  The discussion is concluded with a comparative overview of the 
appeal and review processes followed in the British and American military justice 
systems. 
 
Chapter 8 contains a summary of the findings and recommendations. 
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Addendum A to Chapter 1 
 
Abbreviations and language 
 
Because of the cumbersome nature of the military terminology relevant to military 
courts, the accepted military abbreviations are used throughout the thesis.  As a 
matter of convenience the male gender is used throughout but unless the 
contrary intention appears these words include the female gender.  Words in the 
singular include the plural and words in the plural include the singular, where 
applicable. 
 
List of abbreviations 
 
Commanding Officer’s Disciplinary Hearing…………………………………...CODH 
Court of a Military Judge…………………………………………………………...CMJ 
Court of a Senior Military Judge……………………………………………...….CSMJ 
Court of Military Appeal……………………………………………………………CMA 
Department of Defence and Military Veterans…………………………………..DOD 
Department of Defence Instruction………………………………………………DODI 
Legal Satellite Office……………………………………………………………Legsato 
Military Discipline Code…………………………………………………………….MDC 
Military Discipline Supplementary Measures Act……………………………MDSMA 
South African National Defence Force………………………………………..SANDF 
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CHAPTER 2 
 
A BRIEF HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF MILITARY LAW 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
Considering the history of South Africa one could be forgiven for assuming that 
current South African military law is based on British military law, transplanted 
here after colonisation of South Africa by the British Empire.  Oosthuizen, 
however, is of the opinion that the South African military common law is in fact 
based on Roman military law as influenced by English military law.1  He 
contends2 that South African military law originated from Roman law as practised 
by the inhabitants of Western Europe at the time of the demise of the Roman 
Empire, which was subsequently transplanted to England by the Normans in 
1066, after which it eventually spread to South Africa. 
 
Roman military law would be a logical starting point for the study of military law in 
general.  The Roman army was arguably one of the greatest military powers in 
antiquity and the Roman Empire conquered and was maintained through military 
power.3  A disciplined force would have been essential in this context.  From a 
legal historical perspective one need only look at our common law system and 
                                               
1
 Oosthuizen M M “Die Geskiedkundige Agtergrond van die Militêre Reg“ (1990) 53 THRHR at 
211. 
2
 Oosthuizen at 212. 
3
 Brand C E Roman Military Law (1968) at 3; Oosthuizen at 215; Kagan D et al The Western 
Heritage 5 ed (1995) at 148; Kapp P H et al Geskiedenis van die Westerse Beskawing Deel 1:  
Oorsprong tot Intellektuele Rewolusie (1988) at 69-73; Williamson C The Laws of the Roman 
People: Public Law in the Expansion and Decline of the Roman Republic (2005) at ix. 
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the great works concerning law that derived from this era to understand the need 
for a short historical overview of Roman military law,4 offences and punishments. 
 
2.2 Roman military law 
 
2.2.1 From discipline to military law 
 
Not many written works exist regarding military law in ancient history and the first 
is found in approximately 174 – 183 AD, written by Tarruntenus Paternus, known 
as De Re Militari.5  Fragments of military law are found in various references, but 
it cannot be said that there was any codified military law in existence.  Certain 
statutes issued by the emperors regarding the army did touch on discipline, but 
not in the sense as we, in modern times, refer to military codes or statutes.6  
From these sources the Military Laws of Rufus seem to stand out.  Brand 
mentions that these military laws can be seen as a true code of military law in 
that it contains sixty-five numbered articles, containing various offences and 
prescribed punishments that soldiers could be found guilty of.7  There are, 
however, various references to be found regarding customary disciplinary 
procedures in the enforcement of discipline.8 
 
The authority to enforce discipline derives from the concept of the paterfamilias, 
who as head of the household, held absolute power over his household, 
                                               
4
 The history of military law literally spans centuries.  The focus of this thesis is not on the history 
of military law and therefore a mere overview is provided in this chapter.  For an analysis of the 
Roman military law and workings of the Roman army see Brand at 3-122. 
5
 Brand at 125. 
6
 Brand at 127; Phang S E Roman Military Service: Ideologies of Discipline in the Late Republic 
and Early Principate (2008) at 26.  
7
 Brand at 141. 
8
 Brand at 44.  Phang at 26 mentions that no formal legal code or disciplinary handbook existed.  
Most of the military discipline existed through custom and tradition and not through a legal code 
(see also Phang at 135). 
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including his wife, children (irrespective of their age), slaves and animals.9  
Although there seems to have been various restrictions on the father regarding 
his conduct towards his children, the children did not have any legal rights 
against the father.  The authority the paterfamilias had over his slaves was 
subject to even less moral restrictions.10  It is therefore clear that his rule was 
absolute.  From this it would be a logical conclusion that the Roman kings, as 
absolute rulers, could be described as the “super-paterfamilias”.  Brand 
describes the imperium which the kings had as the absolute power over life and 
death of his subject, the “patria potestas of the super-family”.11  The lesser 
magistrates were then in fact acting upon the authority of the king. 
 
The imperium continued in the time of the Republic.  The difference was that 
Rome was ruled by two heads of state (consules) who jointly held the absolute 
authority over life and death over their subjects.  The power of the consules was 
held in check by the veto power that each had over his colleague.  They were 
also in office for only one year after which they could be held responsible for any 
acts committed during their time in office.  In times of crisis the imperium vested 
with a dictator, or sole ruler of Rome and he was not subject to any veto.12 
 
Discipline in the form of patriarchal authority (pater potestas) and the imperium of 
the consules and magistrates cannot be seen as law.  It was merely the power of 
coercion. The beginning of the law can only be seen at the time when this power 
of the magistrates over life and death was limited within the confines of the city 
after a separation of the city government from the “arbitrary rule of military 
command in the field.”13  Brand sees the advent of the criminal law as the time 
                                               
9
 Brand at 34; Kagan at 128; Babington A The Rule of Law in Britain: From the Roman 
Occupation to the Present Day: The Only Liberty 3 ed (1995) at 7; Mousourakis G The Historical 
and Institutional Context of Roman Law (2003) at 2. 
10
 Brand at 36. 
11
 Brand at 36; Robinson O F The Criminal Law of Ancient Rome (1995) at 9. 
12
 Brand at 36-37; Oosthuizen at 212-213; Kagan at 130; Kapp at 68. 
13
 Brand at 37. 
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when the citizens got the right to appeal from the imperium of the magistrate.14  
This right to appeal did not initially apply to the Roman army.  The Roman soldier 
was subject to the unrestrained, authoritative discipline of the commander (the 
imperium militae), similar to the absolute authority of the paterfamilias.  No 
appeal from the commander in the field was possible.15  At that stage there was 
no distinction between discipline and the law. 
 
Throughout the history of the Roman Empire many changes were made to the 
Roman Army,16 but these changes had little impact on the disciplinary 
administration of military justice.  Although the ultimate authority of the army 
vested in the emperor, disciplinary control and military justice were exercised by 
the military commanders.  Soldiers were only subject to trial by their military 
commanders and this judgment was final, except in a few exceptional cases 
involving officers.17  During the early Roman Empire military offences were 
punished summarily, without trial and without appeal.  From the examples given 
by Brand it is also clear that these punishments were in fact extremely brutal and 
the commander was free to choose any punishment that he deemed 
appropriate.18  In general it is clear that soldiers were subjected to harsher 
punishments than civilians.  Voet19 was of the opinion that soldiers were there to 
                                               
14
 Brand at 42. 
15
 Brand at 43.  See Phang at 111 and 151, where it is opined that appeal from the commander’s 
decision would undermine his authority.  The Lex Valera (509 BC) granted every citizen the legal 
right to appeal against a capital sentence.  Initially soldiers were excluded. They were prohibited 
from raising the appeal against punishments imposed by military commanders.  The Lex Porcia 
de provocatione sponsored by Portius Cato in the 2nd century confirmed the plebeian right to 
appeal a magistrate’s decision.  By this time these rights extended to Roman soldiers (see 
Williamson at 212).  This right, called provocatio ad populum, gave an individual the right to 
appeal a decision by the magistrate to the comitia populi tributa.  Where the magistrate would 
attempt to sentence the citizen to death or corporal punishment, he would cry out “provaco ad 
populum” for appeal (see also Mousourakis at 145 and 147). 
16
 For a detailed discussion see Brand at 110-121; Oosthuizen at 212-215. 
17
 Brand at 121-122.  See also Robinson at 12 where he mentions that military courts had their 
own jurisdiction. 
18
 Brand at 74.  Voet was of the opinion that the harshness of the punishment made the soldier 
more obedient to his commander (see van der Westhuizen G J. Voet: Die Militêre Reg uit die 
Oorspronklike Latyn Vertaal (1986) at 195).  Phang at 289 however contends that the 
punishments inflicted on soldiers could not be too cruel since “the imperial system depended on 
keeping the goodwill of the army, not alienating it with saervitia (cruelty).” 
19
 Van der Westhuizen G at 192. 
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defend the legal convictions of their country by ensuring peace and order for the 
state.  Those soldiers who were not obedient were forced into obedience on pain 
of punishment to ensure integrity and obedience.  That is the reason why it was 
the duty of the commander to hand out punishment within the limits of his 
authority. 
 
2.2.2 Rank and the enforcement of discipline 
 
A detailed explanation on the composition of the Roman army falls outside the 
scope of this thesis,20 but the following is noteworthy: 
 
In serious cases of ill-discipline the commanding general personally administered 
justice and in all other less serious cases transgressions were dealt with by his 
subordinates.21  There is mention that during the latter period of the Roman 
Empire, provision was made for soldiers to be tried by their own military judges, 
the commanders.22  
 
The imperium militae held by the commanding general was unlimited.  It was 
seen as the natural right of the commander by virtue of his command and 
therefore he could exercise his powers as he saw fit.23  He had the power to 
restrict or broaden the disciplinary powers of his subordinates and modify the 
disciplinary procedures.  This did not mean that the disciplinary procedures 
                                               
20
 For a complete discussion in this regard see Brand at 46-59; Williamson at 210-211. 
21
 Brand at 43.  The emperor was the commander-in-chief who usually delegated his command to 
trusted members of the aristocracy.  Where soldiers were deployed in remote provinces it would 
not be feasible to refer all disciplinary matters to the emperor and the commanders in the field 
had the necessary authority to impose punishments.  The emperor did in fact have very little to do 
with the imposition of punishment on soldiers unless they were commanding the army in person 
(see Phang at 15, 115–116 and 131).  The actual corporal punishment was executed by the 
centurions and there is also evidence that other officers, below the rank of centurion, could inflict 
corporal punishment. 
22
 Van der Westhuizen G at 383. 
23
 Brand at 68, Mousourakis at 86; Phang at 115. 
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changed every time that the commander changed.  Brand argues that, due to the 
Roman character, there was in fact an element of stability and continuity in these 
disciplinary procedures, although they were not written down.24  
 
The judgment seat of the commanding general was called the tribunal, which 
according to Brand accounts for the origin of the word in our modern language.25  
The commanding general did not administer justice alone but, as mentioned, 
delegated disciplinary authority to his subordinates.  The general application of 
discipline was in the form of immediate action by the commander without the 
benefit of a trial.  In those instances not involving discipline, soldiers could ask for 
a trial by judges and there were instances where military commanders referred 
such cases to the judges who, as mentioned, were the subordinates delegated 
by the commander.26 
 
Next in rank to the Commanding General were the lieutenant generals or legati 
who assisted the supreme commander.  They also had certain disciplinary 
powers, which seem to have been restricted only insofar the supreme 
commander may have imposed certain limitations on them.27  These 
commanders usually settled the matter in the camp of the soldiers, known as the 
principia.28 
 
The tribunes of the soldiers had a certain amount of authority to administer 
discipline amongst the soldiers.  Although historians have not elaborated on the 
                                               
24
 Brand at 69.  Written records on military law as a code seem to appear in the time around 174-
183 AD under the rule of Marcus Aurelius.  Prior to that military law seems to have been based 
mainly on common law and verbal orders (see Brand at 123-124).  Other aspects of the Roman 
military were however done in writing since the size of the Roman army and the need for 
manpower necessitated proper record keeping (see in this regard Williamson at 208-209). 
25
 Brand at 70.  See also Mousourakis at 129, where he mentions that justice was dispensed by 
the Praetor from an ivory chair placed on an elevated platform, called the tribunal. 
26
 Brand at 72.  The commanders could choose whether to try the matter themselves or delegate 
the task to a subordinate (see also van der Westhuizen G at 385). 
27
 Brand at 75; Phang at 133. 
28
 Van der Westhuizen G at 386. 
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disciplinary functions, these functions were exercised in terms of set rules and 
procedures.29 Voet30 briefly discusses the military tribunes, giving us an idea of 
how they functioned.  They functioned mainly during the period when the Roman 
Empire was divided into the Western and Eastern Empire.  The Western Empire 
had two such military tribunes, one for cavalry and one for foot soldiers.  The 
Eastern Empire had five of which two were always present. 
 
The work of the military tribune entailed settling disputes amongst soldiers, 
investigating offences committed by soldiers and pronouncing sentence befitting 
the seriousness of the crime.  It was however not possible for one person to 
handle all the military cases, resulting in cases being remanded for long periods 
of time.  This was not conducive for military discipline, as cases should be 
completed as soon as possible.  For this reason the tribunes then delegated their 
powers to the commanders to preside over the military trials.  As an example one 
can mention, as indicated earlier, that in those instances where it is proven that 
the patrols responsible for the security of the camp during the night watch were 
derelict in their duty, the tribunes sat with the council to try the offender and if 
found guilty, to sentence him to death by being beaten with cudgels.31  This, 
according to Brand, is an example of the administration of law in contrast to the 
purely disciplinary action of the supreme commander.  However, this should not 
be seen in the same context as we understand the administration of law today.  
Brand sees the administration of law in this context as “little more than custom, 
with the sanction of the commanding general.”32  For the effective administration 
                                               
29
 Brand at 76.  He quotes Polybius (as translated) who said that “[a] tribune,…, has the right of 
inflicting fines, of demanding sureties, and of punishment by flogging.  The bastinado is also 
inflicted on those who steal anything from the camp, on those who give false evidence, on young 
men who have abused their person, and finally on anyone who has been punished three times for 
the same offence.”  According to Brand at 77 these councils of tribunes constituted what is known 
today as the court martial. 
30
 Van der Westhuizen G at 384. 
31
 Brand at 77. 
32
 Brand at 77. 
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of discipline, it was necessary for the commander to give effective and often 
harsh punishments.33 
 
Tribunes did have direct disciplinary authority in accordance with the rank they 
held, but according to Brand their main function was to impose set patterns of 
conduct or norms, thereby enforcing the rules of conduct as set out by the 
commander’s authority, in effect enforcing the administration of the law.34  In 
order to enforce these patterns, trials were necessary.  It is not clear from the 
historians what form of trial was required before punishment could be imposed.  
It also appears as if the soldiers had no right to appeal to higher authority from a 
decision by the tribunes, but it would be a logical conclusion that no capital 
punishment would in fact be affected without the knowledge of the general.35 
 
Below the rank of the lieutenant generals were the centurions and their authority 
was purely disciplinary in nature.  They were seen as the permanent career 
officers in the Roman legions.36  The badge of office of the centurion was the 
vitis, or vine staff, and was used for punishment by the centurion in that he struck 
the offender with this staff for misconduct.37  The disciplinary authority of the 
centurion was derived from custom within the Roman army.  The centurion, 
according to Brand,38 was the backbone of Roman military discipline, because of 
the immediacy of his punishment. 
 
                                               
33
 Brand at 78 gives various examples.  In the case of mutiny or showing cowardice in the face of 
battle, the leaders, or other classes of soldiers in exemplary positions, were routinely executed as 
an example to others.  With these harsh examples it was possible to crush any misconduct, 
especially disobedience, immediately.  Disobedience was seen as the highest offence against 
discipline. 
34
 Brand at 78. 
35
 Brand at 79; Phang at 116. 
36
 Clayton P A E A Companion to Roman Britain (1980) at 36; van der Westhuizen G at 385. 
37
 Brand at 80; Clayton at 36. 
38
 Brand at 81. 
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Then followed the principales, who as a group can be best described as junior 
officers or non-commissioned officers.  They had certain wide ranging 
disciplinary authority, depending on their rank and standing and the private 
soldiers owed them a certain degree of respect. Other than a general description 
on the fact that they were also responsible for military discipline, not much is 
known regarding the scope of their authority.39 
 
2.2.3 Offences 
 
Although the discussion below centres on military offences it must be kept in 
mind that soldiers could also commit civilian offences.   
 
There is general consensus that offences committed by soldiers could be divided 
into criminal and military offences.40 The first category of common offences 
(civilian offences) was those offences committed by soldiers and civilians alike 
and punished by means of ordinary criminal punishments. These offences 
included, inter alia, murder and in Roman times, adultery.41 
 
Nefas, or a contravention of divine law, could also be regarded as a common 
offence.42  A contravention of the divine law would usually be an offence 
prosecuted by the state in the public interest.  The typical sanction would be 
assigning the offender and his property to a god for purification in order to restore 
the natural balance.  As a result the offender would be deprived of his protection 
                                               
39
 Brand at 82. 
40
 Bauman R A Crime and Punishment in Ancient Rome (1996) at 131; Brand at 171 where he 
states that “[c]riminal offences of soldiers are either specifically military or in common with others; 
hence their prosecution is either specific or general.  An offence is specifically military if it is 
committed by a person in his capacity as a soldier.”  Voet also makes this distinction.  He refers 
to common offences as those that can be committed either by soldiers or civilians as well as 
distinctive military offences committed by soldiers contrary to military discipline (see in this regard 
van der Westhuizen G at 192-193).  This distinction remains relevant today. 
41
 Van der Westhuizen G at 192. 
42
 Brand at 99. 
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by the law and could be put to death by anyone.  His death would then be seen 
as a sacrifice to the god he was assigned to.43 
 
Within the military offences committed by soldiers in violation of their oaths were 
offences against divine law.  Religion played an important part in the life of the 
Roman soldier.  Every Roman soldier swore an oath known as the sacramentum 
militae “to be obedient and to execute the orders of his officers to the best of his 
ability.”44  Any violation of this oath was denounced by men and the gods.  This 
formal oath concluded with a formal consignment of the person and his property 
to the wrath of the gods if he should violate his oath.  Any soldier who violated his 
oath became sacer or outside the law and he could be killed by anyone without 
fear of consequences.45  The importance of this oath is that it has remained a 
serious offence in all modern militaries to disobey a lawful order.  It was also not 
possible to appeal against any punishment imposed for such offences by the 
pontifix maximus46. 
 
Other oaths included an oath not to steal, taken soon after arriving at the camp.  
This included theft from a comrade as well as dividing the loot of conquered 
armies.  All loot was to be divided equally to curb dissention within the ranks and 
although one could keep loot secret from one’s comrades, one could not keep it 
secret from the gods.47  He could therefore not be pardoned for this perjury 
against the gods and punishment was death by cudgelling.  A certain degree of 
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 Mousourkis at 141.  Robinson at 95 mentions that offences against religion which had 
implications for public order were more likely seen as a matter of public discipline rather than a 
matter of law. 
44
 Brand at 47; Williamson at 208. 
45
 Brand at 91; Van der Westhuizen G at 88-90.  See also Phang at 117 where she discusses the 
fact that during the period of the later Republic, the expiatory nature of the punishment was no 
longer required and the generals could in fact impose any sentence they saw fit.  From the 4th 
century BC military executions had lost their religious nature. 
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 Initially there was no real distinction between religion and the law.  The office of the pontifice 
was held in high esteem and as advisor to the king advised him as to the right course of action.  
This was a highly sought after office because of the distinction and dignity associated with it (see 
Brand at 86). 
47
 See Brand at 94; Phang at 119 for a description of the contents of the oath. 
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latitude was allowed for human frailty and theft of an item worth less than a 
sesterce in value was simply seen as a tort and not an offence against the 
gods.48  During the time of the monarchy and early Republic, murder was also 
punished as an offence against the gods.49 
 
The purpose of punishing nefas was the restoration of the disrupted harmony 
between the gods and the community.50  For less serious offences against the 
gods the offender would have to sacrifice an animal to the god that he 
offended.51 
 
The violation of a statute was also seen as a common offence.  Early legislation 
did not formulate penalties and therefore the magistrates had a discretion 
regarding sentence.  This discretion was limited in the sense that it was exposed 
to public opinion in the form of an appeal to the people.52  Once these statutes 
provided for the definitions of offences in advance as well as the appropriate 
punishments, the right to appeal to the people was seen as superfluous and 
subsequently abandoned.53  As long as the magistrate acted within the limits of 
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 Brand at 97.  It is of interest to note here that in terms of the MDC, prior to the amendments 
made by Act 16 of 1999, a similar distinction was drawn with regard to the offence of theft in the 
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people (see Robinson at 1). 
 47 
the statute, no-one could interfere.54  It was regarded as the magistrate giving 
effect to the will of the people.55 
 
The second category was distinctive offences (military offences) committed by 
soldiers contrary to military discipline and prescriptions.56  These are the offences 
that are typically referred to when discussing military law. 
 
Voet also mentions a third category, which is a combination of the two mentioned 
above.57  These offences could be committed either by soldiers or civilians but 
soldiers would normally be punished more harshly than civilians.  The reason for 
their harsher punishment, according to Voet, is twofold.58  Firstly, because 
soldiers were paid with public funds and therefore owed a higher degree of 
obedience to the state than their civilian counterparts, and secondly, because 
military discipline required harsh punishments.  Soldiers are usually regarded as 
tougher than civilians and the opinion was held that a light punishment would not 
keep them in check.  The strength of soldiers lay in their weapons and if they 
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 This view expressed by Brand is not entirely accurate.  It is submitted that he is referring to the 
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were not suppressed when they were disobedient they could easily overrun 
others. 
 
Disobeying a magistrate was regarded as the primary offence within Roman law 
because of the premium placed on discipline in Roman society, irrespective of 
whether the person was a soldier or a civilian.  Logically, this offence would be 
even more serious within the military environment.59 
  
Included in this group of offences (which could also include treason) was the 
offence of proditio.  It included a number of offences that involved disobedience 
to orders given by the magistrate in those instances where the magistrate was 
doing duty as a military commander.60 
 
Perduellio, a separate offence included in this group, was the offence of treason, 
which was considered a very serious crime.61  Treason included any act that 
threatened the security of the state, such as assisting the enemy during a time of 
war or stirring up a rebellion.  These offences were typically punishable by 
death.62 
 
Any citizen could commit this offence but soldiers had a stronger duty of loyalty 
towards the state than civilians.63  The offence of treason was widely defined and 
included such actions as leading armies into ambush, taking up arms against the 
state, unauthorised communications with the enemy and defecting to the 
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 Brand at 99; Oosthuizen at 217. 
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 Mousourakis at 144. 
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 Mousourakis at 143; van der Westhuizen G at 201. 
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enemy.64  Such offenders were considered public enemies rather than soldiers 
and were consequently subjected to torture and other harsh punishments.65 
 
2.2.3.1 Specific Roman military offences relevant in modern times 
 
Some military offences from Roman times have remained part of military law and 
continue to be offences to this day.  Although a more comprehensive list exists, 
the following examples will suffice. 66 
 
Insubordination against a commander or other superior officer was punishable by 
death.67  The seriousness of the offence depended on the seniority of the 
superior officer.  If the insubordination took place against a commander of the 
legion it was more serious than, for example, against a centurion.68  
Insubordination in modern times still remains a serious offence within the military 
milieu.   
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Mutiny, as in modern times, was seen as a serious offence and punishable with 
death.  Less serious instances of riotous behaviour were punishable with 
reduction in rank.69 
 
Malingering was punished with flogging and discharge from the service.70  In 
those instances where a father injured his son in order to make him unfit for duty, 
the father would be banned.  Where he cut off the thumbs of his son so that the 
son was unable to hold a sword, the father would be sold into slavery along with 
all his possessions.71 
 
Where a soldier fled from battle or acted cowardly, he was put to death and any 
loot that he may have taken was divided amongst his comrades because his 
actions had put their lives at risk.72  Even where a soldier was injured in battle 
and left the battle line without permission from his commander, he would be 
sentenced to death.73  The death penalty was replaced with shaming 
punishments and the fear of soldiers of being seen as cowards motivated them in 
battle.74   
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Absence without leave, which is still very prevalent today, resulted in the 
dismissal from the service.  In times of war any absence from an impending 
battle could be punishable with death, and where leniency was shown, the 
offender was flogged and transferred to another branch of service.75 
 
Desertion was seen as one of the more serious military offences because one of 
the most important duties of soldiers was to stay with their units and not leave 
without permission.76  The seriousness of the offence depended to a large extent 
on the status of the unit, the size of the soldier’s remuneration as well as the rank 
and office of the offender.  A further distinction was made between deserting 
during a time of peace and a time of war.77  A similar distinction exists today. 
 
If the desertion took place during peace-time, the foot soldiers were transferred 
to another unit and those in the cavalry were discharged.  If desertion took place 
during a time of war soldiers would receive the death penalty and could be put to 
death by anyone without fear of reprisal.78 
 
There are other examples of punishments imposed on deserters as well.  Voet79 
refers to soldiers receiving corporal punishment or being publicly sold.  There 
were instances where, during time of war, the soldier’s leg tendons were cut and 
he could walk no further.  Certain emperors cut off the hands and feet of 
deserters, believing that it contributed to better discipline.  If a soldier died while 
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on desertion his property was forfeited to the state and any individual who 
assisted a deserter could receive the death penalty. 
 
Where a deserter returned to his unit within a period of five years, he would 
receive a lesser punishment, otherwise, if more than five years elapsed, he 
would be banished.  Where a group of soldiers returned from desertion they were 
demoted in rank and transferred to other units.80 
 
A further distinction was made in that commanders who deserted received a 
harsher punishment than ordinary soldiers.  Desertion in these instances was 
seen as an offence against the state constituting treason.81 
 
A distinction is made between desertion and absence without leave.82  This 
distinction remains relevant today.  As in modern times, absence was seen as a 
lesser offence than desertion.83  A deserter forfeited his earnings as a soldier.  
Soldiers who returned after a period of unauthorised absence forfeited their pay 
and gratuities for the period absent, unless the emperor determined otherwise.84  
Those offenders who evaded military service were reduced to slavery because 
they had betrayed freedom.85   
 
Another offence that seems to have its origins in ancient times is the so-called 
general article of conduct to the prejudice of military discipline.  This article in 
Roman times determined that “every disorder to the prejudice of the common 
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discipline is a military offence, as for example of laziness, of insolence, or of 
idleness.”86  This general offence appears throughout the history of the American 
Articles of War, later known as the Uniform Code of Military Justice, which 
provides that “all disorders and neglects to the prejudice of good order and 
military discipline…shall be taken cognizance of by a …court-martial…and 
punished at the discretion of such court.”  It is also found in the British Articles of 
War and in the South African Military Discipline Code, where section 46 states 
that “[a]ny person who by act or omission causes actual or potential prejudice to 
good order and military discipline” is guilty of an offence. 
 
2.2.4 Punishments 
 
As mentioned above early statutes did not contain prescribed punishments 
resulting in very wide punishment jurisdiction in terms of application.  It was 
dependent on the whim of the commander meting out the punishment.87    
 
Typical military punishments were death, reprimands, fines, extra duties, transfer 
to another division, reduction in rank and discharge with ignominy.88  
Imprisonment was not seen as a punishment.89  Certain punishments, however, 
became customary due to their continued use for specific offences.  
 
A soldier could be deprived of his pay which would include deprivation of 
retirement remuneration as well as his current remuneration.  He could be 
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sentenced to a reduction of rank (gradus dejection) as well as reduction in his 
branch of service (militae mutation). 
 
Dishonourable discharge as a form of disgrace (ignominia) was widely used.  A 
dishonourable discharge resulted in a loss of pension.  This form of punishment 
also included other forms of disgrace.  Mention is made of a legion or individual 
soldiers being disgraced by the issue of barley rations instead of wheat.  The 
shame of this punishment lay in the fact that barley was seen as animal rations, 
not even given to the slaves for consumption.90  They could also be required to 
camp outside the encampment of the army or other marks of disgrace could be 
inflicted on offenders.91  Shaming could entail being stripped of his military 
insignia, sword and sword-belt and in some instances being stripped naked.  The 
soldier was made to stand without his weapons and armour or even naked 
before the camp, emphasising his shame and humiliation.92  It is of interest that 
even today, as part of certain military punishments, distinguishing marks are 
given to offenders so that others can see that punishment is being inflicted.93  
The ultimate shaming, according to Phang, was the disbandment of an entire 
legion, losing their status, income and all benefits. 94 
 
Corporal punishment (castigatio) usually took the form of flogging and was given 
irrespective of the rank or position of the offender.  Corporal punishment was 
usually indicated in instances of less serious offences.  However, a beating could 
be sufficient to leave permanent scars.95 
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An offender could also be sentenced to death.  The means of execution was 
dependent on the seriousness and the type of offence committed.  Beheading 
with an axe after being flogged was customary.  Deserters to the enemy and 
traitors were usually tortured and thrown to the wild animals in the arena and 
others were crucified.  The method of inflicting the death penalty depended on 
the discretion of the commanding general.96  It was believed that the maximum 
suffering achieved the maximum deterrence.97 
 
Other forms of punishment were also available.  Brand98 mentions reduction to 
slavery, mutilations and the imposition of various duties.  Where a large number 
of soldiers committed the same offence, for example misconduct in battle, the 
whole group was decimated.  When required, the death penalty could be exacted 
from each individual, irrespective of the number of soldiers.99 
 
The most common punishments found during this era are death, dishonourable 
discharge and degradation in service.100  Mention is also made of other, not so 
common, punishments such as rapists’ noses being cut off.101 Voet102 also 
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mentions soldiers being publicly sold.  There were instances where, if found 
guilty of desertion during time of war, the soldier’s leg tendons were cut and he 
could walk no further.  Certain emperors cut off the hands and feet of deserters, 
believing it contributed to better discipline.  A soldier who died while on desertion 
had his property forfeited to the state. Any individual who assisted a deserter 
could receive the death penalty. 
 
Roman soldiers were however treated more leniently in some respects when 
sentenced.  Soldiers, unlike civilians, could not be subjected to torture except in 
instances of treason, nor could they be sentenced to work in the mines.103  When 
sentenced to death they were allowed to transfer their property to their heirs prior 
to their execution, provided they were convicted of a military crime and not a 
civilian crime.104 
 
With the fall of the Roman Empire to the Germanic tribes in about 476 AD, the 
structured organisation of the Romans gave way to the more individualistic 
approach held by these Germanic tribes.105  However, the Roman model of 
military law influenced the European armies and “is credited by most 
commentators as the template for later military codes.”106 
 
2.3 European military law in the Middle Ages 
 
Military and civil courts during the Middle Ages were not separate entities.  These 
courts were known as Courts of Chivalry.  The knights were judges in the civil 
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courts and also commanders in the armies.107  Some of the nobility were raised 
in this tradition from a very early age and received training as knights.  Their 
position as knights and their training made them natural judges.108  In Normandy 
the power and authority of the Courts of Chivalry was vested in the high military 
officials.  This system of military justice as adjudicated by the knights was later 
introduced in Britain at the time of the Norman Conquest.109  Two important 
contributors to the development of military law during this period were the Age of 
Chivalry and the Articles of War of King Gustavus Adolphus of Sweden.110   
 
2.3.1 Age of Chivalry 
 
During the Middle Ages the military leaders, who were known for their bravery, 
were appointed by the town councils.  The town council was responsible for 
deciding on all important matters within a town or group.  These commanders 
were chosen for a specific campaign when going to war, but in reality, on their 
return, they tended to become the future leaders of the town.111  During times of 
peace these military leaders usually surrounded themselves with young men and 
frequently went out to plunder.  These young men then tended to remain loyal to 
the military commander during times of war and this group was then known as a 
comitatus.112 
 
Their military law system was consequently based on a system of personal 
loyalty to the leader of the comitatus, who in turn was responsible for their well 
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being and safety.  In turn, each leader of the comitatus owed allegiance to a king 
who only had any real power at times of war.113  The relationship of personal 
allegiance was voluntary and could be broken at any time as long as the leader 
was not in any danger.  This consequently resulted in a military force that was 
not as disciplined as that of the Romans.114 
 
In 1532 Emperor Charles V developed the Carolingian Code, which was seen as 
the model military law code of Europe.115  This code provided for a “spear” court 
where the regiment came together to pass judgment over those members of the 
regiment that committed offences.116  These military law codes were further 
enhanced by the articles of Maximillian II in 1570, followed by the Articles of War 
of the Free Netherlands117 (also known as the code of Maurice of Nassau) in 
1590.118  These codes resemble an agreement between two contracting parties 
and not a set of orders as would be reflected by later codes of military law.119 
 
2.3.2 The Articles of War by King Gustavus Adolphus 
 
The most significant contribution to modern military law, however, was made by 
the Articles of War, drafted by King Gustavus Adolphus of Sweden and signed on 
15 July 1621.120  These articles established a hierarchy of courts-martial.  Two 
types existed. The first was an inferior or regimental court-martial, over which a 
regimental commander presided.  This court-martial had the authority to try 
                                               
113
 Oosthuizen at 219. 
114
 Oosthuizen at 219. 
115
 Snedeker at 7; Rollman R O “Of Crimes, Courts-Martial and Punishment – A Short History of 
Military Justice” (1969) 11 United States Air Force JAG Law Review 212 at 213. 
116
 Snedeker at 7. 
117
 Snedeker at 7. 
118
 Rollman at 213. 
119
 Rollman at 213. 
120
 Snedeker at 7; Cooper N G “Gustavus Adolphus and Military Justice” (1981) 92 Military Law 
Review 129 at 130.  The reason for the promulgation of these Articles of War was to maintain 
order and discipline in his army.  Cooper at 131 refers to King Adolphus as “the father of modern 
military discipline” (see also Schlueter at 132). 
 59 
cases of theft, insubordination and other minor offences.121  The second type of 
court martial was a superior permanent general court martial presided over by 
the Royal Marshal of Sweden with the jurisdiction to try cases of treason and 
other more serious offences.122  This court was also authorised to hear civil 
causes within the army.123  The accused could appeal from the lower regimental 
court martial to the superior court martial of the Royal Marshal.  A final appeal 
was possible to the king.124   The system also provided for special military 
prosecutors as well as an auditor who supervised the application of the rules.125 
 
The punishments in terms of the Articles of War were generally extremely harsh, 
which seems to have been necessary during these times of war.  The armies 
consisted mostly of mercenary armies with looting being the order of the day.  
The death penalty was prescribed for a large number of offences.126  The 
punishment was affected to some extent by the seriousness of the offence.127  
Where an accused was found guilty of lesser offences all offenders were 
punished uniformly, irrespective of their rank.  Sentences included forfeiture of 
goods, decimation by hanging, confinement on diminished rations of bread and 
water, placement in shackles and riding the wooden horse.128 
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The Articles of War of Sweden were followed throughout Europe, until they were 
replaced in the process of codification in the 19th century. This process 
established a similar system throughout Europe, which continues to a large 
extent until today.129 
 
2.4 British military law 
 
2.4.1 Anglo-Saxon Britain130 
 
Britain was invaded by Rome in 43BC after Aulus Plautius successfully landed 
north of the Thames.131  Occupied by Rome, Britain was exposed to the Roman 
legal system132 and, inevitably, the Roman military law. 
 
Military exposure was limited since only Roman citizens could be part of the 
Roman legions, although British citizens could join the auxiliary forces.  Because 
of the extended periods of service of 25 years on the frontiers local recruitment 
became commonplace by the 2nd century AD,133 indicating that British citizens 
became conversant with the Roman military law. 134  It would have been 
impossible not to be exposed to the military law customs of the Romans over 
such a period of time. 
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Further influence on military law stems from the Anglo-Saxons who came to 
control a large part of Britain during the 5th century AD.  Roman occupation of 
Britain ended in 410AD and various barbarian tribes invaded Britain.135  
 
The Anglo-Saxons brought their own primitive legal systems, customs and 
religions.  The Romans did not directly influence them.  Although most Roman 
institutions subsequently disappeared and the Anglo-Saxons ruled in terms of 
their own laws, there is evidence that some traces of Roman law remained.136  
Britain was divided into various smaller regions which eventually resulted in four 
independent kingdoms that took turns ruling the Anglo-Saxon settlements.137 
 
The Anglo-Saxon legal system was based on the traditions of the Teutonic tribes, 
subsequently changed and adapted to the conditions influenced by feudalism 
and Christianity.  However, as was the case with the Germanic tribes, the feudal 
lords in Britain did surround themselves in times of peace with young liegemen in 
order to train these young men in the art of war so that the feudal lords would be 
protected during times of war.  This allegiance was stronger during times of war, 
but not so during peacetimes.  Ultimately the whole population came under the 
control of one feudal lord, the king in 941 when Edmund became king of Britain 
and the whole kingdom swore allegiance to him.  As such, the king was now the 
head of the armed forces.138  In spite of following the king, soldiers during this 
time were nothing more than mercenaries, serving for reward.139  Approximately 
1016, after the invasion by the Danish, the mercenary element evolved, with 
professional warriors joining the army.  These were men with proven valour who 
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dedicated their whole lives to warfare.  They were governed by set rules of 
conduct and formed a guild that lived at court and was paid by the king.  They 
had their own code and decided transgressions against this code in consultation 
with the king.140  At this time the army also consisted of soldiers who owed 
service because of landownership.  These soldiers consisted of representative of 
‘the hides’, one person selected for each hide.141 
 
At this time there were no regular prisons in Anglo-Saxon Britain.  Criminals were 
punished by means of fines, flogging, death and mutilation.  The method of 
execution varied from time to time but was mainly done by hanging or beheading.  
Mutilation also took different forms.  It could mean that the offenders’ hands or 
feet were cut off, eyes put out, excision of the nose, ears or upper lip or even 
scalping.142 
 
2.4.2 The Court of Chivalry 
 
William the Conqueror conquered Britain in 1066 at the Battle of Hastings.143  
The Normans initially governed England by its own laws, trying to preserve its 
traditions, but this changed in 1069.144  Feudalism as it existed in France and 
Normandy at the time was introduced to Britain.145  Feudalism was very 
important since it was the essential way to provide an army.146 
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At the time of the Norman conquest Britain did not have a single system of law 
applicable throughout the country.  The Norman kings centralised the 
administration of justice and laid the first foundations for the English common 
law.147 
 
Another important aspect of military law imported by William the Conqueror, was 
the Court of Chivalry.148  According to Oosthuizen this Court of Chivalry can be 
seen as the beginning of the modern military court.149  The Court of Chivalry 
functioned as a military court under the auspices of the Constable or Marshal,150 
and had jurisdiction over all soldiers, within or outside the borders of Britain, as 
well as all civilians during times of rebellion.151  In order to regulate discipline in 
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were finally abandoned in 1385 (see Norman at 251). 
147
 Babington at 46. 
148
 See in this regard Manual of Military Law (1914) at 8. For a contrary view see Squibb at 10. 
149
 Oosthuizen at 221; Snedeker at 11; Pratt S C Military Law 18 ed (1910) at 6; Adye S P A 
Treatise on Courts Martial (1769) at 1-6; Manual of Military Law (1929) at 7-8.  The Court of 
Chivalry formed part of the Supreme Court established by William the Conqueror.  The 
Constable, being the Commander-in-Chief of the Army, had all matters pertaining to the army 
under his jurisdiction.  The court held jurisdiction over military matters not provided for in terms of 
the common law (see Squibb at XXVI). 
150
 Oosthuizen at 221; Snedeker at 11; Adye at 1-6; Manual of Military Law (1929) at 7-8.  These 
two ranks were the highest officers’ ranks in the army and the Constable was the person 
responsible for the enforcement of discipline within the army (see also Nourse G B “The Court of 
Chivalry” (1955) South African Law Review 151 at 152; Cooper at 133).  This court was also 
known as the Court of the Constable and Marshal and administered martial law from the time of 
the Norman Conquest until its abolishment in 1521 (see Rogers A P V “The Use of Military Courts 
to Try Suspects” (2002) 51 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 967 at 968; Schlueter at 
136; Manual of Military Law (1914) at 8.  For a discussion on the close relationship between the 
Constable and the Marshal, who jointly presided over the court see Squibb at 1. 
151
 The powers of the Court of Chivalry were included in the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court of 
England (Aula Regis) under William the Conqueror.  The Supreme Court moved from place to 
place with the king and this inconvenience was one of the reasons resulting in the division of the 
court into a different court under the rule of Edward I.  This resulted in the Court of Chivalry 
receiving its own jurisdiction, presided over by the constable or marshal.  Although its primary 
mandate was matters of discipline in the army, it also had jurisdiction over heraldy and slanders 
on noble men (see Snedeker at 13; Manual of Military Law (1914) at 8; Pratt at 6).  See Rollman 
at 213 for punishments during this period such as, when killing another on board a ship, tying the 
murderer to the body of his victim and throwing him overboard to drown at sea, losing a hand for 
drawing a knife to strike another person, or a thief having his head shaved, covered with boiling 
pitch and covered in feathers (see also Winthrop at 1411). 
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the army, regulations were drawn up and issued at the beginning of each 
campaign.152  Offences and punishments included cutting off a person’s hand or 
beheading him when injuring a comrade while carrying a sword in camp when 
prohibited from doing so.  The punishment for wounding a comrade in a fight was 
mutilation, and if he killed his comrade, the punishment was death.153  Where the 
accused robbed a merchant, he had to pay back double the amount stolen, and 
for being a rogue his head was shaved and his cheek branded.154   
 
The Lord High Constable was the commander of the armies of the king.  Where 
required, the constable acted as judge in cases of litigation between soldiers and 
followers of the army.  This court also had jurisdiction over certain criminal 
matters that were detrimental to discipline over which the civil courts did not have 
jurisdiction at that stage.155  The constable was assisted by the marshal whose 
duties can be compared today to that of the adjutant.  They were in turn assisted 
by three doctors of civil law and a clerk, who acted as prosecutor.156 
 
After 1521, the office of constable ceased to exist157 and subsequently all officers 
were authorised by the king to apply military law.  The Court of Chivalry had 
limited criminal jurisdiction, which was confined to murder and other civil crimes 
committed outside the borders of Britain during times of peace.  During times of 
war the jurisdiction of the Court of Chivalry expanded, authorising it to try any 
offence committed by a soldier in contravention of the Articles of War that were in 
                                               
152
 Norman at 135. 
153
 Norman at 136. 
154
 Norman at 136. 
155
 Adye at 6; Manual of Military Law (1914) at 8.  The criminal jurisdiction was limited to murder 
and civil crimes committed outside the borders of the country in times of peace. 
156
 Adye at 6; Manual of Military Law (1929) at 8; Schlueter at 136.  For the personnel of the court 
see Squibb at 128-137. 
157
 With the decapitation of the last constable of Britain, Edward, Duke of Buckingham, for treason 
(see in this regard Oosthuizen at 221; Snedeker at 13).  The constable was succeeded by the 
marshal for purposes of adjudicating trials and this evolved in the “marshal’s court”, later known 
as the court martial (see Manual of Military Law (1914) at 9; Pratt at 7; Schlueter at 137). 
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force at that particular time.158  As supreme commander of the army, the king 
issued Articles of War from time to time containing the military code of 
conduct.159 
 
2.4.3 The Council of War 
 
The Court of Chivalry, as presided over by the marshal gradually evolved into a 
new type of military court, the Council of War.160  This court became the modern 
court martial, a term that came into use in 1663 in the regulations.161  These 
tribunals were convened by and presided over by a general.  Its powers were 
limited to times of war.162  The abuse of these courts by the expansion of 
jurisdiction authorised by royal prerogative over civilians and soldiers during 
peace time resulted in a struggle between the king and parliament. 
 
The start of important changes to the application of military law was the Petition 
of Rights in 1628,163 which in turn led to a Council Board of lawyers and judges 
investigating the legality of the Articles of War of 1639.  They held the opinion 
                                               
158
 Snedeker at 14.  In this court the accused was entitled to fight a dual with his accuser to settle 
the matter (see also the Manual of Military Law (1914) at 8; Schlueter 137). 
159
 Snedeker at 14.  Numerous Articles of War were issued between 1190 in the time of Richard I 
and 1688, the reign of James II (see also Banning at 292). 
160
 Snedeker at 15; Manual of Military Law (1914) at 9.  The Court of Chivalry was never 
abolished by statute but in all practicality it has ceased to exist.  After the Court of Chivalry no 
longer functioned as a military tribunal, the king granted special commissions for the application 
of military law (see Cooper at 133; Schlueter at 138).  For a description on the functioning of the 
Councils of War as military courts see Winthrop at 1432-1433. 
161
 Manual of Military Law (1914) at 9. 
162
 Schlueter at 139. 
163
 Snedeker at 11 and 15.  The Petition of Rights declared, inter alia, that the attempts of the 
king to enforce military law under the authority of the king in times of peace as well as war were 
contrary to the law.  It was the start of a bid to limit the king’s powers in terms of military law.  It 
stated that the king had no authority to proclaim martial law in times of peace (see also Cooper at 
133).  As a result of the attempted abuse of the use of the courts-martial jurisdiction, King Charles 
I was forced into assenting to the Petition of Rights (see Schlueter at 139-140). 
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that military law should only be applied in England when an enemy of the king 
was “really near an army of the king”.164 
 
In terms of the Articles of War of 1629 soldiers were subject to various lesser 
punishments if they neglected their various moral and religious duties.165  These 
punishments consisted of branding a soldier with a hot iron for swearing and 
strappado for being drunk on guard duty.  The more serious offences such as 
violence or “uncivil speech” against anyone in a position of authority resulted in 
the death penalty.166  Soldiers were handed over to the Marshal’s Court for trial 
and punishment. 
 
In 1639 the Royal Commission of 1638 authorised the Law and Ordinances of 
War which provided for the administration of military justice.167  These laws and 
ordinances authorised the Council of War and the Advocate of the Army to try 
soldiers and other persons who offended against the king.168  The General had 
no limit placed on his authority and the Laws and Ordinances did not lay down 
any rules for the composition of the court or any of the court procedures.169  No 
appeal was possible.  In 1642 Parliament issued the first direct legislation 
authorising the formation of military courts.170  The legislation appointed a 
commanding general and 56 other officers to execute military law.171  At this time 
discipline was very strict and the punishment severe.  Not only did the military 
code make provision for military offences but also for various moral offences.  
                                               
164
 Snedeker at 11; Clode C M The Administration of Justice under Military and Martial Law as 
Applicable to The Army, Navy, Marines and Auxiliary Forces 2 ed (1874). 
165
 Clode at 9. 
166
 Clode at 9.  The death penalty could only be executed after confirmation by the General.  The 
General of the Army, in this respect, was very similar to the Roman general, holding the power of 
life and death over the soldier. 
167
 Clode at 11.  These ordinances and laws were based on the Articles of War of Gustavus 
Adolphus: see Cooper at 133-134; Rollman at 213. 
168
 Clode at 11.  Soldiers were compelled to obey their superiors and offences such as mutiny 
and sedition were expressly prohibited. 
169
 Clode at 11. 
170
 Schlueter at 140. 
171
 These officers were known as “commissioners” (see Schlueter at 141).  They could in turn 
appoint a judge advocate, provost marshal and other officers as required. 
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When found swearing, the punishment was usually a fine and being drunk was 
punished with the wooden horse.172  Other punishments included flogging and 
public disgrace.173 
 
As there was still no standing army in Britain, the articles of war issued only 
applied during times of war.  The king, however, did have guards and 
garrisons174 and it became apparent that it would be necessary to address the 
discipline of these soldiers in times of peace.175  The king used his prerogative to 
govern his troops and consequently issued such regulations in 1662.  Six of the 
Orders contained in the regulations concerned military offences.  These 
regulations also authorised the General of the Army to convene courts-martial.176  
According to Snedeker, the lack of serious punishment for offences resulted in 
discipline among the soldiers remaining lax.177 
 
                                               
172
 Fortescue at 282.  He describes the wooden horse as “a triangular block of wood, like a 
saddle-stand, raised on four legs and finished with a crude representation of a horse’s head.  On 
this the culprit was set astride for one hour a day for so many days, with from one to six muskets 
tied to his heels; and that degradation might be added to the penalty, drunkards rode the horse in 
some public place,…,with cans around their necks” (see also Gilbert A N “The Regimental Courts 
Martial in the Eighteenth Century British Army” (1976) 8 Albion: A Quarterly Journal Convened 
with British Studies 50 at 54). 
173
 Fortescue at 283. 
174
 Clode at 13; Schlueter at 141.  The guards were known as “His Majesty’s Guards and 
Garrisons”.  The Parliament of the Restoration in 1660 allowed the king to maintain a force of 
8000 men at his own expense.  This ultimately developed into the standing army.  With the 
standing army, knight service was abolished (see Morrison C G Notes on Military Law, 
Organisation, and Interior Economy (1897) at 4). 
175
 Manual of Military Law (1914) at 10; Schlueter at 141. 
176
 Clode at 13. 
177
 See Snedeker at 17; Manual of Military Law (1914) at 10 for the reasons for this lack of 
discipline.  One cannot necessarily agree with Snedeker’s opinion regarding this being the result 
of a lack of harsh punishment.  Clode at 11-12 refers to 34 Articles in the Articles of War that 
prescribed the death penalty.  Lesser punishments consisted of fines, imprisonment, burning of a 
soldier’s tongue with a hot iron, whipping, riding the wooden horse and various other punishments 
as the courts-martial deemed appropriate.  This can hardly be seen as lenient.  A further 
punishment mentioned is reminiscent of the Roman punishment of decimation in that where a 
Regiment failed in its duty, the officers and every 10th soldier was punished severely. 
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Subsequent “Orders and Articles of War” were issued in 1666 and 1672 
respectively.  This lead to the development of the Military Code and legal system 
established in terms of the first Mutiny Act.178 
 
The Code of 1666 gave rise to the two different types of military courts.  It 
established the General Court-martial consisting of 13 officers of which five must 
at least hold the rank of Captain.  The Judge Advocate attended and this court 
convened as often as required.  It had jurisdiction over serious offences, those 
requiring punishment of “life or limb”.179  As serious as the offences and 
punishment were seen, it was not required that the proceedings of the court-
martial be recorded. 
 
The Regimental Court-martial was utilised for lesser offences not quite requiring 
the punishment mentioned above.  They had jurisdiction over soldiers and not 
officers.180  According to Gilbert181 most military offences were tried by this forum.  
The jurisdiction of the Regimental Court-martial was not as clearly defined as the 
General Court-martial, resulting in severe punishments for relatively less severe 
offences.  Since the Regimental court-martial was easier to convene it seems as 
if soldiers were routinely charged for lesser offences than their conduct 
warranted in order for this court to retain jurisdiction.  However, punishment was 
more severe than those imposed by the General Court-martial since the 
jurisdiction was not adequately defined.182 
 
                                               
178
 Clode at 13. 
179
 Clode at 13. 
180
 Clode at 13.  
181
 Gilbert at 50; Steppler G A “British Military Law, Discipline, and the Conduct of Regimental 
Courts Martial in the Later Eighteenth Century” (1987) 102 The English Historical Review 859 at 
860. 
182
 Gilbert at 51 and 54. 
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The Code of 1672 continued with the two-court system, providing for a General 
Court-martial and the Court of the Colonel of the Regiment.183  The General 
Court-martial was recorded and the Judge Advocate General of the Army 
prosecuted on behalf of the King.  The Regimental Court heard cases of disputes 
between soldiers and officers, or of officers amongst themselves.  If the 
aggrieved party was not satisfied with the outcomes, he had the right to appeal to 
the General Court-martial, but in the event that he was not successful with his 
appeal, he had to reimburse the opposing party for the trouble and the expense 
of the appeal.184 
 
The day-to-day discipline of the Regiment was the responsibility of the Captains 
which they exercised under the authority of the Colonel.185  Commanding officers 
had the authority to summarily punish soldiers for minor transgressions.186  
Punishment imposed differed from commanding officer to commanding officer 
                                               
183
 Clode at 16.  The Regimental Court-martial once again tried only the lesser disciplinary 
offences.  Unlike the Code of 1666, the 1672 Code did not prescribe the number of officers 
required to sit in judgment, all that was required was that every judge had to deliver his vote on 
finding and in the case of sentencing the sentence was determined by the most votes.  In the 
case of an equality of votes, the President of the court martial had the final say.  See Clode at 58-
59 for a discussion on the jurisdiction of these courts.  Steppler at 866 mentions that this form of 
Court-martial typically consisted of five officers, or where that number was not available, three 
officers.  A third court-martial was provided for in 1829, ie the District Court and in hierarchy lay 
between the Regimental Court and the General Court-martial.  This court could not try officers, 
only soldiers, for offences such as mutiny or desertion, or any other disciplinary offence and could 
not impose the death penalty (see also Burroughs at 560 in this regard). 
184
 Clode at 17; Gilbert at 57-58.  It would seem as if the soldiers did not have automatic access 
to this procedure to the General Court-martial.  All applications for such appeal had to be 
addressed to the Commander-in-Chief, who had the authority to allow such appeal or not and it 
would seem from contemporary writers mentioned by Gilbert that these requests for appeal was 
routinely denied.  He sums up the opinion of the Army as that “[i]f it should once be declared, that 
an appeal lies in all cases indiscriminately, the Service might be impeded by the frequency of 
General Courts-Martial, or discipline would suffer much, as soldiers would be tempted to appeal 
of the Halberts merely for the sake of procrastinating the day of Punishment..” 
185
 Clode at 17; Gilbert at 57-58.  Over time other military courts also evolved, such as the 
“Detachment General Court-martial” which punished crimes committed against the inhabitants of 
foreign countries and the “Drum Head” used to summarily punish offences such as mutiny or 
insubordination committed while on march (see Clode at 59-60). 
186
 Burroughs at 557. 
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and included confinement to barracks, incarceration in solitary cells of black 
holes,187 extra guard duties, forced marched or punishment drills.188 
 
2.4.4. The Mutiny Act 
 
In 1688, the “Glorious Revolution” took place against the rule of James II and 
after deposing the king a Bill of Rights was adopted in 1689 which determined 
that the permission of parliament was required for authorising a standing army.189  
The first Mutiny Act was a direct result of a contingent of troops, under order to 
deploy to Holland, which committed mutiny and declared their allegiance to King 
James II who had enlisted them.190  The First Mutiny Act provided for the death 
penalty that a court-martial could inflict for an offence of mutiny or desertion.191  
Although the death penalty was the only sentence mentioned by this first Mutiny 
Act, it did provide the Court with the authority to impose any other punishment 
within the Court’s discretion.192  Some other forms of punishment that existed at 
                                               
187
 Black holes were cells without any lights or windows. 
188
 Burroughs at 557-559.  Variations included parading at the guardroom every hour with full 
equipment or wearing the jacket inside out, which has a striking resemblance to the punishment 
drill that can be ordered in modern times.  By 1868 fines were added for offences such as 
drunkenness (see also Steppler 863-864). 
189
 Oosthuizen at 222; Squibb at 5. 
190
 Oosthuizen at 222; Manual of Military Law (1914) at 10; Schlueter at 142; Rollman at 214; 
Fortescue at 337; Banning at 292. 
191
 Schlueter at 143; Rollman at 215.  The First Mutiny Act did not replace the existing Articles of 
War promulgated by James II.  It simply implemented the death penalty for mutiny and desertion.  
Although it provided no more than that, “it recognized at least that military crime cannot be 
adequately checked by civil law…” (see Fortescue at 337; Morrison at 4; Pratt at 4-6; Winthrop at 
1446-1447). 
192
 Section 2 of the Mutiny Act of 1689; Clode at 155 and 208.  These punishments were not 
named.  Where the Court awarded the death penalty, it was also left within the discretion of the 
Court to determine the method of execution.  This was usually done by means of hanging.  Adye 
at 121 contends that the method of execution should be determined by the offence committed.  
Other courts did not interfere with the court-martial’s discretion in sentencing.  Civil courts in fact 
also refused to hear appeals from military courts.  However, in the case of the death penalty the 
prisoner could make exceptions against the proceedings of the Court-martial.  He could apply to 
the King’s Bench for a writ of habeas corpus to bring the matter before the civil courts for review 
(see Clode at 157; Morrison at 4; Winthrop at 1446). 
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the times were the wooden horse, piqueting and running the gauntlet.193  As 
deterrent all troops had to gather and witness the public punishment.194  The Act 
gave the General of the Army the power to grant officers commissions for the 
purpose of convening courts-martial.195  The Act also provided that the Mutiny 
Act would however not exempt any soldier from the ordinary process of civil 
law.196 
 
Although the First Mutiny Act was limited to a period of seven months, 
subsequent Mutiny Acts were issued by parliament annually from 1689 to 1878 in 
which parliament authorised the king to have a standing army and also 
authorised the expenditure of such army.  These Mutiny Acts also confirmed the 
king’s authority to issue a code of conduct regulating the actions of the soldiers in 
as far as the Mutiny Acts did not provide for their conduct.197  Until 1712, these 
Mutiny Acts did not apply to colonies of Britain abroad and the main offences 
punishable were mutiny and desertion.198  Although the British Empire was at war 
for most of this period, the narrow application of the Mutiny Act did not present 
great difficulty as the Articles of War issued by the commanders and the king 
governed the soldiers.199  During the following century the application of the Act 
was extended to all colonies of the British Empire. 
 
                                               
193
 Gilbert at 54 gives a brief description of these punishments, stating that “[p]iqueting was the 
practice of suspending a soldier by the arms over a sharp pointed stake.  Sometimes it resulted in 
permanent lameness”. 
194
 Gilbert at 54; Steppler at 872. 
195
 Clode at 21; Manual of Military Law (1914) at 11.  The Act provided that the court martial had 
to consist of at least 13 officers, field officers in the trial of officers of field rank and Captains in all 
other instances.  At least nine of these officers had to concur on sentence.  See s 10 of the 
Mutiny Act of 1689. 
196
 Snedeker at 18.  The importance of this Act was that it made certain military offences 
punishable within the domestic borders of Britain.  The death penalty could not be inflicted at 
home for any military offence, except as provided for in the Mutiny Act.  
197
 Snedeker at 18; Steppler at 862; Banning at 293. 
198
 Clode at 22; Schlueter at 143.  The Mutiny Act only made provisions for a limited number of 
specific offences.  Where lesser offences were committed, or the Army was abroad, the Act did 
not apply and the Army was punished in terms of the Articles of War issued by the King or the 
General Officer in Command (see Manual of Military Law (1914) at 11; Morrison at 5; Banning at 
293). 
199
 Snedeker at 18; Manual of Military Law (1914) at 11. 
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Although the death penalty could be awarded for desertion or sedition, it was not 
always executed.  The King or the General had the authority to substitute the 
death penalty with corporal punishment.200  The death penalty inflicted for 
desertion eventually gave way to other forms of punishment.  By 1766 Courts-
martial was given a discretion and where the court was of the opinion that the 
death penalty would be too severe under the particular circumstances, they could 
sentence the accused to transportation for a number of years, or even for life, in 
a regiment abroad.201  By 1803 the prescribed punishment for desertion became 
transportation and the death penalty would only be inflicted if the soldier 
subsequently returned to his country unlawfully.202  Over time, transportation was 
replaced by penal servitude as a punishment. 
 
Corporal punishment became prevalent, being inflicted for offences such as 
immoral behaviour or neglecting of duties.  Parliament gave a general statutory 
sanction to the Articles of War, which consequently no longer remained the 
exclusive prerogative of the king.  By 1812 imprisonment was accepted as an 
alternative punishment for lesser offences203 and a limit was placed on the 
number of lashes allowed during corporal punishment. 204  
                                               
200
 Clode at 32; Burroughs at 560.  Corporal punishment comprised flogging with a “cat of nine 
tails” in front of the Regiment. 
201
 Clode at 33; Burroughs at 560.  Soldiers were transported to “condemned corps” in unhealthy 
colonies abroad, such as West Africa.  According to Burroughs the diseases and climate resulted 
in a punishment similar to the death penalty in severity.  This punishment was later abandoned on 
humane grounds.  Not all locations were as severe.  Locations such as the new settlements in 
Australia and Bermuda lost its deterrent value since it was seen as “free passages to a land of 
opportunity…”  By 1857 transportation was abolished as a punishment.  Adye at 108-109 on the 
other hand is of the opinion that transportation as military sentence was different from 
transportation inflicted by civil courts.  He did not see it as such a shameful military punishment 
since those transported to Regiments abroad were no worse off than soldiers in those Regiments 
who had not committed offences.  Courts martial had wide sentencing powers, including 
discharge, cashiering, corporal punishment, imprisonment or any other punishment (see Winthrop 
at 1448-1469). 
202
 Clode at 33; Burroughs at 560.  It was during this time that the Mutiny Act and the Articles of 
War were broadened and found application abroad (see Schlueter at 143). 
203
 Clode at 33.  In general those who were to return to the Army subsequent to their 
incarceration were sent to military prisons and those who were discharged to civil prisons.  A 
prisoner could only be subjected to solitary confinement where sentences as such by the Court 
(see Clode at 171-172).  Soldiers were, up to that time, accommodated in civil prisons, but the 
military saw a need for a uniquely military environment “dispensing severe discipline geared to 
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Although further offences were added to the Mutiny Act in 1830, the power of the 
Court-martial was curtailed and they could no longer impose any punishment that 
was contrary to English law.205  During 1868 Courts-martial no longer had the 
authority to sentence a soldier to corporal punishment.206 
 
The Mutiny Act of 1873-1874 allowed the General Court-martial to impose as 
sentence death, penal servitude, imprisonment, forfeiture of pay or pension and 
any other punishment accepted as practice in the service.207  In lieu of the death 
sentence, the commanding officer on review could order the offender into penal 
servitude for a minimum term of five years or imprisonment with or without hard 
labour and with or without solitary confinement.208  Where an accused was found 
guilty of theft, fraud or embezzlement, the offender could be sentenced to penal 
servitude or a fine, imprisonment with or without hard labour, dismissal from 
service,209 and in the case of a non-commissioned officer or warrant officer, to 
reduction to the ranks, depending on the seriousness of the offence.  Apart from 
the sentence, the accused also had to compensate the victim from his own 
                                                                                                                                            
the needs and habits of soldiers, embracing hard labour and sharp drill, and ‘never losing sight of 
the important principle that the object of military punishment consists not only in the repression of 
Crime, but in effecting that object in the shortest possible space of time’” (see Burroughs at 565).  
204
 Burroughs at 560-562.  Although favoured by the military, corporal punishment came under 
severe scrutiny from Parliament.  By 1829 the court’s jurisdiction regarding the number of lashes 
was reduced to 500 in a district court-martial and 300 in the regimental courts.  This was reduced 
even further in 1833 and offences for which the punishment could be imposed were limited to 
“mutiny, desertion, insubordination and violence, disgraceful conduct, and stealing army 
property.” 
205
 Clode at 155; Gilbert at 65. 
206
 Clode at 35.  New offences included malingering, self-mutilation and disgraceful conduct.  
New sentences included a reprimand and discharge (see Clode at 172). 
207
 Section 8 of the Mutiny Act of 1873. This included the sentence of cashiering, for officers.  
Certain restrictions were placed on the sentences in that the death penalty could only be imposed 
if two-thirds of the officers present at the Court-martial concurred, a minimum of five years penal 
servitude was prescribed and the maximum term of imprisonment was set at two years (see also 
Clode at 217). 
208
 Section 16 of the Mutiny Act of 1873. 
209
 Burroughs at 570 also briefly discusses discharge with ignominy from the Army.  The 
authorities were wary of allowing this sentence too easily for fear that those who no longer wished 
to serve would commit offences in order to be discharged from service.  Therefore this 
punishment was only given exceptionally and then coupled with a lengthy sentence of 
transportation or penal servitude. 
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expense for such loss or damage as determined by the court.210  The District 
Court-martial had the same sentencing jurisdiction, except death and penal 
servitude which were excluded.211 
 
The Regimental Court-martial had authority to impose corporal punishment, 
imprisonment212 and forfeiture of pay.213  Where a soldier was sentenced to 
corporal punishment, the soldier could, in addition, be sentenced to 
imprisonment.  Where the corporal punishment formed the whole or a part of the 
sentence, the sentence could be confirmed and then commuted to one of 
imprisonment to a maximum period of 42 days, with or without hard labour, with 
or without solitary confinement.  Where the sentence of corporal punishment was 
mitigated, a period of imprisonment to a maximum of 20 days could be imposed 
with or without hard labour, with or without solitary confinement.214 
 
Apart from those offences and punishments prescribed in the Mutiny Act, the 
Articles of War also made provision for other offences and punishments.215  
Soldiers were therefore governed by the king in terms of the Articles of War and 
were subject to civil control in terms of the Mutiny Act of the day. 
                                               
210
 Section 17 of the Mutiny Act of 1873. 
211
 Section 9 of the Mutiny Act of 1873; Clode at 217. 
212
 To a maximum period of 42 days, with or without hard labour, with or without solitary 
confinement. 
213
 Section 10 of the Mutiny Act of 1873; Clode at 218.  Since corporal punishment was 
abolished, section 22 provided that the Court could only impose corporal punishment as sentence 
while the soldier was on active service and not during times of peace.  Corporal punishment could 
be imposed for offences such as mutiny, insubordination, desertion, drunkenness on duty, 
disgraceful conduct or any breach of the Articles of War.  A maximum of 50 lashes was allowed.  
Officers and Warrant Officers could not be sentenced to corporal punishment (see in this regard 
also Burroughs at 564).  Corporal punishment was finally abolished in 1881. 
214
 Section 24 of the Mutiny Act of 1873.  The period of solitary confinement was restricted to not 
exceeding seven days at a time with intervals of at least seven days between each period of 
solitary confinement. 
215
 See Clode at 249-280 for a full discussion.  In general, offences ranged from crimes with 
regard to divine worship, mutiny, insubordination, desertion, absence without leave, offences in 
the field, drunkenness and disgraceful conduct.  Typical punishments prescribed were death, 
cashiering, fines, penal servitude, imprisonment, dismissal, reduction in rank, loss of seniority, 
reprimand etc.  These Articles of War can be compared to the MDC of today, listing military 
offences and a prescribed punishment for each. 
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The Mutiny Act was replaced by the Army Discipline and Regulation Act in 1879 
and in 1881 the British Army Act came into operation.216  The 1881 British Army 
Act was a consolidation of the parliamentary prescripts for military discipline as 
found in the Mutiny Act and the code of conduct issued by the king.217  As with 
the Mutiny Acts, the British Army Act had to be promulgated by parliament every 
year by means of the Army (Annual) Act.218  The Army Act had no force on its 
own.  This principle remains to this day with the current British legislation 
required to be renewed every five years.219 
 
2.5 South African military law history 
 
2.5.1 Introduction 
 
Apart from the influences from ancient civilisations, Europe and England, the 
history and development of the Armed Forces on South African soil also played a 
major role in the development of the South African military law.  Being a British 
Colony resulted in the British influence being felt more keenly, but as will be 
shown below, other influences also had a role to play. 
                                               
216
 Oosthuizen at 222; Manual of Military Law (1914) at 14; Schlueter at 143, Rollman at 215.  
The British Army Act of 1881 is of importance to the South African Military Law as it was used for 
the discipline of the Union soldiers even after the 1912 Zuid-Afrika Verdedigingswet 13 of 1912 
came into operation and was only effectively replaced by the Defence Act 44 of 1957,  although 
the principles from the 1881 Act remained entrenched in our modern South African military law as 
will be indicated below (see van der Westhuizen H “An Introduction to the Military Courts in South 
Africa and Some Recommended Changes” (1994) 14 African Defence Review 18 at 18; Morrison 
at 5; Manual of Military Law (1914) at 6).  For a discussion on the various military offences in 
terms of the Army Act of 1881 see Manual of Military Law (1914) at 15-28.  Many of the offences 
are still relevant today. 
217
 Banning at 293 states that one of the reasons for replacing the Mutiny Act was the 
inconvenience of the army being governed partly by an Act of Parliament and partly by the 
Articles of War. 
218
 Morrison at 5.  The annual re-institution of the Army Act confirmed the constitutional principle 
of Parliamentary control over the army.  This Annual Act states that the keeping of a standing 
army during peace time without Parliament’s approval is illegal (see also in this regard Manual of 
Military Law (1914) at 1; Pratt at 8-9). 
219
 It should be noted that British Naval Law developed separately (see Snedeker at 34-47). 
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This section discusses the South African history in three broad eras.  Firstly, the 
development of military punishments during South Africa’s earliest history will be 
briefly examined.  Although South Africa’s history stretches further back than the 
first Europeans landing at the Cape of Good Hope, this will be regarded as the 
starting point for the discussion on the development of South African military law.  
The development within the four provinces differed due to important historical 
influences of the “Vereenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie”  (VOC), British 
occupation and the Anglo-Boer war.  Each province is discussed separately. 
 
The second era referred to is the period of development during the Anglo-Boer 
war and its influence on the subsequent formulation of the Union defence 
legislation.  This includes the period shortly after the war until the adoption of the 
first Union Defence Act of 1912. 
 
The third broad category addresses the development of military law and 
punishment through the various Defence Acts until just prior to the current 
defence legislation. 
 
2.5.2 The early armed forces of South Africa 
 
2.5.2.1 Cape Colony 
 
The earliest western military history of South Africa can be traced to the 
“Vereenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie” (VOC) who settled a small stopping 
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point for their ships in the Cape.220  Jan van Riebeeck, who was sent by the VOC 
to build a fort and establish the stopping point, was assisted by a garrison of 70 
men on board the Drommedaris.221  Discipline on board, while undertaking their 
voyage to the Cape, was harsh.  The provost, who was responsible for keeping 
order and discipline, had a staff as symbol of his authority, decorated with orange 
ribbons.  He acted as prosecutor in instances of misbehaviour on board.222 
 
On arrival the garrison had to assist in building the fort and was to be utilised in 
the protection of the fort from the indigenous people.  The head of the military 
force was a major-general stationed in Batavia.223  The garrison, however, 
consisted of people from various nationalities.  They were mercenaries with little 
or no loyalty towards the VOC and were therefore not completely trusted by their 
employers.224 
 
                                               
220
 Tylden G The Armed Forces of South Africa (1954) at 2; Nöthling C J Geskiedenis van die 
Suid-Afrikaanse Weermag (Deel 1) 1652-1945 (1995) at 6; Grobbelaar P M Die Ontstaan van ‘n 
Westerse Militêre Tradisie aan die Kaap tot 1795 (1994) at 68. 
221
 Nöthling at 6.  According to Grobbelaar the VOC had extensive administrative, legal, and 
legislative powers regarding their possessions, but remained subject to the laws of the 
Netherlands. (see Roux P E Die Verdedigingstelsel aan die Kaap onder die Hollands-Oosindiese 
Kompanjie (1652-1795) (1923) at 29).  
222
 Molsbergen E C G Van Riebeeck en Sy Tyd (1968) at 46-47.  He also mentions an example 
where soldiers found guilty of gambling on board were tied up and thrown overboard. 
223
 Grobbelaar at 68.  Mentzel O F The Cape in Mid-Eighteenth Century: Being the Biography of 
Rudolph Siegfried Allemann, Captain of the Military Forces and Commander of the Castle in the 
Service of the Dutch East India Company at the Cape of Good Hope (1920) at 3.  The Captain of 
the military force in the Cape of Good Hope was the de facto commander of the Cape forces and 
did not in fact report to the Major-General.  The military forces in the Cape were independent from 
the government in Batavia, although they did follow its laws. 
224
 Grobbelaar at 70; Roux at 31.  Mercenaries may in fact not be the appropriate term for the 
soldiers of the VOC.  Mercenaries engender an idea of professional soldiers.  See Mentzel at 16-
25 for a discussion on the recruitment of the soldiers that came to be in the Cape of Good Hope 
in this period.  In contrast Molsbergen at 43-45 discusses the recruitment of soldiers by the 
“seelenverkaufer” (soul seller).  The picture painted by Molsbergen is much harsher than the one 
by Mentzel.  What is however clear is that the “soldiers” recruited by the VOC were more likely to 
be persons with nowhere else to go and nothing left to lose and they could not be described as 
professional soldiers by any stretch of the imagination. 
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Van Riebeeck was very strict on discipline and his first regulations were issued 
soon after arriving in the Cape.225  Because the VOC was a trading company and 
did not want to spend too much money on defence, the regulations written were 
mainly aimed at prohibiting the soldiers from being abusive towards the native 
population.  The VOC wanted to protect its trading at all costs.  Where the 
indigenous people stole equipment or weapons no-one was allowed to beat them 
or treat them badly.  In fact, the person from whom was stolen had to 
compensate the VOC and was liable to receive 50 lashes as punishment.226  
Harsh punishment was also inflicted where soldiers slept on duty or traded with 
the native population.227 
 
Desertion was not tolerated.  Molsbergen228 gives an example of four individuals 
who attempted to desert and go to Mozambique.  They were not successful and 
on their return they were officially tried.  Two were sentenced to death, although 
the death sentence was subsequently commuted.  They were bound to a pole 
and a shot was fired over their heads.  They were then keelhauled229, given 150 
lashes and further ordered to perform hard labour for two years, bound in 
chains.230 
                                               
225
 Molsbergen at 56.  The text of the regulations can be found in Jeffreys M K Kaapse 
Plakaatboek 1652–1707: Deel I (1944).  The first Resolution was written on 8 April 1652 giving 
instructions to all soldiers and sailors aboard the three ships (see Roux at 30).  It would seem as 
if, at first, there was no civil jurisdiction and the regulations were only applicable to soldiers.  It 
was only as late as 1656 that the administrative and judicial functions were separated (see Van 
Zyl at 428-430). 
226
 Jeffreys at 2 further shows that apart from the 50 lashes, the offender also forfeited his wine 
ration for eight days or could be sentenced to any harsher punishment as deemed appropriate.  
The punishment was subsequently increased and the Resolution of 14 October 1652 indicates a 
sentence of 100 lashes for first offenders.  Roux at 33 also mentions that where a soldier 
assaulted one of the native population or acted unlawfully against him in any way, the soldier 
would be sentenced to 50 lashes, the punishment executed in the presence of the victim so that 
he could see that the actions of the soldier was in no way approved by the VOC. 
227
 Molsbergen at 56; Roux at 32; Jeffreys at 3. 
228
 Molsbergen at 57. 
229
 This entailed being dragged underneath the ship’s keel with a rope, and if not weighted down 
properly, being injured on the barnacles on the keel, or worst, drowning. 
230
 The sentence was subsequently mitigated in that the chains were taken off upon a promise of 
good behaviour.  The sentence seems excessive, but these multiple punishments seem to have 
been the norm during that period.  See also Mentzel at 133 were he describes these multiple 
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Other typical punishments consisted of torture on the rack where an offender 
refused to confess, being thrown off the pier into the sea, lashed with the butt of 
a musket, piece of rope or cane, being forced to stand guard with six muskets, 
being keelhauled, branded or bound to a pole with the item of the offence, for 
example a sheepskin if he had stolen a sheep, bound to the pole above the 
offender’s head.231  Despite the harshness of the discipline and the punishment, 
no-one was sentenced to death in the Cape in Van Riebeeck’s time232 but, as 
sentence, a shot was sometimes fired over the head of the offender as symbol 
that he in fact deserved the death penalty.  Fines were also given in the form of 
forfeiture of his salary.  Part of the fine was then paid over to the “fiscael”.233 
 
The garrison force was used from 1652 to 1662, but as the colony grew, the 
military force had to be expanded to protect the local population.234  In 1658 a 
voluntary citizen force was brought into existence to assist the garrison in the 
protection of the expanding colony.  The Cape governor supplied the citizen force 
with ammunition and weapons.235  In 1689 a Code was issued, governing the 
soldiers’ behaviour during times of war.236  As time progressed the voluntary 
nature of the citizen force ceased to exist and membership became 
compulsory.237  The members of the citizen force had to pledge allegiance to the 
                                                                                                                                            
punishments prior to its reform.  See Jeffreys at 90 for a further example of punishment incurred 
by 20 soldiers who deserted. 
231
 Molsbergen at 81.  For a third offence of desertion, the offender could be sentenced to 
banishment and hard labour on Robben Island for a year (see Jeffreys at 91). 
232
 Serious offences with a possible death sentence were sent to Batavia for trial (see Molsbergen 
at 82; Mentzel at 133). 
233
 Molsbergen at 82.  The “fiscael” was an employee of the VOC whose main function was that of 
prosecutor.  Unfortunately there was no sign of impartiality and offenders were vigorously 
prosecuted since the “fiscael” was paid a percentage of all fines (see Van Zyl at 431). 
234
 Tylden at 2. 
235
 Nöthling at 6. 
236
 Jeffreys at 255-256.  This Code addressed absence without leave and guard duties.  
Punishments ranged from fines to lashings. 
237
 Grobbelaar at 110; Tylden at 2; Boyden P B et al, (eds) ‘Ashes and Blood’ The British Army in 
South Africa 1795 to1914 (1999) at 10; Roux at 50. 
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State-General of Holland, the Prince of Orange, VOC, the Governor and the 
Political Council.238 
 
By 1712 the political board became increasingly disturbed by the lack of 
discipline exhibited by the military forces in the Cape.  In a resolution of 1 
January 1712 it is mentioned that the lack of order, bad habits and misuse 
amongst the soldiers were a point of concern and were seen as detrimental to 
military discipline.239  It was then determined in this resolution that the same 
Code as issued by the State-General and published in the Netherlands would be 
applicable to the soldiers of the Cape garrison.240 
 
Various offences and punishments were described in this Code.  In the first three 
articles of the Code the offences of blasphemy, violent crimes and mutiny were 
mentioned.  The subsequent sections discussed other offences such as absence 
without leave, sleeping while on duty, desertion, fighting, assault, disobedience of 
orders and drunkenness, to name a few.241 
 
                                               
238
 Roux at 53.  Roux discussed the content of the pledge (at 54), which consisted, inter alia, of 
following orders and complying with all ordinances.  If a member of the citizen militia was called 
up for duty during a time of war and refused, it was seen as perjury against the oath of allegiance 
taken on recruitment.  In those instances he was liable for punishment of “te lyf en te leeven (see 
also Roux at 70).” 
239
 Grobbelaar at 76. 
240
 Grobbelaar at 77.  This Code, published on 13 August 1590, was the result of certain military 
reforms brought about by Maurits of Nasau in the Netherlands and applicable to the Staatse 
Leger, the military force of the Netherlands.  A very strict code of discipline was followed by the 
Staatse Leger and severe punishments were inflicted on soldiers who misbehaved.  This strict 
discipline gave the Staatse Leger a very good name amongst the military forces of Europe (see 
Grobbelaar at 58).  Other European states such as Germany, France and England were of the 
first to study the reforms in the Netherlands and implement them.  The reforms came after 
renewed interest and study of the classical Greek and Roman military systems by Maurits.  It 
must also be kept in mind that the military authority in the Cape was exercised by the Governor, 
under the command of the Governor-General of the Board of India.  He in turn had to answer in 
military matters to the Lords XVII, who lent their authority from the State-General (see Grobbelaar 
at 69). 
241
 Grobbelaar at 77. 
 81 
Punishment was severe.  On a second conviction of blasphemy, for example, the 
offender could be sentenced to having a hole burnt through his tongue with a hot 
piece of metal.  Violent crimes could be given the death penalty and where an 
offender was found guilty of mutiny or a similar offence he could be hanged.  A 
person found sleeping on duty could also be sentenced to death, and where an 
individual left the fort or entered it by any other way than the authorised route, 
that person would be sentenced to death by hanging.242  Fleeing in the face of 
the enemy meant being beaten to death by anyone who was there. 
 
Punishment was however only imposed after an official trial.  The Captain of the 
military forces, being the commander of the military forces in the Cape was also 
the President of the Council of Justice.243  The Vice-Governor acted as judge.  
The “fiscael” acted as prosecutor and four merchants acted as assessors.  An 
under-merchant, the head of the Office of Justice, acted as secretary and was 
responsible for keeping the court minutes.244  A court with higher authority also 
existed, namely the Council of Policy, where the Governor acted as President 
and three upper-merchants and four merchants acted as assessors.245 
 
At that time a distinction was made between punishments that only the “fiscael” 
could execute and those executed by military authorities.  If a punishment was to 
be inflicted by the “fiscael”, it was seen as a serious offence for which the 
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 Grobbelaar at 77 who mentions that this severe punishment for using the incorrect access 
route into the fort can probably be ascribed to the vulnerability of the fort to outside attack.  Any 
person not making use of the authorised entrances could in fact be the enemy. 
243
 The Council of Justice was similar to what is known today as the court martial (see Mentzel at 
10). 
244
 Mentzel at 10.  The Governor was independent and did not act as judge during the trial.  All 
sentences of the Council of Justice had to be authorised by the Governor before they could be 
executed.  Were the governor was not satisfied with the sentence he could request the Council to 
modify it.  If they did not want to comply he had the authority to change the sentence unilaterally, 
stating “Ik neem het op mij”, but he then also had to answer to any consequences resulting from 
his amending of the sentence. 
245
 Mentzel at 10.  See also his discussion at 9 on the various ranks coupled to the office of upper-
merchant, merchant and under-merchants. 
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offender had to be sent to Batavia for trial.246  “Fiscael” punishment was seen as 
involving a measure of disgrace, for example running the gauntlet.  In the case of 
minor military offences, the military authorities tried the accused.247 
 
It was during the late 1700’s that some reform took place regarding punishment 
and the multiple punishments were replaced by a different system, seemingly 
one of single punishment.  Running the gauntlet was no longer a punishment 
only given by the fiscal, but became a military punishment, no longer viewed with 
disgrace.248 
 
The citizen militia stood under the command of their own officers, but the general 
command remained with the captain of the garrison.  Officers were elected 
annually with their appointment being subject to confirmation by the Political 
Council.  The citizen militia also followed the practices and traditions of the 
Staatse Leger.249 
 
With the expansion of the colony to Graaf-Reinett and Stellenbosch, the Citizen 
War Council (‘burgerkrygsraad’) came into existence in order to organise the 
growing militia.  By 1768 they had a permanent code, governing their 
organisation and tasks.  Their mandate included handling all cases relevant to 
the maintenance of good order and discipline of the Colony.  Where instances of 
disobedience to orders occurred or offences were committed, the War Council 
had the authority to punish the offender to the extent of a fine.250  They did not 
however have the authority to impose other military punishments.  Part of the fine 
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 Mentzel at 133. 
247
 Mentzel at 133.  Military offences include sleeping on sentry duty or absence without leave for 
up to three days.  If an accused was absent for more than three days, the military authorities had 
to refer the matter to Batavia for trial.  This was not always in the best interest of the accused as 
the punishments inflicted in Batavia seem to have been harsher than in the Cape. 
248
 Mentzel at 133-134. 
249
 Grobbelaar at 110. 
250
 Roux at 64 
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was used to cover the expenses of the War Council, sometimes being their only 
source of income.251 
 
A First Commandant held command over the commando’s with a Second 
Commandant to assist him.  It was their duty to ensure that all members in their 
commandos attended the yearly training sessions and complied with the orders 
issued by the government in the Cape.252  When reporting to the Citizen War 
Council in Stellenbosch, the Commandant would then subpoena those 
individuals who neglected their duty to appear before the War Council.  The 
Commandant then personally acted as prosecutor.253  If found guilty they were 
sentenced with an excessive fine.254  According to Roux255, the Cape 
government was very serious regarding the apprehension and punishment of 
those refusing to do commando service because of the threat posed by the 
Khoisan raids that were very prevalent at the time. 
 
It is from this citizen militia that the commando system developed,256 carrying 
with it the traditions of the Staatse Leger.  By the 1780’s the VOC has 
strengthened its garrison with released slaves, Khoisan and Africans.  Prior to 
the first British invasion in 1795, the local military force consisted of a permanent 
force component (the garrison or the “Nationale Troup”) and citizen force 
members. 
 
                                               
251
 Roux at 65.  It would seem that the more serious offences were tried by the Council of Justice.  
See Roux at 152 for an example in this regard. 
252
 Roux at 173-174. 
253
 Roux at 173-174. 
254
 Roux at 178.  A distinction was made regarding the severity of the fine, depending on the rank 
of the offender: “…en de zulx uiterlijk tot de soma van een hondert ryksds met opzight tot de 
veldwachtmeester of te veldcorporaals en van vyftig ryksds met relatie tot de gemeenen.” 
255
 Roux at 179. 
256
 Roux at 179; Tylden at 2; Nöthling at 6.  The VOC did not have the capacity to protect the 
farmers from the Khoisan raids on the farms and the regular soldier in his traditional uniform did 
not have a hope of catching the much faster Khoisan.  Therefore it became apparent that horses 
were needed and that developed into the commandos. 
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During the eighteenth century the Dutch power started to decline and England 
and France became more powerful.  When Prince William of Orange was 
expelled from the Netherlands, England feared the possibility of France taking 
over the trading routes to the East.  In a pre-emptive move against France and 
acting in the name of the Prince of Orange, British forces occupied the Cape 
from 1795.257 
 
With the occupation by Britain, the Cape colony surrendered and had to pledge 
allegiance to the British throne, thereby submitting to the laws and customs of 
England.258  The British occupation only lasted until 1803 when the Cape was 
returned to the Batavians in terms of the Treaty of Amiens signed in March 
1802.259  After the withdrawal of the British troops in 1803, 3150 Batavian troops 
were sent to the Cape to take responsibility for its defence and once again the 
commando system was implemented.260 
 
In 1806 Britain, once again, invaded the Cape.  The British invasion force hardly 
met any resistance.  The local military force consisted of Dutch regular troops 
(the garrison), some European mercenaries and the locally raised militia.  The 
garrison was weak and militarily unreliable, consisting mostly of mercenary 
troops.  The citizen force could not assist much because they were, according to 
Boyden, harvesting their crops.261 
 
With the second occupation of the Cape the British at first took over, but did not 
do away with the commandos.  Up to 1815 regular British officers were placed in 
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 Boyden at 10; Roux at 71; van Zyl at 443. 
258
 Boyden at 34. 
259
 Boyden at 37. 
260
 Nöthling at 7. 
261
 Boyden at 10 and 37.  This would, however, seem to be a harsh and unfair judgment not 
entirely rooted in the truth.  Roux extensively discusses the various measures that the militia 
attempted to put in place and fight the English invasion during this time, just to be superseded in 
decision by the VOC and the Governor of the Cape.  Their inability to adequately assist the 
regular military forces was rather due to political decisions than a lack of interest on their part. 
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charge of the commandos but after 1825 they served under the command of their 
own officers.262  It was also this commando system that formed the backbone of 
the later military forces of the Boer Republics.  The commandos were disbanded 
in 1834 in the Cape after which the defence of the Cape colony was left to British 
troops.  By 1835 they were also making use of volunteer forces.  As the borders 
of the colony expanded, the focus of defence moved away from the Cape to the 
rest of South Africa. 
 
An extensive discussion on the history of the Voortrekkers, the start of the Boer 
Republics and the Anglo-Boer wars falls outside the scope of this work.  Cursory 
mention will be made of these events as far as they pertain to the perceived 
development of the military, and with it the military law, of South Africa.  A short 
discussion on the status of the military forces of Natal and the two republics 
follow as a background illustrating the difficulties encountered in unifying the 
defence forces of South Africa. 
 
2.5.2.2 Natal 
 
The first organised defence force in Natal came with the advent of the 
Voortrekker Republic of Natalia.263  As was the case in the Cape Colony, the 
people of Natal based their first defence force on the commando system. 
 
They were divided into areas, each under the command of a field cornet 
(“veldkornet”), grouped together in a district under the command of a 
Commandant with a Commandant-General as the commander-in-chief.  This 
position of Commandant-General was not a permanent position, but only became 
operative during times of war. 
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 Boyden at 3; Nöthling at 7.  It was during this time – with the British Settlers – that the existing 
Roman-Dutch law became Anglicised. 
263
 Nöthling at 8. 
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After a decision of the Republic’s government to move a large group of Zulus to 
the Natal south-coast, the British government decided to intervene.  They 
annexed Natal in 1845 and proclaimed it a district of the Cape Colony.  After 
annexation the defence of Natal became the responsibility of the British troops.264  
From 1879 volunteer units also assisted the British troops.265  The volunteer 
units, known as the Militia, were governed by rules similar to those found for the 
British armed forces at the time.266  When called on active service, members of 
the Militia could be sentenced by court martial for military offences.267  
Punishments included fines, imprisonment with or without hard labour, reduction 
to lower grade or to the ranks or in the case of officers, to cashiering, dismissal, 
loss of seniority or a reprimand.268 
 
From the above it is clear that although the Cape started out with a Dutch military 
system, which would include a Dutch military law system, with the invasion of 
Britain the system was changed to an English system.  The same can be said for 
Natal.  The system in the two Boer Republics did however differ. 
 
2.5.2.3 The Zuid-Afrikaansche Republiek 
 
The ZAR also made use of the commando system for their defence force.269  The 
commandos seem to have been governed by the Thirty Three Articles issued by 
the “Adjunct Raad” in Potchefstroom in 1844.  This piece of legislation vaguely 
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 Nöthling at 8. 
265
 Boyden et al at 67. 
266
 See as example Act no 36 of 1903 “To Create a Militia Force” in Statutes of Natal:  
Supplement 1900-1906. 
267
 Section 48 of Act 36 of 1903 provides that any member on active service who is found guilty of 
disobeying orders or conduct to the prejudice of good order and discipline may be tried and 
sentenced by the Commanding Officer of the accused’s Corps, an ordinary court martial or a 
special court martial. 
268
 Section 50 of Act no 36 of 1903. 
269
 Tylden at 17. 
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addressed disciplinary issues but did not make provision for a structured military 
law or procedure of military courts (presumably a function undertaken by the 
Council of War).  “Traditional” military offences such as absence without leave 
are not addressed at all.  Offences that are mentioned are treason or attempted 
treason, knowledge of treason and not reporting it, perjury, assault, defamation, 
murder, theft and refusal to perform military service.270  Each article also 
provided for a specific punishment, ranging from a fine, imprisonment or 
banishment from the Republic.  In those instances where the Thirty Three 
Articles did not make provision for an offence, the laws of Holland would be 
applicable.271 
 
Military service in the commandos was compulsory for all males between the 
ages of 16 and 60.272  In any instance where one of the officers in command 
refused to muster the military force under his command, while under orders of 
the authorities to do so, he was liable to pay a fine or could be sentenced to 
imprisonment.273 
 
Officers in the commando were elected by vote and were appointed at first for an 
indefinite period of time.  With changes made to the constitution in 1889, the 
officers’ appointments became coupled to a period of service of between three 
and ten years, depending on the rank held. 
 
                                               
270
 Articles 9 to 23 of the Thirty Three Articles in Instructions for the Commandants: Also the 
Thirty-Three Articles, Being General Regulations Relating to the Law Courts, with Four 
Appendices (1879).  
271
 Article 31 of the Thirty Three Articles.  Appendix no 1 stipulated which laws of Holland would 
apply in these instances. 
272
 Nöthling at 9; art 2 of the Instructions in Instructions for the Commandants; art 95 of the 
Grondwet van de Zuid-Afrikaansche Republiek in Ameshoff H A D  De Locate Wetten der Zuid-
Afrikaansche Republiek 1888-1889 (1893) at 186. 
273
 Nöthling at 9; art 8 of the Thirty Three Articles (De Drie en Dertig Artikelen, Zijnde Algemeene 
Betalingen en Wetten voor de Teregtzittingen) in Eybers G W Select Constitutional Documents 
Illustrating South African History 1795-1910 (1918) at 351. 
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The field cornets and assistant field cornets were responsible for the 
maintenance of order and the execution of all sentences issued by the Council of 
War.274 
 
The Commandant-General could convene the Council of War in the event of any 
charges being preferred against an officer or any men regarding a transgression 
or offence for which a provision was made in terms of the law.275  The senior 
officer of this Council sat as chairman and in the event of a fine being imposed, 
Article 17 determined that the Commandant-General had to inform the Magistrate 
of the district who then had to take steps to recover the fine from the accused. 
 
Apart from the commandos, the Republic also started an artillery corps as its 
permanent force.  The mounted artillery was governed by Act no 2 of 1889.  This 
legislation gave the military court as well as the civil courts jurisdiction over 
members of the artillery and police.  The offences were listed in Schedule A of 
the Act.276  The Act also provided for three types of military courts, namely the 
“dagelijksch ochtenrapport”277, the “strafrapport”278 and the “krijgsraad”279.  The 
following sentences could be imposed: 
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 See art 104 and 105(a) of the Constitution of the ZAR of 1858 in Eybers at 386. 
275
 Article 13 of the Instructions in Instructions for the Commandants; art 112 of the Constitution of 
the ZAR 1858 in Eybers at 389. 
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 Section 2 of Act no 2 of 1889.  Offences listed in Schedule A were, inter alia, mutiny, sedition, 
use of violence or threatening language towards a superior officer, desertion, refusal to do duty, 
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The “dagelijksch ochtenrapport” could sentence all officers, non-commissioned 
officers and soldiers to: 
 
- A reprimand;280 
- Fine to a maximum of two pounds;281 
- Camp arrest until ordered otherwise;282 
- “Arrestkamer” to a maximum of 30 days;283 
- Hard labour to a maximum of 30 days;284 
- Locked in a block to a maximum period of six hours;285 
- Canon punishment to a maximum period of four hours.286 
 
The “strafrapport” could sentence all officers, non-commissioned officers and 
soldiers to: 
 
- Camp arrest; 
- “Arrestkamer” for a maximum period of two months; 
- A fine to a maximum of five pounds; 
- Hard labour to a maximum of six months; 
- Locked in a block for a maximum period of 12 hours; 
                                               
280
 A reprimand could not be given in the presence of a subordinate and was not to be given in 
any manner that infringed on the accused’s dignity (see s 9 of Act 2 of 1889). 
281
 Fines were deducted from the accused’s salary and paid over to the State. 
282
 When sentenced to camp arrest the accused was not allowed to leave the camp outside of 
duty hours. 
283
 This punishment can be compared to the modern punishment of confinement to barracks.  The 
accused was confined to a specific room.  The sentence could be aggravated by limiting the 
accused’s food to every second day on which he would only receive a ration of bread and water.  
He would also not be allowed any tobacco or matches and his salary would be reduced or 
forfeited for the duration of his sentence. 
284
 Where sentenced to hard labour by the “dagelijksch ochtenrapport” or “strafrapport” the 
accused would complete the punishment in his camp.  He would not be allowed to leave the 
camp and would also receive his food there.  Where sentenced to hard labour by the Court-
martial he would be handed over to the civil authorities to complete his sentence with civilian 
prisoners sentenced to hard labour. 
285
 This punishment consisted of locking one or both feet of the accused in a block.  This 
punishment was not to be executed in public and was reserved for those instances where the 
accused was not a first offender and all other punishments did not have the desired effect. 
286
 The accused had to sit on a canon for a specified time without his feet touching the ground. 
 90 
- Reduction to a lower rank. 
 
The Court-martial had the jurisdiction to impose all the above sentences as well 
as the death penalty.  The death penalty could be executed either by means of 
hanging287 or being shot288. 
 
2.5.2.4 The Republic of the Orange Free State 
 
As was the situation in the ZAR, the Republic of the Orange Free State adopted 
the commando system as the core of its military force.289  The commander in 
chief was a Commandant-General appointed from the ranks of the commandos.  
In times of war he received his orders from the State President.  The position 
was not utilised in times of peace. 
 
All male citizens between the ages of 16 and 60 were compelled to serve in the 
commando and in 1854 the first Commando Act was published.290 
 
By 1864 the government had founded a mounted artillery and by 1880 the 
artillery comprised of an adjutant, lieutenant, a sergeant, a teacher, a chapel 
master and about 12 artillerists.291 
 
By 1899 it became clear that there would be a war between the Boer Republics 
and the English and by September 1899 between 56 and 65 percent of all males 
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between the ages of 16 and 60 were called up.292  Unlike the British Forces, no 
formal form of military law governing the discipline of these forces existed.  The 
rules of discipline that did exist at the time were those based on normal 
acceptable behaviour.  The Commando Act did make provision for offences that 
could be committed in times of war.  These offences consisted of treason, 
sedition, assisting the enemy or any other offence in a similar vein.293  No 
mention is made of purely disciplinary offences as it was understood in the 
military environment.  However, a lack of discipline was a problem faced by the 
Boer commanders.294  They did enforce discipline, but because of the 
temperament of the Boers this was difficult to achieve.295  A Council of War 
(“Krygsraad”) operated in every commando for the purpose of maintaining order 
and discipline and consisted of the President, the Commandants and the field 
cornets.296  These courts had the same authority in sentencing as the civil courts.  
Appeal to the civil court was limited to those instances where sentences were 
imposed of more than one month imprisonment, with or without hard labour or 
fines exceeding 20 pounds.  They had the authority to impose the death penalty, 
provided that the Council of War consisted of more than 12 members, with at 
least two-thirds concurring.  The execution only took place with approval of the 
President.297 
 
According to Pretorius298 one of the biggest disciplinary problems was absence 
without leave.  Some of the commando members became tired of living in the 
Commando and returned home without leave, usually returning to the 
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Commando after a brief period of time.  However, the commanders did not leave 
a breach of discipline unpunished.  Pretorius299 gives some examples.  Where a 
person shot a buck against the orders of the officers, he was punished by having 
to walk around the laager for hours with a saddle on his head.  His weapon and 
ammunition would be tied to the saddle and he would be teased by his 
comrades.  Another form of punishment was that the offender had to get onto the 
bloody skin of a recently slaughtered cow.  Slits were cut into the sides so that 
his comrades’ hands could get a good grip, after which he would be thrown into 
the air time and again until his comrades felt that he had had enough. 
 
2.5.3 The Anglo-Boer War (1899-1902) 
 
The Anglo-Boer war was important from a military law perspective for two 
reasons, namely for the important role the military courts played in the Cape 
Colony regarding the prosecution of the rebels as well as providing a possible 
explanation for the adoption of an almost exclusive British military law code when 
unification took place in 1910. 
 
In 1899 the functioning of the military court, and its procedures and sentences 
were placed under the spotlight.  Probably one of the most important reasons for 
this being the fact was that for the first time military courts were being used to 
prosecute civilians.300 
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Prior to the implementation of martial law, Lord Carnavon issued guidelines to be 
used by the military courts.301  The guidelines determined that all military courts 
should be convened by the commanding officer of the district falling under martial 
law or another officer delegated by such commanding officer.  The court had to 
consist of at least three members.  The president of the court martial had to keep 
complete record of the proceedings and contain at least the name, age, sex and 
occupation of the accused, the charges brought against him or her, important 
aspects of the defence as well as the decision reached by the court.  This record 
then had to be signed and forwarded to the officer who had convened the court 
martial.  The convening officer then had to confirm the sentence or change it and 
in turn forward all court records to the commander-in-chief, who forwarded it to 
the Advocate-General in London.302 
 
All accused had to be afforded a reasonable opportunity to prepare for their 
defence, all witnesses to be sworn in and all hearsay evidence had to be 
excluded.303 
 
Guidelines were also furnished regarding the sentencing of offenders.  The death 
penalty could only be given where two-thirds of the court martial agreed.  The 
maximum period of imprisonment was only for the duration of martial law.  
Corporal punishment was permissible but no more than 50 lashes.  It was also 
determined that the court, in determining sentence, should be guided by the 
circumstances of each case and should not be overly strict.304 
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Because of the severe objection from various quarters regarding the prosecution 
of civilians by military courts, further instructions were issued to the military in 
order to address certain concerns raised.305 
 
It was determined that before any prosecution was instituted against an 
individual, the officer concerned with the administration of martial law or a 
magistrate, first had to do a preliminary investigation.306  Where no prima facie 
case existed against an accused, he had to be released immediately.  In all 
instances where the civilian court was still functioning, matters normally falling 
within its jurisdiction were to be referred to them for trial.  In all instances where 
regulations of martial law were contravened, the matter had to be referred to the 
military court.307  Where possible, a magistrate had to be one of the members 
presiding over the court martial.308 
 
All procedures to be followed were the same as those followed in courts martial, 
except that all the evidence for the defence was to be recorded in full.  According 
to these newer instructions the death penalty could only be imposed in those 
cases where all the members of the military court were in agreement.  The 
sentence would then have to be confirmed by the commander-in-chief before 
being carried out.  All sentences imposed by the military courts had to be 
executed within the borders of the district where martial law applied.309  In those 
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instances where the civilian courts were not operational, the military courts were 
authorised to prosecute lesser offences with the provision that the maximum 
sentence was a fine of no more than ten pounds or imprisonment of no more 
than 30 days.310 
 
The sentencing jurisdiction of the military courts regarding the prosecution of 
civilians was the same as that in terms of the Army Act311 applicable to British 
soldiers, with the addition of a fine.  The court was also authorised to sentence 
an accused to removal from the proclaimed district.  Where an accused was 
sentenced to a fine, the court also had to impose an alternative sentence of 
imprisonment.  Where the accused could not pay the fine, authority was granted 
to attach his moveable property and use the proceeds for payment of the fine.312 
 
Because of further pressure applied by the civilian community, provision was 
made for the trial of alleged rebels by a special court brought into existence for 
this purpose.  A decision was made that all instances of treason and other 
political offences were to be tried by the special courts.  At least two members of 
the court had to be judges of the High Court of the Cape Colony and the third 
member had to be a judge, advocate or lawyer with at least ten years 
experience.313 
 
An important aspect is that the Treason Act determined that for the period that 
the special courts were in existence, no other court, including military courts had 
the authority to try offences falling within the jurisdiction of the special courts.  
These special courts only had jurisdiction over offences committed prior to 12 
April 1901 after which rebels had to be tried by civilian courts.  The special courts 
were authorised to try the ringleaders of the rebels and the rest were to be 
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referred to the military courts.  The military courts therefore would try the less 
serious of the offenders.  In spite of the legislation, an army order was issued by 
Lord Kitchener authorising military courts to continue with the trial of civilians 
suspected of treason, an offence within the jurisdiction of the special courts.314 
 
The order authorised any commanding officer to convene a military court without 
a warrant.  It specified that these military courts were instituted to try those 
individuals not subject to the Army Act and it also stated that the military court 
was to be conducted in the same manner as the courts martial.  The power of 
these courts was unlimited in the sense that their sentencing jurisdiction was 
unlimited.  Snyman quotes the Army Order in this regard where it stated that 
“they have the power to sentence a convicted offender to death for any offence, 
in accordance with the custom of war.”315  The death penalty was prescribed, 
inter alia, for offences such as assassination, plundering, treason and spying. 
 
In spite of the earlier determination that the rebels were to be referred to the 
civilian courts subsequent to 12 April 1901, the rebellion in the Cape became so 
serious that all matters were referred to the military court for a speedy trial.  On 
22 April 1901 a notice was published in the Cape of Good Hope Government 
Gazette316 that any British subject and all persons living in the Cape Colony who 
took up arms against the Imperial government, or who incited such behaviour, 
would be subject to immediate arrest and trial by military court.  On conviction 
such person would be subject to “the severest penalties of the law.”317 
 
Shortly afterwards a pamphlet was issued regarding the administration of the 
military courts and they were given unlimited jurisdiction, subject only to the 
discretion of the members of the military court, to sentence any accused found 
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guilty of those offences seen as detrimental to the civilized manner of conducting 
a war, such as assassination.318  As with the previous occasion, the courts were 
authorised to also impose fines, in which case an alternative of imprisonment had 
to be imposed, as well as removal of the individual from the district.319 
 
Unfortunately the military courts were guilty of various malpractices.  The military 
courts did not always follow the regulations issued to them.  There is some 
evidence that at various trials no record was kept of the trial, which of course 
begs the question how the sentences could be confirmed by higher authority 
without the record of the proceedings.320  Rebels were found guilty on evidence 
that did not prove their guilt beyond reasonable doubt and the courts imposed 
severe sentences, often sentencing the accused to death.  One of the more 
serious malpractices was certainly the execution of rebels in public.321 
 
Another measure employed by the military courts as a deterrent was that the 
sentence was not made known to the convicted person directly after conviction.  
He was only informed of his sentence once it had been confirmed by higher 
authority.  The sentence would then be read out to the convicted person in public 
where other civilians were compelled to attend the sentencing procedure.322  It is 
therefore understandable that the general public feelings towards the military 
courts were negative.323 
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The British parliament was also not satisfied with the “justice” dispensed by the 
military courts and they convened a Commission of Inquiry to investigate the 
trials done by the courts.  Many sentences were set aside.324 
 
This brings an end to one of the most notorious chapters in the history of the 
military courts in South Africa.  The result was a negative feeling towards military 
courts and the end of the Anglo-Boer war started a new chapter in this history.  
As will be seen, the Anglo-Boer war played an important part in the difficulties 
experienced with establishing a Union Defence Force and may also have been a 
contributing factor to why, in spite of various military forces existing in South 
Africa at the time, the British military law system was followed. 
 
2.5.4 The South African Military between 1903 and 1910 
 
The end of the Anglo-Boer war and the signing of the peace accord in 1902 
brought an end to the traditional defence structures of the two Boer Republics.  It 
also meant an end to the commando system as it was known at the time.  
Imperial troops were stationed in all four provinces of South Africa.  These 
imperial garrisons resorted under British command and were stationed in 
Pretoria.  The aim of these troops was to stop any possible rebellions 
subsequent to the end of the war.325 
 
As a colony of the British Empire, the defence of South Africa was the 
responsibility of Britain prior to 1910.  Consequently they handled all military 
matters including those of a disciplinary nature.  This was the responsibility of the 
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Imperial British Command, established to co-ordinate the protection of the British 
Empire.326 
 
Due to its various commitments regarding its colonies and the expense 
associated with keeping a standing army in a colony, it became difficult for Britain 
to remain solely responsible for the defence of South Africa.  Apart from the 
imperial forces in South Africa, each colony had its own military force, 
independent from the other.  These military forces were mainly made up of 
volunteer forces.  Eventually this enabled a reduction of the Imperial garrisons in 
South Africa.  However, the Orange Free State did not have a volunteer force.327  
With time it became clear that the colonies had to start working together to 
ensure an effective defence against uprisings within the borders of South Africa.  
This need influenced the London Colonial Conference held in 1907 where the 
matter was discussed.  It was recommended that better relations between British 
and colonial military forces should be effected and imperial military uniformity 
was emphasised.328 
 
A subsequent conference was held in Durban in 1908 where the differences 
between the various military forces regarding training, discipline and 
organisation, amongst others, were discussed.  A decision was reached that in 
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future the various forces would make use of the same names and divisions, 
thereby being more uniform.329  The Committee also discussed the need for a 
uniform discipline approach.330  The disciplinary procedure differed in each 
colony and it was foreseen that some difficulty may be experienced in the event 
of combined deployments.  It was suggested that a combined force should have 
uniform offences and punishments.  This decision must also be seen against the 
background of the foreseen unification of the colonies and was aimed at 
restructuring the military forces to save time and money once unification took 
place.331 
 
Various recommendations were made by the conferences, all of which show a 
clear British influence.  It was even recommended that the British manuals in use 
at the time be taken over by the Union Defence Force, thereby consolidating the 
British influence.332  Various British officers and citizens were involved in 
formulating the new defence legislation for the Union Defence Force.  H.M.R. 
Bourne, the later Secretary of Defence, oversaw the writing of the Defence Bill.  
Lord Methuen also had a large influence on the writing of the Defence Bill.333 
 
The problem areas identified regarding the various military forces in South Africa 
were maintenance, training and discipline.334  In trying to structure a defence 
force they investigated the military forces of various countries .  They 
investigated the Swiss, Australian and Norwegian defence structures.335  On 
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various levels these different models influenced the Union Defence Force, but 
with regard to discipline, offences and punishments, they followed the British 
model.336 
 
Grimbeek337 discusses two further reasons why the Union Defence Force had 
such a strong British influence: 
 
1. Due to the requirements for unity between the colonies, South 
Africa did not immediately have the same urgency in starting a 
unified defence force as Britain envisioned.  Britain felt that a 
unified defence force was very important for South Africa.  As a 
result Lord Methuen, as commander of the imperial forces, was the 
driving force behind starting a Union Defence Force. 
 
2. At the time of initiating steps towards a unified defence force, so 
soon after the Anglo-Boer war, the British and the Boers did not 
trust each other.  This resulted in the Afrikaners feeling negative 
towards the implementation of the Defence Bill which they felt had 
been written by the British.  They had made little or no contribution 
towards the writing of the Defence Bill, in turn resulting in a mainly 
British approach towards the Bill. 
 
Chapter VII of the Defence Bill made provision for offences and punishments that 
could be implemented.  Two Acts were used in compiling this chapter, the Army 
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Act of Britain and Ireland and the Defence Act of the Cape of Good Hope.338  
With regard to the Army Act the necessary amendments and changes would be 
made from time to time by means of regulations issued by the Governor-General.  
Only certain sections of Act 25 of 1898, which would be determined by ordinance 
at a later stage, would be applicable to the Defence Bill.339 
 
The Bill made provision for various offences, such as fraud concerning the 
insurance of horses, unlawfully selling property of the defence force, inciting 
another to neglect his duties, and giving of false information, to mention a few.340  
The punishment proposed was a maximum fine of 100 pounds or one year 
imprisonment, with or without hard labour.  The offender’s salary could also be 
withheld, either in part or as a whole. 
 
With the establishment of the Union, the South African authorities started taking 
over more and more responsibilities in this regard and in 1921 the Imperial British 
Command was finally closed down.341  The Zuid Afrika Verdedigingswet342 came 
into operation on 13 June 1912, replacing the British Army Act of 1881.343  Unlike 
its British counterpart, there was no requirement of annual renewal of the South 
African Defence legislation. 
 
As was the situation in Britain, a distinction was made between the navy and the 
rest of the defence force.  The Union Navy was still seen as a part of the British 
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Navy344 and until 1957 a different code of military discipline applied to members 
of the Navy.345 
 
The 1912 Defence Act remained in force until the promulgation of a new Defence 
Act346 on 10 June 1957, which determined that there would be a uniform Military 
Discipline Code, applicable to all arms of service, including the Navy.347  
According to Oosthuizen348 the aim of the Defence Act of 1957 was to give the 
South African military law an independent direction.  However, the British military 
traditions regarding offences and trials remained. 
 
Until South Africa became a Republic in 1961, the British monarch was the 
supreme commander of the Union Defence Forces.  Subsequently, this position 
was taken over by the State President and he became the commander-in-chief of 
the South African Defence Force. 
 
2.5.4.1 South African military law in terms of the British Army Act of 1881 
 
Until 1912, when the Union of South Africa promulgated the Defence Act of 1912, 
the British Army Act of 1881 was applied to all matters of the armed forces since 
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South Africa was a British Colony under British rule.349  The Army Act was only in 
force for one year at a time and had to be put in force annually by an Act of 
British Parliament. 
 
In terms of the Defence Act (Amendment) and Dominion Forces Act350 which 
amended the Defence Act351 the set of rules governing the discipline of the Union 
Defence Force became known as the Military Discipline Code (known today as 
the MDC).352 
 
Part I of the Army Act of 1881 set out the crimes and punishments in terms of 
military law.353  The more serious offences could be divided into two categories: 
(1) offences in relation to the enemy punishable with death354 and (2) offences in 
relation to the enemy not punishable with death.355  Although death was a 
                                               
349
 For these purposes Part I concerning discipline and Part V concerning the application of 
military law are of relevance (see Morrison at 5).  Section 175 of the Army Act, 1881 provides that 
all officers, non-commissioned officers and men “belonging to a force raised in a colony to which 
this Act is, in whole or in part, applied by the law of the colony, at such times and subject to such 
adaptations, modifications and exceptions as made be specified in such law” will be subject to the 
military law (see s 177 of the Army Act, 1881).  The situation did not change in 1912.  Section 95 
of Act 13 of 1912 determined that the British Army Act would remain applicable.  Section 3 of the 
Defence Act (Amendment) and Dominion Forces Act 32 of 1932 repealed s 95, but s 2 of Act 32 
of 1932 determined that, in effect, the law as applicable at the time of the amendment would 
remain in force.  In effect the British Army Act of 1881 still applied to the Union Defence Force 
despite various subsequent Union Defence Acts.  Section 2 provided that:  “(1) Those provisions 
of the Army Act, 1881 (44 and 45 Vict. C. 58) of the United Kingdom as amended from time to 
time up to the commencement of this Act, and the rules of procedure made under section seventy 
thereof, as adapted and modified under section ninety-five of the principal Act, which by virtue of 
section ninety-five of the principal Act, comprise, at the commencement of this Act, the Union 
Military Discipline Code, shall, …subject to the provisions of sub-section (3) of this section, 
continue to apply in relation to the Defence Forces of the Union and to all members thereof…”  In 
terms of sub-section (3) the navy was specifically excluded from the application of this Union 
Military Discipline Code (See van der Westhuizen H at 18). 
350
 Act 32 of 1932. 
351
 Act 13 of 1912. 
352
 Oosthuizen at 223; s 2 of Act 21 of 1932. 
353
 Morrison at 31-40. 
354
 See s 4 of the Army Act, 1881.  These offences are similar to those punishable in our current 
MDC as contraventions of ss 4 and 5 MDC. 
355
 Section 5 of the Army Act, 1881. 
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possible punishment, provision was made for lesser sentences.356  What is also 
clear is that certain offences were seen as more serious if committed while on 
active service than at other times, which consequently allowed for more severe 
punishments.357 
 
Apart from the military offences, military courts had the jurisdiction to try any civil 
offence, committed by a member of the armed forces, except murder, treason, 
rape or culpable homicide committed within the borders of the United Kingdom or 
within the dominions.358  The exception to this rule, where the military court would 
have jurisdiction, was where the offence was committed while on active service, 
or the place of the offence was more than one hundred miles, measured in a 
straight line, from any city or town in which the offender could be tried by a civil 
court.  This did not, however, take away the jurisdiction of civil courts over 
members of the armed service for military offences.359 
 
A list or scale of punishments was given in section 44 of the Act.360  The following 
punishments were possible: 
 
In the case of officers: 
- death;361 
- penal servitude;362 
                                               
356
 Section 44 sets out the various options regarding punishment (see Command of the Army 
Council Manual of Military Law 7 ed (1929) at 28-30). 
357
 Section 6 of the Army Act, 1881.  This is similar to our current situation where certain offences 
such as desertion is punished more severely during time of service (see also Manual of Military 
Law (1929) at 15). 
358
 Section 41 of the Army Act, 1881. 
359
 Section 41A of the Army Act, 1881. 
360
 Manual of Military Law (1929) at 28.   
361
 The death penalty consisted of hanging in the case of civil offences and shooting for military 
offences (see Furse A D Tabular Précis of Military Law (1896) Table XXIV; Pratt at 191-192). 
362
 The minimum period of penal servitude was set at three years.  Sentences were to commence 
on the day on which the President of the Court-martial signed the proceedings.  Where an officer 
was sentenced to penal servitude, that sentence had to be coupled to a sentence of cashiering.  
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- imprisonment;363 
- cashiering; 
- dismissal; 
- forfeiture in the prescribed manner of seniority in rank, either in the 
army or the corps to which the offender belonged, or both; or where 
the officer’s promotion was dependent on length of service, forfeiture of 
all or any part of his service for the purposes of promotion;364 
- severe reprimand or reprimand;365 
- stoppages.366 
 
In the case of soldiers: 
- death; 
- penal servitude; 
- imprisonment; 
- detention for a term not exceeding two years;367 
                                                                                                                                            
A non-commissioned officer had to be sentenced to reduction to the ranks.  All soldiers 
sentenced to penal servitude were also discharged (see Furse Table XXIV; Pratt at 192).  
363
 Imprisonment could be imposed with or without hard labour.  Where an officer was sentenced 
to imprisonment, the officer also had to be cashiered.  Where a non-commissioned officer was 
sentenced to imprisonment he also had to be reduced to the ranks.  A Regimental court martial 
could imposed a period of a maximum of 42 days and the General court martial, etc, a maximum 
period of two years.  Where the accused had already been sentenced to imprisonment 
previously, the new sentence of imprisonment had to run concurrently.  Where the accused was 
sentenced to imprisonment for a purely disciplinary offence but was not discharged with 
ignominy, he was committed to a military prison.  Where sentenced for the contravention of 
certain other offences or discharged with ignominy, the accused was committed to a civil prison 
(see Furse Table XXIV; Pratt at 192-195; Cox W F Guide to the Preparation of Cases for District 
Courts-Martial and the Conduct of the Proceedings 3 ed (1918) at 87). 
364
 An officer could not be sentenced to a reduction to a lower rank, only to forfeiture of seniority of 
rank, either in the Army or in his regiment (see Pratt at 191).  The officer could also be sentenced 
to the forfeiture of any medal and decorations, except for the Victoria Cross or any other Order of 
which the king was the donor. 
365
 A reprimand could consist of a public, severe reprimand issued in General Orders or on 
parade or a private reprimand in front of one or two officers (see Furse Table XXX).  
366
 Defined by Furse Table XXXVI as “such deductions from the ordinary pay of a Soldier, 
awarded by a [Court-martial] or [commanding officer], or a Secretary of State, to make good any 
expenses, loss, damage, or destruction, as will leave to the Soldier, after paying for his Messing 
and Washing, not less than1d. a day…”  Stoppages were not seen as a punishment but as 
compensation for losses incurred by the Crown (see Pratt at 198-200). 
367
 The punishment of detention was introduced in 1906.  The aim of this punishment was to 
prevent soldiers convicted of disciplinary offences and who were not discharged with ignominy, 
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- discharge with ignominy;368 
- in the case of a non-commissioned officer, reduction to the ranks or to 
a lower grade, or forfeiture, in the prescribed manner, of seniority of 
rank;369 
- in the case of a non-commissioned officer, severe reprimand or 
reprimand;370 
- forfeitures, fines and stoppages;371 and 
- field punishment not exceeding three months.372 
 
Every offence mentioned in the Army Act had a prescribed maximum 
punishment.373  This means that the Court generally had a discretion to award 
any lesser punishment provided by section 44 of the Army Act.  The maximum 
punishment would only be given in those instances where the offence was of 
such a nature, or the criminal record of the offender justified the maximum 
punishment. 
 
                                                                                                                                            
from the stigma attached to imprisonment (Manual of Military Law (1929) at 29).  Imprisonment 
was subsequently no longer seen as an appropriate punishment for disciplinary offences. 
368
 This sentence could be imposed on soldiers sentenced to penal servitude or imprisonment.  It 
was a compulsory sentence where the accused was regarded as a persistent offender or the 
offence contained an element of disgrace (see Pratt at 195). 
369
 Reduction to a lower rank or to the ranks could be combined with any other sentence (see 
Furse Table XXX; Pratt at 195-196).  
370
 A non-commissioned officer could only be sentenced to a reprimand by his commanding 
officer and not by court-martial.  A soldier could not be sentenced to a reprimand (see Furse 
Table XXX).  
371
 Forfeitures could include the forfeiture of all or part of his past service towards pension, all or 
part of deferred pay already earned, all or any of his good conduct badges or any medals or 
decorations along with any annuities or gratuities attached to such medal or decorations (see 
Pratt at 196-198).  Fines were limited only in terms of the ordinary criminal law of England (see 
Pratt at 198). 
372
 Pratt at 200-201. 
373
 Manual of Military Law (1929) at 28-29.  There are two exceptions.  In the case where an 
officer was found guilty of scandalous behaviour, the prescribed punishment was cashiering and 
in the case of murder, the prescribed punishment was death. 
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Section 44 of the Army Act also allowed for more than one punishment to be 
imposed in combination.374  In the case of an officer sentenced to penal servitude 
or imprisonment, the officer also had to be cashiered.375  Where a non-
commissioned officer was sentenced to penal servitude or imprisonment, he 
would automatically be reduced to the ranks. 
 
Certain provisions were also coupled to these punishments.  Of interest, inter 
alia, is the fact that the Army Council could restore all or part of the lost seniority 
of rank of an officer for good and faithful service, or for any other reason that may 
in the opinion of the Council warrant restoration of the seniority.376 
 
Where on active service, a soldier could be sentenced to field punishment377 as 
prescribed from time to time.  This field punishment could include personal 
restraint or any labour or employment which the soldier would be subjected to 
during a term of imprisonment, as long as the field punishment did not pose any 
threat to the life or limb of the accused.378 
 
The commanding officer was authorised to decide whether to continue with 
charges brought against the accused.  He decided whether to dismiss the 
charge, refer the matter for court-martial or summarily try the offender.379  He had 
                                               
374
 Manual of Military Law (1929) at 29 mentions examples.  Where a soldier was sentenced to 
reduction of rank, for example, he could also be sentenced to a reprimand.  Only one sentence 
was imposed but it could include more than one punishment (see Cox at 87). 
375
 In this instance the court had no discretion and had to combine these two sentences. 
376
 Section 44(2A) of the Army Act 1881. 
377
 In terms of s 44(5) of the Army Act, 1881, this did not include flogging or attachment to a fixed 
object.  Furse Table XXX refers to two types of field imprisonment.  Field imprisonment no 1 
meant that the prisoner was kept in irons, handcuffs ropes, allowing him to be secured to prevent 
his escape.  In this case he could be attached to a fixed object for a maximum period not 
exceeding two hours per day, three out of four consecutive days or more than 21 days.  Field 
imprisonment no 2 meant the prisoner was kept in irons or ropes but not attached to a fixed 
object.  Field punishment could only be imposed on a private on active service when 
imprisonment was not an option, for the offences of aggravated drunkenness, disgraceful conduct 
or offences punishable by death or penal servitude (see Pratt at 200-201). 
378
 See s 44 of the Army Act 1881 for the various court orders to be made by the court-martial. 
379
 Section 46 of the Army Act 1881. 
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jurisdiction over soldiers380 to deal with the case summarily and had the following 
sentencing jurisdiction: 
 
- detention for a period not exceeding 28 days; 
- in the case of drunkenness, a fine not exceeding two pounds, in 
addition to any other punishment; 
- in addition to any other punishment, deduction of pay; 
- in the case of a soldier not of non-commissioned rank, while on active 
service, field punishment not exceeding a period of 28 days, forfeiture 
of pay for a period commencing on the day of sentencing and not 
exceeding 28 days; and 
- in addition to any other punishment, award any minor punishment that 
he was authorised to award, except where detention for a period 
exceeding seven days was awarded.381 
 
It was also possible to bring officers below the rank of lieutenant colonel and 
warrant officers to appear for trial by summary trial.382  The presiding officer had 
to be of the rank of general officer or brigadier, authorised to convene a general 
court martial, or any officer not below the rank of major general, appointed for the 
purpose by the Army Council.  As in the case of summary trials of non-
commissioned officers, the authority had the power to dismiss the charges, with 
or without hearing evidence, or he could decide to proceed with the charges, 
either by means of court martial or summary trial.  His sentencing jurisdiction was 
limited to: 
 
In the case of an officer: 
                                               
380
 Read as non-commissioned members of the armed service below the rank of warrant officer. 
381
 Minor punishments in this context included, inter alia, confinement to barracks for a period not 
exceeding 21 days, extra guard duties or an admonition.   
382
 Section 47 of the Army Act 1881. 
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- forfeiture of seniority of rank, either in the army or the corps to which 
the offender belonged, or in both, or reduction in seniority in rank; 
- severe reprimand or reprimand; 
- any deduction authorised by the Act to be made from his pay. 
 
In the case of a warrant officer: 
- forfeiture in the prescribed manner of seniority in rank; 
- severe reprimand or reprimand; 
- any deduction authorised by the Act to be made from his ordinary pay. 
 
A distinction can be made between two types of courts martial, the general court 
martial and the district court martial.  The general court martial was convened by 
the King or an officer deriving authority from the King to convene the general 
court martial.383  The court consisted of no less than five officers, four of whom 
could not be of the rank below that of a captain.  They were authorised to impose 
the death penalty, but only after two-thirds of the presiding officers concurred. 
 
The district court-martial was convened by an officer authorised to convene 
general courts martial or an officer deriving authority to convene a district court 
martial from an officer authorised to convene general courts-martial.  The court 
consisted of no less than three officers who had held their commission for at 
least two years.  Its jurisdiction did not extend to officers in the armed forces and 
punishment jurisdiction was further limited.  The district court martial could not 
impose the death penalty, nor imprisonment of a period exceeding two years. 
 
A third instance can also be identified.  Where the offence was committed 
outside the borders of the United Kingdom (or South Africa), or where the body of 
troops were on active service, a field general court-martial could be convened 
                                               
383
 Section 48 of the Army Act 1881. 
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where it was important, in the opinion of the commander of those forces, that a 
court martial be convened and that it would not be practicable to convene a 
general court martial.384  This court martial had the jurisdiction to try any member 
subject to the Act, for any offence prescribed in the Act.  It further had the 
jurisdiction to impose any sentence that a general court-martial was authorised to 
impose.  This field general court martial consisted of at least three officers, but 
where that was not possible, the sentencing jurisdiction of such court was 
restricted to field punishment as provided for by the Act or imprisonment for a 
period not exceeding two years.  The death penalty imposed by a field general 
court martial could only be executed when all the members of the court martial 
were in agreement. 
 
Specific mention is also made of a sentence of imprisonment and detention.385  
Where imprisonment was given as a sentence by a military court, the accused 
would either complete his sentence in a military prison, detention barracks, in 
other military custody, in civil prison or partly in the one and partly in the other.  
Where a sentence of detention was given, the accused would complete his 
sentence in the detention barracks or in other military custody, but not in a 
prison. 
 
The King authorised certain officers to convene courts martial by means of a 
Royal Warrant in order to try persons who were subject to military law.386  Such 
authorised officers had to hold the rank of field officer of higher, but in 
exceptional circumstances the King could authorise another officer, not below the 
rank of captain, to convene such a court martial.  The same officer could also be 
appointed as confirming authority of the finding and sentence of the general court 
martial.387 
                                               
384
 Section 49 of the Army Act 1881. 
385
 Section 63 of the Army Act 1881. 
386
 Section 122 of the Army Act 1881. 
387
 The same principle was applied in the subsequent South African legislation. 
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In turn, any officer authorised to convene a general court martial was authorised 
to convene a district court martial.  Such an officer could also authorise another 
officer under his command, of the rank not below that of captain, to convene 
such a district court martial.388  He was also authorised to confirm any 
subsequent finding and sentence by the district court martial. 
 
The rules of evidence applied in the military courts were the same as those rules 
of evidence followed in the British civil courts.389 
 
Provision was made for the establishment of military prisons and detention 
barracks.390  Military prisons were governed by rules made by the Secretary of 
State in terms of the Army Act.  These rules had to provide for the management 
and regulations concerning these prisons.  The Act prohibited the use of corporal 
punishment in military prisons and further provided that any imprisonment or 
detention in these facilities could not be harsher than it would be in a civilian 
prison. 
 
The Army Act also addressed the question on the jurisdiction of the military 
courts.  Military courts retained jurisdiction over an individual where a military 
offence was committed by a person while being subject to military law, even after 
such individual ceased to be subject to military law.  The armed forces retained 
jurisdiction for a period of three months after he had ceased to be subject, which 
                                               
388
 Section 123 of the Army Act 1881. 
389
 Section 127 of the Army Act 1881. 
390
 Section 132 of the Army Act 1881.  For a short discussion on the provost prison see Furse at 
Note 3.  
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means that the trial had to be completed within a period of three months after he 
had ceased being subject to military law.391 
 
Military courts also lost their jurisdiction to try military offences where those 
offices had been committed three years or more prior to the date of the trial.392 
 
Prosecution and punishment of a member of the armed forces by court martial 
did not bar prosecution by the civilian courts.  The Army Act did however make 
provision that the civilian court was bound to take any sentence imposed by the 
military court into consideration when imposing a sentence.393  Where a member 
had been convicted by a competent civilian court for an offence however, the 
military court could not try such a member for that offence in terms of military law. 
 
2.5.4.2 South African military law in terms of the Defence Act 13 of 1912 
 
Chapter VII of the South Africa Defence Act 13 of 1912 applied to matters of 
“discipline, offences and legal procedure”.  As mentioned earlier, section 95 
determined that the British Army Act (1881) would still apply to disciplinary 
matters in the Union Defence Force, and although section 95 was subsequently 
repealed by Act 32 of 1932, section 2 of the said Act determined that the law 
applicable up to the date of the amendment Act would remain applicable.394 
                                               
391
 Section 158 of the Army Act 1881.  An exception would be where a member had committed 
the offence of mutiny, fraudulent enlistment or desertion, in which case the jurisdiction of the court 
did not prescribe. 
392
 Section 161 of the Army Act 1881.  The offences of mutiny, desertion and fraudulent 
enlistment being the exception.  However, where a soldier had rendered three years exemplary 
service, he would not be tried for desertion (unless on active service) or fraudulent enlistment 
committed prior to the commencement of three years.  Where the soldier committed fraudulent 
enlistment, he would however lose recognition of any service rendered prior to the enlistment.  
The forfeiture could be restored by a decision of the Army Council. 
393
 Section 162 of the Army Act 1881. 
394
 Tshivhase A E “Transformation of Military Courts” (2009) 24 South African Public Law 450 at 
452.  See also Defence Headquarters Military Discipline Code, Regulations, and Orders and 
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The magistrates’ court and the superior court had jurisdiction over all members 
as well as all military offences in terms of the Military Code.395  Their sentencing 
jurisdiction was prescribed by the Act.  The magistrates’ court could impose a 
sentence of imprisonment with or without hard labour for a period not exceeding 
six months or a maximum fine of 50 pounds.  The superior court was authorised 
to impose any sentence as prescribed by the Military Code for the relevant 
offence.396 
 
The unique nature of the military court as well as the military offences were taken 
into consideration in that the Act provided that397  
 
[i]n imposing any punishment for an offence under this Act or the Military Code 
the court shall take cognizance of the gravity of the offence in relation to its 
military bearing and have due regard to the maintenance in the Defence Forces 
of a proper standard of military discipline. 
 
It was further stated that when a non-commissioned officer (NCO) was convicted 
by a civil court for an offence in terms of the Military Code, that NCO was liable to 
a further administrative action of reduction to the ranks, or being reduced in 
grade, in addition to any penalty imposed by the civil court.398 
 
The Act provided for military courts in the form of a court martial and a trial by a 
commanding officer (which later became known as the summary trial) and their 
                                                                                                                                            
Instructions (1935) at 54-195 for the complete Military Discipline Code “being the Army Act and 
Rules of Procedure as adopted and modified under the South Africa Defence Act, 1912.” 
395
 Section 97(1) of Act 13 of 1912. 
396
 Section 97(1) of Act 13 of 1912. 
397
 Section 97(2) of Act 13 of 1912. 
398
 Section 97(3) of Act 13 of 1912.  Reduction to the ranks means that his non-commissioned 
officer’s rank was taken away and he had no rank.  A reduction in grade would be the equivalent 
of a modern day reduction in seniority of rank.  This situation no longer applies. 
 115 
penal jurisdiction was limited to that prescribed by the Defence Act or the Military 
Code.399 
 
Apart from those offences punishable in terms of the Military Code the Defence 
Act provided for certain special offences.  These offences are similar to those 
provided for through the ages in the history of military law.400 
 
Penalties for the contravention of the offences provided for in the Defence Act 
ranged from a fine not exceeding 100 pounds to, on default of payment of the 
fine, imprisonment with or without hard labour for a maximum period of one year, 
to imprisonment with or without the option of a fine.401  For other offences in 
terms of the Act, punishment was a fine of a maximum of 25 pounds and or 
imprisonment of a maximum period of three months.  The Defence Act further 
provided for the imposition of a period of detention in lieu of the fine or 
imprisonment.402  Such detention had to be completed at any prescribed depot, 
training camp or station of the Defence Force for the purpose of undergoing 
training or exercises during the period of detention.  Escaping from detention and 
failing to complete the training or exercises were seen as a further offence.  If 
convicted the accused faced a possible sentence of imprisonment with or without 
hard labour for a maximum period of one month.  What is of interest is that the 
Act determined that the period of detention did not have to continuous and a limit 
was also placed on the duration of the detention.403 
 
Where a member of the Defence Force was sentenced to a period of 
imprisonment or detention, including a sentence not exceeding 14 days, the 
                                               
399
 Section 98 of Act 13 of 1912. 
400
 See ss 100-108 for the various special offences. 
401
 Section 109 for the contravention of ss 80, 91, 92 and 94.  From the prescribed punishment it 
can be seen that these offences were seen as serious offences. 
402
 In s 109(2) of Act 13 of 1912.  This sentence seems to have been available only upon 
application to the prescribed authority. 
403
 Section 132 of the Army Act 1881. 
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imprisonment did not have to be executed in a civilian prison.  The Governor-
General was authorised by the Act to appoint any place in lieu of such prison or 
detention for the execution of the sentence.404   
 
A commanding officer was authorised405 to sentence a member of the Defence 
Force found guilty of a Military Code offence to deduction of pay or stoppage of 
his allowances, as well as place him under deduction of pay or stop allowances 
to enable restitution to the public or his corps for any damages or loss suffered 
due to the his negligence of wrongful action.406  In the same instance, a 
magistrates’ court and the superior court were also authorised to order a member 
of the Defence Force to pay restitution to the public or his corps in the event of 
damage or loss caused by his wrongful action or negligence.407 
 
Offences in terms of the Defence Act were seen in a slightly more serious light 
than those offences prescribed in the Military Code.  This can be seen from the 
penalties allowed.  In cases where an accused was found guilty of the 
contravention of a section in the Defence Act, the maximum penalty possible by 
a court martial or commanding officer was five pounds and in the case of Military 
Code offences, the prescribed fine was one pound for those offences under the 
Code punishable by a fine. 
 
The Defence Act of 1912 was subsequently amended by the Defence Act 
(Amendment) and Dominion Forces Act, Act no 32 of 1932.  This Act, for the first 
                                               
404
 In terms of s 112 of Act 13 of 1912.  No record was found during the course of the research 
where such a place was appointed.  
405
 In terms of s 113(1) of Act 13 of 1912. 
406
 The maximum amount allowed in this instance for members of the Coast Garrison Force or 
Active Citizen Force could not exceed any pay or allowance due to him in respect of one training 
year. 
407
 Section 113(2) of Act 13 of 1912. 
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time, referred to the Military Discipline Code which, with certain amendments 
remains applicable to this day.408   
 
This led to the promulgation of the Defence Act 44 of 1957 on 1 November 1958, 
which, according to Oosthuizen409 was seen as a conscious effort by the 
legislature to return to the Roman-Dutch common law410.  The Defence Act 
started moving away from the British system and in 1957 the final severance was 
made by implementation of the Defence Act of 1957411  
 
2.5.4.3 South African military law in terms of the Defence Act 44 of 1957 
 
Discipline and military legal matters were governed by Chapter XI of the Defence 
Act of 1957.  Similar to the 1912 Act, the Military Discipline Code consisted of the 
First Schedule to the Defence Act as well as the rules promulgated in terms of 
the Defence Act.412 
 
                                               
408
 Section 2 of Act 32 of 1932.  At this stage the MDC consisted of the provisions of the Army Act 
of 1881 of the United Kingdom, as amended there from time to time, up to the commencement of 
the 1932 Act as well as the Rules of Procedure in terms of the Act.  The current MDC is similar in 
that it consists of the First Schedule of the Defence Act of 1957 as well as the Rules of Procedure 
in terms of the MDSMA. 
409
 Oosthuizen at 223. 
410
 See also De Villiers E L K “Die Suid-Afrikaanse Militêre Regstelsel” (1974) 2 Codicillus 9 at 9.  
To what extent this held any real changes for military law is not clear.  Seen against the 
background of what was happening at the time regarding a return to Roman Dutch law, one might 
adduce the following:  Although Roman-Dutch law never disappeared during the time of 
colonisation, English law had a great influence on the South African legal system.  From the 
1920’s there was a concerted effort to move away from the English law towards the Roman-
Dutch law.  For an insightful discussion see Van Zyl at 420–421.  The development of Afrikaans 
law faculties, the abandonment of the appeal process to the Privy Council in England as well as 
the establishment of the South African Court of Appeal showed a clear application of Roman 
Dutch law.  So although there was a shift of focus to Roman Dutch law, the South African law 
remained with English influences (see Van Zyl at 481-494).  Comparing military law prior to the 
1957 legislation and that of post 1957, there is no clear break between the “English” version and 
the new South African version in terms of so-called Roman-Dutch law.  This is probably due to 
the fact that both the English military law as well as the Dutch military law has its roots in Roman 
law – as argued above- and that no fundamental difference exists. 
411
 Oosthuizen at 224. 
412
 Section 104 (1) of the Defence Act 44 of 1957.   
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The Defence Act of 1957 mentioned legal officers in the Defence Force for the 
first time.413  It was also determined that the Defence Act would apply to all 
members of the Permanent Force as well as members of the Commandos, 
Citizen Force and the Reserve when on service or under training.  Restricted 
sentence jurisdiction was given to military courts when sentencing members of 
the Reserve, Commandos and Citizen Force.414 
 
The Supreme Court and the magistrates’ court were given jurisdiction over 
military offences, authorising the prescribed punishments, and specifically in the 
case of the magistrates’ court, authorising a sentence of detention.415  Corporal 
punishment was expressly excluded from possible punishment options.416 
 
In the event of a “military” prosecution by a civilian court, the Act required the 
civilian court to consider the seriousness of the offence within a military context 
when imposing a sentence and enjoined them to take cognisance of the 
necessity of maintaining military discipline within the military environment. 
 
The civilian court was further authorised to reduce any non-commissioned officer 
to the ranks or reduce him to any lower rank.417  The civilian court did not have 
similar powers of reduction of the rank of officers.  Only the prescribed authority, 
being the Chief of the SADF or the Chief of the Arm of Service had that authority. 
                                               
413
 Section 104(3) of Act 44 of 1957. 
414
 Section 104(5)(b) of Act 44 of 1957.  They were not subject to any other punishment than 
cashiering, dismissal from the SADF, discharge with ignominy, forfeiture of service or seniority of 
rank, reduction to the ranks or to a lower rank or grade, detention not extending past the duration 
of their service or training, fines, forfeitures and stoppages of pay, severe reprimand, reprimand, 
admonition, confinement to barracks or extra guards and pickets. 
415
 Section 105(1) of Act 44 of 1957.  The Supreme Court had inherent jurisdiction to impose any 
sentence but the Magistrate’s court is a creature of statute and had therefore to be given 
jurisdiction to impose detention, a sentence not ordinarily within its sentencing jurisdiction (De 
Villiers at 9). 
416
 It must be kept in mind that this legislation applied during a period when corporal punishment 
was an authorised form of punishment in civil court. 
417
 Section 105(3) of Act 44 of 1957. 
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Section 107 of Act 44 of 1957 did not provide an accused the right to appeal any 
finding or sentence of a military court, although it did not derogate from the right 
to review by the Supreme Court of South Africa. 
 
The Act itself, apart from those offences provided for in the MDC, also created a 
number of statutory offences punishable by a military court.418  In general the 
punishments for the contravention of these sections varied419 from fines to a 
maximum of 500 pounds or imprisonment to a maximum of five years to fines not 
exceeding 100 pounds or imprisonment not exceeding six months. 
 
However, the part of the legislation mainly used for the determination of 
punishment within the military legal environment at that time was the First 
Schedule to the Defence Act (MDC).  The MDC listed those offences that were 
applicable to members of the Defence Force who were subject to the Code.420  
They varied in seriousness.  Each section or offence had a prescribed 
punishment.  These punishments, however, were not to be seen as the 
punishment that would necessarily be imposed by the court.  The punishments 
as set out in each section of the MDC were mainly used as an indication of the 
seriousness of the offence. 
 
A distinction was made between military disciplinary offences and military 
criminal offences.  Military disciplinary offences were those offences considered 
of a less serious nature for which the prescribed punishment was imprisonment 
for a period not exceeding one year.421  They were the offences in the MDC.  
                                               
418
 See ss 110-126 of the Defence Act 44 of 1957. 
419
 See s 127 of Act 44 of 1957. 
420
 Offences listed in sections 4-50 of the MDC (see De Villiers at 10). 
421
 Offences such as drunkenness (s 33 of the MDC), absence without leave (s 14 of the MDC) 
and conduct to the prejudice of military discipline (s 46 of the MDC) are but a few of the 
examples. 
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These offences could be tried summarily by summary trials which had a limited 
sentencing jurisdiction.422 
 
All offences with prescribed punishments exceeding one year were seen as the 
military criminal offences and fell within the jurisdiction of the court martial which 
had a higher sentencing jurisdiction.423 
 
Military courts were also given the jurisdiction to try civil offences424 and could 
impose any punishment for those offences as long as it did not exceed its 
jurisdiction. 
 
In terms of the Act the military judicial system allowed for three types of military 
courts:425 the summary trial, the general court martial and the ordinary court 
martial.  As mentioned earlier, the summary trial, presided over by a 
commanding officer426, had a limited sentencing jurisdiction427. 
 
                                               
422
 The sentencing jurisdiction of the summary trial was governed by s 62 of the MDC which 
determined that the punishments must include, in the case of a non-commissioned officer a fine 
not exceeding ten pounds; reversion of acting or temporary rank to his substantive rank; or a 
reprimand and in the case of privates, detention or field punishment for a period not exceeding 21 
days; or to a fine not exceeding five pounds; or a reprimand. 
423
 These offences included, inter alia, the endangering of forces (s 4 of the MDC), theft of state 
property (s 20 of the MDC) and scandalous behaviour (s 32 of the MDC). 
424
 In terms of s 56 of the MDC but this did not include murder, rape, treason and culpable 
homicide committed within the borders of the Union.  Military courts did, however, have 
jurisdiction over these capital offences if committed by SADF members outside the borders of the 
Union. 
425
 Section 1 of the MDC defines military courts as:  “any court or officer deriving jurisdiction from 
this code or from an officer, to try persons charged with offences under this code and to impose 
punishment.”  See also De Villiers at 10-14 for a more comprehensive discussion on the 
jurisdiction of these courts.  Tshivhase (2009) at 452 refers to six types of courts martial but the 
summary trials mentioned cannot be classified as courts martial and therefore there were two 
types of courts martial and the rest were the various levels of summary trials. 
426
 Section 62(3) of the MDC defines a commanding officer as “any officer under the command of 
a convening authority who has been empowered in writing by such convening authority to 
exercise all or any of the powers conferred upon a commanding officer by that sub-section, and 
includes any officer to whom powers have been delegated under sub-section (2) (see De Villiers 
at 10)”. 
427
 Section 62(3) of the MDC. 
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The ordinary court martial had jurisdiction over all members subject to the MDC, 
excluding officers428, for any offence committed by such person, except a capital 
offence or the contravention of section 4 or section 5 of the MDC.429  Sentencing 
jurisdiction included any sentence which could be imposed in respect thereof by 
a general court martial, limiting the jurisdiction for imposing imprisonment to a 
maximum period of two years.430 
 
The general court martial had jurisdiction over all members subject to the MDC 
for any offence, except treason, rape, murder and culpable homicide committed 
within the borders of the country.431  Sentencing jurisdiction included any penalty 
as prescribed by section 91 of the MDC and in the case of civil offences, any 
penalty within the punitive jurisdiction of the court martial, which could be 
imposed in respect of that offence by the relevant civil court.432 
 
Punishments provided for in the MDC433 were the following:  
 
In the case of an officer:  
- death; 
- imprisonment; 
- cashiering; 
- dismissal from the SADF; 
- reduction to any lower commissioned rank; 
- reduction in seniority in rank; 
                                               
428
 Section 71 of the MDC; De Villiers at 12. 
429
 Section 4 of the MDC, being the endangering of the safety of forces and s 5 of the MDC being 
offences by a person in command of troops, vessels or aircraft, eg where such a commander fails 
to engage the enemy. 
430
 De Villiers at 10. 
431
 Section 70 of the MDC; De Villiers at 14. 
432
 De Villiers at 14. 
433
 See s 91(1) of the MDC.  Section 91(2) of the MDC provides that each penalty listed is seen 
as less severe and less serious in consequences than that provided for in any preceding sub-
paragraph (see De Villiers at 11-12). 
 122 
- a fine not exceeding 200 pounds; or 
- a reprimand. 
 
In the case of a warrant officer or a non-commissioned officer: 
- death; 
- imprisonment; 
- discharge with ignominy from the SADF; 
- detention for a period not exceeding two years; 
- reduction to any lower rank, to non-commissioned rank or to the 
ranks; 
- discharge from the SADF; 
- a fine not exceeding 50 pounds; or 
- a reprimand. 
 
In the case of private: 
- death; 
- imprisonment; 
- discharge with ignominy from the SADF; 
- detention for a period not exceeding two years; 
- field punishment for a period not exceeding three months; 
- discharge from the SADF; 
- a fine not exceeding 25 pounds; or 
- a reprimand. 
 
It was further stated that, unlike a civilian court, the accused who was convicted 
of more than one offence listed on the same charge sheet, would only be given 
one sentence in respect of all charges.434  It was further determined that if the 
                                               
434
 Pretorius C J “Regspleging in die Suid-Afrikaanse Weermag” (1973) De Rebus Procuratoriis 
317 at 319; s 92 of the MDC; De Villiers at 12.  It was possible, in certain instances to combine 
sentences.  In other instances it was compulsory to do so.  For example where a non-
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sentence was seen as a valid sentence for any one charge of which the accused 
had been convicted, it would be deemed valid in respect of all the charges on the 
charge sheet of which he had been convicted.435 
 
Apart from fines and imprisonment as a punishment, all sentences imposed by 
the military court structure were of an uniquely military nature.  These sentences 
could not be found in the civilian court structure.  According to Pretorius436 this is 
due to the fact that the purpose of punishment in the SADF is to enforce 
discipline within the ranks.437 
 
Sentences of a court-martial, however, could not be enforced before the 
convening authority confirmed the finding and sentence.438  Only acquittals were 
not subject to confirmation.  Certain offences439 could only be confirmed by the 
Council of Review before implementation and such sentences were not subject 
to review by any other reviewing authority.  There was no provision for appeal 
against finding and sentence of a court-martial.440 
However, in those instances where the death penalty was imposed, such 
sentence had to be confirmed by the confirming authority, endorsed by the 
                                                                                                                                            
commissioned officer was sentenced to detention he also had to be sentenced to reduction to the 
ranks.  An officer sentenced to imprisonment also had to be sentenced to cashiering. 
435
 Pretorius at 319. 
436
 Pretorius at 318. 
437
 Minister of Defence v Potsane; Legal Soldier (Pty) Ltd v Minister of Defence 2002 (1) SA 1 
(CC) paras 21 and 23 where it was held that “military justice is concerned not so much with the 
prosecution of crime but with the maintenance of discipline.”  See also Morrison at 3 where he 
argues that although punishment in military law is important “it would be a grave error to imagine 
that punishment is in itself the chief agent to be relied upon for promoting and maintaining 
discipline in the army.  Discipline cannot be enforced solely by the fear of punishment, and no 
reliance can in reality be placed upon any system which is not founded upon the good relations 
existing between military superiors and their inferiors…” 
438
 Section 96 MDC. 
439
 Those sentences of cashiering, dismissal of officers from the SADF, discharge with ignominy 
of warrant officers and non-commissioned officers holding the substantive rank of sergeant or 
higher, or imprisonment for a period exceeding three months (see s 103 of the MDC). 
440
 De Villiers at 14. 
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Council of Review as being in accordance with real and substantive justice and 
then had to be approved by the Governor-General before execution.441 
 
With the confirmation or review of the finding of the court martial the confirming 
or reviewing authority could request the court martial to give written reasons for 
its finding.442  The findings of the court-martial were reviewed at various levels, 
depending on the authority of the convening authority who convened the court 
martial.443  These powers of review were exercised in terms of the MDC and 
entailed, inter alia, the authority to endorse the sentence, set aside the sentence 
or vary the sentence.444  In those instances where the review was held on 
request of the accused, the review council could, at its discretion, increase any 
sentence given by the court martial.445  In those instances where the finding or 
sentence was confirmed, substituted or changed, it would be deemed to be the 
finding and sentence of the original court martial who passed the sentence.446 
 
The fact that the General Officer Commanding of the SADF had the authority to 
mitigate, remit or commute any sentence imposed by the military court at his 
discretion raised serious questions regarding the independence of the military 
judicial system.447  The same question can be raised due to the fact that the 
person who convened the court-martial in the first place was also the person who 
had to confirm the findings and sentence of the court.  
 
The Defence Act 44 of 1957 was amended numerous times, but the essence of 
its content remained the same.  From time to time the amounts of the fines were 
amended but sentences had remained the same since 1958. 
                                               
441
 Section 104 of the MDC. 
442
 Section 108 of the MDC. 
443
 See ss 108, 109 and 110 of the MDC. 
444
 Section 115 of the MDC. 
445
 Section 115(4) of the MDC. 
446
 Section 116 of the MDC. 
447
 Section 117 of the MDC; De Villiers 15.  A discussion on this question follows in ch 5 below. 
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With the advent of the Interim Constitution as well as the Constitution of 1996, it 
became clear that changes had to be made to the defence legislation and 
specifically the military law environment.  Unfortunately the Defence Force did 
not seem to be in any hurry to make the necessary changes and it was only after 
a decision by the Cape Town High Court448 that compelled the Defence Force to 
comply with the Constitution that the necessary changes were made to the 
military justice system. 
 
A moratorium was placed on courts martial, pending new legislation and on 28 
May 1999 the MDSMA449 came into operation.  The 1957 Defence Act was 
amended and the Rules in terms of the MDSMA were published in the 
Government Gazette450 on the 11th of June 1999.  The 1957 Defence Act was 
subsequently replaced by the 2002 Defence Act.451  Further changes are 
envisaged in the near future452. 
 
Military discipline was enforced through unique punishments by superiors and 
later by military tribunals throughout the military’s history.  This is also true in the 
history of the South African military.  Those parts of the Colony under British rule 
or exposed to the British military show the most similarities to British military law 
at the time.  The only influence of note brought by the Dutch system was the 
formation of the commando system and its incorporation into the military at that 
time.  The influence of the Boer Republics on the Union Defence Force was 
negligible. 
                                               
448
 Freedom of Expression Institute v President Ordinary Court Martial 1999 (4) SA 471 (C); 
Tshivhase (2009) at 453.  The matter subsequently served before the Constitutional Court in 
President of the Ordinary Court Martial v Freedom of Expression Institute 1999 (4) SA 682 (CC) 
who declined to confirm the order of invalidity because at that time the impugned provisions of the 
MDC and the Defence Act had been repealed and replaced by the MDSMA and any order of 
confirmation would be of no effect (see Tshivhase (2009) at 454). 
449
 Act 16 of 1999. 
450
 GG no 20165. 
451
 Act 42 of 2002. 
452
 The draft Military Discipline Bill is scheduled to be tabled before parliament during 2011. 
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For many years after unionisation the British Army Act of 1881 played a critical 
role in the development of military punishments and courts martial trial 
procedures.  The 1912 and 1957 defence legislation showed little independent 
development.  A perusal of the punishments shows that sentencing in the military 
remained stagnant.453 
 
The Roman military influences are clear, however, contrary to Oosthuizen’s 
contention,454 it would appear as if the South African military law has developed 
from the English law as it evolved from and was influenced by Roman military 
law. 
                                               
453
 The discussion on current military punishments in ch 6 below confirms that in essence not 
much has changed regarding military punishments since the 1881 Army Act. 
454
 Oosthuizen at 212; ch 2 above. 
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Addendum A to Chapter 2 
 
SUMMARY:  MILITARY PUNISHMENTS THROUGH THE AGES 
 
It would seem, in perusing the brief history of the development of military law that 
some offences and punishments have remained strikingly similar or at least have 
retained some similarities in the punishment.  The following list of the various 
punishments from Roman times until the Defence Act of 1957 serves as an 
illustration of these similarities.  
 
Roman punishments. 
 
- Deprivation of pay; 
- reduction in rank; 
- disgrace, which included a dishonourable discharge; 
- corporal punishment; 
- death; 
- reduction to slavery 
- mutilations and various forms of torture; 
- the imposition of various extra duties; and 
- decimation. 
 
Punishment in the Middle Ages 
 
- Forfeiture of goods; 
- death; 
- decimation; 
- confinement, including on bread and water; 
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- placement in shackles; and 
- riding the wooden horse. 
 
British Military punishments 
 
- Confinement to barracks; 
- incarceration in solitary cells; 
- extra guard duties; 
- forced marches; 
- punishment drills; 
- fines; 
- death; 
- penal servitude; 
- reduction to the ranks; 
- riding the wooden horse; 
- losing a hand; and  
- being tarred and feathered. 
 
Punishment applicable in the Cape Colony from 1652 until the Anglo-Boer War 
 
- Being keelhauled; 
- lashes with a whip or butt of a musket; 
- hard labour; 
- being bound in chains; 
- standing guard with six muskets; 
- branding; 
- being bound to a pole; 
- fines; 
- having a hole burnt through the tongue with a hot iron; 
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- death; and 
- running the gauntlet. 
 
Punishment applicable in Natal until the Anglo-Boer War 
 
- Fines; 
- imprisonment with or without hard labour; 
- reduction to a lower grade or reduction to the ranks; 
- cashiering of officers; 
- dismissal; 
- loss of seniority; and 
- reprimand. 
 
Punishment applicable in the ZAR until the Anglo-Boer War 
 
- Fine; 
- imprisonment; 
- banishment from the Republic; 
- reprimand; 
- camp arrest; 
- hard labour; 
- being locked in a block; 
- canon punishment; 
- death; and 
- reduction to a lower rank. 
 
Punishment applicable in the Orange Free State until the Anglo-Boer War 
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- The Council of War could impose any punishment that the 
civilian courts could impose. 
 
Punishment during the Anglo-Boer War 
 
- Death 
- imprisonment 
- corporal punishment 
- fines; and 
- removal for the district. 
 
Punishment applicable during the period of 1903-1910 
 
- Fines 
- imprisonment with or without hard labour; 
- withholding of the accused’s salary; 
- cashiering of officers; 
- dismissal of officers; 
- forfeiture of seniority of rank of officers; 
- discharge with ignominy of other ranks; 
- detention to a maximum of two years; 
- stoppages; 
- reduction in rank, reduction to the ranks or reduction of seniority 
of ranks for other ranks than officers; 
- reprimand or severe reprimand; and 
- field punishment for soldiers. 
 
Punishment applicable during the Defence Act 13 of 1912 
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- Fines; 
- imprisonment with or without hard labour; 
- imprisonment with or without the option of a fine; 
- detention; 
- deduction of pay; and 
- stoppages of allowances. 
 
Punishment applicable during the Defence Act 44 of 1957 
 
- Death; 
- imprisonment; 
- cashiering for officers; 
- dismissal from the SADF for officers; 
- discharge with ignominy for other ranks; 
- detention for a period to a maximum period of two years; 
- reduction to any lower rank; 
- reduction to the ranks; 
- discharge from the SADF; 
- fines; 
- reprimand; and 
- field punishment to a maximum period of 3 months. 
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CHAPTER 3 
 
MILITARY COURTS: THEIR JURISDICTION AND PROCEDURES 
 
3.1 Background 
 
Looking at the historical development of the South African military justice system 
it is clear that the court procedures, offences and punishments have remained all 
but static for a number of years.1  Due to significant transformational changes in 
the SANDF2 and domestic legislation, especially in accordance with the 
Constitution, it became clear that the military justice system did not comply with 
certain constitutional imperatives.3 
 
Change was long overdue when the Military Discipline Supplementary Measures 
Act (MDSMA)4 came into operation, creating a fundamentally different military 
court system.5  A clean break was made from the past in order to bring the South 
African military justice system in line with the Constitution.6  With the replacement 
of ad hoc military courts, presided over by Presidents, with permanent courts 
                                               
1
 See in this regard ch 2 above at paras 2.5.4.1-2.5.4.3. 
2
 The SANDF has changed from an offensive force to a defensive force and there has been a 
large scale integration of previous non-statutory forces members such as MK and APLA and the 
former SADF to create a new SANDF.  The defensive mandate of the SANDF is stated in s 
200(2) of the Constitution (“The primary object of the defence force is to defend and protect the 
Republic, its territorial integrity and its people in accordance with the Constitution and the 
principles of international law regulating the use of force”); s 201(2) (the President may authorise 
the employment of the SANDF, inter alia in “defence of the Republic”); Woolman S C et al 
“Security Services” in Woolman S & Bishop M (eds) Constitutional Law of South Africa 2 ed 
(2002) at 23B-44. 
3
 See Freedom of Expression Institute v President, Ordinary Court Martial 1999 (2) SA 471 (C); 
Vashakmadze M Understanding Military Justice (2010) 10. 
4
 Act 16 of 1999. 
5
 See in this regard Tshivhase A E “Military Courts in a Democratic South Africa: An Assessment 
of their Independence” (2006) 6 New Zealand Armed Forces Law Review 96 at 98; Tshivhase A 
E “Transformation of Military Courts” (2009) 24 South African Public Law 450 at 453-454. 
6
 See Minister of Defence v Potsane; Legal Soldier (Pty) Ltd v Minister of Defence 2002 (1) SA 1 
(CC) para 31.  The clean break, however, only pertained to the military courts and their 
procedures.  Sentencing options remain static, except for some minor changes to the maximum 
amount of the fine that may be imposed. 
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presided over by military judges, came questions on the constitutionality, 
impartiality and independence of the courts.  However, before a determination 
can be made about these concerns, it is necessary to understand the 
composition and the procedures of the different military courts. 
 
The new military courts7 established by the MDSMA are the Court of Military 
Appeal (CMA),8 the Court of a Senior Military Judge (CSMJ),9 the Court of a 
Military Judge (CMJ)10 and the Commanding Officer’s Disciplinary Hearing 
(CODH).11 
 
Apart from establishing a new court structure in order to maintain military 
discipline, the object of the MDSMA is to provide for the proper administration of 
military justice and the maintenance of military discipline and ensuring that the 
accused receives a fair trial and has access to the High Court of South Africa.12  
The military justice system operates in terms of a different system than that of the 
civilian justice system because they serve different purposes.  Whereas the aim 
and purpose of the civilian system is to punish offenders for the crimes that they 
have committed, the main aim of the military justice system is to enforce 
discipline.13 
                                               
7
 Section 1 of the MDSMA defines a military court as “[a]ny one of the following courts and the 
disciplinary hearing referred to in section 6.” Section 6 of the MDSMA names these courts.  See 
also in this regard Stoop B C “Defence” in Law of South Africa: Vol 7 (LAWSA) 2 ed (2004) para 
397; Carnelley M “The South African Military Court System – Independent, Impartial and 
Constitutional?” (2005) 33(2) Scientia Militaria 55 at 59.  The MDSMA not only defines the 
different courts but also regulate the pre-trial, trial and post-trial procedures (see Berne R A & 
Doha H N S A (eds) Military Justice Legislation Model: Republic of South Africa: Military 
Discipline Supplementary Measures Act, 1999 (2010) at 10). 
8
 Sections 7-8 of the MDSMA; LAWSA paras 398-399. 
9
 Section 9 of the MDSMA; LAWSA para 400. 
10
 Section 10 of the MDSMA; LAWSA para 401. 
11
 Section 11 of the MDSMA; LAWSA para 402. 
12
 Section 2 of the MDSMA. 
13
 See Minister of Defence v Potsane; Legal Soldier (Pty) Ltd v Minister of Defence 2002 (1) SA 1 
(CC) paras 4, 10, 23 and 38; Council of Review, South African Defence Force v Mönnig 1992 (3) 
SA 482 (A) at 492; Vashakmadze at 10; Morris L J Military Justice: A Guide to the Issues (2010) 
at 3; Ministerial Task Team Report by the Ministerial Task Team on Transformation of Military 
Legal System (2005) at 32; R v Généraux [1992] 1 SCR 259 (the “purpose of a separate system 
of military tribunals is to allow the Armed Forces to deal with matters that pertain directly to the 
discipline, efficiency and morale of the military….To maintain the Armed Forces in a state of 
readiness, the military must be in a position to enforce internal discipline effectively and 
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A system of military justice can be said to have two purposes: 
 
a. “[T]o ensure the discipline of its members in a just manner.”  In this 
sense military law is seen as the backbone of military discipline in 
the armed forces.14 
 
b. “[T]o provide an instrument of management.”15  It assists the 
military in acting against offenders, enabling prompt action.  In this 
sense, according to Anderson, military law promotes organisational 
goals 16. 
 
Although the military justice system is a separate system from the civilian 
environment, it should not be so different that it does not comply with acceptable 
standards of law as practiced in the civilian courts.17  The military justice system 
can, to a large extent, be seen as a merging of military traditions and the criminal 
procedure followed in the civilian courts.18  The procedures followed during a 
                                                                                                                                            
efficiently.  Breaches of military discipline must be dealt with speedily and frequently, punished 
more severely than would be the case if a civilian engaged in such conduct.  There is thus a need 
for separate tribunals to enforce special disciplinary standards in the military”). 
14
 Anderson G C The Legal Classification of Military Tribunals as Courts of Law (1988) at 98; 
O’Callahan v Parker 395 US 258 (1969).  Discipline within the military environment is very 
important and strict.  The Constitution provides in s 200(1) that the “defence force must be 
structured and managed as a disciplined military force”.  According to LAWSA para 394 the main 
purpose of military discipline is to maintain the “operational efficiency of the national defence 
force” (see also Carnelley at 56; Vashakmadze at 10; ch 1 at para 1.6.2).  Consequently 
punishment may be harsh to ensure discipline (see R v Davids 1983 (2) SA 807 (SR) at 808; 
Woolman et al at 23B-47; Minister of Defence v Potsane; Legal Soldier (Pty) Ltd v Minister of 
Defence 2002 (1) SA 1 (CC) para 39. 
15
 Anderson at 98. 
16
 Anderson at 99; Vashakmadze at 10.  The ability of the military court to take immediate action 
enables the restoration of discipline. 
17
 See Vashakmadze at 21 where the author says that the “military and ordinary civilian systems 
of justice should apply comparable standards with respect to training, judicial independence and 
career prospects.  The military justice system should not be completely isolated from its civilian 
counterpart.” 
18
 For a short discussion on the ceremonial aspects and military court traditions see Anderson at 
104. 
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military trial are similar to those in civilian trials.19  However, where any other law 
is in conflict with the MDSMA, not including the Constitution, the MDSMA will 
prevail.20 
 
Military courts must act in conformity with the Constitution.21  Subsequently the 
military courts have to comply with fair trial guarantees and international 
standards as found in the Constitution.  The military justice system was 
challenged inter alia on two important aspects, being (1) the constitutionality of 
the courts martial system22 and (2) the existence of the military prosecution 
counsel.23 
 
The Freedom of Expression Institute24 and Potsane25 cases compelled the courts 
to consider the status of the military courts within the wider judiciary.  
Determining the status of the military courts is important since they are 
authorised to sentence an accused, which may include a deprivation of freedom.  
The judicial authority to sentence an individual vests in the courts.26  Terblanche 
defines “sentencing” as “the action by a formal criminal court of imposing a 
sentence on a convicted offender.”27  Consequently, to legitimately impose a 
                                               
19
 Rules 18 and 20 of the MDSMA.  See also s 84 of the MDC (“[t]he rules of evidence as applied 
by the civil courts of the Republic shall be followed in and by military courts…”); s 21 of the 
MDSMA (enjoining prosecution and defence counsel to “act in conformity with the provisions of 
this Act and, in relation to the examination, cross-examination and re-examination of witnesses, 
the practice of the civilian courts in the Republic” should be followed).  However, the criminal 
procedure followed in the civilian courts cannot be used to supplement the powers of the military 
courts where the defence legislation does not provide for those specific powers (see in this regard 
r 21 of the MDSMA). 
20
 Section 4 of the MDSMA.  Berne & Doha at 10 postulates that s 4 of the MDSMA interferes with 
the implementation of civilian legislation in our military courts. 
21
 Section 2 of the Constitution confirms its supremacy.  All laws are subject to the Constitution 
and the Bill of Rights (see Tshivhase (2009) at 454-455). 
22
 See Freedom of Expression Institute v President, Ordinary Court Martial 1999 (2) SA 471 (C). 
23
 See Minister of Defence v Potsane; Legal Soldier (Pty) Ltd v Minister of Defence 2002 (1) SA 1 
(CC); Tshivhase (2009) at 461.  This aspect falls outside the scope of the current research but for 
a brief discussion in this regard see Woolman et al at 23B-47 to 23B-48. 
24
 Freedom of Expression Institute v President, Ordinary Court Martial 1999 (2) SA 471 (C). 
25
 Minister of Defence v Potsane; Legal Soldier (Pty) Ltd v Minister of Defence 2002 (1) SA 1 
(CC). 
26
 Section 165 of the Constitution. 
27
 Terblanche S S A Guide to Sentencing in South Africa (2007) at 2. 
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sentence on an accused, the court should be regarded as a “criminal” court 
which has the authority to convict an accused for an offence.28  
 
Military sentences, being unique, are discussed below according to the following 
framework: 
 
1. The status of the military courts. 
 
2. General principles regarding military punishments. 
 
3. Prescribed military punishments. 
 
3.2 Military courts 
 
3.2.1 Introduction 
 
Each military court has its own penal jurisdiction, depending on the status of the 
court.  There are two courts of the first instance, the CSMJ and the CMJ, as well 
as a disciplinary forum, the CODH.  Their penal jurisdiction is determined by the 
MDSMA.29  From these courts matters are referred for appeal and review to the 
CMA.  Therefore it is prudent to have a short overview of the various courts’ 
procedures before discussing their status as courts of law.30   
 
3.2.2 The Court of Military Appeal 
 
The CMA is the highest military court and its judgments are binding on all lower 
military courts.31  Unlike the High Courts of South Africa the CMA does not have 
inherent jurisdiction and its jurisdiction is set out in the legislation.32 
                                               
28
 See De Lange v Smuts 1998 (1) SA 736 (CC) at 740-741. 
29
 Sections 11-12 of the MDSMA. 
30
 See ch 4 below. 
31
 Section 6(3) of the MDSMA; Tshivhase (2006) at 108. 
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The members of the court are appointed by the Minister33 and consist of three to 
five members, depending on the offence.34  The Minister may establish more 
than one CMA35 and the court can sit any place inside or outside the borders of 
the RSA.36  This court therefore only operates on an ad hoc basis.  This creates 
two potential constitutional concerns regarding the independence of the court: 
 
1. Being appointed on an ad hoc basis may have implications 
regarding the requirement that judges must have security of tenure 
to be seen as independent.37 
 
2. The appointment of the judges by the Minister of Defence is 
possibly contrary to the procedure that should be followed in the 
appointment of judges in terms of the Constitution.38 
 
In the case of serious offences such as treason, murder, rape or culpable 
homicide committed outside the borders of the RSA, or a contravention of 
sections 4 or 5 of the MDC, the CMA is composed of five judges, an 
appropriately qualified officer of the permanent force with a law degree and a 
                                                                                                                                            
32
 Section 6(2) of the MDSMA. 
33
 Section 7(1) of the MDSMA.  The relevant minister referred is the Minister of Defence and 
Military Veterans. 
34
 In the case of serious offences such as treason, murder, rape or culpable homicide committed 
outside the borders of the RSA, or a contravention of ss 4 or 5 of the MDC, the CMA is composed 
of five judges, an appropriately qualified officer of the permanent force with an appropriate law 
degree and a person qualified with experience as a commander (see also s 7(1)(a) of the 
MDSMA).  In all other instances the court will consist of three judges and the appropriate officers 
as mentioned (see s 7(1)(b) of the MDSMA; LAWSA para 398; Carnelley at 59; Tshivhase (2006) 
at 108).  An appropriately qualified officer refers to an officer who has completed and passed a 
departmental course in military law (see s 1 of the MDSMA; Tshivhase (2009) at 456). 
35
 Section 7(2) of the MDSMA.  The Adjutant General must then determine which cases or 
classes of cases must be heard by which courts. 
36
 Section 7(4) of the MDSMA.  Unlike the civilian courts, military courts are not bound by area 
regarding their jurisdiction. 
37
 Freedom of Expression Institute v President, Ordinary Court Martial 1999 (2) SA 471 (C) para 
23; Findlay v The United Kingdom (1997) 24 EHRR 221 para 72; R v Valente (1985) 24 DLR (4th) 
161 (SCC).   
38
 For a discussion of these concerns, see ch 4 at para 4.2.1.5 Selection and appointment below. 
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person qualified with experience as a commander in the field.39  In all other 
instances the court consists of three members.40  A five-member military appeal 
court is chaired by an incumbent or retired High Court judge and a three-member 
military appeal court by an incumbent or retired High Court judge or magistrate 
with at least ten years’ continuous experience.41 
 
Cases heard by the CSMJ and CMJ will serve before the CMA in one of three 
instances: 
 
1. Where the accused was sentenced to imprisonment, suspended 
imprisonment, cashiering, discharge with ignominy and dismissal or 
discharge from the SANDF.42 
 
2. When the Director: Military Judicial Reviews refers a case to the 
Court of Military Appeal.43  
 
3. When the offender applies for review to the CMA.44 
 
The CMA has full appeal and review competencies regarding any case tried by a 
military court.45 
 
 
 
                                               
39
 See also s 7(1)(a) of the MDSMA. 
40
 See s 7(1)(b) of the MDSMA; LAWSA para 398; Carnelley at 59; Tshivhase (2006) at 108. 
41
 Sections 7(1)(a)(i) and 7(1)(b)(i) of the MDSMA.  The Minister may also appoint an alternative 
chairperson. 
42
 Sections 7(1)(a) (i)-(iii) and 34(2) of the MDSMA read with rr 71(1) and (3)(a) of the MDSMA. 
43
 Section 34(3) of the MDSMA read with rr 71(4) and 73 of the MDSMA. 
44
 Section 34(5) of the MDSMA read with rr 71(3)(b) and 72 of the MDSMA.  The offender may 
apply for review by the CMA within six months of his conviction.  The CMA may allow late 
submission of the application if good cause is shown, but may not allow the review if the late 
application is done later than two years after conviction (see further ch 7 at para 7.4.6 below). 
45
 Section 8(1) of the MDSMA; LAWSA para 399; Carnelley at 73-74 (the powers of the CMA is in 
line with s 35(3)(o) of the Constitutional requirement of an accused’s right to appeal and review); 
ch 7 at para 7.4.8 below. 
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3.2.3 The Court of a Senior Military Judge 
 
The CSMJ is the highest military court of first instance and consists of an officer 
of at least the rank of Colonel,46 with a minimum of five years experience as a 
practicing advocate or attorney or five years experience in the administration of 
criminal or military justice.47  
 
The CSMJ has the jurisdiction to try any person, irrespective of their rank, who is 
subject to the MDC for any offence, except murder, rape, treason or culpable 
homicide committed within the borders of the RSA.  Upon conviction the court 
may impose any sentence referred to in section 12 of the MDSMA.48  Where 
serious offences are tried, the CSMJ will consist of three judges under the 
presidency of the most senior of the judges.49 
 
The court also consists of two military assessors.50  Assessors are appointed by 
the Director: Military Judges or a military judge authorised by the Director.51  
Where military assessors are appointed, they will start their duty after the plea of 
                                               
46
 Or Navy equivalent of captain.  See also LAWSA para 400. 
47
 Section 9(1) of the MDSMA.  The person must also be assigned by the Minister to act as a 
senior judge (see s 14(1)(b) of the MDSMA).  Section 13(1)(2) of the MDSMA provides that all 
military judges must hold an appropriate degree in law.  According to the Personnel Management 
Code (PMC): Department of Defence Occupational Category: Military Law Practitioner (MLP) 
PMC Code: 00911 (2007) para 9(c) an appropriate degree in law refers to an LLB or BProc 
degree. 
48
 Section 9(2) of the MDSMA.  There is no limitation on the sentencing jurisdiction of this court. 
49
 Section 9(3) of the MDSMA.  The offences referred to are murder, rape, treason and culpable 
homicide committed outside the borders of the RSA, as well as contraventions of ss 4 and 5 of 
the MDC. 
50
 Sections 20 and 30(24) of the MDSMA.  A military assessor is an officer or warrant officer who 
assists the military judge in deciding the facts of the case.  Assessors only assist a military judge 
when requested to so by the accused.  The accused has the right to elect to be tried by a judge 
with two assessors and he may elect that one of the assessors must be a warrant officer.  In S v 
Kunene (CMA 38/2000) the CMA held that where an accused does not exercise his choice 
regarding the election of a warrant officer both assessors appointed by the judge will be officers.  
Military assessors play an important role in assisting the court to ensure that justice is seen to be 
done in those instances where the accused feels that because of differences in cultures and 
beliefs that he will not receive a fair trial. 
51
 Section 20(1) of the MDSMA.  Assessors are appointed from a register of military assessors 
held by the legal satellite offices (legsatos).   The factors considered when choosing an assessor 
include, inter alia, the military, social and cultural environment of the accused as well as his 
educational background (for the complete criteria in choosing as assessor see ss 20(2)–(4) of the 
MDSMA). 
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the accused.52  If a question of law arises, the judge will decide the matter 
without the assistance of the assessors,53 and a finding by the court will be by a 
majority of the court.54  
 
When conducting a trial, the military judge must exercise his authority,55 inter 
alia: 
 
1. independently and only subject to the Constitution and the law; 
 
2. by applying the Constitution and the law impartially and without fear, 
favour or prejudice; 
 
3. the court must ensure that the accused does not suffer any disadvantage 
due to his position as an accused, irrespective of whether the accused is 
represented or not.56 
 
In exercising their authority all judges must perform their duties in a manner that 
is consistent with the policy directives issued by the Director: Military Judges, but 
otherwise free of any command or executive interference.57 
                                               
52
 Section 20(5) of the MDSMA. 
53
 Section 20(6) of the MDSMA. 
54
 Judges must indicate clearly whether the findings of the court are unanimous and if not, the 
reasons for the dissenting finding must be clearly set out (see s 20(8) of the MDSMA). 
55
 See s 19 of the MDSMA; LAWSA para 405. 
56
 Anecdotal evidence indicates that a military court ensures that an accused does not appear in 
court unrepresented.  Where the accused refuses legal representation the military judge will 
instruct military defence counsel to attend the trial and be available if the accused needs 
assistance.  However, in S v Hoffman (CMA 058/2005) the accused before the military court in 
Oudtshoorn was instructed to obtain legal counsel in October 2002.  On 5 February 2005, a half 
hour before commencement of the trial, the accused fired his defence counsel.  The judge gave 
him until that afternoon to either obtain new counsel or make alternative arrangements regarding 
his defence.  The accused failed to appear before the court and a final remand was given until the 
following morning.  On the morning of 6 February the prosecution submitted a letter from an 
attorney in Malmesbury requesting a postponement in order to take instructions from his client, 
the accused.  The judge refused a further postponement and ordered the trial of the undefended 
accused.  Military defence counsel was made available to the accused and sat in for the duration 
of the trial, although the accused refused to make use of him.  The CMA found this to be a gross 
irregularity since the accused did not have sufficient time to prepare and set the finding and 
sentence aside. 
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3.2.3.1 Trial procedure: General comments 
 
When a date and time have been set for the trial by the Court of a Senior Military 
Judge, the members will assemble behind closed doors where the presiding 
judge will satisfy himself that the other military judges, if applicable, as well as the 
assessors are present and qualified to serve at the proceedings.58  Once the 
judge is satisfied that the court is properly constituted, the court is opened and 
the proceedings are subsequently conducted in open court.59 
 
The following people are present during the trial:60 
 
1. The accused. 
2. The prosecutor. 
3. Defence counsel, where applicable. 
4. An interpreter, where required. 
5. Such members of the public who wish to attend, subject to the seating 
availability of the venue. 
 
The prosecutor calls the case for trial and the court orderly calls the accused into 
court.61  The accused, accompanied by an escort, is marched in by the court 
orderly.  The escort will then show the necessary salute and compliments to the 
court.62  Once the accused is before the court, he identifies himself by stating 
                                                                                                                                            
57
 Section 14(4) of the MDSMA.  The policy directive issued to the military judges must be in line 
with the Constitution and the law in order to comply with s 19 of the MDSMA.  If there is a conflict 
between the requirements of the law and policy directives, the law will trump the policy directive. 
58
 Rule 30(1) of the MDSMA. 
59
 Rule 30(3) of the MDSMA; s 33(3) of the MDSMA. 
60
 Rule 31(1) of the MDSMA. 
61
 Rule 32(1) of the MDSMA. 
62
 Traditionally the escort takes responsibility for the accused during and after the trial.  The escort 
must see to it that the accused is in court and in the event that the accused is ordered into 
detention by the court at the end of the trial, it is the escort’s responsibility to ensure that the 
accused does not escape custody.  The escort of the accused will be of the same or higher rank 
than the accused. 
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aloud his force number, rank, full names and unit.63  The presiding judge in turn 
identifies himself and introduces the other judges (if any) and assessors to the 
accused.64 
 
Where applicable, the prosecutor or the accused may now request that the trial 
be held in camera.  The court will only grant such an application in those 
instances where they are of opinion that it would be in the “interest of justice, 
public safety, the administration of justice, national security, or to protect the 
identity of juveniles or the privacy of any party other than the accused…”65  The 
application will be considered in closed proceedings where the prosecutor and 
the accused will be afforded the opportunity to address the court or, if required, 
lead evidence.  If the application is successful all attending members of the 
public are required to leave the court. 
 
The presiding judge or the assessors must recuse themselves if: 
 
1. They are related to the accused or the complainant by “affinity or 
consanguinity in the first or second degree”.66 
 
2. They have, or during the trial gain any knowledge of the facts of the case 
outside the proceedings that may or is likely to prejudice them in their 
decision.67 
 
3. They bear the accused such animosity that it is likely to prejudice their 
decision.68 
 
4. They have a personal interest in the proceedings. 
                                               
63
 Rule 32(2) of the MDSMA. 
64
 Rules 33(1)-(2) of the MDSMA. 
65
 Section 33(3)(c) of the MDSMA. 
66
 Rule 35(1)(a) of the MDSMA. 
67
 Rule 35(1)(b) of the MDSMA. 
68
 Rule 35(1)(c) of the MDSMA. 
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5. Any of them have signed as a witness on the accused’s election to be 
heard at the CODH.69 
 
If there is no recusal, the accused is given the opportunity by the presiding judge 
to object to being tried by any of the judges or the assessors.70  The accused can 
object on the grounds that the assessor has a personal interest in the case, that 
there is likely to be a conflict of interest because of his participation in the case or 
that he might be biased.71 
 
In the instance where the accused objects, the functionary against whom the 
objection was raised will leave the proceedings and the remaining members will 
hear the objection and any argument or evidence relating to the objection.  In the 
case where only one military judge is presiding, that military judge will hear the 
objection and make the determination.72  Where the objection is upheld or where 
there is an equality of the votes, the presiding judge will report the determination 
to the local representative of the Adjutant General who will then replace the judge 
with a relief judge.73  Where an objection is upheld against one of the assessors 
the relevant assessor will withdraw.  The assessor will not be replaced by 
another assessor.74 
 
The judge proceeds to administer the oath75 to all the assessors, court 
functionaries and members under instruction where it may be applicable. 
                                               
69
 Rule 35(1)(d) of the MDSMA.  The fact that they were involved in the administrative process 
prior to the matter serving before the court, such as being a witness during the election stage, 
may imply prior knowledge of the facts by the presiding officer. 
70
 Rule 36(1) of the MDSMA. 
71
 See s 20(9) of the MDSMA.  Although s 20(9) of the MDSMA only provides for the recusal of 
assessors, r 36(2) of the MDSMA provides that the grounds for objections by the accused apply 
to both the military judge and the assessor. 
72
 Rule 36(3) of the MDSMA. 
73
 Rule 36(5) of the MDSMA.  The accused may also object to be tried by the relief judge and the 
process followed will be the same as with the first objection (see r 36(9) of the MDSMA). 
74
 S v Kunene (CMA 38/2000). 
75
 The various oaths and affirmations are found in Chapter 15 of the rules to the MDSMA and 
each court functionary or witness has a specific oath (see rr 80–88 of the MDSMA). 
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Where the prosecution counsel intends to amend the charge sheet or withdraw 
one or more of the charges it must be done before the charge sheet is read to 
the accused.  The prosecution counsel now reads the charge sheet to the 
accused.  Before pleading to any of the charges the court explains to the 
accused his right to object76 to the trial (on the grounds that the military court has 
no jurisdiction over him or the offence)77 or to any charge, on the ground that it 
does not disclose any offence. 
 
The court will hear evidence from both parties regarding the objection, make a 
finding and announce the finding in open court.  Where the objection is upheld, 
the prosecution counsel will take the appropriate steps to have the accused tried 
before a court with the appropriate jurisdiction.78 
 
Where there is a defect in the charge, the court can allow the prosecution 
counsel to amend the charge sheet where it would not be prejudicial to the 
accused and the court will postpone the matter to allow the accused to prepare 
properly for his defence on the amended charge.  Where the charge cannot be 
amended without prejudice to the accused, the court will allow the objection and 
strike the charge from the charge sheet.79 
 
                                               
76
 Rule 38 MDSMA. 
77
 Military law, which includes the MDC, the MDSMA and the Defence Act applies to all uniform 
members of the SANDF (see s 104(5) of the Defence Act 44 of 1957; s 3(1)(a) of the Defence Act 
42 of 2002; s 3(2) of the MDSMA).  Since the CSMJ has jurisdiction over all ranks and all 
offences except murder, rape, treason and culpable homicide committed inside the borders of the 
Republic, the only possible successful objection might be in terms of the prescription periods in ss 
58 and 59 of the MDC.  In terms of s 58 of the MDC, the military court will only have jurisdiction 
over an offence, subject to certain exceptions, where the case is brought to trial within three years 
after the date of the commission of the offence.  After three years, the military courts lose 
jurisdiction.  The civil courts however retain jurisdiction and the matter may be heard in civil court.  
Section 59 of the MDC holds that the military court will only have jurisdiction over members who 
are subject to the MDC.  This is also subject to certain exceptions as found in ss 59(1)(a)–(c) of 
the MDC.  The military court will retain jurisdiction over a person who is no longer subject to the 
MDC if the offence for which he is being tried was committed while he was subject to the MDC 
and the accused is tried within three months of him no longer being subject to the MDC. 
78
 Rules 39(1)-(2) of the MDSMA. 
79
 Rule 39(3) of the MDSMA. 
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Where the objection is not upheld, the trial will continue.  The accused is then 
required to plea to each charge separately.80 
 
Where the accused pleads guilty, he can be convicted of that charge.81  
However, where an accused pleads guilty to the offences of murder, rape or 
culpable homicide committed outside the borders of the country or to a 
contravention of sections 4 or 5 of the MDC, the court will record a plea of ‘not 
guilty’.82  It is also possible for an accused to change any plea of ‘guilty’ or ‘not 
guilty’ any time before a finding is made by the court on a charge.83  Where the 
plea is changed to one of “not guilty”, the trial will continue as if the accused 
pleaded “not guilty” from the outset and the prosecution counsel will call all 
witnesses not previously called or re-call witnesses if required. 
 
The trial procedure to be followed from here depend the accused’s plea.  The 
trial procedure differs depending whether the accused pleads “not guilty”84 or 
“guilty.”85  
 
3.2.3.2 Trial when the accused pleads “not guilty” 
 
The prosecutor may start the trial with an opening address.  This is not 
compulsory, unless ordered by the court to do so.  During this opening address 
the prosecution counsel will outline the evidence to be adduced.86  Although it is 
not required, it is advisable that the prosecution give an opening address in those 
                                               
80
 In terms of r 41 of the MDSMA, the accused can, apart from pleas of “guilty” or “not guilty” raise 
a number of special pleas.  Any two of the pleas provided in r 41(1) of the MDSMA may be 
pleaded together.  The plea must be tendered by the accused and not by his legal representative. 
81
 Rule 42(1)(b) of the MDSMA.  See also in this regard s 88 of the MDC which allows for 
alternative charges to both military as well as civilian offences. 
82
 Rules 42(9)(b)(i)-(ii) of the MDSMA. 
83
 Rules 43 and 44 of the MDSMA.  It is also the duty of the court to change an accused’s plea of 
“guilty” to “not guilty” where it appears to the court that the accused did not intend to plead guilty, 
has a valid defence or incorrectly made any admissions (see in this regard r 44(1)(b)(i)-(iii) of the 
MDSMA.  
84
 See Chapter 7 of the rules to the MDSMA. 
85
 See Chapter 8 of the rules to the MDSMA. 
86
 Rule 45(a) of the MDSMA. 
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instances where the accused is charged with multiple charges.  It makes it easier 
for the court to follow the evidence. 
 
The accused, or his defence counsel on his behalf, may also choose to give an 
opening address, however, in instances where acting on authority or an alibi is 
raised as defence, the defence is compelled to give an opening address.87 
 
The accused may then make any admission regarding any disputed fact before 
the court and the prosecution is afforded the same opportunity.  Where such 
admissions are made, it is considered sufficient proof of the matter and no further 
evidence needs to be adduced regarding such fact.88 
 
After the opening addresses, the prosecution counsel leads the evidence on 
behalf of the state.  In those instances where a preliminary investigation89 was 
held, all the witnesses who testified at the preliminary investigation, or whose 
statements were submitted, are called by the prosecution counsel.  In the event 
                                               
87
 Rule 45(b) of the MDSMA. 
88
 Rule 46 of the MDSMA. 
89
 The purpose of a preliminary investigation is to investigate allegations that an accused, who is 
subject to the MDC, has committed an offence and with the intention to then bring that accused 
before a military court for trial.  Preliminary investigations are ordered during the appearance (the 
arraignment) of an accused in terms of s 29 of the MDSMA where the judge or commanding 
officer appoints a recording officer to complete the preliminary investigation.  A preliminary 
investigation may be ordered for any offence committed by a person of any rank group, but is 
usually not done in those instances where the offence and rank of the accused results in the 
offence falling within the jurisdiction of the CODH, ie where the accused is below the rank of 
warrant officer and where he committed a disciplinary offence.  Preliminary investigations are 
compulsory, irrespective of rank, where the accused committed treason, murder, rape or culpable 
homicide outside the borders of the Republic, any contravention of ss 4 or 5 of the MDC or any 
offence where the prescribed punishment exceeds ten years imprisonment.  See s 30 of the 
MDSMA for an explanation of the process of preliminary investigations.  Following the correct 
procedures in completing the preliminary investigations are extremely important.  In S v Maluleke 
(CMA 31/2009) the CMA held that where the seriousness of the offence requires that a 
preliminary investigation be held, an irregular preliminary investigation not done in accordance 
with the prescripts of s 30(8) of the MDSMA would result in any subsequent trial being ultra vires.  
“The (invalid) preliminary investigation(s) lead to the lack of jurisdiction of a military court to try the 
accused.  In fact, no military court would have jurisdiction without a valid preliminary investigation 
from which these serious charges followed.”  The military courts however failed to enforce the 
direction provided by the CMA in Maluleke and subsequently most of the CMA decisions for 2011 
resulted in the setting aside of the findings on serious offences because the correct preliminary 
investigation had not been followed (see also in this regard S v Goliath (CMA 078/2004); S v 
Dippenaar (CMA 038/2004)). 
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that the prosecution counsel wishes to call witnesses whose statements are not 
contained in the preliminary investigation, the accused must be afforded 
sufficient opportunity to prepare and the prosecution counsel has to furnish the 
accused with a copy of the statement to allow the accused to prepare.90  Where 
the prosecution does not furnish the accused with a copy prior to the trial, the 
witness may be allowed to testify and the court will then grant a reasonable 
postponement before cross-examination to allow the defence to prepare for 
cross-examination.91 
 
After the prosecution counsel has adduced all the evidence required to prove its 
case, the case is closed.  Where the prosecution counsel did not call all the 
witnesses who testified in the preliminary investigation, the court must be 
informed and the witness made available to the defence and the court.92 
 
After closing of the state’s case the court must inform the accused of his rights in 
terms of rule 48 of the MDSMA.  The accused will now have the opportunity to 
apply for acquittal of the charges on the grounds that the prosecution counsel did 
not establish a prima facie case against him.  He may also choose to close his 
case without leading any evidence for the defence.93  The court will close to 
consider any such application brought by the accused.  If the court finds that the 
prosecution counsel did not establish a prima facie case, it will return a verdict of 
“not guilty.”94  Where the court finds that a prima facie case was established, the 
application for acquittal is refused and the trial continues.  The accused may then 
choose to close his case without leading any evidence.95 
 
Where the accused is not discharged at the close of the state’s case, the court 
has to inform the accused that he has the right to remain silent and that no 
                                               
90
 Rule 47(2) of the MDSMA. 
91
 Rule 47(3) of the MDSMA. 
92
 Rule 47(6) of the MDSMA. 
93
 Rule 48(1) of the MDSMA. 
94
 Rule 48(3) of the MDSMA. 
95
 Rule 48(4) of the MDSMA. 
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negative inference may be drawn if he should choose to exercise that right.96 In 
addition the court must ask the accused whether he intends to adduce any 
evidence.  The accused is then also given the opportunity to address the court 
regarding any evidence that he may adduce.97 
 
Where the accused indicates to the court that he will be adducing evidence and 
indicates that he will be testifying or making an unsworn statement on his own 
behalf, the accused must testify before calling any other witnesses.98  If, during 
the presentation of the defence’s case, the accused decides to testify, this will 
affect the weight of the evidence and the court may draw any inference it may 
deems reasonable from the accused’s actions.99  After adducing all evidence, the 
accused will close his case. 
 
The prosecutor is now compelled to make a closing address to the court and the 
accused may make a closing address.  Where the accused makes such an 
address, the prosecutor may reply on any point of law raised during the 
accused’s closing address.100 
 
The military court will now close to consider its finding on all the charges levelled 
against the accused.  The burden of proof for conviction of any charge, or 
alternative charge, is “beyond reasonable doubt.”101 
 
3.2.3.3 Trial when the accused pleads “guilty” 
 
Where an accused pleads guilty on the charges, it “constitutes the unambiguous 
admission of all the elements of that charge, the accused’s intention to 
                                               
96
 Rule 49(1)(a) of the MDSMA. 
97
 Rule 49(1)(b) of the MDSMA. 
98
 Rule 49(2)(a) of the MDSMA.  Where the accused chooses to make an unsworn statement, the 
accused cannot be cross-examined, but the court may ask questions to elucidate any matter (see 
r 49(5) of the MDSMA in this regard). 
99
 Rule 49(2)(b) of the MDSMA. 
100
 Rule 50 of the MDSMA. 
101
 Rule 51 of the MDSMA. 
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acknowledge his or her guilt on that charge…”102  The exact procedure depends 
on whether, prior to the trial, a preliminary investigation was held or not.103 
 
If a preliminary investigation was held104 the court, after hearing and recording 
the plea of the accused, closes to peruse the evidence recorded at the 
preliminary investigation.105  If the court is satisfied that this record proves that 
the offences mentioned in the charge sheet were actually committed, the court 
may convict the accused.106 Prior to reading the evidence recorded at the 
preliminary investigation, the court may allow the accused to make any 
admissions relevant to the charges and also allow the prosecution to lead 
relevant evidence.107 If after perusing all this evidential material the court is not 
satisfied that the charges are proven, it must record a plea of “not guilty.” Then 
the trial will continue as if the accused pleaded “not guilty” from the start.108 
 
If an accused pleads “guilty” but no preliminary investigation was held, there is no 
evidence of the offence before the court.  The court may, however, convict the 
accused on his plea of “guilty” alone.109 In these instances, the court may, in its 
discretion, question the accused in order to ensure that the offence was in fact 
                                               
102
 Rule 53(1) of the MDSMA.  It also includes a concession that the court has jurisdiction over the 
accused and the charge. 
103
 During the preliminary investigation the prosecution counsel gathers all the evidence, either by 
means of oral evidence under oath or by means of affidavits, to ensure that the state has a prima 
facie case against the accused.  The prosecution then reads all the evidence over to the accused.  
Where a prima facie case is established a preliminary charge sheet is read and the accused is 
given the opportunity to present his side of the case.  He may however exercise his right to 
remain silent.  Upon completion, copies of the preliminary investigation are handed over to the 
prosecution counsel for prosecution and the accused is provided with a copy in order to prepare 
for his defence.  For the complete procedures see s 30 of the MDSMA. 
104
 Rule 54 of the MDSMA. 
105
 If the accused pleads guilty to an alternative to the main charge, the prosecution counsel may 
only accept the guilty plea with the permission of the senior prosecution counsel. 
106
 Rule 54(1) of the MDSMA.  In S v Ngubane (CMA 08/99) the CMA held that where an accused 
pleads guilty the court may accept that plea and convict the accused if it is satisfied after reading 
the preliminary investigation that there is sufficient evidence to show that the accused did commit 
the offence and that he intended to acknowledge his guilt.  In casu the evidence before the court 
showed that the accused suffered from mental illness and the conviction and sentence was set 
aside. 
107
 Rule 54(2) of the MDSMA. 
108
 Rule 54(3) of the MDSMA. 
109
 The procedure is provided for in r 55(1) of the MDSMA. 
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committed, or to elucidate any aspect.110  All questions put to the accused and 
answers must be recorded.111  If the accused is represented and defence 
counsel answers on behalf of the accused, the court must confirm with the 
accused that such answers are in accordance with his instructions.112 
 
The prosecutor may be given the opportunity to adduce evidence and the 
accused will be given the opportunity to make admissions regarding the 
charges.113 
 
Where the judge is assisted by assessors the court must close when considering 
the finding.  If the military judge sits alone the court need not close to consider its 
finding, but the judge must still apply his mind when considering the finding.  
Where the court, taking into account any evidence adduced or any admissions 
made by the accused, is satisfied that the accused is guilty, the accused will be 
convicted. 
 
3.2.3.4 Pleas of “guilty” and “not guilty” on different charges 
 
Where the accused pleads “guilty” to some of the charges and “not guilty” to 
others the different pleas are recorded accordingly.  The “not guilty” pleas are 
dealt with first in the same manner as discussed above.114  Once the court has 
                                               
110
 Rule 55(2) of the MDSMA.  The CMA has found that military courts should ask questions when 
the accused pleads guilty and no preliminary investigation was held.  See S v Ngozi (CMA 
136/2000), where the CMA held that “a court should ascertain whether the accused admits all the 
elements of the offence.  This may be done by directing questions at the accused or by way of a 
statement by the accused explaining his plea(s) of guilty, whether in writing or orally.”  This may 
be in the best interest of an unrepresented accused, but one could question the necessity of the 
court’s decision when the accused is legally represented. 
111
 Rule 55(3) of the MDSMA. 
112
 Rule 55(5) of the MDSMA. 
113
 Rule 55(6) of the MDSMA.  The court should confirm any admissions that the accused makes.  
See S v Mushapi (CMA 073/2007) where the CMA held that where defence counsel had tendered 
certain admissions during the trial and the judge subsequently failed to confirm the admissions 
with the accused, military judges “should always make sure that they confirm the admission with 
the accused.  In the present case the omission was cured by evidence and no prejudice ensued.” 
114
 Rule 57(1) of the MDSMA. 
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made a finding on the “not guilty” pleas then only will the court consider the 
“guilty” pleas in accordance with the procedures discussed above. 
 
Any evidence led during the trial in judging the “not guilty” plea can be taken into 
consideration when deciding on the guilty pleas, insofar as that evidence is 
relevant.115  Any admission made relating to any of the charges can further be 
taken into consideration regarding any of the other charges where the 
admissions may be relevant to such charges.116 
 
3.2.3.5 Post-finding and sentencing procedures 
 
The finding on every charge will be announced in open court.117  The prosecution 
counsel will then read and submit the accused’s record of service.118  The record 
of service is mainly a summary of previous convictions, both civilian and military, 
indicating the type of offence, date of conviction as well as the sentence imposed 
for those offences.119 
 
The accused must confirm that the particulars contained in the record are 
accurate.  In those instances where there is a dispute regarding the accuracy of 
the record of service, evidence will be led by the prosecutor and the accused 
after which the presiding judge will make a ruling.120 
 
At this stage the prosecution counsel and the defence may agree on any facts 
that may be relevant regarding the determination of sentence.  The court will be 
                                               
115
 Rule 57(2) of the MDSMA. 
116
 Rule 57(3) of the MDSMA. 
117
 Rule 58 of the MDSMA. 
118
 Known as the DD28 (see r 59(1) of the MDSMA).  It contains information regarding the 
accused which will be taken into consideration in determining sentence (see the discussion in ch 
5 at para 5.6.1 below).  
119
 Previous convictions of 10 years or more are not taken into account for purposes of 
sentencing. 
120
 Rule 59(2) of the MDSMA. 
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informed that these facts are not in dispute.121  The prosecution counsel is then 
given the opportunity to lead evidence regarding the prevalence of the offence of 
which the accused has been found guilty as well as any other evidence relevant 
to the consideration of the sentence.122  The accused is also given the 
opportunity to adduce evidence in mitigation of sentence.123 
 
In instances where the military court foresees that specific orders may be 
made,124 the court will give the prosecution counsel and the accused the 
opportunity to call witnesses or address the court in this regard.  The court may 
also call witnesses.125  After hearing all evidence the court will close to determine 
the facts relevant to sentencing.  Once these proceedings have been concluded, 
the assessors will withdraw and the court will once again close for the presiding 
judge to take time to consider the sentence.126 
 
A military judge may only impose one sentence, irrespective of the number of 
charges brought against the accused.127  Where the sentence is a valid sentence 
on any of the charges preferred on the charge sheet, that sentence is deemed to 
be a valid sentence in respect of all of the charges of which the accused was 
found guilty.128  The presiding judge will record the sentence in the record of 
proceedings and announce the sentence in open court.129  At this stage the court 
also informs the accused of his rights of appeal and review.130 
                                               
121
 Rule 59(3) of the MDSMA.  Where both parties agree to the facts that are not disputed, the 
parties are bound by that agreement (see S v Malengi (CMA 075/2001) where the prosecution 
argued contrary to the agreed facts the CMA held that “[i]t is a generally accepted principle that a 
party who agreed on certain facts is bound by that agreement”). 
122
 Rule 59(4) of the MDSMA. 
123
 Rule 59(5) of the MDSMA. 
124
 See ss 128, 129, 130 and 148 of the MDC for the relevant court orders.  These orders are 
discussed in ch 6 at paras 6.2.10.1 and 6.3 below.   
125
 Rule 59(6) of the MDSMA.  In S v Titus (CMA 59/2000) the CMA held that “during sentencing 
the trial court can no longer play a passive role…the trial court could have investigated the 
defence’s assertion that the accused acted in the manner he did because of his condition.”  For 
the position in the civilian court see S v Siebert 1998 (1) SACR 554 (A) 559a-b. 
126
 Rule 59(7)-(9) of the MDSMA. 
127
 See ch 5 at 5.7.2 below. 
128
 Rule 59(10) of the MDSMA; s 92 of the MDC. 
129
 Rule 59(11) of the MDSMA. 
130
 See ch 7 below. 
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The court then closes and the accused is marched out by the court orderly.  The 
accused’s escort remains responsible for the custody of the accused.  An 
accused will remain in custody pending the review of his case.131  However, an 
accused will be released from custody when sentenced by the military court to 
one of the following sentences:132 
 
1. A reprimand. 
2. Extra duties. 
3. Corrective punishment. 
4. Confinement to barracks. 
5. A fine.133 
6. Reversion from acting or temporary rank to substantive rank. 
7. Reduction to any lower rank or to the ranks. 
8. Reduction in seniority in rank. 
9. Imprisonment or detention which is entirely suspended. 
 
For any other sentence, such as imprisonment, the local representative of the 
Adjutant General may release the accused from custody on such conditions as 
may be determined by the local representative.  Upon such release, the accused 
will be compelled to attend the subsequent promulgation of the finding and 
sentence once it has been confirmed by the Court of Military Appeal and failure 
to do so will result in the re-arrest of the accused.134 
 
Where the accused is released while awaiting the decision of the CMA, the Chief 
of the South African National Defence Force (CSANDF) may order that the 
                                               
131
 Section 34(9) of the MDSMA. 
132
 Section 34(10) of the MDSMA. 
133
 Where a sentenced accused is no longer subject to the MDC, eg where he has resigned within 
three months prior to his trial, the accused will only be released once the fine has been paid (see 
s 34(10)(b) of the MDSMA). 
134
 Section 34(11) of the MDSMA.  This is usually done because confirmation by the Court of 
Military Appeal can take up to 18 months to complete and it would not be in the interest of justice 
to keep the accused in custody for the duration of the time pending confirmation (see the 
discussion in this regard in ch 7 at para 7.5.3.1 below). 
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accused be suspended for the period awaiting the decision where it would be in 
“the interest of the good governance or reputation of the South African National 
Defence Force, or in the interest of justice…”135  The CSANDF must inform the 
accused in writing of his intention to exercise his powers in this regard and the 
accused will have 24 hours, or longer if permitted by the CSANDF, to make 
representations. 
 
All findings and sentences must be promulgated in the prescribed manner 
subsequent to the trial.136 
 
3.2.4 The Court of a Military Judge 
 
The court procedures, regardless of whether they involve a plea of “guilty” or “not 
guilty” are exactly the same during a trial by a court of a military judge as with the 
court of a senior military judge.137  The differences between the two courts lie in 
their jurisdiction over offences, the seniority of the military judges, the rank of the 
accused and the court’s sentencing jurisdiction. 
 
The CMJ consists of an officer of at least field rank138 with a minimum of three 
years’ experience as an advocate or attorney, or three years’ experience in a 
criminal or military justice system,139 as well as two military assessors.140 
 
This court has jurisdiction over any person subject to the MDC, except officers of 
field rank or higher.  The court may try an accused for any offence except 
                                               
135
 Section 42 of the MDSMA.  As example one can mention the case against a chaplain of Air 
Force Base Langebaanweg who was found guilty of indecent assault of a female subordinate.  
He was sentenced to imprisonment of 12 months and cashiering.  Since the sentence required 
automatic review by the CMA, the chaplain was suspended for the duration pending review since 
it would not have been in the interest of justice to allow him to continue with his ministry in view of 
the nature and the seriousness of the charges (see S v Siwali (CMA 34/2006)). 
136
 Section 35 of the MDSMA; ch 5 para 5.9.1 below. 
137
 See para 3.2.3 above. 
138
 Field rank, as defined in s 1 of the MDC, is a rank of at least a major, being a senior officer’s 
rank. 
139
 Section 10(1) of the MDSMA; Carnelley at 60; LAWSA para 401. 
140
 Section 10(2) of the MDSMA. 
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murder, rape, culpable homicide and contraventions of sections 4 and 5 of the 
MDC, in other words, those offences which involve endangering the safety of the 
forces or a failure of a commander in command of troops to engage the enemy 
during a battle.  Its sentencing jurisdiction includes all those punishments as set 
out in section 12 of the MDSMA, but the sentence of imprisonment is limited to a 
maximum period of two years.141 
 
3.2.5 The Commanding Officer’s Disciplinary Hearing 
 
So far this forum has not received much attention in legal literature. The question 
is whether it qualifies as a court of law, as explained in Chapter 4 below.  The 
answer requires a full discussion. 
 
The disciplinary hearing is ideally suited for promoting military discipline in that it 
is a summary hearing, able to enforce swift justice in instances of relatively minor 
military disciplinary transgressions, imposing relatively light sentences.142 
 
Of the courts listed, the CODH has the lowest jurisdiction.  The court is presided 
over by a commanding officer143 or a subordinate of at least field rank.144  The 
commanding officer does not need a written appointment or delegation since he 
derives his authority directly from the MDSMA, except in the case of a 
subordinate officer, who will necessarily require a written appointment.145  There 
                                               
141
 Section 10(2) of the MDSMA. 
142
 Rant J W Courts-Martial Handbook, Practice and Procedure (1998) at 6 and 80.  Since it is so 
conducive for military discipline this forum, according to the Ministerial Task Team, is recognised 
as part of the principle of a disciplined force in terms of s 200(1) of the Constitution (see also 
Minister of Defence v Potsane; Legal Soldier (Pty) Ltd v Minister of Defence 2002 (1) SA 1 (CC) 
para 40). 
143
 In a general military context a commanding officer is the officer in charge of a military unit or 
formation.  For the purpose of the CODH a commanding officer is defined in s 1 of the MDC as 
“an officer who has been appointed to command any unit or formation of the South African 
National Defence Force and also an officer subordinate in rank to and authorised by such 
commanding officer to conduct disciplinary hearings”.  
144
 In this context a subordinate officer is any officer subordinate in rank to the commanding officer 
of the unit, as long as such subordinate officer holds at least the rank of major. 
145
 Such authorisation must be given in writing and is signed by the relevant commanding officer 
of the unit (see s 11(1) of the MDSMA; LAWSA para 402).  Where a delegated subordinate officer 
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is also no appointment as judicial officer by the Minister as is the case with the 
other levels of military courts.  It is not a requirement that an accused can only be 
tried by a commanding officer of his own unit as long as that presiding officer is a 
commanding officer or has been duly appointed as a trial officer by the 
commanding officer.146  It may happen, for example, that an accused is on 
deployment and will then fall under the command and control of the officer 
commanding of that particular deployment. 
 
The commanding officer has jurisdiction over any person, except officers and 
warrant officers, as long as the accused is of or below the rank of staff sergeant 
and has elected to be tried by a CODH.147  The choice to be tried by CODH is 
done by means of an election certificate.148  The election certificate must be 
witnessed by an officer, other than the commanding officer who is to preside over 
the trial.149  This is done in order to prevent undue influence by the commanding 
officer acting as presiding officer at the trial.  The accused also has the right to 
seek legal advice before exercising his choice.150  The accused must indicate on 
the election certificate whether he had in fact taken legal advice or whether he 
has waived his right to legal representation prior to making his choice.  The 
accused must also indicate the following in the presence of the witness: 
 
1. That he elects to be tried by a disciplinary hearing. 
                                                                                                                                            
does in fact act as trial officer without being duly appointed, such disciplinary hearing will be seen 
as null and void.  In terms of s 11(1) of the MDSMA only commanding officers and subordinates 
“authorised thereto in writing” have the jurisdiction to preside over a CODH. 
146
 Section 11(2) of the MDSMA states that a commanding officer (which includes a duly 
delegated subordinate) may conduct a CODH of any person subject to the MDC and is not 
restricted to members of their own units over whom they exercise command and control. 
147
 Section 11(2) of the MDSMA.  Officers and warrant officers cannot be tried by means of a 
disciplinary hearing even in those instances where they commit purely disciplinary offences.  
Depending on their rank, they will appear before the CSMJ or a CMJ. 
148
 See s 29(5) of the MDSMA; r 60(2) of the MDSMA; Annexure 5 of the rules to the MDSMA.  In 
terms of s 29(5) of the MDSMA an accused with the rank of staff sergeant and below who has 
been charged with a disciplinary offence has the right to elect to be tried by CODH if he intends to 
plead guilty and waives his right to legal representation.  Disciplinary offences are those offences 
for which the prescribed punishment in terms of the MDC does not exceed one year 
imprisonment (see s 1(xviii) of the MDSMA). 
149
 Section 29(6) of the MDSMA. 
150
 Section 29(6) of the MDSMA. 
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2. That he intends to tender a plea of “guilty.”151 
3. That he understands that the prosecutor can arraign him before any 
military court other than a disciplinary hearing. 
 
The election certificate further contains the charge sheet in order for the accused 
to make an informed decision before exercising his choice of opting for a “guilty” 
plea at a disciplinary hearing.  
 
The commanding officer will therefore only have jurisdiction over an accused if: 
 
1. the accused is of the rank below that of a warrant officer; 
 
2. the accused pleads “guilty”;152 and 
 
3. the accused waives his right to legal representation during the trial.  
 
It should also be noted that although the choice of electing a CODH is given to 
the accused, the final decision on whether the accused will be tried at that 
particular forum is dependent on the military prosecution counsel.  Certain 
offences have been removed from the jurisdiction of the CODH in terms of policy 
decisions even though it may be allowed in terms of the Act and the accused will 
have to appear before a CMJ.  These offences include: 
 
1. The contravention of section 24(1)(a) of the MDC, which entails the 
negligent loss of fire-arms or ammunition.153 
                                               
151
 This by no means prevents an accused from changing his plea to one of ‘not guilty’ at any 
stage prior to him being asked to plead during the disciplinary hearing. 
152
 It is not possible for an accused to be found “not guilty” by a CODH.  If, at any stage during the 
trial, the presiding officer is of the opinion that the accused did not intend to plead guilty, or, after 
questioning of the accused, the presiding officer is of the opinion that the accused indeed has a 
potential defence, the trial is stopped and referred to a CMJ.   
153
 In such instances the accused will be charged in terms of the Firearms Control Act 60 of 2000.  
Where a member of the SANDF is found guilty of the negligent handling or loss of a firearm and 
is declared incompetent to possess a firearm by the court, it may have severe consequences for 
 158 
 
2. Section 25 of the MDC, the willful or negligent damage or destruction of 
public property. 
 
3. The contravention of section 26 of the MDC, which entails deficiencies in 
stores. 
 
4. The contravention of section 27 of the MDC, which usually entails the 
unauthorised use of military vehicles or equipment. 
 
5. The contravention of section 28 of the MDC, which includes negligent 
driving of military vehicles and driving under the influence of alcohol, as 
well as reckless flying of an aircraft. 
 
6. All cases of inappropriate sexual conduct in the work place or sexual 
harassment.154 
 
7. Cases of intimidation.155 
 
Where the accused has multiple previous convictions of the same or similar 
nature, the prosecution counsel may foresee the imposition of a sentence of 
more than R600, thereby falling outside the jurisdiction of the CODH.  In this 
case the matter will be referred to the CMJ from the outset.  This will also be the 
case where the accused has a suspended sentence for the same offence and 
there may be a possibility that the suspended sentence may be imposed.  Where 
the accused elects to plead guilty but wants to make use of legal representation, 
the matter will also be referred to the CMJ.  Since the presiding officer at the 
                                                                                                                                            
his further utilisation in the SANDF.  The SANDF cannot employ soldiers who are not allowed to 
own or handle firearms. 
154
 These matters may not be handled administratively at the units.  They must first be brought to 
the attention of the relevant legsato where a decision will be made on how to proceed. 
155
 Instances of intimidation are viewed in a serious light and the handling thereof is determined 
by Department of Defence Instruction 1/2000: Instruction to Counter Intimidation Amongst 
Members of the DoD (2000). 
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CODH is not in possession of a legal degree it would be unfair towards the 
accused and the presiding officer if he had to preside over a matter where he or 
she had to decide complicated legal issues raised by defence counsel.  In the 
interest of justice and a fair trial such matters are to be referred to the CMJ. 
 
3.2.5.1 Trial procedure 
 
Every hearing is conducted in an open court in the presence of the accused, the 
prosecutor,156 any members of the public who wish to attend,157 a member from 
the accused’s department or section158 on request of the accused or a 
representative from the military union159 as well as an interpreter, if required.160 
The trial starts when the accused is marched in by a court orderly, together with 
an appointed escort.161  The accused identifies himself to the commanding officer 
and the commanding officer will in turn identify himself.162  The accused is then 
asked to confirm the election to appear before the disciplinary hearing. 
 
At this stage the commanding officer must recuse himself if there is a likelihood 
that he may be biased against the accused, he has signed the election certificate 
as a witness or he is related to the accused in any way.163  If there are no 
grounds for a recusal the commanding officer informs the accused that he has 
the opportunity to object to the commanding officer conducting the hearing.  The 
grounds for objection are the same as for a recusal, including possible prior 
knowledge of the case.  All objections and arguments must be recorded in writing 
                                               
156
 In this context the prosecutor is usually the Adjutant of the particular unit who has completed 
the Advanced Military Law Course for Officers presented by the School of Military Justice (see 
also r 61(9) of the MDSMA). 
157
 Depending on the available space, which is usually limited since disciplinary hearings are 
generally conducted in the office of the presiding officer. 
158
 Who is senior in rank to the accused 
159
 This representative will act strictly in an observer capacity and cannot act or speak on behalf of 
the accused. 
160
 Rule 61(c) of the MDSMA also makes provision for the disciplinary hearing of prisoners of war 
in which case the accused would be entitled to have a fellow prisoner of war present at the trial. 
161
 Rule 62(1) of the MDSMA. 
162
 Rule 62(2) of the MDSMA. 
163
 Rule 63 of the MDSMA. 
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and attached to the record of proceeding.  All evidence will likewise be recorded 
and attached.  In the event that the commanding officer recuses himself, he 
withdraws and the case is referred back to the commanding officer of the unit 
who will then assign the case to another commanding officer who is competent to 
complete the hearing.  Where the commanding officer does not recuse himself, 
the hearing will continue.  The accused is also given the opportunity to object to 
being tried by the “new” commanding officer.  Arguments will be heard in this 
regard and the trial officer will make the decision whether to continue with the 
trial.164 
 
The prosecutor reads out the charge sheet and hands it in to the trial officer.165  
The accused is asked to plead to each charge separately and each plea is then 
recorded in the record of proceedings.  In the event that the accused enters any 
other plea than one of guilty the proceedings are stopped, the case remanded 
and referred to a court of a military judge.166 After plea, the presiding officer may 
ask any questions for clarification purposes if required.167  If, from the accused’s 
answers, it appears that the accused may in fact have a defence, the trial is 
stopped and the matter referred to a court of a military judge.168  Presiding 
officers in practice seldom ask questions and can then find the accused guilty on 
his plea alone.169  No evidence as to his guilt is led.  The guilty finding on each 
separate charge is announced in open court.170 
 
 
                                               
164
 Rule 64 of the MDSMA. 
165
 This is the charge sheet as contained in the election certificate of which the accused has taken 
cognisance.  The prosecutor and the accused sign the charge sheet prior to the start of the 
CODH. 
166
 Rule 65 of the MDSMA.  The referral is indicated on the record of proceedings, the documents 
are handed back to the prosecutor and the court adjourns. 
167
 Rule 66(2) of the MDSMA.  It is within the discretion of the presiding officer to put questions to 
the accused.  The questions can be directed at confirming whether the accused understands that 
his actions constituted an offence and that he indeed intended to plead guilty.  All questions and 
answers must be recorded on the record of proceedings. 
168
 The fact that the presiding officer is not legally qualified often results in him not identifying such 
possible defences and then continuing with the trial. 
169
 Rule 66 of the MDSMA. 
170
 Rule 67 of the MDSMA. 
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3.2.5.2 Procedure after conviction 
 
After conviction, the accused’s record of service is read.171  The record of service 
is then handed in by the prosecutor.  The prosecutor and the accused may lead 
evidence regarding any orders that can be made by the court.172  As is the case 
during the CMJ, the prosecutor and the accused may agree on facts that are 
relevant for sentencing and will then inform the court that those facts are not in 
dispute.  The prosecutor may lead evidence as to the prevalence of the offence 
as well as any other evidence that may be relevant regarding the sentencing of 
the accused.173  Then the accused is given the opportunity to bring evidence in 
mitigation of sentence.174  Any evidence given must be recorded and attached to 
the record of proceedings.  The court may also call its own witnesses in the 
process of determining an appropriate sentence. 
 
Once the evidence has been recorded, the prosecutor and the accused may 
address the court on any additional orders that the court might make and must 
address the court with regard to sentencing.175  The court will then close to 
consider sentence.  The sentence and relevant court orders are recorded in 
writing and announced in open court in the presence of the accused.176 
 
The accused is then informed that the sentence is of immediate effect but will be 
reviewed by the review counsel of the relevant legal satellite office (Legsato) 
under whose jurisdiction the unit is.  He is also informed that he has the right to 
apply that his case be reviewed by the CMA.  The accused can as soon as 
possible but no later than 14 days after the trial make written representations to 
the reviewing authority regarding facts of law or the validity of the finding, 
                                               
171
 The process regarding the record of service followed at the CODH is the same as discussed 
above regarding the CSMJ (see r 68 of the MDSMA).  An example of the pro forma document is 
set out in Annexure 6 of the rules to the MDSMA. 
172
 See ss 29(1) and (3) of the MDC; r 68(6) of the MDSMA. 
173
 Rule 68(3)-(4) of the MDSMA. 
174
 Rule 68(5) of the MDSMA. 
175
 Rule 68(6) of the MDSMA; see ch 6 at paras 6.2.10.1 and 6.3 below regarding court orders. 
176
 Rule 68(7) of the MDSMA. 
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sentence or court order which will then be taken into consideration during the 
review of the trial.  He is also informed of his right to approach the High Court for 
relief at his own cost.177  In the rare case that the review counsel does not uphold 
the disciplinary hearing, the matter is referred to the Director: Military Judicial 
Reviews.178 
 
3.3 Conclusion 
 
As can be seen from these discussions, the procedures in military courts closely 
resemble those followed in civilian courts.  This does not automatically qualify 
military courts as ordinary courts.  Their jurisdiction and procedures do not 
answer the question regarding the status of military courts.  In the next chapter 
the question on whether military courts qualify as ordinary courts within the South 
African criminal justice system is investigated. 
                                               
177
 Rule 68(9) of the MDSMA. 
178
 Experience has shown that the review counsel will very rarely interfere with a finding of the 
disciplinary hearing.  Where an accused has pleaded guilty, no evidence is led during the hearing 
and no questions asked by the presiding officer (as is often the case) that may show a possible 
defence; there are really no grounds for the review counsel to change the guilty finding by the 
disciplinary hearing.  Informal discussions with the review counsel show that grounds for the 
setting aside of findings in the CODH are limited to instances of duplication or splitting of charges 
or incorrectly completed charge sheets, such as instances of procedural irregularities.  They are 
however more likely to change a sentence in the instance where they are of the opinion that the 
sentence is shockingly inappropriate. 
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CHAPTER 4 
 
THE STATUS OF MILITARY COURTS:  ARE THEY ORDINARY COURTS? 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
The aim and function of the judiciary is to see that justice is done.1  The courts 
and the administration of justice are governed by the Constitution.2  The 
independence of the judiciary is guaranteed by the Constitution,3 which also lists 
the various courts that constitute the South African judicial system.4 In addition to 
the well-known civilian courts it also provides for “any other court established or 
recognised in terms of an Act of Parliament, including any court of a status 
similar to either the High Court or the Magistrate’s Courts.”5  The constitutional 
provisions governing the composition, jurisdiction and functioning of the courts 
are rather vague.6  These provisions do however create the framework in which 
all courts must operate.  All courts are required to be independent, subject only to 
the Constitution and the law.  No person or organ of the state may interfere with 
the functioning of the courts.7  This framework clearly emphasises that all courts 
must function independently to ensure that justice is done.  This raises the 
question whether the military courts are to be considered as “courts” for the 
purposes of the Constitution and whether they would, therefore, be able to 
function independently to ensure that justice is done in the military context. 
 
                                               
1
 Nel S S Aspekte van die Onafhanklikheid van die Strafhowe – ‘n Regsvergelykende Ondersoek 
(2000) at 12. 
2
 Chapter 8 of the Constitution. 
3
 Section 165 of the Constitution. 
4
 Section 166 of the Constitution.  These courts are the Constitutional Court, the High Courts, the 
Magistrate’s Courts and any other court recognised in terms of an Act of Parliament. 
5
 Section 166(e) of the Constitution. 
6
 The Constitution merely requires that “[a]ll courts function in terms of national legislation, and 
their rules and procedures must be provided for in national legislation” (see s 171 of the 
Constitution; Tshivhase A E “Transformation of Military Courts” (2009) 24 SAPL 450 at 464). 
7
 Section 165 of the Constitution. 
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As discussed above8 the aim of the military justice system is different from that of 
the civilian justice system – it is to enforce discipline.  However, in the attainment 
of discipline justice must also be done.  To attain justice two components are of 
importance – procedural justice and substantive justice.9  In this context justice 
not only means that a fair decision must be reached on the facts, but also that 
the trial must be conducted in accordance with a fair procedure.10 
 
Procedural justice refers to a fair decision and includes the principles of the rule 
of law, separation of powers and the independence of the judiciary.  Fair trial 
procedures refer to those rights enshrined in section 35 of the Constitution, also 
known as fair trial rights,11 including the right to a public hearing before an 
ordinary court. 
 
In determining the status of the military courts as independent courts, the 
principle of the rule of law and the doctrine of separation of powers are briefly 
examined before evaluating military courts against the criteria required for an 
independent court.  
 
The South African literature currently available on the independence of the 
military courts generally only discusses the Court of a Senior Military Judge 
(CSMJ) and the Court of a Military Judge (CMJ).  The Commanding Officer’s 
Disciplinary Hearing (CODH) is not discussed.12  An assumption is made by the 
Ministerial Task Team that the CODH is not a court of law and that an accused 
appearing before the disciplinary hearing cannot be classified as an accused 
facing criminal charges, therefore one need not comply with the strict 
                                               
8
 See ch 3 at para 3.1 above. 
9
 Mahomed I “The Role of the Judiciary in a Constitutional State: Address at the First Orientation 
Course for New Judges” (1998) SALJ 111 at 115; Nel at 82. 
10
 Nel at 82. 
11
 Nel at 82; Mahomed at 113-114. 
12
 See in this regard Carnelley M “The South African Military Court System – Independent, 
Impartial and Constitutional?” (2005) 33(2) Scientia Militaria 55; Tshivhase A E “Military Courts in 
a Democratic South Africa: An Assessment of Their Independence” (2006) 6 New Zealand Armed 
Forces Law Review 96. 
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requirements set out in the Constitution regarding fair trials.  This assumption is 
investigated below.   
 
In the determination whether the military court affords an accused the right to a 
fair trial in terms of the Constitution, it is necessary to first establish whether the 
military offender can be regarded as an “accused” before a criminal court before 
the section 35(3) rights attach to him.13  Once again the military courts are 
evaluated to see whether they comply with the requirement. 
 
The procedures followed in the military courts are generally similar to those 
followed in the civilian court.14  However, merely following the processes of the 
civilian criminal courts does not automatically qualify a military court as an 
ordinary criminal court.  One would have to evaluate military courts against the 
criteria set in terms of the common law, the Constitution and other relevant 
legislation to determine whether it can be classified as a criminal court. 
 
4.2 The status of the military courts 
 
The status of military courts is discussed with specific reference to judicial 
independence and fair trial rights. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
13
 Section 35(3) of the Constitution holds that “[e]very accused person has a right to a fair trial, 
which includes the right – (c) to a public trial before an ordinary court, …” (emphasis added).  See 
also Nel v Le Roux 1996 (3) SA 562 (CC) para 11. 
14
 See ch 3 at para 3.1 above.  See further s 21(d) of the MDSMA which provides that the 
examination and cross-examination of witnesses must be conducted the same way as in civilian 
courts.  Rule 20 of the MDSMA states that the general principles of national law with regard to 
criminal liability must be applied to military courts and in terms of s 84 of the MDC military courts 
must follow the rules of evidence as applied by civil courts.  However, r 21 of the MDSMA 
determines that the law of criminal procedure as applied by civilian courts does not supplement 
the powers of the military courts or the rules of procedure. 
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4.2.1 Judicial independence 
 
Judicial independence can be described as15 
 
the right and the duty of judges to perform the function of judicial adjudication, 
through an application of their own integrity and the law, without any actual or 
perceived, direct or indirect interference from or dependence on any other person 
or institution. 
 
As mentioned before, the Constitution guarantees the independence of all courts 
by holding that “the courts are independent and subject only to the Constitution 
and the law, which they must apply impartially and without fear, favour or 
prejudice.”16  This principle is not unique to South Africa.  In terms of international 
law it is a well established right that an individual should be tried by an 
“independent, impartial and ordinary court or tribunal.”17  A tribunal is defined as 
a “body whose function is to determine matters within its competence on the 
basis of rules of law, following proceedings conducted in a prescribed manner.”18  
A tribunal may consist exclusively of judges although participation by laymen is 
seen as acceptable in terms of international law.  Four characteristics of a 
tribunal are identified, namely the “power of binding decisions, defined 
                                               
15
 See Mahomed at 112; Kelly J F B “An Independent Judiciary: The Core of the Rule of Law” 
(1997) International Centre for Criminal Justice Reform and Criminal Justice Policy at 2; Laue R E 
“The Independence of the Judiciary in the Lower Courts” (1995) De Rebus 519. 
16
 Section 165(2) of the Constitution; Nel at 13; Mahomed at 111; Seedorf S & Sibanda S 
“Separation of Powers” in Woolman S & Bishop M (eds) Constitutional Law of South Africa 2 ed 
(2002) at 12-25. 
17
 Steytler N Constitutional Criminal Procedure: A Commentary on the Constitution of the 
Republic of South Africa, 1996 (1998) at 257; Cachalia J A “Administrative Independence as a 
Guarantee of Judicial Independence: Experiences from South Africa” (2010) De Rebus 57 at 57.  
The United Nations (UN) also confirmed the importance of the judicial independence by adopting 
the Basic Principles on the Independence of the Judiciary in 1985.  The UN expects that the laws 
of its member states must guarantee the independence of its judiciary (see Kelly at 1).  Article 10 
of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights states that “[e]veryone is entitled in full equality to a 
fair and public hearing by an independent and impartial tribunal, in the determination of his rights 
and obligations and of any criminal charge against him.”  See also Bangamwabo F X “The Right 
to an Independent and Impartial Tribunal: A Comparative Study of the Namibian Judiciary and 
International Judges” in Horn N & Bosl A (eds) Human Rights and the Rule of Law in Namibia 
(2008) at 243. 
18
 Stavros S The Guarantees for Accused Persons Under Article 6 of the European Convention 
on Human Rights (2003) at 124. 
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competence, resolution of disputes in accordance with rules of law and clear 
procedural rules”.19  It is further required that cases should be heard by courts 
“established by law.”20  This requirement is seen as a guarantee against the “ad 
hoc creation of tribunals to try specific cases.”21  But what about military courts?22  
It has been argued that military tribunals are by definition extraordinary courts 
which “tend to be politically motivated and therefore the potential for lack of 
independence and impartiality is very high.”23  Does this statement hold true for 
South African military courts? 
 
Military courts are not exempt from the requirement of judicial independence:24 
The view expressed above on the lack of independence of the military court is in 
contrast with the opinion expressed by the African Commission that 25 
 
military tribunal[s] per se [are] not offensive to the rights in the Charter nor does it 
imply an unfair or unjust process….[but] must be subject to the same 
requirements of fairness, openness, and justice, independence, and due process 
as any other process. 
 
The right to be tried by an independent and impartial tribunal is an absolute right 
without any exceptions and military courts must therefore comply with these 
                                               
19
 Stavros at 125. 
20
 See Van Dijk P & van Hoof G J H Theory and Practice of the European Convention on Human 
Rights 2 ed (1990) at 339 (the “prescription that the tribunal must be “established by law” implies 
the guarantee that the organization of the judiciary in a democratic society is not left to the 
discretion of the executive, but constitutes the subject of a legal regulation by parliament”). 
21
 Steytler (1998) at 258. 
22
 Although no human rights treaties exist that specifically address military courts, a number of 
international documents addresses certain aspects relating to military courts (see Andreu-
Guzman F in Johnson A B (ed) Law and Justice: The Case for Parliamentary Scrutiny (2006) at 
64; Danilet C Independence and Impartiality of Justice – International Standards (2000) at 2-3; 
Tshivhase (2006) at 98–99; Autherman V & Elena S in Henderson K (ed) Global Best Practices: 
Judicial Integrity, Standards and Consensus Principles (2004) at 2 for a list of applicable 
international documents). 
23
 Steytler (1998) at 258. 
24
 Tshivhase (2006) at 99. 
25
 Tshivhase (2006) at 102. 
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standards.26  The United Nations Human Rights Committee further regards the 
right to be tried by an independent court a non-derogable.27 
 
In evaluating the independence of the judiciary two aspects are of importance - 
the substantive independence of the judiciary as well as the personal 
independence of the judicial officer.28  The substantive independence of the 
judiciary means that the judicial officers are only subject to the law in the 
execution of their duties.29  Interwoven with the important principle of substantive 
independence is the principle of the rule of law and the doctrine of separation of 
powers which requires the one branch of government to be independent from the 
other. In this context it requires the judiciary to be independent from the 
executive.30   
 
4.2.1.1 The rule of law 
 
The “rule of law” is generally the term used for the set of principles to be followed 
by organs of the state or the executive when limiting the rights of individuals.31  
These principles include, inter alia, legality, the doctrine of separation of powers 
and human rights.  The rule of law means32 
 
                                               
26
 Danilet at 5; Johnson at 65. 
27
 Joinet L Issue of the Administration of Justice Through Military Tribunals (2002) at 2-3. 
28
 Nel at 18-19. 
29
 Nel at 18; s 165(2) of the Constitution. 
30
 Tshivhase (2006) at 98; Currie I & De Waal J The Bill of Rights Handbook (2005) at 18; Currie I 
& De Waal J (eds) The New Constitutional and Administrative Law: Volume One: Constitutional 
Law (2001) at 269; Okpaluba C “Institutional Independence and the Constitutionality of 
Legislation Establishing Lower Courts and Tribunals” (2003) 28 Journal for Juridical Science 109 
at 110 (“the independence of the judiciary is a sine qua non of a democratic state”).  This is 
confirmed by the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights which identified, inter alia, 
respect for human rights, the exercise of power in terms of the rule of law, the separation of 
powers and the independence of the judiciary as essential elements of democracy (see Arbour L 
in Johnson at 15). 
31
 Nel at 24. 
32
 Raz J “The Rule of Law and its Virtue” (1977) 93 The Law Quarterly Review 195 at 196. 
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in its broadest sense…that people should obey the law and be ruled by it  [b]ut in 
political and legal theory it has come to be read in a narrower sense, that the 
government shall be ruled by the law and [be] subject to it. 
 
In a historical overview in Currie and De Waal three main principles of the rule of 
law are identified.33  Brief mention is made of the two deemed relevant in the 
context of this discussion. 
 
The first principle refers to the supremacy of the law rather than arbitrary power.  
This principle means that no-one can be punished without a contravention of the 
law.  The second principle refers to the concept of equality before the law which 
implies that every person, including state officials, is subject to the jurisdiction of 
the ordinary courts.34 
 
Although Raz argues that the doctrine of the rule of law is “not of overriding 
importance”35 and “is just one of the virtues which a legal system may 
possess…[i]t is not to be confused with democracy, justice…[or] human rights of 
any kind…”36 this does not hold true for South Africa.  In South Africa the rule of 
law has been elevated to a constitutional value.37  The Constitution provides that 
the38 
 
Republic of South Africa is one, sovereign, democratic state founded on the 
following values: …supremacy of the constitution and the rule of law. 
                                               
33
 Currie & De Waal (2001) at 75; Currie & De Waal (2005) at 10; De Lange v Smuts 1998 (3) SA 
785 (CC) para 46; Meyerson D “The Rule of Law and the Separation of Powers” (2004) 
Macquarie Law Journal 1 at 1. 
34
 Currie & De Waal (2001) at 75; Nel at 25; Currie & De Waal (2005) at 11. 
35
 Raz at 195. 
36
 Raz at 196. 
37
 Michelman I “The Rule of Law, Legality and the Supremacy of the Constitution” in Woolman S 
& Bishop M (eds) Constitutional Law of South Africa 2 ed (2002) at 11-2 (“[a]mong the founding 
values of the Republic – alongside democracy, human dignity and the achievement of equality, 
non-racialism and non-sexism – the Final Constitution lists ‘supremacy of the constitution and the 
rule of law’.  As might have been forseen from this text the rule of law like dignity, is today 
invoked in South African constitutional jurisprudence as a pervasive value that ‘informs the 
interpretation of many, possibly all, other rights”); Currie & De Waal (2005) at 10. 
38
 Section 1(c) of the Constitution; Currie & De Waal (2005) at 10. 
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The rule of law “imposes an obligation on the state and other individuals to 
resolve their disputes through the application of law”.  One would not be allowed 
to take the law into your own hands.39  The rule of law further prohibits arbitrary 
decision making in that it prohibits the executive from being a judge in its own 
case, thereby limiting subjective decisions and protecting individuals.40  Where 
someone other than from the judiciary is given the jurisdiction to detain an 
individual, it would violate the rule of law.  Arbitrary decision making may result 
from a lack of independence by the court or tribunal.41  The independence of the 
judiciary is therefore an important aspect of the principle of the rule of law.42 
 
Another important aspect of procedural justice is the doctrine of separation of 
powers.43 
 
4.2.1.2 Separation of powers 
 
The doctrine of separation of powers requires the three functions of government, 
namely the executive, the legislative and the judicial functions to be performed by 
separate branches of the government.44  Although the Constitution does not 
expressly provide for the doctrine, Constitutional Principle VI provides that 45 
 
                                               
39
 Currie & De Waal (2001) at 78; Chief Lesapo v North West Agricultural Bank 2000 (1) SA 409 
(CC) para 11. 
40
 See Nel at 27; Currie & De Waal (2005) at 12; Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association of 
SA: In Re: ex parte President of the Republic of South Africa 2000 (2) SA 674 (CC) para 85; Raz 
at 206 (the “law inevitably creates a great danger of arbitrary power – the rule of law is designed 
to minimise the danger created by the law itself”). 
41
 Currie & De Waal (2001) at 79–81; Currie & De Waal (2005) at 13; De Lange v Smuts 1998 (3) 
SA 785 (CC) para 59; Raz at 201 (the “rules concerning the independence of the judiciary…are, 
therefore, essential for the preservation of the rule of law”). 
42
 Currie & De Waal (2005) at 13. 
43
 For a complete discussion of the doctrine see Seedorf & Sibanda at 12-1; Currie & De Waal 
(2001) at 91-119; Meyerson at 2. 
44
 Currie & De Waal (2005) at 18. 
45
 See Seedorf & Sibanda at 12-18, 12-20; Currie & De Waal (2005) at 18; South African 
Association of Personal Injury Lawyers v Heath 2001 (1) SA 883 (CC). 
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[t]here shall be a separation of powers between the legislature, executive and 
judiciary46, with appropriate checks and balances to ensure accountability, 
responsiveness and openness. 
 
The purpose of the doctrine is to “prevent the excessive concentration of power 
in a single person or body.”47  However, such separation cannot be a complete 
separation.  Certain checks and balances are applicable which means that one 
branch of government will exercise some influence and control over another 
branch of government.48  The independence and impartiality of the judiciary is 
linked to this doctrine and is guaranteed by the Constitution.49 
 
4.2.1.3 Judicial independence and impartiality 
 
Judicial independence means that judges must apply the law impartially, without 
pressure from outside and should function independently from the other 
branches of government.50  It is clearly essential for a fair trial and is considered 
a cornerstone of democracy.51   
 
                                               
46
 Currie & De Waal (2001) at 268 define ‘judicial authority’ as “the organ of government not 
forming part of the executive or the legislative, which is not subject to personal, subjective and 
collective controls and which performs the primary function of adjudication.” 
47
 Currie & De Waal (2005) at 18; Meyerson at 1. 
48
 Currie & De Waal (2005) at 18; Meyerson at 1; Seedorf & Sibanda at 12-19; Ex Parte 
Chairperson of the Constitutional Assembly: In Re Certification of the Constitution of the Republic 
of South Africa, 1996 1996 (10) BCLR 1253 (CC) (First Certification Judgment) para 108. 
49
 Section 165(1)-(2) of the Constitution; Seedorf & Sibanda at 12-28; the First Certification 
Judgment 1996 (10) BCLR 1253 (CC) para 123 (“[a]n essential part of the separation of powers is 
that there be an independent judiciary… What is crucial to the separation of powers and the 
independence of the judiciary is that the judiciary should enforce the law impartially and that it 
should function independently of the legislature and the executive”); South African Association of 
Personal Injury Lawyers v Heath para 25; Currie & De Waal (2001) at 108, 268; Steytler (1998) at 
260. 
50
 Currie & De Waal (2001) at 299; s 165(2)-(3) of the Constitution; Govindjee A & Vrancken P 
(eds) Introduction to Human Rights Law (2009) at 215; Seedorf & Sibanda at 12-28.  Taitz J L 
“The Right to Reasonable and Adequate Notice of Criminal Proceedings – An Essential Aspect of 
Procedural Justice” (1992) 2 SACJ 132 at 138 refers to the impartiality of the judge as one of the 
“twin pillars of justice.”  It is not only judges but also judicial officers that need to be independent.  
Judges are seen as those judicial officers that act in the superior courts while other officers 
performing judicial functions are seen as judicial officers (see in this regard Currie & De Waal 
(2001) at 268. 
51
 Nel at 15. 
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It is further required that judges must be “independent” and “impartial”.52  Both 
the concept of “independence” and “impartiality” form an integral part of the way 
in which courts must exercise their judicial functions.  Although they are separate 
concepts, the court cannot be perceived as impartial if it is not perceived as 
independent.53  “Impartiality” as a concept denotes the state of mind of the 
judicial officer and “independence” refers to the relationship between the judiciary 
and the other branches of government.54 
 
Impartiality means that the judicial officer must be free of personal bias55 and 
should not allow himself to be influenced by any factors outside the courtroom.56  
It was found that the test to determine the impartiality of the judicial officer 
includes a “reasonable suspicion of bias” and where that is the case, the judicial 
officer has to recuse himself57 even if “there is no concrete indication of partiality 
of the person.”58  The MDSMA clearly provides for the recusal of the military 
judge in any instance of bias.59 
 
When considering the independence of the judiciary a distinction is made 
between substantive (or institutional) independence and personal independence.  
Judges must have both before they can be regarded as being independent.60  
 
 
                                               
52
 Nel at 17; Kelly at 4; United Nations (UN) Basic Principles on the Independence of the Judiciary 
(1985) principle 2 (“[t]he judiciary shall decide matters before them impartially on the basis of 
facts and in accordance with the law, without and restrictions, improper influences, inducements, 
pressures, threats or interferences, direct or indirect, from any quarter or for any reason”). 
53
 Okpaluba at 128.  For an international perspective on “impartiality” see Danilet at 18-24. 
54
 Currie & De Waal (2001) at 299; Okpaluba at 125; Nel at 17. 
55
 Findlay v United Kingdom (1997) 24 EHRR 221 para 78. 
56
 Van Dijk & van Hoof at 336. 
57
 Council of Review, South African Defence Force v Mönnig 1992 (3) SA 482 (A) at 491; Findlay 
v United Kingdom (1997) 24 EHRR 221 para 76 (the appearance of impartiality may be important 
for the maintenance of confidence in the military justice system);Sramek v Austria (1984) 7 EHRR 
351 para 42; Lord Bingham of Cornhill “A New Supreme Court for the United Kingdom” (2002) 
The Constitution Unit Spring Lecture 2002 at 4-5. 
58
 Van Dijk & van Hoof at 338-339. 
59
 Rule 35 of the MDSMA.  The discussion regarding the recusal of military judges in ch 3 at para 
3.2.3.1 above has reference. 
60
 Nel at 16-17; Seedorf & Sibanda at 12-18; R v Valente (1985) 24 DLR (4th) 161 (SCC) at 171; 
Kelly at 4; Cachalia at 57. 
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4.2.1.4 Institutional or substantive independence 
 
Judicial officers are only subject to the law in the execution of their duties and not 
to prescripts from an organ of state.61  The collective independence of the 
judiciary as a whole depends on this principle.62  This means that the 
administrative duties of the judiciary and the findings of the court must not be 
subject to any influence by any organ of state.63  Institutional independence 
therefore refers to the independence of the judiciary from the executive and the 
legislature64 when the judiciary has “control over the administrative decisions that 
bear directly and immediately on the exercise of the judicial functions.”65  
Whether the court will have the necessary institutional independence will depend, 
inter alia, on the specific function of the court and its place in the judicial 
hierarchy.66  The Constitutional Court is prepared to accept a lower standard of 
independence for the lower courts compared to the standard set for the High 
Courts.67 
 
                                               
61
 Nel at 18-19 and 21. 
62
 McNairn D “Does Canada Need a Permanent Military Court?” (2006) 18 National Journal of 
Constitutional Law 205 at 226.  It is opined that institutional independence only attaches to the 
court as an institution. 
63
 Nel at 18-19. 
64
 Okpaluba at 117; Tshivhase (2006) at 118; the earlier discussion on the separation of powers 
doctrine at para 4.2.1.2 above; UN Basic Principles on the Independence of the Judiciary 
principle 1 (“[t]he independence of the judiciary shall be guaranteed by the State and enshrined in 
the Constitution or the law of the country.  It is the duty of all governmental and other institutions 
to respect and observe the independence of the judiciary”) (emphasis added). 
65
 R v Valente (1985) 24 DLR (4th) 161 (SCC) at 190; Steytler (1998) at 265 (the appointment of 
judges and court lists); Nel at 20 (judicial matters should resort exclusively with the judiciary and 
the allocation of cases should also rest with the judiciary). 
66
 Okpaluba at 119; Seedorf & Sibanda at 12-30; McNairn (2006) at 228; R v Généreux [1992] 1 
SCR 259 para 3 where the court found that the right to be tried by an independent and impartial 
tribunal must be interpreted in light of the purpose of the system of military justice, being the 
enforcement of discipline, which may result in a difference between the military context of the 
Constitutional right and that of a regular criminal trial. 
67
 Franco J & Powell C “The Meaning of Constitutional Independence in Van Rooyen v The State” 
(2004) 121 SALJ 562 at 574; Van Rooyen v The State 2002 (9) BCLR 810 (CC) paras 27-28 
(“[j]udicial independence can be achieved in a variety of ways; the most rigorous and elaborate 
conditions of judicial independence need not be applied to all courts, and it is permissible for the 
essential conditions for independence to bear some relationship to the variety of courts that exist 
within the judicial system”). 
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The test for determining whether the court is in fact independent is an objective 
one where not only the factual independence is considered, but also the 
perceived independence.68  Such perception of a lack of independence, must be 
a reasonable one, 69 
 
based on a balanced view of all the material information….[t]he well-informed, 
thoughtful and objective observer must be sensitive to the country’s complex 
social realities, in touch with its evolving patterns of constitutional development, 
and guided by the Constitution, its values and the differentiation it makes 
between different levels of court. 
 
To avoid the appearance of outside influence the judiciary should not have 
contact with either political parties or organs of state.70  Kelly opines that in 
criminal cases the individual who is prosecuted should not be tried by a judiciary 
that is part of the “official state structure which is, in effect, prosecuting that 
individual.”71  However, the military as an organ of state cannot help but become 
involved when soldiers are prosecuted in military courts.  Does this result in 
military courts not being recognised as independent and impartial? 
                                               
68
 Van Rooyen v The State 2002 (9) BCLR 810 (CC) para 32 (“[i]t is, therefore, important that a 
tribunal should be perceived as independent, as well as impartial, and that the test for 
independence should include that perception”); Findlay v United Kingdom (1997) 24 EHRR 221; 
Rant J W “Findlay, The Consequences: Remarks Given at the Judge Advocate General School, 
November 1997” (1998) 25 Reporter 3-7 at 6; De Lange v Smuts 1998 (3) SA 785 (CC); Freedom 
of Expression Institute v President, Ordinary Court Martial 1999 (2) SA 471 (C) para 25; Financial 
Services Board v Pepkor Pension Fund 1998 (11) BCLR 1425 (C) at 1432; Tshivhase (2009) at 
476-477; Nel at 70, 72 (public trust in the independence of the judiciary increases its legitimacy in 
the eyes of the public).  Public perceptions and opinion play a large role in the legitimacy of the 
judiciary (see Kelly at 4 where it is stated that “a court can only be truly accepted as a just one if it 
has the confidence of the public that it is just and fair”).  It is a well known adage that “justice 
should not only be done, but should manifestly and undoubtedly be seen to be done” (see Nel at 
68 quoting Lord Heward in R v Sussex Justices: Ex Parte McCarthy (1924) 1 KB 256); Danilet at 
17.  For a contrary view see Essex T & Pickle L T “A Reply to the Report of the Commission on 
the 50th Anniversary of the Uniform Code of Military Justice (May 2001): “The Cox Commission”” 
(2002) 52 Air Force Law Review 233 at 265 where, in commenting on the Uniform Code of 
Military Justice (UCMJ), it is stated that the UCMJ should not be changed due to perceptions.  
The authors opine that a perception of a lack of independence does not result in the military 
judiciary actually lacking independence.  Changing the law to make the military judiciary more 
independent is therefore unnecessary and one should rather “campaign to educate the public and 
military members, but we do not need to change the law because of perceptions.”  
69
 Van Rooyen v The State 2002 (9) BCLR 810 (CC) para 34; Okpaluba at 130. 
70
 Kelly at 5. 
71
 Kelly at 5. 
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Separation of powers does not mean a complete separation and it is inevitable 
that the judiciary will have some contact with the executive branch in terms of 
financial and administrative issues.72  The important aspect however, in terms of 
international standards, is to “limit the formal interaction between these two 
branches of government to only the extent necessary to provide security and the 
necessary financial and administrative support to the courts.”73 
 
The requirement of independence of the judiciary applies to all military courts.74  
After the invalidation of the courts martial system75 the MDSMA created a new 
military court system, bringing it in line with the constitutional requirements.76  It is 
submitted that military courts should now be regarded as courts established in 
terms of the Constitution.77  This has subsequently been confirmed by the civilian 
courts concerning trials in terms of military law.  Although the court held in S v 
Tsotsi78 that military courts do not form part of the ordinary courts structure, 
subsequent decisions accepted military courts as inferior courts, possibly with the 
same status as magistrate’s courts.79  The question, however, is whether these 
courts have institutional independence. 
 
                                               
72
 Kelly at 5. 
73
 Kelly at 6. 
74
 Section 165 of the Constitution refers throughout to “the courts”, referring by implications to all 
courts.  No exceptions are mentioned in the Constitution.  Institutional independence in the 
context of the military justice system not only refers to the independence of the military justice 
system but also to an independent prosecution body.  The independence of military prosecution 
however falls outside the scope of this research.  See the discussion in Minister of Defence v 
Potsane; Legal Soldier (Pty) Ltd v Minister of Defence 2002 (1) SA 1 (CC) on the constitutionality 
of having a separate prosecution body for the military.  The independence of the military 
prosecution body per se was however not addressed. 
75
 See Freedom of Expression Institute v President, Ordinary Court Martial 1999 (2) SA 471 (C). 
76
 Minister of Defence v Potsane; Legal Soldiers (Pty) Ltd v Minister of Defence 2002 (1) SA 1 
(CC) para 31; s 2 of the MDSMA regarding the aim of the Act being, inter alia, to create military 
courts.  The military court system is further established by s 6 MDSMA. 
77
 Section 166(e) of the Constitution (“any other court established or recognized in terms of an Act 
of Parliament.”) (emphasis added); Tshivhase (2009) at 464. 
78
 S v Tsotsi 2004 (2) SACR 273 (E) para 12. 
79
 Mbambo v Minister of Defence 2005 (2) SA 226 (T) at 233A (“military courts of first instance are 
inferior courts”); Tsoaeli v Minister of Defence; Kholomba v Minister of Defence [2006] JOL 17034 
(T) at 6-7; Steyn v Minister of Defence [2004] JOL 13059 (T) at 12. 
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The legislation governing military justice makes provision for the independence of 
the CSMJ and the CMJ.80  It is required from every military and senior military 
judge to exercise their judicial function independently and subject only to the 
Constitution and the law,81 that the Constitution and the law be applied impartially 
and without fear, favour or prejudice82 and that all proceedings before the military 
court should be conducted in a manner befitting a court of justice.83  It is notable 
that these requirements, of institutional independence, are not extended to the 
CODH.  Section 19 of the MDSMA applies expressly to military judges and senior 
military judges, but not to commanding officers presiding over disciplinary 
hearings.  Functionaries appointed by the Adjutant General are further required 
to perform their functions “free from executive or command interference” but 
remain subject to policy directives.84  This would indicate a sufficient level of 
factual institutional independence.85   
 
However, as mentioned above, the perception of independence must also exist.  
It is therefore necessary to consider concerns influencing the perception of 
institutional independence of the military courts. Two such concerns are 
particularly notable, namely the fact that serving members of the SANDF are 
appointed as military judges, and the role of the Adjutant General.  
 
The MDSMA provides that officers are assigned to the post of senior military or 
military judge.86  This creates an institutional link between military judges and the 
SANDF.  As serving officers they form part of the public service and it was found 
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 Section 19 of the MDSMA.  The oaths of the various functionaries of the military courts as 
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 Section 19(b) of the MDSMA. 
83
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86
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(2009) at 466. 
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that such officers do not in fact enjoy judicial independence.87  The state is a 
party in all cases serving before the military courts.  The executive may therefore 
conceivably have a stake in the outcome of the trial.  Where the judicial officer is 
seen as part of the executive by virtue of his employment as a public official, this 
may create a reasonable concern regarding the independence of that court. 
 
This perception may not necessarily apply to all military courts in equal measure.  
The CMA does not exclusively consist of serving members.  The chairperson of 
the CMA is a serving or retired judge of the High Court or a serving or retired 
magistrate, although the other members of the courts are serving members of the 
SANDF.88  The appointment of a civilian as member of the CMA may enhance 
the perception that the court is independent.89  This alone may on the other hand 
not be sufficient to guarantee independence.  The fact that serving members are 
appointed was a matter of concern for the Ministerial Task Team.  Although they 
recognise the importance of military experience in trying offences of a military 
nature and imposing specific sentences, they are of the opinion that it would be 
preferable if retired individuals with the required knowledge were appointed, in 
order to counter the perception of bias.90  In general, the Ministerial Task Team 
was however satisfied that the CMA complies with the requirements of an 
independent and impartial tribunal.91 
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 Freedom of Expression Institute v President, Ordinary Court Martial 1999 (2) SA 471 (C) para 
23; De Lange v Smuts 1998 (3) SA 785 (CC) para 73 and 75.  For a contrary opinion see Morris v 
The United Kingdom [2002] 34 ECHR 52 para 103 where the court found that the appointment of 
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 According to the Ministerial Task Team Report by the Ministerial Task Team on the 
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 See Cooper v The United Kingdom and Grieves v The United Kingdom (2004) 39 EHRR 8 para 
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This view is also supported by the Ministerial Task Team at 15. 
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 A view supported by Carnelley at 77; Steyn v Minister of Defence [2004] JOL 13059 (T) para 11 
(the court held that “there could be no merit in the argument that the CMA or…the military justice 
system is not independent and impartial as the civilian courts are”). 
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As mentioned, judges in the CMJ and CSMJ will always be serving members of 
senior rank since only officers can be assigned to the function of military judge by 
the Minister.  The Ministerial Task Team argued that appointing civilian or retired 
judges to these courts may guarantee institutional independence since they 
come from a background of independence and there would be no institutional link 
between the members of the court and the executive.92  The Ministerial Task 
Team recommended that retired or serving regional magistrates should be 
appointed as the chairperson of the CSMJ in order to promote the credibility and 
legitimacy of the military judicial system.  Where such a magistrate does not have 
the required expertise and knowledge of the Defence Force, retired members of 
the SANDF or members with the required knowledge should be appointed as 
members of the court.93 
 
This approach is followed in the British military court system.  The British military 
judiciary consists of eight full-time judges, consisting of a Vice-Judge Advocate 
General and seven Assistant Judge Advocates General.  There are also ten part-
time Judge Advocates available if necessary.  All military judges are civilians, 
appointed from experienced barristers or solicitors from the civilian courts.94  
They are appointed in the same manner as District and Circuit Judges.  Military 
judges may also serve in the Crown Court.  In very serious or unprecedented 
cases a High Court Judge may also preside over a court martial.95 
 
Many other jurisdictions, however, appoint military members as military judges.  
Canada appoints military lawyers to the independent Office of the Chief Military 
Judge.  They are appointed by a Judicial Selection Committee for a renewable 
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 See in this regard Cooper v The United Kingdom and Grieves v The United Kingdom (2004) 39 
EHRR 8; Carnelley at 65.  The Ministerial Task Team at 17 recommends that retired or serving 
regional magistrates should be appointed as the chairperson of the CSMJ in order to promote the 
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 Ministerial Task Team at 17. 
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 See Joinet at 15. 
95
 Judiciary of England and Wales Military (2011) at 1. 
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period of five years.96  As is the case in South Africa, the requirement for the 
appointment of officers prevents civilians from appointment as military judges.97  
In the United States the Judge Advocate General also appoints military members 
as military judges.98  They do however report through a different chain of 
command.99  The convening authority who convenes the court martial does not 
appoint the specific judge for a particular case and is also not responsible for the 
judge’s annual performance report.100 
 
It is submitted that the appointment of civilians to the function of military judge 
may not necessarily be the best solution.  The aim of military courts is “to 
maintain military discipline.”101  This would be very difficult to achieve if the 
judicial officer has no military experience or understanding of the uniqueness of 
military discipline.102  The Constitutional Court found that there is a difference 
between civilian life and military life that necessitates a military justice system 
that makes provision for these differences.103  It was found that104 
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 See Mbambo v Minister of Defence 2005 (2) SA 226 (T) at 233F-G where the court held that 
“military courts are better able to ensure that the SANDF’s constitutional obligation to maintain 
discipline is fulfilled.  In particular, military courts are better suited to judge the seriousness of 
offences in military context.” 
103
 Minister of Defence v Potsane; Legal Soldier (Pty) Ltd v Minister of Defence 2002 (1) SA 1 
(CC) 2002 (1) SA 1 (CC) (although the decision related to the function of military prosecutions, it 
is submitted that the reasoning by Kriegler J may equally apply to military judges); Financial 
Services Board v Pepkor Pension Fund 1998 (11) BCLR 1425 (C) at 1432 (Conradie J, in 
determining the independence of Financial Services Appeal Board, found the Appeal Board was 
designed to combine persons with expert knowledge in complex financial matters and it would not 
be inappropriate to appoint a person who may be sensitive to policy concerns of the Appeal 
Board.  It can therefore be argued that it would not be inappropriate to appoint serving members 
to the military court, being a specialised area of law). 
104
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[s]oldiers live and work in a subculture of their own.  This is recognised and 
accepted by acknowledging the constitutional validity of a separate military 
justice system with its own unique rules, offences and punishments… [A]lthough 
the Bill of Rights is not excluded, the relationship between the SANDF and its 
members has certain unique features.  For instance, what would be acceptable in 
another employment relationship is not only impermissible for a soldier but may 
be visited by punishment… 
 
Considering the uniqueness of the military environment the court further asked 
“[w]hy should military prosecutions be conducted by civilians? Why should 
decisions regarding military discipline be taken by outsiders?”105 
 
It is submitted that the conclusion by Fay, quoted with approval by Carnelley, 
should be supported:106 
 
In a military organization … there cannot ever be a truly independent military 
judiciary; the reason is that the military officer must be involved in the 
administration of discipline at all levels.  A major strength of the present military 
judicial system rests on the use of trained military officers, who are also legal 
officers, to sit on courts martial in judicial roles.  If this connection were to be 
severed, (and true independence can only be achieved by such severance), the 
advantage of independence of the judge that might thereby be achieved would 
be more than offset by the disadvantage of the eventual loss by the judge of the 
military knowledge and experience which today helps him to meet his 
responsibilities effectively.  Neither the Forces nor the accused would benefit 
from such a separation. 
 
Since the aim of military law is the maintenance of discipline, the use of serving 
members as military judges can be justified.  Tshivhase, after perusing 
international jurisdictions, notably Australia, comes to the conclusion that military 
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 Minister of Defence v Potsane; Legal Soldier (Pty) Ltd v Minister of Defence 2002 (1) SA 1 
(CC) para 32. 
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 Fay J B “Canadian Military Criminal Law: An Examination of Military Justice – Part IV” (1975) 
23 Chitty’s Law Journal 228 at 248; Carnelley at 68. 
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law development shows a “disapproval of the civilianisation of military courts.”107 
This would indicate support for the use of serving members as military judges.  
However, a large number of jurisdictions are in fact moving in the opposite 
direction towards the civilianisation of military courts.  More countries are now 
under pressure to conform to international standards of human rights, aligning 
with reforms taking place in the civilian courts.  There is in fact growing 
international consensus to limit the role of military courts or to abolish them 
completely.108  Findings by an international study on military jurisdictions showed 
that several countries have done away with military courts. 109  Military cases are 
then heard in civilian courts, either in courts formed as a specialised element of 
the civilian court or before a purely civilian court.  Examples mentioned in the 
study are Finland, where military prosecutions were taken over by civilian public 
prosecutors; and the Netherlands, where military personnel are prosecuted 
before a civilian court.  Where military courts are not abolished completely, 
countries are limiting the jurisdiction of military tribunals to times of war – such as 
Germany, Greece, Austria, France, Norway and Sweden.  Review of these 
military trials is then done by the civilian supreme courts.110 
 
The emphasis on discipline in the military in the context of the perceived 
independence of the military courts may raise a further concern.  Military judges, 
as serving members, are also subject to the same military discipline: they have to 
act on orders given by higher authority.111  This argument can be countered by 
the legal principle that soldiers, including military judges, are only required to 
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obey manifestly legal orders.112  An order by the executive interfering with the 
independence of the military judiciary would clearly constitute an illegal order and 
can therefore legally be disobeyed.  It should also be noted that military judges 
fall under the command and control of the Director: Military Judges, thereby 
forming a separate division within the Military Legal Services Division.  Military 
judges would therefore conceivably receive orders mainly from the Director: 
Military Judges. 
 
Certain safeguards could counter the perception of a lack of independence.  
Such safeguards may include the fact that all judges are required to hold a 
degree in law.  All judges are required to take an oath or make an affirmation that 
they will apply the law without fear, favour or prejudice.113  Although military 
judges are compelled to perform their functions free from executive or command 
interference, they are still required to remain within policy guidelines.114 
 
This proviso raises the following interpretation question:  Since the MDSMA 
trumps all other legislation, except for the Constitution,115 does this mean that the 
policy considerations, referred to in section 14(4) of the MDSMA, could result in 
the de facto interference by the executive in the application of the law and the 
decisions by the court?  It is submitted that policy directives breaching the 
independence of the military judiciary would be contra bonos mores and would 
constitute a “manifestly illegal order”, allowing military judges not to follow such 
directives.  The importance of policy considerations in the decision to prosecute 
in a military court has already received some attention in the courts.116  Military 
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judges come from the same environment as the executive and it is therefore 
conceivable that military judges and the executive who appoint them may have a 
similar mindset, resulting in possible institutional bias to the detriment of the 
accused when appointing “military minded” judges. 
 
In the Van Rooyen117 judgment the court found that the magistrate’s court as an 
institution had little protection from political interference, but still found that it was 
sufficiently independent as long as there was a third body which could be called 
upon to remedy any undue influence, such as a court of appeal.118  It is 
submitted that military courts should now be viewed in the same light since 
provision is made for the review and appeal of military cases to the CMA and the 
High Court of South Africa.119 
 
The role of the Adjutant General 
 
Institutional independence includes the view that the judiciary must be 
responsible for its own administrative processes.120  This also applies to the 
allocation of cases within the judiciary – the responsibility should rest with the 
judiciary.121  The MDSMA, governing the functions of the CMJ122 and the 
CSMJ,123 does not provide the military judiciary with the authority to control their 
own administrative processes.  Instead, the administration of the military judiciary 
                                                                                                                                            
prosecutor and the accused … the effect on military lines of authority and command would be 
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lies with the Adjutant General.124 This situation might create a further area of 
possible executive interference due to the wide powers held by the Adjutant 
General of the Military Legal Services Division. 
 
The Adjutant General is an officer in the SANDF who is admitted as or is 
qualified for admission as an attorney or advocate and who has at least seven 
years of experience in the administration of criminal or military law.  The Adjutant 
General is appointed by the Minister.125  He is126  
 
responsible for the overall management, promotion, facilitation and co-ordination 
of activities in order to ensure the effective administration of military justice and 
the military legal services…. 
 
As a senior officer in the SANDF his managerial function forms part of the 
executive and he is required to report on his judicial functions to the executive.127  
All assignments of functionaries by the Minister are done on the recommendation 
of the Adjutant General.  Notice should be taken of the peremptory language 
used, namely that the “Minister shall assign officers…on the recommendation of 
the Adjutant General…”128  It would therefore seem as if no individual can be 
                                               
124
 See also Tshivhase (2009) at 475. 
125
 Section 27 of the MDSMA. 
126
 Sections 28(1)(a)-(b) of the MDSMA.  The local representative of the Adjutant General, who as 
the administrative head of the Legal Satellite Office (Legsato), is the Officer in Charge of the 
Legsato and is authorsed in writing by the Adjutant General to “manage, facilitate and co-ordinate 
activities ensuring the effective administration of military justice and military legal services.” 
127
 Section 28(1)(b) of the MDSMA. 
128
 Section 14 of the MDSMA (emphasis added).  The importance of the Adjutant General in the 
assignment process is confirmed in s 14(2) of the MDSMA where it is provided that the Adjutant 
General must be convinced that the officer to be assigned is “a fit and proper person of sound 
character…”  The Judge Advocate General (JAG) of the US armed forces (a post equivalent to 
that of the Adjutant General in South Africa) selects the military judges for appointment.  The JAG 
is also the principal legal advisor for the armed forces.  This may lead to a conflict of interest (see 
Lederer & Hundley at 651).  The US Supreme Court however held in Weiss v United States 114 
SCt 752 (1994) that this state of affairs did not influence the independence of the judiciary.  In 
Spain the members of the military courts are appointed by the Minister of Defence (see Joinet at 
14). 
 185 
assigned to the post of military judge without the recommendation of the Adjutant 
General.129 
 
The local representative of the Adjutant General must, in consultation with the 
Director: Military Judges or the military judge directly, plan and schedule the 
availability of the military judges for trial.130 
 
The influence of the Adjutant General is also felt in the highest military court, the 
CMA.  The MDSMA makes provision for more than one CMA.131  Where more 
than one CMA is established, the Adjutant General is authorised to determine 
which cases or classes of cases will be brought before which court.132  In these 
instances the executive (in the guise of the Adjutant General) is effectively 
exercising control over which cases are heard before which judge. 
 
Although the influence of the Adjutant General is confined to the administrative 
functions of the military courts and should not influence the way in which the 
trials are conducted or the decisions taken by the military judges, the perception 
created is one where cases can be assigned to judges sympathetic to the cause 
of the executive.  It does, however, seem to be generally accepted, within the 
limited debate on the independence of the military judiciary, that the military 
justice system is essentially independent.133  The reason put forward is that the 
concerns regarding judicial independence do not affect the judicial decision-
making process.  However, a clear distinction is not made between the 
institutional independence of the individual judge, in terms of which the judge is 
allowed to reach a finding without outside influence, and the collective 
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institutional independence of the military judiciary as a whole.134  As mentioned 
earlier, the individual independence of the judge is dependent on the collective 
independence of the judiciary.135  Both these aspects must be complied with.  It 
is submitted that the concerns raised do not interfere with the individual 
independence of the military judges, but raise real concerns regarding the 
collective institutional independence of the military judiciary. 
 
The administrative procedures for which the Adjutant General is responsible 
should resort under the authority of the Director: Military Judges.  However, as 
seen previously, the South African model of separation of powers does not 
provide for a complete severance between the various branches of government.  
Dealings between the courts and the executive regarding administrative matters 
are inevitable. This is not necessarily contrary to the international standards as 
long as the “interaction between these two branches of government is [limited] 
only to the extent necessary to provide security and the 
necessary…administrative support.”136  As long as the Adjutant General’s 
involvement in the judicial administration of the military courts is limited to 
administrative support, the institutional independence of the military judiciary 
might withstand constitutional scrutiny. 
 
A possible solution for this problem, according to the Ministerial Task Team, 
might be to place a civilian in a post similar to that of the Registrar of the High 
Court, to take over this administrative function from the Adjutant General, thereby 
ensuring independence.137 
 
The Canadian military justice system utilises a Court Martial Administrator who 
convenes the courts martial, issues the convening orders and appoints the 
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members of the courts martial.138  The Court Martial Administrator is a uniformed 
member but works under the supervision of the Chief Military Judge.139 
 
4.2.1.5 Personal independence 
 
In determining whether the courts are truly independent, it is not sufficient that a 
court has the required institutional independence.  The judicial officer must also 
have personal independence.140  This means that the employment conditions of 
the judicial officer must be sufficient to ensure that the individual judge is not 
subject to executive influence.141  There are various criteria to consider when 
evaluating the personal independence of the judiciary, such as142 (1) selection 
and appointment, (2) security of tenure, and (3) financial independence. Although 
these three criteria are acceptable for determining the independence of the 
courts, the application of the criteria could differ depending on the level of the 
court.143  In what follows the CMA, CSMJ and CMJ are evaluated against the 
general requirements set for civilian courts.  A short evaluation of the CODH is 
also included.144   
 
Personal independence of judicial officers is an internationally recognised 
requirement.145  The level of independence required for the various types of 
courts depends on the level of the court.  The lower courts are not necessarily 
entitled to the protection of their independence in the same way as is provided for 
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the higher courts.146  The Constitutional Court, in a comprehensive discussion, 
differentiates between the jurisdiction of the high courts and the magistrates’ 
courts, the appointment of the judges and the governing of their salaries and 
benefits against those of the magistrates as well as the removal from office of 
these judges and judicial officers.147  When considering the method of 
appointment of military judges, the regulation of their salaries and benefits, to 
name a few examples, it is submitted that the CSMJ and CMJ can be favourably 
compared to the magistrates’ court when considering its inclusion as a lower 
court. 
 
The concerns surrounding the appointment of military judges, their security of 
tenure and their financial independence are briefly addressed. 
 
Selection and appointment 
 
The Basic Principles on the Independence of the Judiciary provides that148 
 
[p]ersons selected for judicial office shall be individuals of integrity and ability with 
appropriate training or qualifications in law.  Any method of judicial selection shall 
safeguard against appointments for improper motives.  In the selection of judges, 
there shall be no discrimination against a person on the grounds of race, colour, 
sex, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or 
status, except that a requirement that a candidate for judicial office must be a 
national of the country concerned, shall not be considered discriminatory. 
 
These principles are reflected in the constitutional prescripts set out for the 
appointment of judicial officers.149  The Constitution sets, inter alia, the following 
requirements: 
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1. Only appropriately qualified fit and proper people may be appointed as 
judicial officers.150 
 
2. The judiciary needs to broadly reflect the racial and gender 
composition of the country.151 
 
3. All other judicial officers must be appointed in terms of an Act of 
Parliament which will provide for the promotion, salaries and dismissal 
of the judges without favour or prejudice.152  
 
4. Judicial officers are required to “take an oath or affirm, in accordance 
with Schedule 2, that they will uphold and protect the Constitution”.153 
 
Military judges are not regulated by the general South African legislation that 
regulates the judiciary.154  Military courts are regulated by the MDSMA.155  
Having accepted that military courts can be regarded as “other courts” as 
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 Chapter 3 of the MDSMA. 
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provided for in the Constitution156, military judges must be regarded as judicial 
officers and as such must comply with the constitutional requirement that157 
 
[o]ther judicial officers must be appointed in terms of an Act of Parliament which 
must ensure that the appointment, promotion, transfer or dismissal of, or 
disciplinary steps against, these judicial officers take place without favour or 
prejudice. 
 
The method of appointment of military judges depends on the level of the military 
court to which the judge is appointed.  The appointment of judicial officers is not 
left to the judiciary.158  The members of the CMA, being the most senior in status, 
are appointed by the Minister of Defence in terms of the MDSMA and not by the 
President, as in the case of civilian judges.159  The chairperson of the CMA is a 
retired or serving judge of the High Court or a retired or serving magistrate.  The 
appropriately qualified law officer is usually a senior military judge.  No provision 
is made in terms of the MDSMA on whose recommendation the chairperson or 
the senior military judge as a member of the CMA is appointed.  By implication 
such appointments are therefore made by the Minister alone, acting on her sole 
discretion.  The Ministerial Task Team is of the opinion that the ministerial 
appointment of the members of the CMA need not be seen as executive 
interference with the independence and impartiality of the Court.160 
 
Military judges and senior military judges are also not appointed by the 
President,161 but are assigned to the post of military judge by the Minister on 
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 Section 166(e) of the Constitution. 
157
 Section 174(7) of the Constitution; Van Rooyen v The State 2002 (9) BCLR 810 (CC) para 
120. 
158
 Nel at 92. 
159
 Section 7(1) of the MDSMA.  The Minister may also appoint alternatives for any member of the 
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 Ministerial Task Team at 16.  
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President, and therefore all judges, being officers, are ultimately appointed by the President. 
However, they are not appointed by the President specifically as judges. 
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recommendation of the Adjutant General.162  The Adjutant General is a person of 
a high senior rank within the structures of the SANDF.  As such he is, by law, 
responsible for the administration and management of the whole legal division.  
As he is a senior member of the executive, he should not play such a significant 
role in the appointment of the military judges.  His influence is felt in the fact that, 
within his sole discretion, the Adjutant General will only recommend a person for 
assignment as military judge if he is convinced that the particular officer is a “fit 
and proper person of sound character.”163  This raises a concern regarding the 
perceived independence of the military courts.164 
 
In this regard it has been suggested that all military judges be appointed by the 
Minister without the recommendation of the Adjutant General and where such 
recommendation is required, that a body independent from the SANDF be 
structured to make such recommendations to the Minister.165  However, leaving 
the appointment of military judges within the sole discretion of the Minister may 
not be enough to dispel the perception of lack of independence.  The fact that the 
executive is appointing the judge is not the concern,166 as long as some 
independent body plays a significant role in the appointment process. 
 
It is submitted that, in order to provide the necessary independence, a committee 
should be appointed to recommend those officers for appointment as military 
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 Section 14(1) of the MDSMA; Tshivhase (2009) at 466. 
163
 Section 14(2) of the MDSMA. 
164
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SCR 259 paras 107, 182). 
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judges.167  Such a process has been successfully introduced in Canada, where 
similar concerns regarding the independence of the judiciary were raised.168  
Canadian military judges are appointed by a military judicial selection committee, 
consisting of civilian as well as military personnel.  Most of the members sitting 
on the committee also do not hold any position within the Judge Advocate 
General Corps.169  A judge’s appointment can be renewed after five years and 
the recommendation for such renewal must be done by a renewal committee.170  
The process followed for appointment of military judges is similar to those 
followed for civilian judges.171  Their qualifications required for appointment as 
military judges were brought in line with the requirements set for civilian judges.  
They must therefore have at least ten years experience as a member of the 
Canadian Bar.172 
 
The recommendation by the Ministerial Task Team regarding the appointment of 
an independent body for recommendation of military judges is supported.  Such 
an independent body may go a long way in dispelling the perception of a lack of 
independence.173 
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 It is required in terms of international standards that an independent mechanism is used in the 
appointment and disciplining of judges (see Danilet at 10). 
168
 In 1998 Bill C-25 replaced the post of Judge Advocate with that of military judge.   
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 Madden at 51.  
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 McNairn D “An Update on Military Law Reform in Canada” (2004) New Zealand Armed Forces 
Law Review 36 at 40 
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 McNairn (2000) at 252 
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(1998) at 262). 
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Security of tenure 
 
The Basic Principles on the Independence of the Judiciary provides that: 174 
 
[t]he term of office of judges, their independence, security, adequate 
remuneration, conditions of service, pensions and the age of retirement shall be 
adequately secured by law;  
and175 
  
[j]udges, whether appointed or elected, shall have guaranteed tenure until a 
mandatory retirement age or expiry of their term of office where such exist. 
 
As mentioned earlier, it is a constitutional requirement that judicial officers must 
be appointed in terms of an Act of Parliament which must provide, inter alia, for 
the dismissal of judges.176  Security of tenure means that a judge or judicial 
officer is appointed for a fixed period or until retirement and cannot be removed 
from office without proper cause.177  The MDSMA, creating military courts, should 
therefore provide for the tenure of military judges. 
 
The CMA functions on an ad hoc basis and is not a permanent court.  The 
chairperson and the two other members convene when required.  When the CMA 
is not sitting as a court, the chairperson performs his normal functions as a High 
Court judge and the other members of the CMA continue with their line functions 
within the SANDF.178  The danger regarding perceived executive interference is 
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 UN Basic Principles on the Independence of the Judiciary principle 11. 
175
 UN Basic Principles on the Independence of the Judiciary principle 12.  Regarding the removal 
of judges on disciplinary grounds, see principles 17-20; Danilet at 11. 
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 See also s 176(2) of the Constitution. 
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 Okpaluba at 116; Steytler (1998) at 261; Carnelley at 67; Tshivhase (2006) at 116. 
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 The current legally qualified member of the CMA is used as an example.  Although the 
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Military Academy can be used as an example of a member with command experience.  His line 
function was Officer Commanding of a military unit, and as such was as member of the executive.  
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clear.  Two of the three members of the CMA are in fact members of the 
executive and this may influence perceptions regarding the independence of the 
CMA. 
 
There is no provision in the MDSMA providing for a fixed period of appointment 
of the members of the CMA.  The only provision in this regard is that a member 
of the CMA may be employed on a part-time basis179 and that members of the 
Reserve Force may be appointed.180  Although temporary appointments of 
judges may be necessary for the proper functioning of the court, Steytler argues 
that the temporary appointment of judicial officers may create the perception of 
lack of independence because it may appear that temporary employees would 
execute their duties in such a way to keep their employers satisfied.181  The First 
Certification Judgment182 however found that an acting appointed judge is 
sufficiently protected by the Constitution.183 
 
Senior military judges and military judges are not appointed as judicial officers.  
They are appointed as officers in the SANDF within the Military Legal Services 
Division as military legal practitioners.184  Then, if appropriately qualified, they 
may be assigned to the function of senior military judge or military judge.185  Such 
an assignment is for a fixed period or a specific deployment or operation.186  The 
appointment of military judges need not be permanent and can consist of part-
                                                                                                                                            
He was also appointed as member to the CMA and was required to sit as member when the CMA 
convened to review cases.  As can be seen from these examples, there is a blurring of the 
separation between the judiciary and the executive even at this level. 
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 Appointments are made in terms of the Defence Act 42 of 2002 and the General Regulations 
for the South African National Defence Force.  All military law practitioners, irrespective of 
whether they are appointed as prosecution counsel, defence counsel or military judges, are 
appointed in terms of the Personnel Management Code (PMC): Department of Defence, 
Occupational Category: Military Law Practitioner (MLP) PMC Code: 0091 (2007) at 3. 
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 Section 13 of the MDSMA; Tshivhase (2006) at 114. 
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 Section 15 of the MDSMA; Tshivhase (2006) at 114; Carnelley at 67. 
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time appointments and members of the reserve force.187  Although the fixed 
period of judicial appointment is not per se inconsistent with the concept of 
security of tenure, it would seem that the fixed period should be for a more 
extended period of time.188  A term of office of between five and ten years seems 
to be acceptable to ensure compliance with this requirement.189 
 
The MDSMA does not prescribe the duration of the assignment.  The practice in 
the military law environment, until as recently as approximately 2008, was an 
assignment as military judge for a period of two years, renewable by the Minister 
of Defence.190  The situation has subsequently been changed and military judges 
are currently assigned for a fixed period of only one year.  This may negate any 
argument supporting the independence of the military judiciary.  As stated by 
Tshivhase: 191 
 
The problem with short-term assignments is that they can compromise judicial 
independence.  The possibility of a judicial officer working for the renewal of his 
or her term instead of administering justice cannot be ruled out. 
 
Another important consideration in the determination of the current issue is the 
following: All military judges are firstly appointed as military legal practitioners.  
To “appoint” someone means to officially choose someone for a position or 
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 Section 16 of the MDSMA.  Support functionaries, who are not utilised as full-time judges in 
the CSMJ or CMJ may also be appointed by the Minister of Defence.  Their term of appointment 
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 Tshivhase (2006) at 115; Fidell E R “A World-Wide Perspective on Change in Military Justice” 
(2000) 48 The Air Force Law Review 195 at 203; Tshivhase (2009) at 468; Incal v Turkey (1998) 
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 Tshivhase (2006) at 115; R v Généreux [1992] 1 SCR 259 at 317. 
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responsibility.192  Military legal practitioners are appointed in the Core Service 
System on an initial contract of which the duration is determined by policy.193  In 
practice the contracts are usually for a term of five or ten years and are routinely 
renewed. 
 
After appointment, when appropriately qualified, the legal practitioners are 
assigned to their respective functions, in casu to the post of military judge.194  To 
“assign” someone means to select a person or appoint in a specific post.195  On 
first reading, there does not seem to be a significant difference between the 
concept of “appointment” and “assignment”.  However, in the context of the 
military, a further meaning can be attributed to the concept “assign”.  In the 
military it means to “allocate (men or materials) on a permanent basis”196 or “to 
serve more or less permanently as a member of a particular organization.”197  
Since the extended meaning of “assign” connotes a more permanent situation, it 
is submitted that the assignment as military judge cannot easily be revoked 
before expiry of the assignment period.  The military judge would therefore have 
security of tenure for the duration of that specific assignment.198 
 
Before deciding whether the relatively short period of fixed appointment of 
military judges results in a lack of independence, it is necessary also to consider 
the international perspective. In the USA the Court Martial Appeal Court (now 
known as the United States Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces) held that 
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although judicial independence was necessary for a fair trial, fixed terms of office 
were not required of military judges to comply with the constitutional provision of 
due process.199  The court held that there were sufficient safeguards present to 
protect the independence of judges.  Such safeguards include the “administrative 
method of complaint” available to the judge to protect him against command 
interference, the prosecution of any member, irrespective of rank, where such a 
member attempts to interfere with a judge’s finding or sentence and the fact that 
the judge can appeal to the Court Martial Appeal Court.200  The independence of 
the military judiciary was again challenged in Weiss v United States201 where it 
was alleged that the appointment of military judges without a fixed term violated 
due process.202  The Supreme Court confirmed the judgment of the Court Martial 
Appeal Court in US v Graf203 and held that the appointment process did not 
violate the due process provision.  The Supreme Court held that “[a]lthough a 
fixed term of office is a traditional component of the Anglo-American civilian 
judicial system, it has never been a part of the military justice tradition”.204  The 
difficulty facing military judges without fixed term appointments is exacerbated by 
the fact that the USA does not have permanent military courts.  Courts martial 
are convened on an ad hoc basis as required. 
 
A similar challenge is faced by the Canadian military justice system.  Since 2003, 
when former Chief Justice Lamer first recommended permanent Canadian 
military courts, various other recommendations have been made in this regard.  
The government of Canada have since then introduced three Bills regarding 
changes in the military justice system, but to date have failed to implement the 
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recommendation.205  Canadian military judges are appointed for fixed periods of 
five years.  Recommendations have however been made that their period of 
appointment should be extended.206 
 
Security of tenure is also affected by the ease or otherwise with which military 
judges can be removed from office. Section 177 of the Constitution provides that 
a judge may only be removed by the Judicial Service Commission (JSC) where 
the judge is found to be incapacitated, grossly incompetent or guilty of gross 
misconduct.  Requiring the JSC to remove a judge limits the influence of the 
executive over the judiciary.207  The grounds for the removal of civilian judges are 
however more limited than those set out in section 17 of the MDSMA.  A military 
judge may be removed from his assignment as judge for reasons of the judge’s 
incapacity, incompetence, misconduct or at the written request of the judge.208  
Where the Constitution requires “gross” incompetence or misconduct, section 17 
of the MDSMA requires mere incompetence or misconduct.  It is however 
submitted that section 17 of the MDSMA in essence complies with the 
constitutional requirement for the removal of judges. 
 
Protection against arbitrary removal is critical to the concept of judicial 
independence.209  Limiting the executive’s ability for the arbitrary removal of a 
military judge alone may however not be sufficient to comply with the 
constitutional requirement.  Of concern is the fact that the MDSMA does not 
prescribe a procedure for the removal of military judges.  The UN Basic 
Principles on the Independence of the Judiciary requires that any complaint 
against a judicial officer should be “processed expeditiously and fairly under an 
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 For a full discussion on the issues and recommendations see Canadian Bar Association at 10-
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 Van Rooyen v The State 2002 (9) BCLR 810 (CC) para 161; Tshivhase (2006) at 167; 
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appropriate procedure.  The judge shall have the right to a fair hearing.”210  
Currently the MDSMA does not comply with this prescript. 
 
A further concern regarding the removal of military judges relates to the 
individuals involved in the removal of the judge.  The Minister may remove the 
judge on the recommendation of the Adjutant General alone.211  The concerns 
regarding the Adjutant General’s involvement in the administrative processes of 
the military judiciary discussed above remains relevant.  The Constitutional Court 
held that212 
 
[t]he Minister, a member of the government, should not have the power to 
exercise discipline over judicial officers and to punish them for misconduct.  That 
would place the judicial officers concerned in a subordinate position in relation to 
the government which is inconsistent with judicial independence. 
 
An independent body, as recommended by the Ministerial Task Team regarding 
the appointment of judicial officers may have an important role to play in the 
legitimate removal of military judges as well.  Such a body should act as a buffer 
between the military judiciary and the executive to limit the executive’s influence 
over them. 
 
Despite the lacuna regarding procedures for the removal of military judges, the 
following bears consideration.  If a judge’s or magistrate’s appointment as judicial 
officer is not renewed, that judge or magistrate would no longer have 
employment.  However, if an individual’s assignment as military judge is not 
renewed after expiration of the period of assignment, he will still have 
employment as legal practitioner and will merely be assigned to another function, 
such as review counsel or legal advice.  If however it is accepted that the period 
of one year is too short for security of tenure, it is submitted that the security of 
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 UN Basic Principles on the Independence of the Judiciary principle 17; Tshivhase (2006) at 
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tenure of military judges does not lie in their assignment as military judge, but 
rather in their appointment as military legal practitioner and would therefore 
comply with the requirement of security of tenure. 
 
The importance of fixed terms for judges should also not be over-emphasised.  
Lederer and Hundley raise an interesting point of view.213 They argue that once a 
judge’s fixed term has ended, that judge is once again in competition with the 
other candidates and therefore a judge’s decision may still be influenced by his 
interest in future assignments.  They come to the conclusion that the “degree of 
protection afforded a judge by fixed tenure is de minimus.” 
 
Financial independence 
 
The Constitution holds that “salaries, allowances and benefits of judges may not 
be reduced.”214  All judges and judicial officers should have financial security.215  
Financial independence means that the executive cannot “influence salaries or 
pension schemes on a discretionary or arbitrary basis.  Determining salaries and 
pensions through legislation is the highest form of security.”216  Adequate 
remuneration forms part of judicial independence and a lack of financial security 
may be detrimental to judicial independence.217  In evaluating the financial 
independence of the judiciary, the Constitutional Court held that it entails 
adequate remuneration, a prohibition on the arbitrary reduction of salaries and 
mechanisms aimed at eliminating the need for judicial officers to have to 
negotiate with the executive on matters relating to their remuneration.218 
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However, the MDSMA does not make separate provision for the conditions of 
service of military judges.  All salary scales and allowances are determined in 
terms of section 55 of the Defence Act 42 of 2002.219  Salary packages are also 
predetermined in terms of SANDF policy documents.220  The salaries of military 
judges are governed by the Personnel Management Code (PMC) of Military Law 
Practitioners,221 except for members of the CMA who are not in the full-time 
employ of the state or an organ of state.222  Pay and grade progression within 
salary levels are clearly set out in the PMC and rank progression is subject to the 
policy requirements as provided by the Chief SANDF and the various arms of 
service.223  Military judges are not treated differently from other functionaries in 
the military justice system, for example, a military judge and a prosecutor with a 
similar period of service in the SANDF will receive the same salary and 
benefits.224  Tshivhase argues that this arrangement is not appropriate for military 
judges since it does not recognise their status as judicial officers.225  He states 
that226 
 
[w]hile one acknowledges the uniqueness of the relationship between the military 
and its members, there is no military imperative which would justify the disregard 
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of basic financial security for military judicial officers.  Special measures must be 
adopted to address their financial security. 
 
However, it is submitted that despite the concerns raised by Tshivhase, generally 
the salaries and benefits of military judges are sufficiently protected and 
governed by legislation and policy documents, which means that the executive 
cannot arbitrarily interfere with these salaries and benefits.  As mentioned above, 
in the event of a military judge’s assignment not being renewed, it would not 
affect the financial security of the military judge since he or she is being 
remunerated as a military law practitioner and not as a judicial officer.  This of 
itself acts as a guarantee of judicial independence.  Military judges have no 
financial reason to try and placate the executive in order to have their assignment 
as judge extended.  As long as the assignment periods are inadequate in 
promoting security of tenure, the fact that the judge has no pecuniary interest in 
advancing the agenda of the executive may serve as a powerful check on 
perceived executive interference in the independence of the military judiciary.  It 
must also be mentioned that the occupational specific dispensation for military 
legal officers resulted in the officers within the legal division generally being in a 
better position regarding salary and benefits compared to other officers within the 
SANDF on the same rank level.  This was done in order to recruit and retain 
personnel with appropriate competencies and experience.227 
 
It is submitted that although no specific provision is made for a separate 
remuneration dispensation for military judges, the fact that their salaries are 
governed by various policy documents along with other military court 
functionaries, thereby limiting the executive’s ability to interfere with their salaries 
specifically, provides sufficient financial security for the purpose of their 
independence. 
 
 
                                               
227
 Personnel Management Code para 11. 
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4.2.2 Fair trial criteria and the military courts 
 
Once it has been determined that the judge acted independently and impartially 
in reaching a fair decision on the facts, justice requires further that the trial must 
be conducted in a fair manner, following fair procedures.228  In this context the 
military courts will be evaluated against the fair trial criteria as provided for by the 
Constitution.  In terms of the Constitution each accused person has the right to a 
fair trial which include the following:229 
 
1. to be informed of the charges in enough detail to enable the accused to 
answer the charges; 
 
2. to have sufficient time and facilities to prepare a defence; 
 
3. to a public hearing before an ordinary court; 
 
4. to choose and be represented by a legal practitioner of his choice; and 
 
5. to have the right to review and appeal by a high court.230 
 
The rights listed are merely a minimum set of guarantees to protect the rights of 
an accused.231  Fair trial rights do not only include those rights listed in section 
                                               
228
 Nel at 82; see also para 4.1 above. 
229
 Section 35(3) of the Constitution.  Only those rights considered relevant to this discussion are 
discussed here. 
230
 See ch 7 at para 7.5.3 below. 
231
 Steytler (1998) at 205. 
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35(3) but also include substantive fairness.232  The Constitutional Court found 
that the list of rights in the Interim Constitution233  
 
is broader than the list of specific rights set out in paragraphs (a) to (j) of the 
subsection.  It embraces a concept of substantive fairness which is not to be 
equated with what might have passed muster in our criminal courts before the 
Constitution came into force. 
 
In general it can be said that a trial will be fair where there is adequate protection 
against innocent people being convicted, where there is a presumption of 
innocence, right to legal representation, a trial in public that has not been 
delayed234 unreasonably and one that is “open, impartial and equitable”235.  In 
determining whether an accused received a fair trial, one must take into account 
the trial as a whole and not only each of these individual aspects in isolation.  
Where one aspect may fall short of the constitutional requirement it may not 
necessarily compromise the fairness of the whole trial.  The “cumulative impact 
of a series of procedural shortfalls” should be taken into consideration.236 
 
In evaluating whether military courts comply with the constitutional requirements 
of a fair trial as envisaged by section 35(3) it must be kept in mind that the courts 
do not require that the proceedings must duplicate “all the requirements and 
safeguards embodied in s 25(3) of the [Interim] Constitution [in all 
circumstances].  In most cases it will require the interposition of an impartial 
entity, independent of the Executive and the Legislature to act as arbiter between 
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 Stavros at 43; Van Niekerk v Attorney-General, Transvaal 1990 (4) 806 (A). 
 205 
the individual and the State.”237  The Constitution provides the general norm of 
what a “fair trial” should be but each case will have to be judged individually to 
determine whether the legislature in fact conforms to this norm.238 
 
The right to a fair trial however only applies to an accused person.239  The 
accused must further be someone who is an accused before criminal 
proceedings.240  One must therefore first establish whether an individual before a 
military court can in fact qualify as an accused in criminal proceedings.  Only 
once this has been established will a selection of fair trial rights be discussed in 
more detail. 
 
Although the trial procedures followed in the military courts resemble those 
followed by civilian courts,241 the question remains whether the person being 
tried could be considered an accused for purposes of the Constitution.  No 
specific mention is made in the legislation regarding an individual appearing 
before the CSMJ or the CMJ, but the Ministerial Task Team contends that the 
rights afforded to an accused to a fair trial are not applicable to an accused 
before a CODH.  This is based on Nel v Le Roux,242 where it was held that an 
accused’s rights in terms of section 25(3) of the Interim Constitution are only 
available to an “accused” before a criminal trial.  No further reason is given by the 
Task Team why an accused before a CODH cannot be seen as an accused for 
the purposes of section 35(3) of the Constitution.  It is assumed that the 
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 Nel v Le Roux 1996 (3) SA 562 (CC) at 572 (emphasis added); S v Dzukuda, S v Tshilo 2000 
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Ministerial Task Team’s reasoning is due to the fact that the CODH could 
possibly not be regarded as a “criminal trial.”  However, reliance on the Nel-
judgment alone is not sufficient to contend that an accused before a CODH is not 
an accused before a criminal trial.  The individual in the Nel-judgment was clearly 
not charged with an offence.243  It is therefore different from an accused before a 
CODH, who is charged with an offence.   
 
The status of an accused before a military court, which would include the CODH, 
is investigated below.  The question is: Can a military accused be regarded as an 
accused charged in criminal proceedings?  
 
4.2.3 An accused charged with a criminal offence 
 
4.2.3.1 The accused 
 
The right to a fair trial applies to an accused person involved in criminal 
proceedings.244  Steytler identifies two tests for determining whether an individual 
could be regarded as an “accused”, namely the “ordinary meaning test” and the 
“extended meaning test.”245  
 
4.2.3.2 The ordinary meaning test 
 
With the ordinary meaning test the accused is seen as a person facing criminal 
charges before a court.246 A person becomes an accused once he is charged in 
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 Nel v Le Roux 1996 (3) SA 562 (CC) at 572.  Penalising a witness who refuses to testify is 
clearly not criminal proceedings.  A custodial sentence under the circumstances would also not 
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criminal proceedings.247  To be considered charged he must be “advised by a 
competent authority that a decision has been taken to prosecute him.”248 
 
In Sanderson v Attorney-General, Eastern Cape249 the court discussed three 
possible interpretations for the word “charged”, namely (1) the generic definition 
as found in section 1 of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977 where it is seen 
as a “formulated allegation against an accused”, (2) a narrow definition, referring 
to formal arraignment, and (3) a broad definition, meaning “some or other 
intimation to the accused of the crime(s) alleged to have been committed”.  It is 
submitted that the court’s conclusion that the meaning of the word “charged” is 
vague and dependent on the context of each case is the correct one.250 
 
In the military justice system being charged would refer to the instance where the 
individual is either arrested or warned that charges will be preferred against 
him.251  Notification of the charge must be official but need not be formal.252  
Military members need therefore not wait for the written DD1 (Account of 
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Offence) that is issued within two days of the verbal warning or 24 hours after 
arrest.  Once the verbal warning has been issued, or the arrest effected, the 
individual is considered charged.  This in effect means that any person accused 
of an offence in criminal proceedings, irrespective of the seriousness of the 
offence, is entitled to the full protection of their fair trial rights.253 
 
All persons before military courts can therefore be classified as individuals 
charged with an offence.  To qualify as an accused as required by the 
Constitution however, he must be charged in criminal proceedings.  
Consequently, if a military member is charged in criminal proceedings before a 
military court, that member would be entitled to the protection in terms of section 
35(3).  From the previous discussion it is clear that the CSMJ and the CMJ can 
be regarded as courts for the purposes of section 166 of the Constitution.  Can a 
person appearing before these courts consequently be regarded as an accused 
in criminal proceedings?  What is the situation regarding the CODH?  
 
Applying the ordinary meaning of the term “accused” can create certain 
difficulties in terms of a military accused and his constitutional rights.  To 
understand this difficulty it is necessary to briefly refer to the jurisdiction 
regarding offences applicable to the various military courts.254  The highest 
military court of the first instance, the CSMJ, has jurisdiction over any offence 
committed by military personnel, except for murder, treason, rape and culpable 
homicide committed inside the borders of the Republic.  Outside the borders the 
CSMJ has the necessary jurisdiction.  These military courts also have jurisdiction 
over purely disciplinary offences.  The CMJ has jurisdiction over most offences, 
excluding murder, treason, rape and culpable homicide (whether committed 
inside or outside the borders of the Republic) and contraventions of sections 4 
and 5 of the MDC.  They also have jurisdiction over all disciplinary offences.  The 
CODH only has jurisdiction over disciplinary offences and although it is referred 
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 Steytler (1998) at 209; Engel et al v The Netherlands (1976) 1 EHRR 647. 
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to a military court, it should rather be classified as a disciplinary forum.255  Being 
limited to disciplinary matters it is submitted that hearings before the CODH 
cannot be regarded as criminal proceedings. 
 
The situation in military courts is therefore that the CSMJ and the CMJ hear 
criminal as well as disciplinary matters.  Would this mean that the application of a 
military accused’s fair trial rights depend on whether the trial constitutes criminal 
or disciplinary proceedings?  The CODH on the other hand only consider 
disciplinary matters.  Would this mean that an accused before this forum may 
never rely on their fair trial rights? 
 
An evaluation of what Steytler refers to as the “extended meaning” test might be 
of some assistance in answering these questions. 
 
4.2.3.3 The extended meaning test 
 
According to the extended meaning test an “accused” person is someone who is 
not facing criminal charges, but who should still be entitled to protection of the 
fair trial rights because of the nature of the proceedings,256 or the punitive 
sanction attached to the charges.257 In terms of this test a substantive definition 
of an accused person is emphasised, rather than a formal one.  The extended 
meaning is usually considered when evaluating state institutions such as the 
armed forces.258   
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The nature of the offence 
 
If the proceedings are not clearly criminal in nature, Steytler contends that fair 
trial rights could attach if the offence is criminal in nature.  Conduct can be 
regarded as criminal when “it is aimed at protecting and promoting public welfare 
as opposed to regulating conduct within a private sphere of activity.”259  When 
assessing whether a military person accused of committing an offence in 
contravention of the conduct pertaining to the armed force is an accused facing 
criminal proceedings the nature of the offence plays an important role.260  In the 
military environment criminal and disciplinary offences are distinguished.261  
Although most offences created in the civilian environment are also punishable in 
terms of military law, certain offences are created in the military context which is 
unique to the military.  Many of these offences only qualify as offences because 
the person committing them is in the military and therefore subject to military 
law.262  The European Commission and Court for Human Rights recognised this 
distinction in that263  
 
there is in all the Convention countries a distinction recognized between acts that 
are punishable offences subject to a criminal charge and proceedings in the 
ordinary courts of law, and acts that constitute offences against the discipline, 
internal order and proper conduct of the armed services of civil administration. 
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In R v Wigglesworth264 the court explained the distinction as follows: 
 
If a particular matter is of a public nature, intended to promote public order and 
welfare within a public sphere of activity, then that matter falls within s. 11.265  
This is to be distinguished from private, domestic or disciplinary matters which 
are regulatory, protective or corrective and which are primarily intended to 
maintain discipline, professional integrity and professional standards or to 
regulate conduct within a limited sphere of activity. 
 
In determining the scope of disciplinary offences it is suggested that the court 
also take cognisance of whether the “norm had legitimately earned its place 
among the rules governing the armed forces, in other words whether it had any 
relevance to their proper functioning”.266  Determining the military interests that 
are protected by the rule may in fact give a clearer picture to the vague criteria 
found in establishing the nature of the offence, thereby qualifying the test and 
allowing for a more accurate distinction between criminal and disciplinary 
offences.267 
 
The CSMJ and the CMJ have jurisdiction over both criminal and disciplinary 
offences.  Certain offences committed in the military environment would be 
deemed criminal offences if committed in the public sphere and would therefore 
be seen as criminal offences even if they form part of military law.268  The South 
African distinction between military and disciplinary offences is not based purely 
                                               
264
 R v Wigglesworth [1987] 2 SCR 541 at 251; Van Dijk & van Hoof at 310 (the distinction 
between criminal and disciplinary offences is whether the violated provision only applies to a 
specific group or is generally binding); Herbert Eggs v Switzerland (1976) 15 ECHR DR 51 at 170  
265
 Section 11 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms is similar to s 35 of the South 
African Constitution, providing, inter alia, that any person charged with an offence has the right to 
be informed of the specific charges without undue delay, to be tried within a reasonable time and 
not to be denied bail without just cause. 
266
 Stavros at 11. 
267
 Stavros at 12. 
268
 Steytler (1998) at 212; Morris at 63; Campbell and Fell v United Kingdom (1984) 4 EHRR 293 
para 37 where the court held that it “would also be illogical and anomalous to regard as a criminal 
cause or matter proceedings arising from an offence under the Rules which did not amount to a 
criminal offence under the general law.” 
 212 
on the nature of the offence.269  The MDSMA makes this distinction on the 
grounds of the penal sanction attached to the particular offence.  Any offence of 
which the maximum punishment prescribed does not exceed one year 
imprisonment is deemed a disciplinary offence.270  Any offence with a prescribed 
punishment of more than one year imprisonment is consequently seen as a 
criminal offence, even if it is the type of offence that can only be committed by a 
military person in a military environment.271 
 
The British military system on the other hand distinguishes between criminal and 
disciplinary offences on the grounds of the military nature of the offence.  They 
classify offences as disciplinary that would be regarded as criminal offences in 
South Africa, for example the offences of obstructing military operations or 
assisting the enemy are classified as disciplinary offences.272 
 
When appearing before the CSMJ and CMJ on a criminal charge it is clear that 
the individual qualifies as an accused for purposes of the Constitution.  What is 
the status of an individual facing purely disciplinary charges before these courts? 
 
The European Court of Human Rights recognises a state’s prerogative to rather 
use disciplinary proceedings against members of the armed forces than criminal 
proceedings when the accused contravened a legal rule of the armed forces.273  
The application of fair trial rights should not be restricted only to the application of 
criminal law but should also apply to “penal proceedings.”274  Therefore, where 
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purely disciplinary proceedings are held, the individual is generally not regarded 
as an accused for purposes of his fair trial rights.  If this is applied to the South 
African position it would create an untenable situation in the CSMJ and CMJ, 
where an accused would be afforded his fair trial rights when charged with a 
criminal offence but not when charged with a disciplinary offence.  It is therefore 
necessary to determine whether the penal consequences that can be incurred 
can assist in establishing the status of the accused.275 
 
The penal consequences 
 
This aspect is considered independently from the nature of the offence.  In this 
context one would determine the “true penal consequences” in determining an 
individual’s status as an accused.276  The aim of punishment in the SANDF, as 
mentioned earlier, is mainly to correct discipline and not necessarily to punish 
individuals for committing offences.277  Punishment in disciplinary forums, such 
as the CODH, is mainly aimed at correcting discipline and is generally not 
punitive.278  Where the purpose of the punishment is mainly disciplinary in nature, 
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the constitutional rights to a fair trial seem not to apply since it only applies to 
criminal proceedings.279  However, where punishment “which by its magnitude 
would appear to be imposed for the purpose of redressing the wrong done to 
society at large rather than to the maintenance of internal discipline within a 
limited sphere of activity,” such as imprisonment or a fine, is imposed, the right to 
a fair trial should be applicable.280 
 
Loss of liberty 
 
Constitutional rights should protect the individual whenever a punishment is 
imposed that entails a loss of liberty.281  Loss of liberty does not automatically 
mean the punishment constitutes a criminal penalty.282  Where the loss of liberty 
serves another purpose than punishment, it would not constitute a criminal 
penalty.283 
 
Sentences that involve a loss of liberty include imprisonment,284 detention285 and 
confinement to barracks.  It is clear that sentences of imprisonment and 
detention always result in a loss of liberty, but this is not necessarily true of 
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confinement to barracks. To determine whether an individual sentenced to 
confine to barracks is actually deprived of his liberty requires an assessment of 
the individual’s actual situation in the military.286  This issue was specifically 
addressed in Engel v The Netherlands287 where the court held that members of 
the armed forces are regularly limited in their freedom of movement due to the 
demands of military service.  A mere deprivation of liberty of movement will 
therefore not constitute a contravention of an accused’s rights against arbitrary 
deprivation of liberty. 
 
In discussing different forms of confinement that existed at the time, the court 
came to the conclusion that light arrest, which in its description is similar to our 
sentence of confinement to barracks, does not differ much from the ordinary 
framework of life in the armed forces.288  A sentence such as confinement to 
barracks would, according to this approach, not qualify as a deprivation of liberty 
for the purposes of determining whether fair trial rights should be applied.289  
What would constitute a deprivation of liberty for a civilian cannot be judged the 
same for a member of the armed forces and will only be seen as a deprivation if 
“it takes the form of restrictions that clearly deviate from the normal conditions of 
life within the armed forces…”.290  Where the confinement to barracks entails that 
the member is confined to his living quarters after hours and is not locked in 
although he may not visit the canteen on the unit, it would not constitute a 
                                               
286
 Engel v The Netherlands (1976) 1 EHRR 647 para 59.  For a complete discussion in the 
nature of confinement to barracks as a sentence see ch 6 para 6.2.11 below. 
287
 Engel v The Netherlands (1976) 1 EHRR 647 para 58.  It should however be noted that the 
context of deprivation of liberty the court referred to in this instance was not related to depriving a 
person of his personal liberty but ensuring that he is not arbitrarily deprived of his liberty.  This 
distinction is of some importance.  The arbitrary deprivation of liberty refers to the s 12 right in 
terms of the South African Constitution against the arbitrary deprivation of liberty.  This right 
refers to the “substantive due process rights” of the accused (see Snyckers & Le Roux at 51-8).  
In contrast the deprivation of the personal liberty of the accused in the context discussed here 
refers to the criminal procedure rights of the accused in terms of s 35(3) of the Constitution (see 
Snyckers & Le Roux at 51-8 where it is argued that due process analysis should not be used in 
the interpretation of criminal procedure rights). 
288
 Engel v The Netherlands (1976) 1 EHRR 647 paras 60-62. 
289
 See Engel v The Netherlands (1976) 1 EHRR 647 para 58 where the European Court for 
Human Rights determined that the deprivation of liberty “does not concern mere restrictions upon 
liberty of movement”. 
290
 Engel v The Netherlands (1976) 1 EHRR 647 para 59; Stavros at 10–11. 
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deprivation of liberty since they are able to perform their normal duties.291  At 
most it places a limitation on the accused’s freedom of movement, which given 
the fact that it can only be imposed on soldiers with the rank of private and is 
usually imposed while on training when their freedom of movement is largely 
restricted due to the demands of training anyway, it is submitted that the 
deprivation of liberty in this context is not sufficient to qualify as “true penal 
consequences”, elevating the proceedings from disciplinary to criminal.292 
 
A sentence of detention qualifies as a deprivation of liberty, since a member is 
locked up in a cell and excluded from their normal duties.293  However, in a 
dissenting judgment Verdross J compared the detention of soldiers in military 
detention barracks with the imprisonment of civilians and soldiers in civilian 
prisons and, not surprisingly, found fundamental differences.  Where a civilian is 
cut off from his ordinary environment and occupation he found that a “soldier 
detained for disciplinary reasons stays in the barracks and may, from one 
moment to the next, be ordered to carry out one of his military duties; he thus 
remains, even whilst so detained, potentially within the confines of military 
service…such detention does not in principle amount to a deprivation of 
liberty….”294  Looking at detention as a sentence in the South African context one 
cannot agree with this judgment.  Although an accused has the opportunity to 
return to his work environment after completion of his sentence of detention, he 
is removed from this environment for the duration of the sentence and the 
deprivation of his liberty in this context is sufficiently serious to qualify as “true 
penal consequences.” 
 
 
                                               
291
 Engel v The Netherlands (1976) 1 EHRR 647 para 62.  Stavros at 13 does not agree with this 
contention.  Even though a soldier’s movements may be restricted because they spend most of 
their time in a camp, they do in fact have relative freedom of movement when not on duty.  Any 
restrictions imposed as punishment would therefore qualify as a deprivation of liberty. 
292
 It is submitted that the maximum period of this punishment, being only 21 days, further limits 
the gravity of the punishment. 
293
 Engel v The Netherlands (1976) 1 EHRR 647 para 63, specifically the separate opinion of 
Zekia J. 
294
 Engel v The Netherlands (1976) 1 EHRR 647 in the separate opinion of Verdross J. 
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Imposition of a fine 
 
The main purpose for imposing a fine is to punish the offender by reducing his 
financial ability and quality of life.295  As punishment the fine should serve as a 
deterrent.  For a fine to qualify as “true penal consequences” in terms of 
Steytler’s “extended” definition of who qualifies as an accused, the fine must be 
so severe that the purpose of the fine not only serves as a deterrent but can 
further be regarded as redressing the social wrong done.  It should not merely be 
regarded as maintaining internal discipline.  Steytler explains it as follows:296 
 
Where a fine is imposed not to recover a loss but as a form of punishment with 
the purpose of retribution or deterrence, the fine no longer performs a private 
function but is aimed at protecting the general public.  A further indication of the 
public nature of a fine is whether it is deposited in the national revenue fund. 
 
All fines paid by members of the SANDF are automatically paid into the state’s 
“B7”-account which means that only the state benefits from the fines.  Neither the 
unit where the crime was committed nor the victim involved will ever benefit from 
the imposition of the fine.  State losses may be recovered by means of a 
separate court order297 or civil action instituted against the convicted accused by 
the State Attorney’s office.298 
 
It is an open question to what extent fines imposed by the military courts can 
really act as a deterrent.  To punish the accused and act as a deterrent the fine 
should, to some extent, reduce the accused’s financial ability and “worsen his 
quality of life for some time.”299  The maximum fine that can be imposed by the 
CSMJ is R6000 and by the CODH it is only R600.  Payments can also be done in 
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 Terblanche S S A Guide to Sentencing in South Africa (2007) at 261. 
296
 Steytler (1998) at 213. 
297
 Section 129(1) of the MDC. 
298
 For example where the accused was found guilty of negligent driving of a military vehicle and 
he was not authorised to drive that vehicle, the damages caused by the accident will be collected 
from the accused by means of civil action. 
299
 Terblanche at 261. 
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instalments on the request of the accused.  A study done from statistics provided 
by the South African Navy has in fact shown that even the imposition of 
maximum fines do not reduce the recidivism of military offenders.300 
 
4.2.4 The status of the military accused 
 
Unfortunately most military trials do not fit neatly into a category of criminal 
proceedings.  Many military trials before a CSMJ and CMJ are confronted with an 
accused charged with more than one offence, often combining criminal and 
disciplinary offences in one trial.  However, the fact that the trial has both 
elements should not detract from the criminal nature of the proceedings.301  
Although the “nature of the offence” test as proposed by Steytler does not 
provide a clear answer in such instances it is submitted that the “true penal 
consequences” test may in fact be of assistance.  Even where it is not clear 
whether the proceedings before the military court are of a criminal nature, the 
fact that the penal consequences attached to the offences may lead to a 
deprivation of liberty in the form of imprisonment necessitates protection of the 
accused in terms of section 35(3) of the Constitution.302  Such an interpretation is 
also in line with section 39(1) of the Constitution which enjoins interpreters to 
promote the underlying values of the Constitution.  Any interpretation must 
consider human dignity, equality and freedom.  Constitutional interpretation 
entails a generous inclusive and purposive approach to interpretation rather than 
                                               
300
 See Heinecken L et al “Military Discipline: Where Are We Going Wrong?” (2003) 25 Strategic 
Review for Southern Africa 88 at 98.  Reference is made to law officers stating that offenders 
even budget for offences prior to committing the offence.  This is especially true at the level of the 
CODH where the accused knows that the fine cannot be more than R600. 
301
 Snyckers & Le Roux at 51-17 (in discussing S v Baloyi 2000 (1) BCLR 86 (CC) stated that 
“even proceedings that did not form part of the criminal justice system, or were not criminal trials 
proper, could attract section FC s 35 protection if the character of what the proceedings were 
aimed at achieving sufficiently approximated that of a criminal prosecution”); Mhlekwa v Head of 
the Western Tembuland Regional Authority, Feni v Head of the Western Tembuland Regional 
Authority 2000 (2) SACR 596 (Tk) (the discussion on the procedures followed in the traditional 
courts highlights the similarities between the traditional courts and the military courts. Just as the 
accused before a traditional court was regarded as an accused before criminal proceedings, the 
accused before a military court can be considered an accused before criminal proceedings). 
302
 The sanction attached to all offences in terms of the MDC is imprisonment ranging from three 
months to 30 years (see appendix A to ch 5). 
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an exclusionary approach.303  It is therefore submitted that an accused before a 
CSMJ and a CMJ is an accused for purposes of section 35(3) protection.304 
 
This submission is only relevant to trials by CSMJ and CMJ since they can 
impose sentences of imprisonment and detention.  The nature of the proceedings 
as well as the nature of the offences within its jurisdiction clearly indicate that 
proceedings before the CODH cannot be regarded as criminal.  Although the 
penalty clauses for all military offences consist of imprisonment it is not a 
sentence within the jurisdiction of the CODH.  Confinement to barracks, which do 
fall within the jurisdiction of the CODH, cannot be regarded as sufficient 
deprivation of liberty to qualify as “true penal sanction”.  CODH proceedings are 
further much less formal than before the CSMJ or CMJ and the less proceedings 
resemble a criminal trial the less claim an individual has to full protection under 
section 35(3).305  An accused before the CODH will therefore not be regarded as 
an accused before criminal proceedings. 
 
4.3 An evaluation of a selection of fair trial rights, as applied by the court of a 
senior military judge and court of a military judge 
 
Compliance with the rights to a fair trial is paramount in ensuring that justice is 
done during a trial.  Since an accused before a CSMJ and CMJ is entitled to the 
rights of a fair trial in terms of section 35(3) of the Constitution, a short evaluation 
is done of a selection of fair trial rights as they are applied in the military courts.  
Although it is argued that an accused before a CODH is not entitled to the 
section 35(3) rights it is submitted that such an accused is still entitled to basic 
procedural fairness.  The CODH is therefore briefly evaluated to determine 
whether this forum indeed provides its accused with basic fair procedures. 
 
                                               
303
 Botha C Statutory Interpretation: An Introduction for Students 4 ed (2007) at 119-122. 
304
 See also Mbambo v Minister of Defence 2005 (2) SA 226 (T) at 229D-E where the court found 
that an accused in the military justice system can indeed be seen as an accused for purposes of 
the Constitution. 
305
 Snyckers & Le Roux at 51-13. 
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The following rights are evaluated: 
 
4.3.1 The right to be informed of the charges in enough detail to enable 
 the accused to answer to the charges. 
 
4.3.2 Sufficient time and facilities to prepare a defence. 
 
4.3.3 A public hearing before an ordinary court. 
 
4.3.4 The right to choose and be represented by a legal practitioner of his 
 choice. 
 
The important right regarding appeal and review is discussed elsewhere.306 
 
4.3.1 The right to be informed of the charges in enough detail to enable the 
accused to answer the charges 
 
Section 84(1) of the Criminal Procedure Act states that 
 
[s]ubject to the provisions of this Act and of any other law relating to any 
particular offence, a charge shall set forth the relevant offence in such manner 
and with such particulars as to the time and place at which the offence is alleged 
to have committed and the person, if any, against whom and the property, if any, 
in respect of which the offence is alleged to have been committed, as may 
reasonably sufficient to inform the accused of the nature of the charge. 
 
When a person is charged with an offence, it is required that the charge explain 
the relevant offence in such a manner and in sufficient particulars that the 
accused is sufficiently informed of the charge.307  This includes a reference in the 
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 See ch 7 para 7.5.3 below. 
307
 See also s 80 of the MDC; Steytler (1998) at 227; Stavros at 168-169.  It is required that the 
accused be informed with regard to all the elements of the offence and not only the name of the 
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charge sheet to the provisions applicable to the sentencing regime of a specific 
offence.308  Most of the available case law finds specific application to the 
imposition of the minimum sentence regime.  It is contended that where the state 
intends to invoke section 51 of the Criminal Law Amendment Act 105 of 1997 the 
charge sheet should indicate such an intention.  Although the imposition of 
minimum sentences is not an issue before the military courts, the important 
principle is that it is preferable that any sentencing legislation on which the state 
intends to rely should be contained in the charge sheet.  This includes the facts 
the state intends to prove which may influence the sentence.309  Although the 
charge sheet should specify these particulars, the court in S v Legoa310 held that 
it preferred not to lay down general rules as to exactly how and when the facts 
and possible sentence it might incur should be made known to the accused.  
Each individual case must be evaluated to determine whether the accused’s 
substantive fair trial rights were violated.311  Therefore, although it is preferable 
that the charge sheet should contain a reference to the penalty it is not 
essential.312  To determine whether sufficient information has been given to the 
accused, it should be kept in mind that the accused is presumed innocent and 
therefore has no knowledge of the offence.313   
 
                                                                                                                                            
offence that he is being charged with.  See further Joubert J J (ed) Criminal Procedure Handbook 
9 ed (2009) at 188; S v Hugo 1976 (4) SA 536 (A) at 540E; S v Smith 1991 (2) SACR 217 (C) at 
219g-h; Govindjee & Vrancken at 208.  The CMA held in S v Mdunyelwa (CMA 067/2009) that 
the military judge’s failure to inform an unrepresented accused that he could be convicted of s 1 
of the Criminal Law Amendment Act 1 of 1988, of which the charge was not contained in the 
charge sheet, did not prejudice the accused and the conviction was confirmed.  It is expected of a 
court, when faced with an unrepresented accused faced with serious charges, to inform him of 
these consequences and possible sentences before he enters a plea ( see in this regard also S v 
Yantolo 1977 (2) SA 146 (E) at 149A-B; Van Niekerk v Attorney-General, Transvaal 1990 (4) SA 
806 (A) at 809A; S v Owies 2009 (2) SACR 107 (C) at 108a). 
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 Terblanche at 46. 
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 See S v Cunningham 2004 (2) SACR 16 (E); R v Zonele 1959 (3) SA 319 (A) at 323A-B; S v 
Legoa 2003 (1) SACR 13 (SCA) para 19; S v Ndlovu 1999 (2) SACR 645 (W) at 649f. 
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 S v Legoa 2003 (1) SACR 13 (SCA) para 21. 
311
 S v Legoa 2003 (1) SACR 13 (SCA) para 21. 
312
 S v Legoa 2003 (1) SACR 13 (SCA) para 22; S v Cunningham 2004 (2) SACR 16 (E) at 19b; S 
v Blaauw 1999 (2) SACR 295 (W) at 302d-e.  See also rr 22-23 of the MDSMA, which governs 
the content of military charge sheets.  There is no requirement in terms of the defence legislation 
regarding references to penalties in the charge sheets. 
313
 Steytler (1998) at 227. 
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These principles have now been constitutionalised. Section 35(3)(a) of the 
Constitution provides as follows:314 
 
 Every accused person has a right to a fair trial, which includes the right –  
 
 (a) to be informed of the charge with sufficient details to answer it. 
 
This right starts the moment that the accused is charged and is important 
because without adequate information the accused cannot begin to prepare his 
defence.315  Although the courts have been hesitant to specify at which stage of 
the trial the accused must receive sufficient details, they are in agreement that 
receipt of the information after conviction, during the sentencing phase, does not 
comply with the constitutional provision.316  It is preferable for the information 
regarding the charge and its consequences to be provided either in the charge 
sheet or at the time of the plea.317  However, as long as the accused is informed 
of the details during the course of the trial, the courts have found that the 
accused’s fair trial right in terms of section 35(3)(a) has not been violated.318 
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 See also Steytler (1998) at 225 where he is of the opinion that this section should also be read 
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The main issue discussed in the literature regarding sufficient details of a charge 
seems to be the accused’s right of access to the police docket.319  It is submitted 
that access to police dockets is not an issue in military law.  Wherever an offence 
is serious enough to warrant a police investigation the court, at the arraignment 
of the accused, will order a preliminary investigation.320  Such an investigation 
will incorporate the statements and information of the police docket and 
consequently the accused and his defence counsel will have sufficient access to 
the information contained in the police docket. 
 
The right to be informed of the charges and military courts 
 
These constitutional principles also find application in military law.  Rule 22(1) of 
the MDSMA provides that 
 
[a] charge sheet shall be prepared by a prosecutor in respect of every person to 
be tried by a military court… 
 
With regard to the provision of sufficient information to enable the accused to 
plead, rule 23 of the MDSMA provides that 
 
(2) Every charge shall state the offence with which the accused is charged 
and particulars of the act or omission constituting the offence. 
 
(4) The particulars of the act or omission constituting such offence shall be 
stated in such manner and with such details as to the time and place at which the 
offence is alleged to have been committed and the person, if any, against whom 
and the property, if any, in respect of which the offence is alleged to have been 
committed, as may be reasonably sufficient to inform the accused of the nature 
of the charge. 
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 Snyckers & Le Roux at 51-10851-113 and the authority cited there. 
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 See The right to be informed of the charges and military courts below. 
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The military accused is in a much better position than his civilian counter-part 
since he actually has access to the facts on which his charges are based at 
various stages of the military justice process.   
 
When an accused is charged with an offence, irrespective of his rank, he 
appears before a military court for arraignment as soon as possible after the 
account of the offence has been issued.321  During the arraignment procedure 
the accused is informed of the charges against him. The level of information 
required at this stage of the proceedings is dependent on the nature of the 
offence and the rank of the accused.  Where the accused is of or below the rank 
of a staff-sergeant and he is charged with a disciplinary offence, he may elect to 
be tried by a CODH.  However, to be eligible for trial by a CODH he must plead 
guilty.  To exercise his choice he must be placed in a position where he can 
make an informed decision.  He can only make such an informed decision where 
he is “informed of the charges with sufficient details to answer it.”322  Under these 
circumstances the accused must be adequately provided with information as 
early as his arraignment. 
 
Where the rank of the accused or the seriousness of the offence precludes the 
disciplinary option, it may not be necessary to provide the accused with full 
particulars at the arraignment.  The court doing the arraignment must, under 
certain circumstances, order a preliminary investigation.323  The purpose of a 
preliminary investigation is to investigate allegations that members subject to the 
MDC have committed an offence.  The intention must further be to try that 
accused in a military court.  The accused is present during the preliminary 
investigation and may also have legal representation present during the course 
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 Section 29(2) of the MDSMA.  The account of the offence is known as the DD1 and contains 
concise particulars pertaining to the offence that must be completed so that the prosecutor has 
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 The accused is given the opportunity to consult with defence counsel before exercising his 
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 A preliminary investigation must be ordered where the accused is charged with an offence 
other than a military disciplinary offence or where the accused is of the rank of warrant officer or 
higher (see s 30 of the MDSMA read with r 8 of the MDSMA). 
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of the investigation.  All evidence is recorded and witnesses are sworn in and 
testify under oath.  Where witnesses are not available affidavits are handed in.  
The affidavits are read over to the accused who may also cross-examine any 
witness called to testify.324  A copy of the completed preliminary investigation is 
made available to the accused and his defence counsel for the preparation of his 
trial.  Upon completion of the investigation a preliminary charge sheet is drawn 
up and made available to the accused prior to his trial. 
 
It should be noted that the prosecution counsel is not bound by the preliminary 
charge sheet drawn up after the preliminary investigation.  The accused may not 
object to the charge sheet at his subsequent military trial on the grounds that the 
charges were not preferred against him at the investigation or that the charge 
differs from the preliminary charge sheet.325 
 
In the instances where a CSMJ or CMJ is contemplated but a preliminary 
investigation was not ordered, the accused will merely be informed of the 
charges against him.326  Since the accused is generally not asked to plead during 
the first appearance (the arraignment), the prosecution counsel will have an 
opportunity, on completion of the relevant investigations,327 to draft a final charge 
sheet where the accused chooses a CSMJ or a CMJ.  The final charge sheet will 
then be read during the actual trial of the accused where he will be required to 
plead.  The final charge sheet must however have been made available to the 
defence counsel prior to the trial, providing the defence with sufficient time to 
prepare. 
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 For the comprehensiveness of the evidence see ss 30(7)-(9) of the MDSMA.  A preliminary 
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the unit prosecutors (usually the adjutant of the unit) to gather evidence.  Such an investigation is 
much less formal than the preliminary investigation. 
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The right to be informed of the charges and the CODH 
 
Although the legislation provides that a prosecutor may investigate the charges 
upon receipt of the account of the offence (DD1) it is not compulsory to do so in 
terms of the MDSMA.  However, the Legsatos require all prosecutors at unit level 
to complete an investigation before framing a charge sheet.328  It is in fact the 
practice that the prosecutor may not accept a DD 1 if the complainant or the 
person issuing the DD1 does not attach an affidavit setting out the circumstances 
relating to the incident.  The arraignment takes place after receipt of the DD1.329  
This means that at the time when the accused appears on his arraignment and 
needs to exercise his choice regarding the CODH, the prosecution will at least be 
in possession of some evidence in the form of an affidavit or a complete 
investigation that can be made available to the accused at his arraignment. 
 
Despite this the Ministerial Task Team has raised concerns that the accused 
appearing on arraignment and who must opt for a CODH is not protected in 
that:330 
 
1. there is no express obligation on the commanding officer to ensure 
that the accused fully understands the nature of the offences with 
which he is charged; 
 
2. the accused is not informed that the offence he is charged with falls 
within the jurisdiction of the commanding officer or what possible 
sentences can be imposed, thereby resulting in the accused not 
being able to make an informed decision;331 and 
 
                                               
328
 See r 8 of the MDSMA. 
329
 Sections 29(1)-(2) of the MDSMA.  For a discussion on the arraignment of the accused see ch 
3 para 3.2.5 above. 
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 Ministerial Task Team at 47. 
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 See at para 4.3.1 above. 
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3. the accused is not given the right to request further information to 
enable him to respond to the charge with an appropriate plea. 
 
It is required that the commanding officer, at the arraignment of the accused, 
informs the accused of the charges he is facing.332  When the accused is given 
his election certificate a charge sheet containing all the relevant information 
required in terms of the legislation, is attached to the election certificate.333  
Therefore the accused facing a possible CODH is clearly informed of the 
contents of the charges against him. 
 
Furthermore, the accused is informed that he may consult with a legal 
practitioner of his choice334 prior to exercising his election and he therefore has 
sufficient opportunity to ascertain the nature of the charges in consultation with 
his legal representative if he is uncertain in this regard.335  The same can be said 
regarding the nature of possible sentences that may be imposed.336  It is 
submitted that cases before the CODH are distinguishable from the civilian cases 
discussed.  Where the accused is not informed of possible sentences and opts 
for a CODH, it cannot act to his detriment.337  When the sentence can prejudice 
the accused by exposing him to a harsher punishment it is an important principle 
that the sentence provisions should be indicated on the charge sheet.  The 
sentencing jurisdiction of the CODH is very limited compared to the CSMJ and 
CMJ and although any sanction may be seen as prejudicial, the accused will not 
be exposed to severe punishments within the CODH’s jurisdiction.  His legal 
representative is in a position to advise him accordingly.  Although the court held 
in S v Langa338 that representation by a legal practitioner does not mean that the 
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 S v Langa 2010 (2) SACR 289 (KZP). 
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court need not satisfy itself that the accused is aware of the possible sentencing 
regime, it did find that such an inquiry is a factual one.  A failure by the 
commanding officer in providing information on the consequences of the charges 
should not render the proceedings unfair.339 
 
Nothing in the legislation prevents the accused from requesting further 
information from the prosecution regarding the charges, such as witness 
statements, before deciding to plead guilty on the charges.  There is no 
foreseeable reason why the commanding officer or the prosecution would refuse 
the accused such access.  In the event of such refusal, once again the accused 
can turn to the assistance from a legal representative in this regard.340  
Statements by prosecution witnesses in the military justice environment are 
generally not privileged as in the civilian environment an accused is entitled to 
such statements or at the very least, to a summary of the evidence.341 
 
The nature and amount of information required to comply with this constitutional 
requirement always depends on the type of case before the court.342  Even if the 
accused is unable for some reason to access the witness statement, it is 
submitted that the nature of the CODH, the fact that it has limited sentencing 
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jurisdiction and only tries relatively minor offences, will negate the need for 
detailed access to the evidence. 
 
Since it is the choice of the accused to submit to the jurisdiction of the CODH, he 
can merely indicate his intention to plead “not guilty” or request legal 
representation where he is unsure about the charges, the jurisdiction or has 
difficulty in making an informed decision and the matter will be referred to the 
CMJ for prosecution.  Opting for trial by CSMJ or CMJ will not be to the detriment 
of the accused.  Personal experience has shown that the CSMJ and CMJ take 
the fact into consideration that the accused is charged with a disciplinary offence 
cognisable by a CODH and will sentence the accused accordingly, in some 
instances even more leniently.343 
 
From the above discussion it is submitted that the accused before a military court 
as well as the CODH is sufficiently informed of the charges against him to allow 
him to formulate his plea. 
 
4.3.2 Sufficient time and facilities to prepare a defence 
 
Section 35(3)(b) of the Constitution provides that 
 
 [e]very accused person has a right to a fair trial, which includes the right –  
 
 (b) to have adequate time and facilities to prepare a defence; 
 
This right covers a wide range of principles such as the accused’s right of access 
to information and witnesses as well as consultation with a legal representative, 
specifically the right to assistance by the state for preparation of a defence.344  It 
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 Heinecken et al at 92. 
344
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also entails the right not to be tried too hastily345 resulting in too little time to 
properly prepare his defence.346 
 
This right is not specifically limited to the trial itself.  What constitutes a fair trial 
can also be dependent on the procedures preceding the trial.  Where there is no 
fairness in the investigation it may taint the trial and result in the trial court being 
unable to provide the accused with a fair trial.347  Two important aspects to this 
right need to be considered: the accused must have adequate time to prepare a 
defence and must have adequate facilities to prepare the defence. 
 
Adequate time to prepare a defence 
 
If a trial is convened too soon, the accused may not have sufficient time to 
prepare his defence.  What would constitute adequate time for preparation would 
differ from case to case.  Factors that may be taken into consideration are “the 
complexity of the case,348 the sufficiency of time for the appointment of a lawyer 
and the stage of the proceedings.”349  It is suggested that if the trial takes place 
too soon after the arrest of the accused, he may still be in shock and, especially 
where he is unrepresented, this may lead to a plea of guilty due to undue 
influence by the police or prosecution.350 
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The purpose of this right is to ensure “equality of arms” between the state and 
the accused.351  “Equality of arms” is a procedural mechanism that attempts to 
equalise the inequality of power between the state and the accused.352  This 
does not however mean that the accused is not entitled to procedural and 
evidential privileges that the prosecution is not entitled to.353  Steytler contends 
that although the state is the party who determines when the trial will proceed, 
usually when the state is prepared and can proceed, the accused should be 
afforded the same opportunity.  The trial should not proceed if the accused is not 
prepared for his defence.354 
 
This right further affords the accused the opportunity to make an informed 
decision regarding his plea and trial. 355  At the start of the trial the military judge 
must ascertain whether the accused has had sufficient time to prepare.  Where 
the accused indicates that he did not have sufficient time the matter should be 
postponed. 
 
This right should not be limited to the trial alone, but should include all 
proceedings where the accused’s interests may be negatively affected, for 
example during the plea proceedings or during the sentencing phase.356 
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Adequate facilities to prepare a defence 
 
Equality of arms also implies that there must be some equality of resources 
between the prosecution and the accused.357  The state generally has many 
more resources than the accused.358  Adequate facilities may imply that an 
accused should have access to a lawyer as well as access to the information that 
is held by the state.359  There is a positive duty on the state to provide the 
accused with such facilities which includes access to the police investigation.360  
Refusing an accused access to witness statements deprives the accused of a fair 
trial and is a breach of his fundamental right to a fair trial.361 
 
“Facility” may be afforded its ordinary meaning of an actual place where the 
accused can consult with his legal representative.  The state must provide such 
facilities where an accused is incarcerated and ensure the facility’s integrity.362  
“Facility” can also have another meaning.  In S v Nasser363 the court held that 
“[t]he word ‘facility’,…can mean facilitating or making easier the performance of 
an action…”364.  A positive duty is placed on the state to “facilitate…the 
preparation of a defence” in order to place the accused in the same position as 
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the state.  The obligation of the state is limited in that it only arises where the 
accused can show a need for a facility which relates to the preparation of his 
defence.  The state is only obliged to provide an adequate facility.  Adequacy is 
determined by the court and not the accused.365 
 
The right to adequate time and facilities to prepare a defence in the military court 
 
At the arraignment of the accused the MDSMA provides that the commanding 
officer or the military judge presiding at the arraignment may remand the case for 
sound reasons which include the need to complete the case or the 
investigation.366  It also provides for remand to enable the completion of a 
preliminary investigation.367 
 
Rule 105 of the MDSMA provides that:368 
 
[a]n accused to be tried by a military court shall, whether he or she is in custody 
or not, be afforded every reasonable opportunity and facility to consult with his or 
her counsel, interview prospective defence witnesses, and procure the presence 
of any such witness at his or her trial. 
 
From the moment of arraignment the military accused is informed of his rights 
regarding legal representation.369  At the arraignment the matter is remanded 
either for completion of the preliminary investigation or for referral to the Legal 
Satellite Office for a trial date.370  This means that the accused should have 
sufficient time during the period of remand to start preparing his defence.  Military 
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courts are required to grant postponements to allow the accused to consult with 
his legal representative and to adequately prepare for his defence.371 
 
A military accused has free access to military defence counsel or he may use 
private counsel at his own cost.  As a uniformed member he is further able to 
make use of military facilities when in consultation with his defence counsel in the 
preparation of his defence.  He consults with his military defence counsel during 
office hours and at units which are not located close to a Legsato; the defence 
counsel will make an appointment with the accused prior to the trial and consult 
with him either at the unit or at the military legal office nearest to where the 
accused is stationed.  If this is not possible the defence counsel can do 
telephonic consultations.  It is therefore not necessary for the accused to provide 
his own facilities and he need not be indigent before the state provides him with 
such facilities. 
 
Where the accused is in the detention barracks awaiting trial, provision is made 
by the detention barracks for appointments with defence counsel in their daily 
routine.  No limit is placed on the number of visits that an accused may receive 
from his legal representative.372 
 
The right to adequate time and facilities to prepare a defence before a CODH 
 
Since the CODH only has jurisdiction over guilty pleas where the accused has 
waived the right to legal representation, it is submitted that an evaluation on fair 
procedures is only applicable at the pre-trial stage where the accused, after 
arraignment, must exercise his choice whether to submit to the jurisdiction of the 
CODH. 
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The MDSMA provides that a military court may, at the arraignment of the 
accused, try an accused summarily.373  This will only be possible in those 
instances where the accused is charged with a military disciplinary offence, 
falling within the jurisdiction of the CODH.  In all other instances the court must 
remand the case so that the required preliminary investigation may be done.374  
When confronted with the charge and the opportunity to complete the trial 
immediately, it may lead to the argument that the accused may be compelled into 
a too hasty trial where he appears before a superior officer for the first time.  
However, the accused is not literally tried immediately.  His rights in terms of the 
CODH must first be explained to him.375  He is taken before another officer to 
exercise his choice and he is given the opportunity to consult with defence 
counsel before making his choice.  There is no time limit placed on how long he 
may take to consult with his defence counsel.  The previous discussion on his 
access to sufficient information should also be kept in mind.376  It is therefore 
submitted that within the limited confines of its application regarding the CODH, 
sufficient provision is made for compliance with this right. 
 
4.3.3 A public hearing before an ordinary court 
 
4.3.3.1 Introduction  
 
An ordinary court refers to “a tribunal which not only is not specifically constituted 
for the occasion but is also adorned with the power and the facilities to ensure 
compliance with all the fair trial rights listed in FC s 35.”377  The concept “ordinary 
court” also means that “accused persons should be prosecuted in courts which 
have previously been established by law”.378  This requirement protects an 
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accused against prosecution in ad hoc courts created by the executive “to the 
detriment of judicial independence and impartiality”.379 
 
Although the judicial independence and impartiality requirement as found in 
section 165 of the Constitution fall outside the Bill of Rights, and therefore do not 
form part of the fair trial rights, the requirements of independence and impartiality 
of the courts do find application in section 35(3)(c).380  It was stated in Van 
Rooyen v The State381 that 
 
…it must be kept in mind that judicial impartiality and the application without fear, 
favour or prejudice by the courts of the Constitution and all law, as postulated by 
s 165(2) of the Constitution, are inherent in an accused’s right to a fair trial under 
s 35(3) of the Constitution.  One of the main goals of institutional independence 
is to safeguard such rights. 
 
Ordinary courts should also apply “the duly established procedures of legal 
process to all cases before it.”  When they follow different procedures they are 
transformed into extraordinary courts.382   
 
4.3.3.2 Military courts as ordinary courts 
 
Prior to 1999 military courts were not standing courts and were convened on an 
ad hoc basis.  These courts martial were not considered ordinary courts.383  Only 
an ordinary court can preside over criminal proceedings.384  Only an accused 
before criminal proceedings is entitled to fair trial rights protection in terms of 
section 35(3).  It is therefore important to determine whether military courts can 
now, since being re-created as standing courts, be regarded as ordinary courts. 
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The requirements regarding the independence and impartiality discussed earlier  
in relation to the CSMJ and CMJ apply equally to instances governed by section 
35(3) and are not repeated here. 
 
Snyckers and Le Roux state that the aim of section 35(3)(c) is to “ensure that 
normal criminal trials with full fair trial protection are the only acceptable method 
whereby the state may prosecute individuals for committing offences.”385  Section 
35(3) is however subject to limitation in terms of section 36 of the Constitution.  
Section 36 will allow a limitation of a right in terms of a law of general application 
as long as the limitation is reasonable and justifiable in an open and democratic 
society.  Would the CODH, which is established in terms of the MDSMA, then be 
regarded as a justifiable limitation of the right that only an ordinary court may 
prosecute individuals for offences? 
 
The CODH proceedings cannot be regarded as criminal proceedings and also do 
not possess the same level of independence and impartiality expected from an 
ordinary court.  It should rather be regarded as a court sui generis.386   
 
The reason for the creation of the CODH, namely the swift enforcement of 
discipline, is regarded as a legitimate governmental aim.387 A military accused’s 
right against prosecution in an ad hoc tribunal created by the executive can, with 
this legitimate governmental aim, be limited in terms of section 36 and 
prosecution by the ad hoc tribunal of the CODH will be a justifiable limitation of 
the accused’s constitutional rights.  Although these tribunals, in terms of section 
12(1)(b) of the Constitution, need not comply with section 35(3), they do need to 
satisfy standards of impartiality that are implicit in the minimum requirements of 
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natural justice.388  The standards are independence, impartiality and the fact that 
all legal disputes must be decided in a fair and public hearing.389  A short 
evaluation of the CODH against the principles of independence and impartiality is 
therefore required. 
 
4.3.3.3 The independence and impartiality of the military courts 
 
Although the test for the independence and impartiality of tribunals is similar to 
the test in terms of section 35 of the Constitution, the same level of 
independence is not required for these tribunals as in the case of a court of 
law.390  However, in Mbebe v Chairman, White Commission391 the High Court 
found that “in so far as proceedings of a judicial nature is concerned, the 
Constitutional Court held that a judicial officer…is in all material respects an 
“impartial entity, independent of the executive and the legislature” who is “to act 
as arbiter between the individual and the State”…”392  The degree of 
independence required from the tribunal would depend on the nature of the 
proceedings before it.393 
 
Since it is argued that the CODH is a court sui generis there are no comparable 
guidelines regarding the testing criteria for the independence of the presiding 
officer and the tribunal.  However, it is submitted that the guidelines set out in De 
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Lange v Smuts394 in terms of section 34 of the Constitution would be appropriate 
testing criteria. 
 
The difference in determining the independence of the tribunal versus that of a 
court of law is that the independence of the tribunal is tested against section 34 
of the Constitution and that of a court of law against section 165.395  Section 165 
falls outside the Bill of Rights and is therefore not subject to the limitation of 
section 36 of the Constitution.  Consequently the independence of a court of law 
cannot be limited.  This is not the case with tribunals.  Since its independence is 
tested against section 34, which does fall within the Bill of Rights, the 
independence may conceivably be limited in terms of section 36,396 allowing a 
deviation from the strict standard set out in section 165. 
 
The independence of the tribunal can be determined by evaluating the tribunal 
against the criteria similar to that required for the independence of courts of law, 
namely security of tenure, financial security and institutional independence.397 
 
Security of tenure. 
 
The trial officer conducting the CODH is the commanding officer of the unit or his 
delegate as determined by law.398  Being a trial officer at a CODH is therefore an 
ex officio appointment in terms of legislation and not a post for which the 
commanding officer applies.  The considerations regarding the appointment of 
trial officers as discussed previously regarding the CMJ would therefore not find 
application in this instance.399  The commanding officer remains a trial officer, 
adjudicating over disciplinary hearings, for as long as he is in command of the 
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unit or formation.  Security of tenure is therefore not a factor that influences the 
presiding officer. 
 
Financial security 
 
It is submitted that financial security will also not be a factor that can influence 
the commanding officer in his performance as trial officer.  Being a trial officer is 
not the main function of a commanding officer.  The adjudication of disciplinary 
hearings will in fact only constitute a small part of his responsibilities as 
commanding officer.  A commanding officer is remunerated as a member of the 
SANDF and as such will receive all salary adjustments and benefits as 
prescribed in the appropriate remuneration policy applicable to his rank and 
mustering.  His ad hoc responsibilities as trial officer will not have an influence on 
his remuneration. 
 
Institutional independence 
 
The institutional independence of the tribunal, as with courts of law, should be 
considered against the backdrop of the doctrine of separation of powers.  This 
doctrine, although not specifically referred to in the Constitution, requires that the 
functions of government, namely the executive, legislative and judicial functions, 
should be separated and that each function must be performed by a separate 
branch of government.400  According to the doctrine the executive, on any level, 
should not interfere with the judiciary’s adjudication process on any level.401 
 
Whereas courts of law form part of the judiciary, tribunals generally form part of 
the executive, thereby removing the CODH from the environment of the judiciary 
into the prerogative of the executive.402  This may be seen as an interference 
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with the doctrine of separation of powers which clearly provides that only the 
judiciary can discharge a judicial function.  The separation of powers doctrine 
forms an integral part of the democratic process.  Its purpose is not only to 
prevent an “excessive concentration of powers a single organ” by keeping 
checks and balances on executive powers in place, but also “to promote greater 
government efficiency.”403  In following the last mentioned purpose, the doctrine 
of separation of powers is concerned with the effective execution of government 
powers rather than the judicial limits of its powers.404  In this light it may be 
interpreted that allowing the CODH to adjudicate over certain matters is 
necessary for the effective enforcement of discipline, an important function in 
complying with the constitutional imperative of a disciplined force. 
 
Where the adjudication of cases is removed from the courts the prima facie 
indication is that it constitutes a violation of the doctrine of separation of powers.  
The executive is venturing into the arena of the judiciary.  However, in South 
Africa the doctrine is not applied too rigidly.  There are many kinds of checks and 
balances that can be applied to secure the independence of the judiciary.405 
 
In the case of tribunals and forums the checks and balances are insured in two 
ways: (1) The guarantee of independence and impartiality required in terms of 
section 34; and (2) the right to review by the High Court of South Africa.406 
 
Hopkins is of the opinion that as long as there are sufficient checks and balances 
in place to guarantee the independence of the tribunal, it is permissible to allow 
tribunals to perform judicial functions, both in terms of the separation of powers 
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doctrine and the guarantee of access to courts, even if the tribunal is attached to 
the executive.407 
 
Although all findings and sentences given by the CODH are effective 
immediately,408 they are all subject to review.409  Where review counsel is of the 
opinion that a finding and sentence cannot be upheld, the matter is referred to 
the Director: Military Judicial Review who will then exercise the review powers 
assigned to his function by law.410  In doing this, the Director has similar powers 
as those exercised by the CMA, thereby exercising a judicial function.  However, 
the Director: Military Judicial Reviews cannot be seen as a judicial officer.  He is 
an administrative official exercising a judicial function.411  What is however 
relevant here is the possibility that review counsel cannot be seen as an 
independent and impartial review court for the purposes of constituting sufficient 
checks and balances as averred to above. 
 
However, the accused may also apply for review of the disciplinary hearing by 
the CMA and he has the right to approach the High Court of South Africa for 
relief.  This may act as sufficient checks and balances as required by Hopkins.412 
 
The test for determining the independence of the tribunal is whether “from the 
objective standpoint of the reasonable and informed person, [the court will] be 
perceived as enjoying the essential conditions for independence.”413  An 
informed person would realise that security of tenure and financial security will 
not be sufficient to influence the independence of the tribunal. 
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With regard to institutional independence the reasonable and informed individual 
should also realise that although the commanding officer, as a senior officer and 
part of middle management, forms part of the executive, the level of application 
of the law and interpretation of legal issues are severely limited in terms of the 
jurisdiction of the CODH, thereby limiting the executive opportunity to interfere.414 
 
In terms of legislation, the commanding officer has very limited jurisdiction.  He 
may only adjudicate matters where the individual admits his guilt.  Where the 
individual complies with the legislative requirements set out for trial by a CODH, 
the commanding officer will bring out a finding of guilty.  In any other instance 
where he is of the opinion that the accused has a possible defence, it is not 
within his power to find the individual “not guilty”.415  He must stop the 
proceedings and refer the matter to a CMJ, who will decide the legal issues.416  
Executive interference is hereby limited to the extent of being negligible. 
 
Impartiality of the presiding officer 
 
Determining the institutional independence of the tribunal is not sufficient.  The 
impartiality of the tribunal or the presiding officer is also important.  Impartiality 
“refers to a state of mind or attitude of the tribunal in relation to the issues and 
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 The limitation of his jurisdiction is necessary to protect the accused.  The level of a 
commanding officer’s legal knowledge may differ depending on the arm of service in which he is 
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the law in general.  At the very least all members of the SANDF undergoing military training are 
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presented by the SANDF, such as basic military training, officer’s formative training and the 
various other promotional courses throughout a member’s career in the SANDF.  This limited 
exposure is however not sufficient to make any person proficient in military justice. 
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 This will only happen in instances where the officer commanding questions the accused during 
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416
 Section 29(7) of the MDSMA. 
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the parties in a particular case and connotes absence of bias.”417  Impartiality 
refers to two aspects.  Firstly the presiding officer must be factually impartial, 
referring to actual impartiality and secondly, the presiding officer must be free of 
perceived bias.  The fact that the presiding officer is factually impartial does not 
exclude the possibility of perceived bias.418  Since the perception of bias may be 
more damaging to the perceived impartiality of the CODH, the test for 
determining bias remains, as with section 35 of the Constitution, whether “a fully 
informed person would harbour a reasonable apprehension of bias.”419  It has 
been argued that the test for determining bias should be applied more strictly in 
those instances where non-judicial officers are performing judicial functions.  This 
is because judicial officers are more likely to be perceived as impartial than non-
judicial officers, and tribunals are generally more susceptible to suspicions of 
bias than courts of law.420 
 
The procedures of the CODH address the concerns regarding actual as well as 
perceived bias in the following manner: The commanding officer cannot compel 
an accused to be tried before him or any other CODH.  The election is not done 
in the presence of that commanding officer and he cannot sign as a witness on 
the required election certificate.421 
 
Provision is also made for the recusal of the commanding officer if he is of the 
opinion that he is likely to be biased or where he signed as a witness on the 
accused’s election certificate.422  It is of interest to note that the grounds for 
recusal of the presiding officer at the CODH are substantially less than those 
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 Currie & De Waal (2005) at 724. 
418
 Van der Leeuw G “Court Martial, Judicial and Administrative Tribunals, and the Rule against 
Bias” (1993) 110 SALJ 430 at 430-431. 
419
 Currie & De Waal (2001) at 408; Currie & De Waal (2005) at 724; President of the Republic of 
South Africa v South African Rugby Foorball Union 1999 (4) SA 147 (CC) para 48; Financial 
Services Board v Pepkor Pension Fund 1998 (11) BCLR 1425 (C) at 1432. 
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 Van der Leeuw at 443; Council of Review, South African Defence Force v Mönnig 1992 (3) SA 
482 (A) at 493E. 
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 Section 29(6) of the MDSMA. 
422
 Rule 63 of the MDSMA. 
 245 
provided for the military judge.423  This may be because of the fact that the 
jurisdiction of the commanding officer is limited and the protection required by an 
accused is not as extensive as in the case of the court of a military judge where 
the consequences of conviction are more severe. 
 
Where the commanding officer does not recuse himself and continue with the 
trial, the accused is also given the opportunity to object to being tried by that 
commanding officer.  Although the grounds for objection are not set out in the 
rules of procedure governing disciplinary hearings, it is submitted that the 
grounds for objection will be the same as those before the court of a military 
judge.424  Such grounds would include, inter alia, the commanding officer having 
a personal interest in the finding, having investigated the charges or where there 
is likely to be a conflict of interest. 
 
Total impartiality is not possible.  The commanding officer is a public official and 
a senior officer in the SANDF.  It is inevitable that he will have a certain bias 
towards the enforcement of discipline and be influenced by the policies used in 
the SANDF.425  If the commanding officer does not recuse himself or confirm the 
objection raised by the accused, the accused will have the opportunity to make 
representations to the review authority.426  The fact that the accused at the 
CODH is not represented by defence counsel does not prevent an accused from 
availing him of this right to review.  It is the duty of the commanding officer to 
inform the accused after announcing the sentence that the case will be reviewed 
by review counsel and that he may apply for review by the CMA.427 
 
It is submitted that the commanding officer at the CODH does not have 
independence from the executive.  Although security of tenure and financial 
                                               
423
 Compare r 63 of the MDSMA with r 35 of the MDSMA. 
424
 Rule 36 of the MDSMA; s 20(9) of the MDSMA. 
425
 Van der Leeuw at 437.  This is not necessarily a negative state of affairs for purposes of 
enforcing discipline.   
426
 The accused may also apply for the review by the CMA of the proceedings within 14 days after 
his conviction (see s 34(5) of the MDSMA; r 68(9)(c) of the MDSMA). 
427
 Rules 68(9)(a)(ii)-(iii) of the MDSMA. 
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independence do not play a role in his decision making, some concerns exist 
regarding the institutional independence and perceived impartiality of the 
commanding officer.  It is however submitted that due to the nature of the tribunal 
not qualifying as a court of law, the same level of independence is not required 
as for a court of law.  The accused voluntarily submits to the jurisdiction of the 
CODH and coupled to his rights of appeal and review, it is submitted that 
sufficient checks and balances exist to protect the accused against unfair 
treatment at the hearing. 
 
4.3.3.4 The right to a public hearing 
 
The right to a public hearing is given so that justice can be seen to be done.428  
The Criminal Procedure Act gives substance to this principle in that it provides 
that429  
 
[e]xcept where otherwise expressly provided by this Act or any other law, criminal 
proceedings in any court shall take place in open court, and may take place on 
any day. 
 
This section reflects an important principle of our jurisprudence, namely that 
hearings should be held in public.430  There are two reasons for this principle,431 
                                               
428
 Snyckers & Le Roux at 51-120. 
429
 Section 152 of the Criminal Procedure Act. 
430
 Klink v Regional Court Magistrate 1996 (3) BCLR 402 (SE) at 414; Nel v Le Roux 1996 (3) SA 
562 (CC) para 17; Sanderson v Attorney-General, Eastern Cape para 23. 
431
 Steytler (1998) 250; Currie & De Waal (2005) 782; Klink v Regional Court Magistrate 1996 (3) 
BCLR 402 (SE) at 404.  A further reason is given by Snyckers & Le Roux 51-121 in that this right 
is also an important safeguard of impartiality. 
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namely the enhancement the public’s confidence in the criminal justice system432 
and protecting an accused from a secret trial.433 
 
This right has also been constitutionalised in section 35(3)(c):434 
 
Every accused person has a right to a fair trial, which includes the right – (c) to a 
public trial before an ordinary court; 
 
A public trial means that the public have access to the proceedings and that the 
hearing is conducted in open court.435  To qualify as a public trial there must be 
an oral hearing.436  It is also required that the public should be informed in 
advance that the trial will be held and a failure to do so may affect the overall 
fairness of the trial.437 
 
There are, however, a number of acceptable limitations on the right to a public 
hearing.438  These limitations include instances that are in the interest of state 
security, good order, public morals as well as those instances where it would be 
in the interest of justice to do so.439 
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 Currie & De Waal (2005) at 782.  This reason may also be of extreme importance for the 
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414. 
433
 Axen v the Federal Republic of Germany (1984) 6 EHRR 195 
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 See also Steytler (1998) at 247.  This does not include appeal cases (see in this regard S v 
Pennington 1997 (10) BCLR 1413 (CC) para 50). 
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 Steytler (1998) at 251. 
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 Govindjee & Vrancken at 209; G.A. van Meurs v The Netherlands (1990) para 6.1. 
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 Steytler (1998) at 249; Stavros at 190; Govindjee & Vrancken at 209; G.A. van Meurs v The 
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enrolment issued by the local representative of the Adjutant General or a person under the 
command of the local representative.  See s 32(4) of the MDSMA for the particulars contained in 
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 Nel v Le Roux 1996 (3) SA 562 (CC) para 17. 
439
 Section 153(1) of the Criminal Procedure Act; Steytler (1998) at 253; Stavros at 191; Currie & 
De Waal (2005) at 782; Govindjee & Vrancken at 209. 
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Trial in an open court before a CSMJ and CMJ 
 
The general requirement in terms of military law is that all military trials are 
conducted in open court.440  Once the CSMJ or CMJ is properly constituted the 
military court opens and is conducted in the presence of the accused, the 
prosecutor, and members of the public who wish to attend.441  The proceedings 
continue in open court unless the prosecutor or the accused applies for the case 
to be heard in camera.  An application for a trial in camera is considered by the 
presiding military judge442 in a closed sitting after hearing evidence and allowing 
the prosecutor and the accused to address the court on this matter.443  However, 
the court will have to justify any limitation to the accused’s right to a public trial in 
terms of the limitation clause.444 
 
The court only closes to read the preliminary investigation and during its 
deliberation on finding.  The finding on each charge preferred against the 
accused is announced in open court.445  The sentencing procedures are 
conducted in open court and after the judge closes the court for deliberation on 
sentence, the judge will announce the sentence and relevant court orders in 
open court.446 
 
Trial in an open court before a CODH 
 
The proceedings before the CODH are conducted in open court, subject to 
section 33(3) of the MDSMA.447  The proceedings are conducted in the presence 
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 Section 33(3) of the MDSMA. 
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 Rule 31(1) of the MDSMA. 
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 Rule 34(1) of the MDSMA.  Since the presiding judge is now authorised to make a 
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determination should now be able to withstand constitutional scrutiny. 
443
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of the accused, prosecutor and any witnesses who wish to attend.448 The whole 
of the proceedings, including sentencing, are conducted in open court449 and the 
commanding officer only closes to consider sentence.450  The sentence is 
announced in open court.451 
 
Considering the procedures followed in the military courts and the requirements 
laid down for the trials in camera, it is submitted that the military courts comply 
with the requirements set by section 35(3)(c) of the Constitution. 
 
4.3.4 The right to choose and be represented by a legal practitioner of his 
choice 
 
The right to legal representation encompasses three forms, namely the right to a 
legal practitioner of one’s choice, a legal practitioner assigned at state expense 
or a legal practitioner provided by the Legal Aid Board.452  The first two forms are 
addressed by sections 35(3)(f) and (g) of the Constitution, which provides that 453 
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 Rule 61 of the MDSMA.  It is submitted that although the proceedings before the CODH may 
be heard in camera, the nature of the offences and the lack of witnesses called makes it highly 
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 S v Cornelius 2008 (1) SACR 96 (C) para 8; Steytler (1998) at 302. 
453
 Currie & De Waal (2005) at 760.  Although Goredema C “Implications of Suspects’ and Other 
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1997 (2) SACR 657 (W); S v Rudman; S v Johnson; S v Xaso; Xaso v van Wyk 1989 (3) SA 368 
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defence counsel. 
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 [e]very accused person has a right to a fair trial, which includes the right –  
 
(f) to choose, and be represented by, a legal practitioner, and to be informed 
of the right promptly; [and] 
 
(g) to have a legal practitioner assigned to the accused person by the state 
and at state expense, if substantial injustice would otherwise result, and 
to be informed of this right promptly. 
 
The right to legal representation is seen as an essential part of the fair trial 
rights454 since the adversarial system requires that both the prosecution and the 
accused participate fully in the proceedings.  This will only be possible if the 
accused has the required legal skills and knowledge to participate fully and the 
assistance of a lawyer may be necessary to this end.455  Where an accused 
elects to represent himself, the court has a duty to ensure that the accused is 
aware of the seriousness of the offence and the possible consequences should 
he continue without legal representation.456 
 
The right to legal representation attaches to an accused from the first 
appearance until the conclusion of the appeal process and the accused must be 
given a reasonable time to obtain representation.457  Fair trial rights are also 
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 Stavros at 201; Gorendema at 252; S v Philemon 1997 (2) SACR 657 (W) at 656a-b; Legal Aid 
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24(1)(a) of the MDSMA where it is stated that military defence counsel may represent any person 
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expressly included in the sentencing phase of the trial.458  This entails remand of 
the case where required in order to obtain legal representation.459  A denial of 
such a reasonable opportunity may render a trial unfair.460 
 
4.3.4.1 The right to legal representation of a military accused 
 
These constitutional rights are also afforded to military personnel.461  
 
 Every person subject to the Code has the right –  
 
(a) to legal representation of own choice at his or her own expense, or to be 
assigned military defence counsel at state expense when he or she is to 
appear before or to be tried by a Court of a Military Judge or Senior 
Military Judge; and 
 
(b) to consult with his or her legal representative or with a military defence 
counsel prior to making any election to be heard at a disciplinary hearing. 
 
Although the MDSMA does not determine that the accused must be informed 
promptly as stated in the Constitution, in practice the accused is informed of this 
right when he appears for the first arraignment after he has been charged with an 
offence.462  The Ministerial Task Team however voiced concerns regarding the 
sufficiency of the explanation of the right to legal representation as explained to 
                                                                                                                                            
when they are charged, when they are tried by a CSMJ or CMJ or where they have been 
convicted but still have a remedy or recourse such as review or appeal procedures to follow. 
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the accused during his arraignment.  Their concern pertains to the accused 
eligible for trial by a CODH.463  It is inferred that the accused is not informed of 
the right to consult with a defence counsel to assist him in his decision to choose 
a disciplinary hearing.  It is submitted that the contention by the Ministerial Task 
Team is not correct.  Rule 29(6) of the MDSMA specifically provides that the 
accused only exercises his right “upon having taken or waived the taking of legal 
advice”.  The pro-forma election certificate also requires that the accused 
indicate on the certificate whether he has taken such advice or not.464 
 
It is submitted that this is sufficient.  Once the accused is informed of his right to 
legal representation there is nothing preventing him from doing so.  It is not the 
task of the prosecution or the trial officer to continuously remind him of his 
rights.465  One may urge him to make use of legal representation, but the choice 
remains his.  As was stated in S v Shaba466  
 
[n]et soos daar geen plig op ‘n beskuldigde rus om die Staat se bewyslas te 
verlig of te vergemaklik nie, is daar geen plig op die Staat om ‘n verdagte so te 
begelei dat hy nie sy voet teen ‘n klip stamp nie.  Al wat vereis word, is dat ‘n 
verdagte of aangehoudene op hoogte van sy regte moet wees en dat hy 
onbelemmerd en vrywillig ‘n besluit uitoefen oor hoe hy sy regte gaan uitoefen. 
 
It must be kept in mind that the right to legal representation of an accused facing 
a CODH is limited to the pre-trial procedures only.  Such an accused does not 
have the right to legal representation.  He waives his right to legal representation 
when submitting to the jurisdiction of the CODH. 
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Once the accused has exercised his right to legal representation and is facing a 
CSMJ or CMJ, the accused is generally provided with military defence counsel 
although he may choose to appoint a civilian lawyer at his own expense.  Military 
defence counsel is provided at state expense. 
 
The head of the military defence counsel is the Director: Military Defence 
Counsel.467  Each of the five Legatos has a contingent of defence counsel with a 
Senior Defence Counsel as head.  They report to the Director: Military Defence 
Counsel.  Only members holding a degree in law can be assigned as military 
defence counsel.468  It is however not required that defence counsel must be an 
admitted attorney or advocate in order to function as defence counsel.469  An 
officer is assigned to the function of defence counsel by the Adjutant General for 
a fixed period or for a specific deployment.470  All functions must be performed in 
“a manner consistent with properly given policy directives, but which is otherwise 
free from executive or command interference.”471 
 
Military defence counsel is generally assigned to cases depending on their 
availability and therefore an accused is limited as to his choice regarding a 
specific defence counsel.  The accused has the right to choose any lawyer who 
is willing to defend him.472  However, because of limited availability of specific 
military defence counsel, this may not always be possible.  An accused may 
request a specific defence counsel and the senior defence counsel may then, “in 
his or her discretion, accede to the request if the practicalities of the situation and 
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be granted (see S v Manhuanyana 1996 (2) SACR 283 (E) at 284d-e, g-h). 
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the exigencies of the service favour the appointment of the specified defence 
counsel to represent the accused.”473  Where senior military defence counsel do 
not appoint a requested defence counsel, the accused will have to choose 
another.  His right to choose a specific defence counsel may be legitimately 
limited where that individual is not available and cannot be used to unreasonably 
delay the completion of the trial.474 
 
The accused before a military court is in fact in a better position than most 
accused before a civilian court.  Where an accused before a civilian court is only 
entitled to legal representation at state expense where “substantial injustice 
would otherwise result”, the military accused is always provided with legal 
counsel at state expense when appearing before a CSMJ or CMJ, irrespective of 
the seriousness of the charges or whether he is pleading guilty or not.  If he is not 
satisfied with military counsel he may pay for private counsel of his choice. 
 
It is therefore submitted that the right to legal representation as set out in the 
MDSMA and applied by the CSMJ and CMJ complies with this constitutional 
requirement of a fair trial. 
 
4.4 Conclusion 
 
From the above discussion it is clear that the CSMJ and the CMJ are regarded 
as ordinary courts for the purposes of conducting criminal trials and affording an 
accused his fair trial rights.  Although certain concerns exist regarding the 
institutional and personal independence of these courts, it is submitted that, as 
lower courts, there are sufficient checks and balances in place to state that these 
courts possess a sufficient degree of independence to qualify as an ordinary 
court. 
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The CSMJ and the CMJ also afford the accused the protection required in terms 
of section 35(3) of the Constitution, in some instances even more so than the 
civilian courts.475 
 
The same cannot be said of the accused before the CODH.  Such an accused is 
not considered to be an accused before criminal proceedings and therefore the 
section 35(3) fair trial rights do not attach to him.  The CODH is not considered to 
be a court of law.  It can also not be seen as a tribunal for the purposes of 
section 34 of the Constitution.476  It could be described as a court sui generis.  
The accused is still entitled to basic fair trial procedures, which include 
independent and impartial proceedings. 
 
At this level there is a real possibility of executive influence.  In the analogous 
forum of the summary court martial in the United States of America, Morris477 
argues that 
 
[b]ecause summary courts-martial are convened at a relatively low level – 
battalion command or its equivalent – there is a greater chance of command 
influence and hasty, incomplete, or amateurish investigations…there is less 
direct judicial involvement in the process of referring a case to summary court, as 
well as in trying and reviewing the case. 
 
However, the fact that it is the accused’s choice to opt for a CODH acts as a 
check on executive influence.478  A further check is the accused’s right to appeal 
and review.  It is therefore submitted that the CODH does in fact follow a fair 
procedure in conducting the trial and the military accused’s rights are sufficiently 
protected. 
                                               
475
 See the discussion on the right to legal representation at para 4.3.4.1 above. 
476
 Because of the nature of the guilty plea, these trials cannot be considered a dispute and 
section 34 of the Constitution consequently does not find application. 
477
 Morris at 43. 
478
 Morris at 43. 
  
256 
CHAPTER 5: 
 
PROCEDURAL ASPECTS REGARDING SENTENCING IN THE MILITARY 
COURTS 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
It has been stated in numerous works on sentencing that sentencing is the 
most difficult and probably the most neglected part of the criminal trial.1  This 
statement is also true for military courts.  Although military punishments have 
been listed in legislation as recently updated as 1999, the only change the 
MDSMA brought about was to change the maximum amounts of the fines that 
could be imposed by the various military courts.  No other development has 
been made in the sentencing jurisdiction of military courts since the defence 
legislation of 1957.  In spite of certain constitutional concerns such as those 
raised regarding the constitutionality of the separate military prosecution 
counsel,2 to date no attempt has been made to address other concerns 
regarding specific sentences such as cashiering.  In fact, certain sentences and 
their execution have changed little since the previous century.3  Although it 
cannot be argued that the unique nature of the offences found in military law 
requires unique punishments, military punishment has not kept abreast with the 
developments within the civilian criminal procedure or constitutional 
environments.  One need only look at the MDC, which was supposedly 
amended with the advent of the MDSMA, to see how neglected penalty clauses 
are in military law.  Section 151 of the MDC, which creates the offence of 
contempt of a military court, refers to a punishment on conviction of “a fine not 
                                               
1
 Kruger A Hiemstra’s Criminal Procedure (2008) at 28-1; Terblanche S S A Guide to 
Sentencing in South Africa (2007) at 1; Krugel W F & Terblanche S S Praktiese 
Vonnisoplegging (1990) at 103; Joubert J J (ed) Criminal Procedure Handbook 9 ed (2009) at 
287. 
2
 Raised and addressed in Minister of Defence v Potsane; Legal Soldier (Pty) Ltd v Minister of 
Defence 2002 (1) SA 1 (CC). 
3
 See in this regard the discussion on field punishment in ch 6 at para 6.2.6 below. 
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exceeding 50 pounds or in default of payment to imprisonment for a period not 
exceeding two months.”4  
 
5.2 Legal framework for military sentences 
 
The existing legal framework for sentencing by the military courts comprises the 
Constitution, various pieces of defence legislation, outdated SANDF policy 
documents and more recently, the decisions by the CMA as they pertain to 
sentencing.  Academic works on sentencing may also be of some assistance in 
those instances where military punishments are comparable to civilian 
punishments, but they are limited due to the uniqueness of most military 
sentences and the statutory nature of military courts’ sentencing jurisdiction. 
 
It is important to keep the Constitution in mind during sentencing because all 
courts and organs of state are bound by the Constitution.5  Certain sections of 
the Constitution relate to the SANDF and an individual’s rights of equality, 
dignity and protection against cruel, inhuman and degrading punishment must 
be taken into consideration. 
 
The relevant defence legislation considered is the Defence Act 44 of 1957, as 
amended, which includes the First Schedule or Military Discipline Code (MDC), 
the Defence Act 42 of 2002, the Military Discipline Supplementary Measures 
Act 16 of 1999 (MDSMA) and the Rules of Procedure to the MDSMA.  The task 
of having a coherent discussion of sentencing procedure in the SANDF is made 
difficult by the fact that sections pertaining to sentencing are spread across 
these various documents and are further spread haphazardly within the 
documents themself.  Although the Criminal Procedure Act has very little 
application in this regard, it may provide valuable guidelines for the military 
courts to follow. 
                                               
4
 Emphasis added. 
5
 All law must be interpreted with due regard to the spirit, purport and object of the Constitution 
(see s 39(2) of the Constitution). 
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Due to the unique nature of some of these sentences, policy documents were 
developed explaining the execution of the sentence.  The documents are 
however outdated, mainly dating from the 1980’s.  Some procedures are not 
contained in policy and are based on customs and practices established in the 
SANDF. 
 
The CMA is a relatively new and potentially important source in the 
development of sentencing practice in the SANDF.6  Unfortunately, the use of 
the CMA decisions is limited to those few sentences that are reviewed by the 
CMA because of the automatic review process.  Very few, if any decisions are 
available with regard to the lesser sentences imposed by the military courts.7 
 
5.3 Sentencing discretion 
 
South African civilian courts enjoy a wide sentencing discretion.8  Exercising 
this discretion can be very difficult because of the large number of factors that 
must be taken into consideration.9  Military courts also have fairly wide 
sentencing discretion, with the same factors to consider as the civilian courts, 
but with the added complication of striking a balance between the unique needs 
of the military, the purpose of sentencing in the military environment and 
discipline.10 
 
Firstly a determination must be made of which of the facts are relevant to 
sentencing and then the sentencing judge must decide what weight to attach to 
                                               
6
 CMA decisions are available from 1999. 
7
 This matter is briefly discussed below. 
8
 Kruger at 28-2; Joubert at 288. 
9
 Terblanche (2007) at 114; Joubert at 287; Terblanche S S & Roberts J V “Sentencing in South 
Africa: Lacking in Principle but Delivering Justice?” (2005) 18 South African Journal of Criminal 
Justice 187 at 189; Vowell D “To Determine an Appropriate Sentence: Sentencing in the 
Military Justice System” (1986) 114 Military Law Review 87 at 102. 
10
 Bednar R J “Discharge and Dismissal as Punishment in the Armed Forces” (1962) Military 
Law Review 1 at 27. 
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each.11  Secondly a choice must be made, for example whether the accused 
should be removed from society and then the court must decide on the duration 
of the sentence, whether the sentence should be suspended, for how long and 
under which conditions it should be suspended.  Although most military cases 
tried by the military courts are similar in nature, each one has the potential to be 
unique.  Since most accused will present different personal circumstances 
contributing to the offence the individualisation of sentences is important. 
 
The wider the sentencing discretion of the court, the more personal 
characteristics of the sentencing officer may be evident.12  Although the 
Constitutional Court accepted that a measure of inconsistency is acceptable 
during the imposition of the sentence,13 disparity in sentencing is regarded as 
one of the main concerns with the South African sentencing system and 
consistency in sentencing should be promoted.14  Recent decisions 
emphasised the need for comparison of previous cases in reaching parity in 
sentencing.  The Supreme Court of Appeal held that15 
 
[a]lthough each case stands against the setting of its own facts and 
circumstances, it may be necessary to have a look at comparative cases in 
determining whether the trial court properly exercised its discretion in its 
imposition of sentence. 
 
It is not clear what the position is regarding the CMA.  The CMA has on 
occasion found that sentencing in the military courts should be more consistent 
                                               
11
 Terblanche & Roberts at 193; S v Kibido 1998 (2) SACR 213 (SCA) at 216g-h. 
12
 Terblanche (2007) at 115. 
13
 S v Dzukuda; S v Tshilo 2000 (4) SA 1078 (CC). 
14
 Joubert at 288; South African Law Commission Report: Sentencing (A New Sentencing 
Framework) (2000) at para 1.43; South African Law Commission Discussion Paper 91: 
Sentencing (A New Sentencing Framework) (2000) para 3.1.4. 
15
 S v Coetzee 2010 (1) SACR 176 (SCA) paras 17 and 26 (parity is consequently one of the 
factors that should be taken into account when varying a sentence); S v Michele 2010 (1) 
SACR 131 (SCA); S v GL 2010 (2) SACR 488 (WCC) para 33 (considering the degree of 
culpability of an accused); S v PN 2010 (2) SACR 187 (ECG) at 193d-194g (comparing 
previous decisions as a benchmark not to deviate from the prescribed minimum punishment); S 
v Mapipa 2010 (1) SACR 151 (ECG) para 15; S v De Klerk 2010 (2) SACR 40 (KZP) paras 17-
26. 
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and have in fact varied sentences imposed by the military courts to achieve this 
principle.  In S v Feni16 the defence counsel argued that in a number of similar 
previous cases accused persons were sentenced to a fine.  The CMA did not 
find that the sentence imposed on corporal Feni was shockingly inappropriate, 
but held that due to the need for parity in sentencing the sentence had to be 
varied to a fine of R1000.  More often the CMA had however accepted the 
principle that each case should be judged according to its own facts and 
circumstances, accepting the principle of individualisation of sentences. In fact, 
it is mentioned as the most important factor when sentencing an offender.17  
This seems to be in contrast with the principle that there should be parity 
among sentences for “the same offences committed under more or less similar 
circumstances.”18  Consistency does not however mean that all sentences must 
be the same.  If there is too much uniformity the court’s ability to take significant 
individual differences into consideration is limited.19 
 
Balancing these two contrasting principles is not an easy task.  The CMA gave 
the following guidelines to the military courts on how to approach sentencing:20 
 
  a. Each case must be dealt with on its own merits. 
 
b. As far as possible, military courts should strive to maintain 
uniformity and consistency as regards sentence for similar 
                                               
16
 In S v Feni (CMA 28/99) the accused was found guilty of common law fraud in that he was 
dishonest during an exam and was sentenced by the military court to reduction to the rank of 
lance corporal. 
17
 See S v Feni (CMA 28/99) where the court referred to S v Giannoulis 1975 (4) SA 867 AD 
with approval. 
18
 In this regard the court held in S v Feni (CMA 28/99) that “[u]nequal inconsistent and uneven 
sentences for equal offenders infringe the general sense of justice.  Uniformity and consistency 
in punishment leads to legal certainty and confidence in the administration of military justice.”  
See also Office of the Judge Advocate General Guidance on the Sentencing in the Court 
Martial (OJAG) (2009) at 4 where it is stated that “[s]entencing is a complex and difficult 
exercise and whilst it must not be reduced to a rigid and mechanistic process, consistency of 
approach is essential to maintain public confidence.”   
19
 Terblanche (2007) at 125. 
20
 S v Feni (CMA 28/99).   
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offences and committed under more or less similar 
circumstances. 
 
c. Uniformity should, however, not be elevated to a rule.  It is just a 
helpful method to determine an appropriate sentence. 
 
d. Disparity in the sentence imposed on offenders who committed 
the same offence(s) under similar circumstances will not 
necessarily warrant interference on review or appeal. 
 
e. Where, however, there is a disturbing disparity among such 
sentences, and the circumstances under which the offences 
were committed were more or less the same, and there are no 
personal factors warranting such disparity, interference on 
review or appeal with the sentence may, depending on the 
circumstances, be warranted.  The ground of interference 
would be that the sentence is disturbingly inappropriate.  
See S v Giannoulis, supra. 
 
f. In ameliorating the more severe sentence, the Court does not 
necessarily equate the sentences: it does what it considers 
appropriate in the circumstances.  See R v Fallison 1969 (1) SA 
477 (R, AD). 
 
These are only guidelines given by the CMA and do not take away the 
discretion of the military court to impose a sentence where it is of opinion it is 
an appropriate sentence.  S v Mokgoko21 held that “[g]uidelines by this Court 
are called “Guidelines” because they are guidelines.  This Court has never tried 
to give strict instructions for imposing sentence, and does not intend to do so” 
and in S v Ngcobo22 it held that “[i]t must always be borne in mind that the 
question of the imposition of the sentence is wholly the competency of the trial 
                                               
21
 S v Mokgoko (CMA 188/2001). 
22
 S v Ngcobo (CMA 02/2010). 
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court…” and the CMA will only interfere with the sentence where “there was a 
misdirection when the sentence imposed was considered.” 
 
Sentencing discretion is however not totally free.  Courts have to operate within 
the structure provided by the law but within these boundaries the court can 
exercise their discretion as they see fit.23  The basic principle is that this 
discretion lies with the trial court and a higher court should not interfere 
because they would have imposed a different sentence.24  In S v Martin25 
defence counsel argued that the sentence imposed on the accused was 
disproportionate to the crime and the needs of society and that another court 
may have imposed a different sentence.  The CMA found the “only reason this 
court can impose another sentence is if the court considers the sentence 
shockingly inappropriate, not if the court might impose a lesser sentence…”26 
 
The court should only interfere where it would be reasonable to do so.  The test 
for reasonableness has been described as “whether the trial judge could 
reasonably have imposed the sentence she did.”27  The CMA has held that 
interference in the sentence will be acceptable where the sentence imposed 
was “shockingly inappropriate.”28  In S v Xaba29 the court held that if a sentence 
of discharge was considered too severe for purely disciplinary offences, 
imprisonment would be considered even more inappropriate and varied the 
                                               
23
 Terblanche (2007) at 116; van Zyl Smit D “Sentencing and Punishment” in Woolman S & 
Chaskalson M (eds) Constitutional Law of South Africa (1996) at 28-4.  In S v Venter (CMA 
160/2002) the court held that although s 6(3) of the MDSMA determines that the CMA is the 
highest military court and binds all other military courts, this “does not by any means bind a 
military court to impose a particular sentence for a particular offence merely because this Court 
expressed its opinion that a particular sentence was an appropriate sentence in a particular 
case.” 
24
 See S v Bembe (CMA 121/2000) where the CMA held that the “court will interfere with a 
sentence which is shockingly inappropriate or where there were any irregularities.  The court 
will however not interfere merely because it would not have imposed that sentence itself.”   
25
 S v Martin (CMA 10/07). 
26
 Emphasis added.  For similar reasoning by the CMA see also S v Hako (CMA 005/2004); S v 
Katjedi (CMA 05/2009); S v Ngcobo (CMA 02/2010). 
27
 S v Pieters 1987 (3) SA 717 A; S v Ramabokela 2011 (1) SACR 122 (GNP) para 31; S v 
Kgosimore 1999 (2) SACR 238 (SCA) para 10; S v Dayile 2011 (1) SACR 245 (ECG) para 17; 
S v Michele 2010 (1) SACR 131 (SCA) para 13. 
28
 S v Martin (CMA 10/07).  
29
 S v Xaba (CMA 052/2001). 
  
263 
sentence to a fine and suspended detention.  In S v Stuurman30 it was found 
that the “sentence imposed [was] shockingly inappropriate under the 
circumstances of this case and the personal circumstances of the accused.  
The imposition of a fine in addition to discharge from the SANDF is totally 
unacceptable.”  In S v Du Plessis31 the CMA interfered with the sentence 
because it found that “effective detention is shockingly inappropriate in the 
present case.”  The court may also express its opinion regarding inappropriate 
lenient sentences.32 
 
While sentencing discretion allows for balanced and fair sentencing as well as 
the individualisation of sentences33, some negative aspects regarding 
sentencing discretion have been identified.34 
 
A dimension is added to sentencing that has nothing to do with the crime or the 
accused in the case.  The personality and convictions of the sentencing military 
judge may have an influence on his approach towards sentencing.  This may 
be particularly true for the presiding officer at the CODH.  Presiding officers at 
the CODH have no training regarding sentencing practice.  The curriculum 
presented at the Advanced Military Law Course presented by the School of 
Military Justice does not make provision for any training in this regard, yet the 
presiding officer is authorised to impose punishment on an accused.  Since he 
has no training with regard to an objective approach towards sentencing it is to 
be expected that his personal experience as the officer commanding of the unit 
or a member of middle management on the unit may play a considerable part in 
his approach towards sentencing. 
 
                                               
30
 S v Stuurman (CMA 124/2000). 
31
 S v Du Plessis (CMA 13/2009). 
32
 See S v Kanu (CMA 17/2010) and the discussion on inappropriate lenient sentences in ch 7 
at para 7.4.8 below.  A too lenient sentence can be just as wrong as a sentence that is too 
severe (see also S v Holder 1979 (2) SA 70 (A); S v Mthembu 2011 (1) SACR 272 (KZP) para 
22; S v Vekueminina 1993 (1) SACR 561 (NM) at 562c-d; S v Ncobo; S v Zwelibhangile; S v 
Dlamini 1988 (3) SA 954 (N) at 957A). 
33
 Terblanche (2007) at 119; S v Toms, S v Bruce 1990 (2) SA 802 (A) at 806I. 
34
 Terblanche (2007) at 119. 
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A further aspect is that different views of presiding officers often result in 
disparity of sentences for similar crimes.  This may result in an infringement of 
an accused’s right to equal and fair treatment.  This matter has been raised by 
the CMA on various occasions.35  Two aspects are worth mentioning in this 
regard. 
 
Military judges are appointed from various backgrounds.  Traditionally military 
judges were appointed from the senior ranks of the military legal division, from 
members who have gained experience as military legal practitioners at units, 
military prosecution counsel or military defence counsel.  These military judges 
will have an in-depth understanding of military culture and the serious nature of 
military offences which may seem trivial to a civilian.  The military legal division 
also has a reserve force component which is mainly constituted of civilians who 
are called up from time to time to render service.  It is happening more 
frequently that members from the reserve force are appointed in a permanent 
capacity within the military legal division, also as high ranking military judges.  
These military judges may have little or no experience within the military 
environment and of how things function at unit level.  They will necessarily have 
a different approach towards sentencing military offenders than those judges 
with more military experience.  This may lead to widely divergent approaches in 
sentencing, exacerbating the disparity found in sentencing in military courts. 
 
As mentioned above, the CMA has held in S v Feni36 that military courts 
should, as far as possible, “strive to maintain uniformity and consistency as 
regards sentence for similar offences and committed under more or less similar 
circumstances.”  Although a military court is not bound by the decisions of 
another military court, except the CMA,37 the lack of published military court 
decisions makes it extremely difficult for one military judge to determine what 
another military judge decided under similar circumstances.  It is not viable to 
                                               
35
 See the discussion on parity of sentences and S v Feni (CMA 28/99) above. 
36
 S v Feni (CMA 28/99). 
37
 Section 6(3) of the MDSMA. 
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expect military judges to have parity of sentences if they have no access to 
other decisions.  The only decisions that are published, albeit in a limited way, 
are those from the CMA.  These decisions are only of limited assistance to the 
military courts.  Only a limited number of sentences go on automatic review, so 
comments on any other sentence than imprisonment, cashiering, detention, 
dismissal or discharge from the SANDF are extremely rare.  In many CMA 
cases, especially those pre-2002, the finding or sentence was varied 
accompanied with a statement that reasons would follow, but those reasons are 
not available.  Such cases are of no assistance to any military judge or 
researcher.  The format of publication is also not user-friendly.  It is distributed 
by review counsel from time to time and not all military legal practitioners 
receive copies.  There is no index which makes research difficult.  It is 
suggested that the publication of military court decisions would have a positive 
influence on sentencing practice in military courts. 
 
This leads to the third negative aspect mentioned by Terblanche in that 
disparity results in unpredictability of the outcome of criminal cases which may 
lead to uncertainty of the law.38 
 
Since parity in sentencing is a concern of the CMA and there are currently no 
clear guidelines regarding sentencing it is suggested that the military justice 
system give serious consideration to the implementation of sentencing 
guidelines, especially at the CODH level where parity in sentencing may be 
beneficial to unit moral.  Military sentencing guidelines will enhance sentence 
parity among the courts.39  Sentencing guidelines are provided to the military 
                                               
38
 Terblanche (2007) at 119. 
39
 Immel S M “Development, Adoption, and Implementation of Military Sentencing Guidelines” 
(2000) Military Law Review 159 at 160.  The US Military have very wide sentencing jurisdiction, 
being able to sentence an accused to death but they have no sentencing guidelines.  The 
resultant disparity in sentencing has on occasion been criticised (see Immel at 161 and 171-
173 in this regard).  Prior to 1959 US Military Courts were instructed to consider sentence 
uniformity but the Court of Military Appeal held in United States v Mamaluy, 27 CMR. 176 (CMA 
1959) that panel members did not have the required information at hand to enable them to 
determine a uniform sentence and they were therefore not “adequately equipped to consider 
sentence uniformity.”  See also in this regard Sylkatis S R “Sentencing Disparity in Desertion 
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courts in various other jurisdictions.  The Australian and British military justice 
systems are but a couple that have such sentencing guidelines, especially for 
the lower courts.  One such example is the summary hearing in the Britain 
Armed Forces.40   
 
General guidelines are provided to commanding officers as well as guidelines 
applicable to specific offences.  Typically the charge is mentioned, the 
mitigating and aggravating factors that may be taken into account are listed, a 
range of punishments and sentencing guidance is given.  Specific guidance 
and suggested tariffs for fines are provided in the case of AWOL, which is a 
prevalent offence.41  For all other offences within the jurisdiction of the 
commanding officer two entry points are provided for the presiding officer to 
consider.42  The first entry point is used when the accused pleads not guilty and 
the offence is subsequently proven.  The offender will not receive any discount 
on sentencing under these circumstances.  The second point of entry is where 
the accused admits his guilt and the entry point is then calculated in terms of 
                                                                                                                                         
and Absent without Leave Trials: Advocating a Return of “Uniform” to the Uniform Code of 
Military Justice” (2006) Working Paper 1201 at 5-6.  It is submitted that the South African 
military courts are currently in the same position.  As argued above, the number of sentences 
on which the CMA has commented is extremely limited and in connection with CODH 
appearances it is non-existent.  Most military judges, especially commanding officers at the 
CODH are not equipped to determine a uniform sentence.  Sentencing guidelines will assist in 
this regard.  Appropriate military sentencing guidelines for the South African context requires 
further research and falls outside the current discussion.  For guidelines see Terblanche S S 
“Sentencing Guidelines for South Africa: Lessons from Elsewhere” (2003) South African Law 
Journal 858-882. 
40
 See Manual of Service Law (2011) 1(2) at 1-14-3 to 1-14-7 for an example of the general 
instructions issued to commanding officers in the British forces to use as a quick guide at 
summary hearings. 
41
 Manual of Service Law (2011) 1(2) at 1-14-3.  The following extract of the sentencing 
guidelines applicable to AWOL at 1-14-5 to 1-14-6 serves as example:  The range of 
punishments are given as a guideline stating that the entry point for the offence of AWOL is a 
fine but for a first offence an admonishment, restriction of privileges or stoppage of leave may 
be seen as appropriate.  Where the AWOL is regarded as more serious, the appropriate 
sentence would be one of detention.  A sliding scale is then provided, recommending up to six 
days’ pay as a fine for AWOL of up to 24 hours, nine days’ pay as a fine for up to two days 
AWOL and so forth.  As sentencing guidance the commanding officer is reminded that due to 
the prevalence of AWOL as an offence the deterrent element of the punishment must be 
emphasised, the impact on the offender’s unit must be considered and that a repetition of 
absences without leave should be treated more seriously. 
42
 Manual of Service Law (2011) 1(2) at 1-14-3. 
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the guidelines provided for the reduction of sentence for guilty pleas made at 
the earliest opportunity.43 
 
The sentencing guidance given refers to specific factors taken into 
consideration when deciding the severity of the offence and may include factors 
such as the impact of the offence on the unit and the level of responsibility of 
the offender at the time of the offence.  Some mitigating factors listed may 
include, inter alia, substantial cooperation given during the investigation of the 
offence, good professional record of the offender, serious illness and any 
severe adverse effect that the potential sentence may have on the offender and 
his family.  Aggravating factors such as previous convictions, the vulnerability of 
the victim, alcohol and a breach of trust may be taken into consideration.44  
Following such guidelines would assist in reaching parity in sentence, 
especially at CODH level, thereby ensuring the fair and equal treatment of 
offenders. 
 
5.4 Finding an appropriate sentence 
 
The most important task of the trial court after a finding of guilty is determining 
an appropriate sentence.  An appropriate sentence does not mean the most 
severe sentence.45  An appropriate sentence would be one that balances all the 
relevant factors and circumstances of the case.46  It is trite that “[w]hat has to 
be considered is the triad consisting of the crime, the offender and the interests 
of society.”47  The civilian courts consequently follow the three pillars as set out 
                                               
43
 See para 5.4.24 below. 
44
 Manual of Service Law (2011) 1(2) at 1-14-4. 
45
 Kruger at 28-1. 
46
 Krugel & Terblanche at 104; Du Toit E et al Commentary in the Criminal Procedure Act 
(1997) at 28-10; Schonteich M “Public Perception and Judicial Process” (1999) Sentencing in 
South Africa – Occassional Paper 43 Institute for Security Studies at 7; S v RO 2010 (2) SACR 
248 (SCA) para 30. 
47
 S v Zinn 1969 (2) SA 537 (A) at 540G-H; S v Rabie 1975 (4) SA 855 (A); S v Holder 1979 (2) 
SA 70 (A); S v Olivier 2007 (2) SACR 596 (C) para 12; S v Vehueminina 1993 (1) SACR 561 
(NM) at 562d; S v M (Centre for Child Law as Amicus Curiae) 2007 (2) SACR 539 (CC) para 
10; Krugel & Terblanche at 106-107; Terblanche & Roberts at 198; Du Toit et al at 28-10B-3; 
Kruger at 28-3. 
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in S v Zinn.48  This means that the sentence should reflect the seriousness of 
the crime, take into consideration any mitigating and aggravating factors that 
affect the blameworthiness of the offender and at the same time consider the 
interests of society by protecting society and deterring offenders from 
committing further crimes.49  An aggravating or mitigating factor is any factor 
that the court can properly take into account when determining an appropriate 
sentence.50  This does not imply that all the factors must be afforded equal 
weight.  Terblanche is of the opinion that “the three factors of the Zinn triad 
have to be considered in conjunction with one another and that each should be 
afforded a certain weight depending on the facts of the case.”51  Military courts 
also follow the Zinn triad when considering an appropriate sentence.  In a 
military context the three legs of the triad may translate in the military court 
considering the nature of the offence and its consequences, the effect of the 
offence on discipline in the unit or broader SANDF, its effect on operational 
effectiveness and the status of the offender which will include his rank and level 
of responsibility. 
 
5.4.1 The Crime 
 
It is important that the sentence imposed by the court should reflect the severity 
of the crime.52  Although military crimes can be described as mainly disciplinary 
offences and cannot be compared to the seriousness of crimes such as murder 
or rape tried by the civilian courts, military offences should be judged against 
the constitutional requirement of discipline and the need for a disciplined 
force.53  The unique circumstances of service in the Armed Forces may 
                                               
48
 S v Zinn 1969 (2) SA 537 (A). 
49
 See also Terblanche (2007) 127; Snyman C R Criminal Law 5 ed (2008) at 19-20. 
50
 Terblanche (2007) at 185; S v Ramba 1990 (2) SACR 334 (A) at 341i-342a. 
51
 Terblanche (2007) at 146; S v De Kock 1997 (2) SACR 171 (T). 
52
 Terblanche (2007) at 148; S v Siavhe (CMA 73/2004).  See also Terblanche & Roberts 
(2005) at 201 where it is argued that the seriousness of the offence will always be the starting 
point for determining the severity of the sentence.  This is influenced by the harm occasioned 
by the offence and the offender’s degree of culpability in inflicting the harm. 
53
 Section 200(1) of the Constitution.  In Minister of Defence v Potsane; Legal Soldier (Pty) Ltd v 
Minister of Defence 2002 (1) SA 1 (CC) para 23 it was argued that “military justice is concerned 
  
269 
constitute varying degrees of mitigation or aggravating factors that may not find 
application in a civilian environment.54  It is against this background that the 
“seriousness of the offence” as a leg of the triad in military sentences should be 
judged. 
 
It is not suggested that disciplinary offences are more serious and that the 
seriousness of certain criminal offences over which the military courts do in fact 
have jurisdiction inside the borders of the Republic is not taken into 
consideration during sentencing.55  All crimes committed by soldiers should in 
fact be seen as serious, especially where those crimes are committed while the 
accused is on deployment outside the borders of the Republic.  In S v Sibi56 the 
accused was found guilty of being drunk on duty.  Generally drunkenness is 
seen as a disciplinary offence but at the time the offence was committed, the 
accused was deployed outside the borders.  The court held that “[b]eing drunk 
on duty in an operational zone is a serious offence.”  In S v Louw57 the accused 
was found guilty of pointing a firearm at a fellow soldier, which in its own right is 
considered a serious offence.  However, the court considered this more serious 
since at the time of the offence the accused was deployed in Burundi to protect 
the Minister of Burundi.  This incident had international repercussions and 
reflected negatively on the image of the SANDF.  In S v Moolman58 and S v 
Magumasholo59 the assault on a foreign national committed while on 
                                                                                                                                         
not so much with the prosecution of crime but with the maintenance of discipline” and at para 
38 that military discipline is “about having an effective armed force capable and ready to protect 
the territorial integrity of the country and the freedom of its people.”  In S v Bene (CMA 15/2009) 
the accused was convicted of disobeying lawful commands and using threatening, 
insubordinate or insulting language.  The CMA held that the “offences are at the heart of 
discipline and were committed in a training environment against the person who is chiefly 
responsible for discipline and also in front of subordinates…”  This was seen as aggravating. 
54
 OJAG 29; Minister of Defence v Potsane; Legal Soldier (Pty) Ltd v Minister of Defence 2001 
(2) SACR 632 (CC) para 31 regarding the uniqueness of military service. 
55
 In S v Mmakola (CMA 26/2009) the seriousness of the crime of assault was taken into 
account, in S v Zondo (CMA 67/2008) the seriousness of theft from the accused’s employer 
was considered and in S v Nipha (CMA 08/07) the court considered the seriousness of assault 
with the intent to do grevious bodily harm, especially where the assault was unprovoked. 
56
 S v Sibi (CMA 119/2000). 
57
 S v Louw (CMA 054/2004). 
58
 S v Moolman (CMA 02/2008). 
59
 S v Magumasholo (CMA 18/2009). 
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deployment was viewed in a very serious light and the court held that “[o]ur 
soldiers are supposed to keep the peace as a disciplined force in a war torn 
country.” 
 
All crimes in the MDC with a maximum penalty of one year imprisonment are 
seen as disciplinary offences and those prescribing more than one year 
imprisonment are seen as criminal offences and considered more serious.60  
The maxima contained in the penalty clauses of the specific military crimes can 
therefore be taken into consideration when determining the seriousness of the 
offence.  However, the circumstances relating to each crime can differ and it is 
therefore important to consider each case individually and not make a 
“generalised assessment of severity.”61 
 
Terblanche states that one of the most difficult steps in determining an 
appropriate sentence is finding one which reflects the seriousness of the 
offence and that sentencing officers should find a point of departure to use 
when imposing sentence for a specific type of crime, especially where the 
crimes are committed regularly.62 
 
                                               
60
 The penalty clause is not always an indication of the seriousness of the offence.  The CMA 
found in S v Ngako (CMA 165/2002) that although s 27(b) of the MDC, the taking of a military 
vehicle without authority and using it for purposes other than in the public interest, is seen as a 
disciplinary offence, it is in fact similar to a contravention of s 1 of the General Law Amendment 
Act 1 of 1988 where an offender can be sentenced to the same punishment as in the case of 
theft. 
61
 Terblanche (2007) at 148.  See the CMA cases above regarding the seriousness of 
disciplinary offences committed outside the borders of the Republic.  In cases where the 
accused is convicted of multiple charges, the offence is also considered more serious.  See in 
this regard S v Mageti (CMA 138/2000) where the accused was found guilty of a number of 
charges which on their own were not very serious and the periods of the accused’s absence 
without leave were relatively short, however the court found that it was more serious since he 
was convicted of “quite a number of offences committed over a protracted period of time” (see 
also S v Mokoka (CMA 16/07); S v Nugget (CMA 095/2001); S v Nene (CMA 110/2001); S v 
Renase (CMA 085/2001) where the court held that the period of absence of 368 days, made 
the AWOL a serious offence). 
62
 Terblanche (2007) at 149. 
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The view that society has of the crime must also be taken into account, but the 
court should not subject itself to the opinion of society.63  In a military context 
this aspect refers to the view the military society has of the crime.  Civilians 
may not view military offences in a serious light.  This is due to the fact that 
“what would be acceptable in another employment relationship is not only 
impermissible for a soldier but may be visited by punishment as severe as 
deprivation of liberty for several years.” 64   Discipline is an important aspect, as 
is rank, and these aspects will influence how serious the military community 
sees the offence.  It was held in S v Gcakosi65 that “[d]iscipline (including self 
discipline) is of paramount importance in the SANDF and the accused did not 
display any discipline at all” and in S v Maphosa66 a discharge was considered 
appropriate where the court was of the opinion that “the accused is not 
susceptible to discipline and should no longer be subjected thereto.”  In the 
matter of an assault in the presence of a senior officer the CMA held that the 
accused did “not show any regard for military discipline.”67  These factors were 
seen as aggravating.  Offences committed by officers are also punished 
harshly.68 
 
An offence that has the potential to undermine discipline and cohesion within 
the Armed Forces, such as theft from a comrade69 or the assault of a superior 
officer,70 may be more aggravating than theft committed in terms of the 
common law or common law assault.  An offence such as drunkenness may 
                                               
63
 Terblanche (2007) at 149; S v Makwanyane 1995 (3) SA 391 (CC). 
64
 Minister of Defence v Potsane; Legal Soldier (Pty) Ltd v Minister of Defence 2001 (2) SACR 
632 (CC) para 31. 
65
 S v Gcakosi (CMA 50/2004). 
66
 S v Maphosa (CMA 198/2001). 
67
 S v Mmakola (CMA 026/2009). 
68
 S v Mkhabela (CMA 134/2000). 
69
 Soldiers are expected to operate in a close community and it is imperative that a soldier is 
able to trust his comrade.  His life may depend on it.  Theft from a comrade undermines the 
mutual respect and trust that is necessary to operate in this environment and may in the long 
term undermine the operational effectiveness of the Armed Forces (see also OJAG at 31). 
70
 Violent offences in the military are discussed in OJAG at 33 where it is opined that “personnel 
in Armed Forces are trained to exercise controlled and lawful violence towards the enemy.  
Unlawful violence displays a lack of discipline and can corrode unit cohesiveness and 
operational effectiveness; particularly when directed at service colleagues.” 
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seem trivial, but if committed while in a dangerous environment, such as 
weapons training, it becomes a very serious offence.71 
 
The seriousness of the crime must however not overshadow the other factors 
that must be taken into consideration.72 
 
5.4.2 The criminal 
 
5.4.2.1  Introduction 
 
This aspect refers to the individualisation of the sentence.73  Factors that are 
taken into consideration are inter alia the age,74 rank of the accused, 
employment, the marital status,75 dependants76 and health of the accused.  
These factors are usually seen as mitigating factors but under certain 
circumstances they may also operate as aggravating factors. 
 
5.4.2.2  Age and rank 
 
In a number of judgments the CMA held that where the accused is still young 
and does not have many years experience in the SANDF, the court considers it 
as mitigation.  At the same time that fact that an accused of more advanced 
age with many years service has no previous conviction may also be seen as 
mitigating, although the fact that he has many years experience may 
                                               
71
 See also OJAG at 30 where the seriousness of drug use was discussed.  This discussion 
applies equally to the abuse of alcohol.  It was stated that “[p]ersonnel in the Armed Forcers 
who carry lethal weapons, operate and maintain dangerous equipment, or bear responsibility 
for the safety of others must display higher standards of behaviour than civilians.  They must 
expect to be punished more severely for breaching those high standards.” 
72
 Terblanche (2007) at 150; S v Rabie 1975 (4) SA 855 (A); S v Fhetani 2007 (2) SACR 590 
(SCA) para 5. 
73
 See Terblanche (2007) at 150; Kruger at 28-3; S v Du Toit 1979 (3) SA 846 (A) at 857H-
858A; S v De Kock 1997 (2) SACR 171 (T) at 183h-j. 
74
 See Joubert at 293 for the influence of the youth of the offender on sentencing. 
75
 S v Ngcobo (CMA 02/2010). 
76
 S v Zondo (CMA 67/2008) found the fact that the accused was a single father with three 
dependent daughters a mitigating factor.  See also S v Mpi (CMA 8/2010) for a further example. 
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sometimes be held as aggravating because he was in a position of trust or 
knew enough of the system to manipulate it.77 
 
The higher the rank of the accused, the higher the degree of culpability that is 
assigned to the accused.  It was found that where an officer in the SANDF is 
dishonest, it should be considered an aggravating factor.78  The same level of 
responsibility is expected from senior non-commissioned officers.79  The fact 
that the accused is a member of the military police was regarded as 
aggravating in a number of cases.  In S v Schmahl80 the accused was 
convicted of corruption in that he transported illegal immigrants from Zimbabwe 
using military transport.  The fact that the accused was a member of the military 
police was seen as aggravating and he was discharged with ignominy from the 
SANDF.  Where members of the military police are found guilty of theft and 
other criminal offences, imprisonment is considered an appropriate sentence, 
even where the accused is a first offender.81  Where the accused is in a 
position of trust, the breach of that trust is regarded as an aggravating factor in 
sentencing. 
 
5.4.2.3  Criminal record  
 
The question is further whether the fact that the accused is a first offender or 
has previous convictions may also be taken into consideration when 
determining an appropriate sentence.  A perusal of CMA judgments shows that 
being a first offender is generally taken into consideration by the court as a 
                                               
77
 In S v Muti (CMA 03/07) the CMA held that “[h]is decision not to inform his superiors of his 
problem or whereabouts is totally irresponsible for a man of his age…” and in S v Mokoka 
(CMA 16/07) the accused was regarded as an adult with more than ten years service and was 
expected to know what procedures to follow for not being at work. 
78
 S v Maduba (CMA 51/2008); S v Mkhabela (CMA 134/2000); S v Simelane (CMA 15/2000). 
79
 S v Thys (CMA 27/2009) held that the accused was “a warrant officer and as such he is 
primarily responsible for good discipline in the unit.” 
80
 S v Schmahl (CMA 13/07). 
81
 S v Matsoba (CMA 51/2001); S v Mokubung (CMA 133/2001); S v Mdunyelwa (CMA 
67/2005); S v Vosloo (CMA 68/2005); S v Ndaba (CMA 23/2006). 
  
274 
mitigating factor.82  It is however only one of the factors that are taken into 
consideration for mitigation and is on its own not sufficient to have any 
significant effect in the sentence.83  Whether being a first offender should in fact 
be regarded as a mitigating factor would depend in part on the seriousness of 
the offence committed.  The CMA held that in certain circumstances it would 
even be justified to sentence first time offenders to direct imprisonment.84 
 
Proven previous convictions can be seen as strongly aggravating when 
imposing sentence.85  It should however be kept in mind that the accused is 
being sentenced for the crime that he has committed and the fact that he has 
previous convictions does not increase the seriousness of the offence.86  It may 
however result in a harsher punishment being imposed.  In S v Buthelezi87 the 
court held that the accused “has previous convictions which cannot be ignored 
and which must be reflected in the sentence eventually decided upon.”  In S v 
Lufele88 and S v Renase89 the only aggravating factor present was the 
accused’s previous record.  The five previous convictions of the accused in S v 
                                               
82
 The fact that the accused was a first offender without previous convictions was considered 
mitigating in S v Kena (CMA 66/2000).  See also S v Afrika (CMA 88/2000); S v Miya (CMA 
185/2000); S v Shirinda (CMA 64/2001); S v Dlamini (CMA 94/2001); S v M 2007 (2) SACR 60 
(W) para 63; Kruger at 28-4; S v Mthembu 2011 (1) SACR 272 (KZP) para 11 (the court a quo 
held that the “appellant showed true contrition and regret for what he had done, was a first 
offender, and accepted that he was a good candidate for reformation…”). 
83
 A mitigating factor is one that generally reduces a sentence that would have been imposed in 
the absence of mitigating factors (see Terblanche (2007) at 186). 
84
 S v Radebe (CMA 49/2008); S v Matsoba (CMA 51/2001); S v Ndaba (CMA 23/2006). 
85
 Terblanche (2007) at 188; Schonteich at 9; Terblanche & Roberts at 195; Joubert at 293. 
86
 Terblanche (2007) at 189.  This may be difficult to apply considering that the sentences listed 
in s 12 of the MDSMA are in order of severity.  One would expect the military court to start its 
sentencing at the bottom of the list of sentences, if appropriate, and as the accused continues 
with his criminal or undisciplined behaviour he will graduate to the more severe punishment 
until he is discharged or imprisoned.  Previous convictions eventually lead to harsher 
punishments, although the CMA has on occasion held that previous convictions are not 
necessarily indicative of a habitual offender (see S v Wehr (CMA 31/2000)).  See also S v 
Monaheng (CMA 20/2009) where the court held that an accused with 14 previous convictions 
for the same and related offences “has been sentenced to fines, extra duties and even 
detention.  None of these sentences had any rehabilitative effect on the accused.  Therefore 
the sentence of Discharge from the SA National Defence Force is the only appropriate 
sentence in these circumstances.”  Previous convictions may however show that the moral 
blameworthiness if the accused has increased and he would consequently be liable for a 
harsher punishment than a first offender (see van Zyl Smit (1996) 28-10). 
87
 S v Buthelezi (CMA 10/99).  
88
 S v Lufele (CMA 114/2000). 
89
 S v Renase (CMA 85/2001). 
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Kau90 were seen as indicative that the accused “has a disciplinary problem.”  It 
is difficult to determine the weight that should be attached to the previous 
conviction.  The weight attached is dependent on the sentencing rationale 
followed by the courts.  Where the emphasis is on the incapacitation and 
prediction, more weight will be attached to previous convictions than a court 
focusing on proportionality and retribution.91  A perusal of CMA judgments 
indicates that the military courts may favour a prediction and incapacitation 
approach.  Previous convictions are frequently regarded as strongly 
aggravating and are often cited as reason for a discharge.  When determining 
an appropriate sentence the previous sentences imposed for previous 
convictions could be taken into account where the accused failed to respond to 
previous sentences.92  This is only relevant where the facts of the previous 
conviction are relevant to the current conviction.  However, repetition of the 
same offence cannot on its own justify imposing increasingly more severe 
punishments.93  The aggravating effect of the previous conviction is also 
dependent on when the previous offences were committed.94 
 
5.4.2.4  Remorse 
 
Of interest is the apparent emphasis placed on guilty pleas as a show of 
remorse and taken into consideration by military courts a quo as mitigation in 
sentence.95  Since a lack of remorse is seen as an aggravating factor,96 the 
                                               
90
 S v Kau (CMA 87/2001); S v Mokoena (CMA 01/2009). 
91
 For a complete discussion in this regard see Von Hirsch A “Proportionality and Progressive 
Loss of Mitigation: Further Reflections” in Roberts J V & von Hirsh A (eds) Previous Convictions 
at Sentencing: Theoretical and Applied Perspectives (2010) at 1-3. 
92
 This seems to be the approach followed by the military courts (see S v Monaheng (CMA 
20/2009)). 
93
 Kruger at 28-28. 
94
 Although the accused had previous convictions for the same and other disciplinary offences, 
the court found that the accused had a clean record for more than two years prior to the 
offence, thereby mitigating the seriousness of the previous convictions (see S v Ramoholo 
(CMA 86/2001)). 
95
 Joubert at 291.  It has been the author’s experience in military trials that defence counsel 
routinely equate a plea of guilty with remorse.  Numerous examples are found in CMA cases, 
although, to be fair, it is only one of the mitigating factors taken into account and on its own is 
not sufficient to outweigh the aggravating factors.  See in this regard S v Fesi (CMA 11/2000) 
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question is to what extent the fact that the accused pleaded guilty should be 
taken into consideration as a mitigating factor. 
 
British military law has an interesting approach towards guilty pleas.  The 
Armed Force Act 2006 allows for a reduction in sentence for the early 
admission of the charge by the accused.97  Commanders must apply the 
sentencing principles followed by the civilian courts.98  When the accused is to 
be sentenced the commanding officer or the Judge Advocate must take into 
consideration at which stage of the trial proceedings the accused indicated his 
intent to plead guilty.99  Where the accused had indicated his intention ‘at the 
first reasonable opportunity’, for example during the police investigation, a 
reduction of one third of his sentence is deemed appropriate.  Where he only 
admits his guilt at the last moment, for example right before the trial start and 
the witnesses are about to testify, he may only receive a 10 percent reduction 
in his sentence.100  Any admission after the start of the trial will attract very little 
reduction in sentence.  During sentencing the accused must be informed of any 
credit he received for his admission of his guilt.  The reason for giving the 
reduction101 
                                                                                                                                         
where the accused’s guilty plea was seen as a sign of remorse and S v Mofokeng (CMA 
04/2008) where the accused pleaded guilty and “admitted his shame regarding his actions that 
he took the law into his own hands after being insulted by the complainant.”  A similar approach 
was followed in S v Mnisi (CMA 45/2000); S v Dlamini (CMA 94/2001); S v Montse (CMA 
48/2000). 
96
 Terblanche (2007) at 189; S v Matolo 1998 (1) SACR 206 (C) at 211g; S v Qamata 1997 (1) 
SACR 479 (E) at 482b; S v van de Venter 2011 (1) SACR 238 (SCA) where the court a quo 
took a lack of remorse as an aggravating factor; S v Dumba 2011 (2) SACR 5 (NCK) para 11; S 
v Shaw 2011 (1) SACR 368 (ECG) at 375h where the accused only expressed his remorse 
after his conviction and the court did not accept his remorse as genuine.  For a contrary view 
see S v Mbatha 2009 (2) SACR 623 (KZP) paras 30-31 where the court held that a lack of 
showing remorse cannot always be considered an aggravating factor. 
97
 Section 239 of the Armed Forces Act 2006. 
98
 Manual of Service Law (2011) 1(2) at 1-13-6. 
99
 This is in accordance with the guidelines set out by the Sentencing Guidelines Council in 
terms of s 153(2) of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 which requires a court to impose the shortest 
term of imprisonment that is appropriate given the seriousness of the offence (see Sentencing 
Guidelines Council Reduction in Sentence for a Guilty Plea: Definitive Guideline (2007) at 4). 
100
 Sentencing Guidelines Council at 5. 
101
 Manual of Service Law (2011) 1(2) at 1-13-20; Sentencing Guidelines Council at 6 where it 
is stated that the purpose for giving credit is to encourage those offenders who are guilty to 
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is to recognise the benefits that come from a guilty plea not only to witnesses 
and victims, but also in enabling the CO [commanding officer] and other 
authorities to deal more quickly with outstanding matters. 
 
The principle of reduction of the sentence for a guilty plea is based on the 
effective administration of justice and is not seen as a factor in the mitigation of 
sentence.102 
 
In our law it is accepted that pleading guilty is not necessarily a sign of 
remorse.  The Supreme Court of Appeal recently reiterated that103 
 
a plea of guilty in the face of an open and shut case against an accused person 
is a neutral factor…There is, moreover, a chasm between regret and remorse.  
Many accused persons might well regret their conduct, but that does not 
without more translate to genuine remorse…Whether the offender is sincerely 
remorseful, and not simply feeling sorry for himself or herself at having been 
caught, is a factual question.  In order for the remorse to be a valid 
consideration, the penitence must be sincere and the accused must take the 
court fully into his or her confidence. 
 
The CMA follows similar reasoning.  In S v Makhubela104 the court held that the 
fact that the accused pleaded guilty is not necessarily a sign of remorse and 
that “[a]ccused often plead guilty when they know the evidence against them is 
overwhelming, as in the present case.”  Nevertheless, many trial judges make 
this distinction, which is a matter of some concern. 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                         
plead guilty at the first available opportunity.  It is within the courts prerogative to decide what 
constitutes the “first reasonable opportunity” (see Sentencing Guidelines Council at 10). 
102
 Sentencing Guidelines Council at 4. 
103
 S v Matyityi 2011 (1) SACR 40 (SCA) para 13; S v M 2007 (2) SACR 60 (W) paras 72-76. 
104
 S v Makhubela (CMA 53/2003). 
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5.4.2.5  Other factors 
 
The health status of the accused may act as a mitigating factor.105  In S v 
Mdletshe106 the fact that the accused was terminally ill was considered as a 
mitigating factor.  In S v Nofemele107 the accused’s epilepsy was regarded as 
mitigating, S v Miya108 considered the accused’s depression as a strong 
mitigating factor and S v Dyantyi109 found illness to be a possible strong 
mitigating factor. 
 
The culpability of the offender may also be taken into consideration as 
mitigation or aggravation regarding the sentence.  Offences in the MDC 
generally do not specify the mens rea required for conviction of a specific 
offence, except for certain offences.110  Most offences in the MDC can 
consequently be committed either intentionally or negligently.  The culpability 
with which the offence is committed can have a mitigating or aggravating effect 
on the sentence.111  Where offences are premeditated, the CMA sees this as 
aggravating,112 but offences committed negligently are considered less 
serious.113  In S v Buthelezi114 the court held that it is mitigating where “there is 
no indication that the applicant acted with malice, dishonest intent or in 
deliberate disregard of discipline.”  As a basic guideline the CMA has also 
remarked that it “is generally accepted that disciplinary offences do not attract 
the same degree of moral blameworthiness as “criminal” offences.”115 
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 Du Toit et al 28-10B-5; Kruger at 28-3; S v Mabutho 2005 (1) SACR 485 (W). 
106
 S v Mdletshe (CMA 63/2005). 
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 S v Nofemele (CMA 019/2002). 
108
 S v Miya (CMA 185/2000). 
109
 S v Dyantyi (CMA 56/2000). 
110
 For example see s 19(1) of the MDC which requires willful defiance of authority and s 13 of 
the MDC requires intention for a conviction of desertion. 
111
 S v Nxumalo 1982 (3) SA 856 (A) at 861H; S v GL 2010 (2) SACR 488 (WCC) for an 
example of the application in civilian court.   
112
 S v Simelane (CMA 15/2000); S v Hako (CMA 0005/2004); S v Mpi (CMA 8/2010). 
113
 S v Sechaka (CMA 089/2001); S v Dlamini (CMA 094/2001); S v Boshielo (CMA 16/2009). 
114
 S v Buthelezi (CMA 10/99). 
115
 S v Xaba (CMA 052/2001). 
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The personal circumstances of the offender may be important in consideration 
of the sentence but have often not had much influence on the ultimate 
sentence.  The aggravating factors may often dominate the mitigating personal 
circumstances of the accused.116 
 
5.4.3 The interests of society 
 
The interests of society can work either as mitigation or aggravation.117  CMA 
judgments, as discussed below, show that this aspect often acts as an 
aggravating factor in the SANDF.  The interests of society may be relevant in 
two respects:118 
 
1. It can refer to the reaction of members of the community to the 
commission to the crime, for example their condemnation of the 
crime or their expectations regarding the sentence of the 
accused. 
 
2. The sentence could serve society by preventing a repeat of the 
crime through deterrence, rehabilitation and the protection of 
society by removing the offender.119 
 
The society that is relevant in this context includes the civilian as well as the 
military society.  Although Terblanche states that the second aspect mentioned 
above is the one that is relevant to sentencing, it would seem that where the 
interests of the community are discussed in the context of military courts, it is 
rather the community’s condemnation of the crime that is highlighted, which 
relates to the seriousness of the offence rather than purely to the interests of 
the society. 
                                               
116
 Terblanche (2007) at 151; S v Ngcobo (CMA 02/2010). 
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 Terblanche (2007) at 152. 
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 Terblanche (2007) at 152. 
119
 Terblanche (2007) at 153.  
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The CMA considered the interests of the community in S v Hako120 by 
highlighting the community’s reaction to the offence, stating that 
 
[i]t is commonly known that the SANDF has been plagued by theft from its 
stores and messes.  Theft is a crime and not a mere disciplinary offence.  This 
court has in the past taken it serious if members of the SANDF steal if they are 
on duty or have to stand guard when they steal.  This breaks down the 
essential element of trust.  When members who bear rank commit crime and 
involve subordinates in their crimes the whole order in the SANDF is corrupted.  
Their integrity is suspect to say the least. 
 
The CMA also held in S v Mathebula121 that “the impact of the incident on the 
image of the South African and United Nations forces is detrimental” and in S v 
Magumasholo122 that “[t]hese crimes cause embarrassment to the South 
African National Defence Force and the United Nations.” 
 
These CMA judgments show that the CMA mainly focuses on the effect of the 
crime on the image of the SANDF in their condemnation of the crime.  This 
should be judged against the background of one of the aims of a separate 
military justice system, namely the enforcement of discipline to ensure 
operational effectiveness.  The best interests of the SANDF will therefore play 
an important role in sentence consideration.123 
 
The importance of the opinion of the military community was also emphasised 
in R v Lingard and Kirk124 where the British Court of Appeal found 
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 S v Hako (CMA 005/2004). 
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 S v Mathebula (CMA 60/2008). 
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 S v Magumasholo (CMA 18/2009). 
123
 See in this regard also OJAG at 7. 
124
 R v Lingard and Kirk [2009] EWCA Crim 1745 para 12. 
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[i]t is, in our judgment, extremely important that due deference should be given 
by the courts to decisions of the military authorities in sentence in cases of this 
kind [in casu a case of theft and criminal damage in a military barracks].  They, 
and they alone, are best placed to appreciate the significance of an offence 
such as this in relation to questions of morale and maintenance of appropriate 
behaviour in their units. 
 
It would seem as if the interests of society as a factor within the military 
sentencing environment may have a different focus than is the case with the 
civilian courts.  The emphasis is on the community’s reaction to the crime rather 
than the future prevention of the crime. 
 
This does not however mean that deterrence, rehabilitation and the protection 
of the community is not taken into consideration.  The prevention of crimes 
remains important in ensuring a disciplined force.  Suspended sentences are 
regularly imposed in an attempt to deter individuals from committing crimes.  
The CMA opines that a suspended sentence is imposed as a deterrent and not 
as a punishment.125  Suspended sentences have not always been successful 
as a deterrent.  In S v Pono126 the court found that numerous previous 
sentences, including suspended detention had no rehabilitating or deterrent 
effect.  Barely eight months after being sentenced to suspended detention the 
accused in S v Mkhencele127 went AWOL again and was “not even perturbed 
by the possibility that he may be sentenced to detention and to be losing his 
rank in the process.” 
 
Various military punishments may satisfy the aim of protecting the military 
community.  Although the imprisonment of the offender may protect the 
SANDF, other forms of punishment may achieve the same result.  An 
accused’s dismissal or discharge from the SANDF will also protect the military 
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 S v Pono (CMA 10/2008). 
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282 
community.  If he is no longer in the employ of the SANDF, the military society 
is protected. 
 
Sentencing is not the only way of deterring military offenders.  It is submitted 
the practice of the promulgation plays an important role in general deterrence 
within the unit.128 
 
Deterrence as a form of crime prevention is not the only way of considering the 
best interests of society in imposing a sentence.  Any sentence that gives 
society an advantage or at least creates the least harm can be considered 
being in the interests of society.  A sentence with a positive purpose for the 
community is a sentence in the interest of the community.129 
 
The rehabilitation of the offender could therefore also be considered in the 
interests of society.  It constitutes a positive purpose because the training of 
soldiers is expensive for the taxpayer.  Retaining the services of these trained 
soldiers would be in the economic interest of society.  Rehabilitation in the 
military context is best achieved by means of detention or corrective 
punishment which includes extra drill in order to correct an offender’s discipline 
in instances of less serious offences.130 
 
These factors must be kept in mind when the sentencing court considers the 
relevant penalty clauses in determining an appropriate sentence. 
 
5.5 Penalty clauses 
 
In determining an appropriate sentence it is important to determine the nature 
and the extent of the sentence that can be imposed by the particular court.131  
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 See para 5.9.1 below. 
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 S v Maki 1994 (2) SACR 414 (E); S v Bezuidenhout 1991 (1) SACR 43 (A) at 51d-e. 
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The statutory penalty clause as well as the court’s general sentencing 
jurisdiction is taken into account.132 
 
Military courts have jurisdiction over those military offences found in sections 4 
to 49 of the First Schedule to the Defence Act 44 of 1957 (MDC).  All of these 
offences have a prescribed punishment of imprisonment varying from 21 days 
to 30 years.  See addendum A to this chapter for an overview of the offences 
and penalty clauses applicable.133  Military courts also have jurisdiction over a 
wide number of civilian criminal offices.134 
 
The penalty clauses of these military offences are used as an indication of the 
seriousness of the offence.135  The more severe the term of imprisonment 
attached to the offence, the more serious the offence is considered to be.  All 
offences up to imprisonment not exceeding a maximum term of one year are 
considered to be disciplinary offences.136  This distinction is important in 
determining the jurisdiction of the CMJ and the CODH.  The CODH’s 
jurisdiction is limited to military disciplinary offences, subject to further 
restriction in terms of military prosecution policy.137 
 
Military courts do not impose sentence in terms of the Criminal Procedure Act 
and therefore the list of sentences in terms of section 276(1) of the Criminal 
Procedure Act does not apply to military courts.138  As a creature of statute, 
                                               
132
 Terblanche (2007) 23. 
133
 Sourced from the Ministerial Task Team Report and the MDC. 
134
 Minister of Defence v Potsane, Legal Soldier (Pty) Ltd v Minister of Defence 2002 (1) SA 1 
(CC) para 15. 
135
 Terblanche (2007) at 39; S v Sibisi 1998 (1) SACR 248 (SCA) at 251f-h. 
136
 Section 1(xviii) of the MDSMA. 
137
 See ch 3 at para 3.2.5 above in this regard. 
138
 Although the criminal procedures followed in civilian courts are also applied by the military 
courts, r 21 of the MDSMA provides that this does not supplement the powers of the military 
courts and military courts are therefore bound to those sentences provided in s 12 of the 
MDSMA.  The situation is different for the British military courts.  Since 31 October 2009 most 
of the sentencing options introduced by the Criminal Justice Act 2003 have been available to 
the British military justice system, although military courts do in fact have wider sentencing 
options then the civilian Crown Courts since they may also impose those punishments that are 
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military courts are bound by section 12 of the MDSMA for their general 
sentencing jurisdiction.139 
 
In terms of the Criminal Procedure Act, section 276(1) is subject to other 
penalty clauses in other Acts.  It does not allow for any other sentence than that 
prescribed by statute,140 except where another statute allows a court to impose 
a sentence other than the sentence mentioned in the Criminal Procedure Act, 
the court may impose such a sentence, as long as it falls within its jurisdiction 
to do so.141  This means, for example, that a court cannot impose a fine as a 
sentence if it has not been prescribed by the penalty clause of the particular 
legislation.142 
 
This state of affairs in the civilian courts differs from the situation regarding 
sentencing in the military courts.  All the prescribed penalties in terms of the 
MDC refer to imprisonment as a punishment, but imprisonment is rarely 
imposed by the military courts.  Other punishments in terms of section 12 of the 
MDSMA are more likely to be imposed.  The same would apply where an 
accused is prosecuted in the military court for a civilian criminal offence.  Any 
appropriate punishment in terms of section 12 may be imposed, irrespective of 
what the penalty clause of the offence provides. 
 
Section 51 of the MDC states that  
 
[t]he court convicting any person of any offence under this Code, instead of 
imposing upon that person any penalty prescribed herein in respect of such 
offence, impose upon him or her any other penalty within the court’s jurisdiction 
                                                                                                                                         
unique to the military justice system.  The civilian courts do not have this jurisdiction (see OJAG 
at 6 and 12). 
139
 Du Toit et al at 28-9. 
140
 Section 276(2) of the Criminal Procedure Act. 
141
 Section 276(2)(b) of the Criminal Procedure Act.. 
142
 Joubert at 305; Terblanche (2007) at 27; Kruger at 28-53; S v Pretorius 1980 (4) SA 568 (T) 
at 571D. 
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which is provided for in this Code in respect of any offence, not being a more 
severe penalty than the maximum penalty so prescribed 
 
Section 51 of the MDC only refers to military offences but it is submitted that it 
applies to all trials before the military courts, including civilian criminal offences.  
If it was the intention of the legislature to allow the military court extended 
jurisdiction in the instances of sentencing offenders for convictions of civilian 
offences, the legislature would surely have expressly provided for such an 
exception. 
 
The CSMJ has the highest sentencing jurisdiction of the military courts.  It may 
impose any sentence referred to in section 12 of the MDSMA, including an 
unlimited period of imprisonment, subject only to the maximum penalty 
provided by law for a specific offence.143 The CMJ may also impose any 
sentence in terms of section 12 of the MDSMA, but its jurisdiction regarding a 
sentence of imprisonment is limited to a maximum period of two years.144 
 
The CODH has the most restricted jurisdiction and may only impose those 
sentences provided for in section 12(1)(i) to (m), subject to a maximum fine to 
the amount of R600.145 
                                               
143
 Section 9(2) of the MDSMA. 
144
 Section 10(2) of the MDSMA. 
145
 Section 11(2) of the MDSMA.  The British military justice system distinguishes between two 
courts which have jurisdiction over military personnel, to wit the Court Martial (our equivalent of 
the CSMJ and CMJ) and the summary hearing (our equivalent to the CODH).  The 
commanding officer conducting a summary hearing in the British military however has a much 
wider discretion than our commanding officers.  Apart from their basic sentencing options, they 
may be given extended powers by higher authority.  They are authorised to try, summarily, a 
number of criminal offences such as assault, theft and fraud and have a much wider sentencing 
jurisdiction.  They may hear guilty as well as not guilty pleas.  They are authorised to sentence 
an offender to up to 90 days’ detention where extended powers are granted by higher authority 
and fines are limited to an amount equal to 28 days’ pay of the offender.  They can also make 
service compensation orders where an accused is ordered to pay damages to the victims of 
their crimes up to the amount of one thousand pounds.  These commanding officers are not 
military judges and would not be seen as independent and impartial in terms of the 
requirements of our Constitution and law, yet they have far reaching jurisdiction.  It is justified 
by the argument that operational effectiveness requires commanders to have effective control 
over discipline at all times.  The accused do however have recourse to the Summary Appeal 
  
286 
 
It must always be kept in mind when interpreting the penalty clauses of the 
offences and in determining an appropriate sentence that the military court 
must impose sentence against the background of the values found in the 
Constitution as well as the rights in the Bill of Rights.146  The Constitutional 
principles regarding equality, dignity and a prohibition on cruel and unusual 
punishment must be considered. 
 
5.6 Pre-sentencing procedures 
 
5.6.1 Pre-sentencing procedures in the Court of a Senior Military Judge and 
 Court of a Military Judge 
 
Immediately after a finding of guilty it is the duty of the prosecution counsel to 
read out the offender’s list of previous convictions and submit it as evidence to 
the court.147  The presiding judge will then enquire from the accused whether 
the content of the DD28 is correct.148 
 
If the accused confirms the contents, the DD28 is marked as an annexure to 
the Record of Proceedings.  Where the accused denies the correctness of the 
record of proceedings, the court must hear evidence in this regard.  All 
evidence or arguments presented by the prosecution counsel or the defence 
                                                                                                                                         
Court which is presided over by a civilian judge where they are not satisfied with the outcome or 
sentence of their summary hearing. 
146
 Terblanche (2007) at 23; S v Dzukuda 2000 (2) SACR 443 (CC) paras 37-38; Van Zyl Smit 
D “Sentencing and Punishment” in Woolman S & Bishop M (eds) Constitutional Law of South 
Africa 2 ed (2002) at 49-3. 
147
 The list is contained in the DD28 form, being a summary of the accused’s personal 
particulars and previous convictions (see ch 3 at para 3.2.3.5 above for a discussion of the 
DD28).  The prosecution counsel has a duty to ensure that the information on the DD28 is 
correct.  The CMA held in S v Sithole (CMA 187/2001) that “[p]rosecutors, who get the 
completed records of service (DD28) from units, should not blindly accept what is on the DD28, 
but should, in an attempt to put reliable information before the court, be able to identify 
obviously wrong information on the DD28 and have it rectified.  After all, the presiding military 
judge will look at all previous convictions when considering an appropriate sentence.”  The 
DD28 may not be disclosed to the court at any time prior to the accused’s conviction (see r 119 
of the MDSMA). 
148
 Rule 59(1) of the MDSMA. 
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must be recorded.  The court will then close to consider the finding on the 
correctness of the DD28.  After consideration by the military judge (and the 
assessors, where applicable) the court will announce its finding regarding the 
DD28 in open court.149  Where the court orders an amendment of the DD28 the 
amendment will be affected on the same DD28 and handed in as an annexure.  
Where no amendments are made, the original DD28 will be handed in as an 
annexure. 
 
After the DD28 has been handed in, both parties have the opportunity to place 
other facts before the court that should be taken into consideration for the 
determination of an appropriate sentence.  The relevant facts regarding 
sentencing must be placed before the court. 
 
After agreeing on the relevant facts for the determination of sentence and the 
presentation of evidence in mitigation and aggravation by both parties,150 the 
accused or his defence counsel as well as the prosecution counsel now have 
the opportunity to address the court on sentence.  Once the prosecution 
counsel has addressed the court, the defence is given the opportunity to reply 
to the prosecution’s address.  The address on sentence is very important since 
it is the last opportunity both parties have to highlight factors that they wish the 
court to take into consideration.  The parties may, during the address, submit to 
the court their submissions on what would constitute an appropriate 
sentence.151 
 
If there are no assessors sitting with the judge, the court may close to consider 
any facts relevant to the sentence.  If there are assessors, the court must close 
                                               
149
 Rule 59(2) of the MDSMA. 
150
 See the more detailed discussion of this aspect in ch 3 at para 3.2.3.5 above. 
151
 The address on sentence may be critical in the court’s decision in deciding on an appropriate 
sentence.  In S v Nangu (CMA 60/2000) the court held that “[t]he address on sentence by the 
defence counsel was inadequate.  It mentioned work related problems but neither the court nor 
the defence counsel elicited more information…Care should be taken by both defence and 
prosecution counsel to ensure that they suggest proper and valid sentences to the military 
judge in their addresses on sentence.” 
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to consider such facts.152  After consideration of the facts, the court will re-open 
and the assessors will withdraw from the proceedings in open court.153  
Assessors play no part in the actual sentencing of the accused and the court, 
now consisting of the military judge alone, may close and take time for the 
consideration and determination of an appropriate sentence.154  The military 
judge then decides on the sentence, records it and announces the sentence in 
open court.155 
 
5.6.2 Pre-sentencing procedures at the Commanding Officer’s Disciplinary 
 Hearing 
 
It is important that all the information is placed before the court so that the court 
can determine an appropriate sentence.  This is especially true during the 
sentencing process of the CODH.  No evidence is led during the trial and this is 
the only opportunity that the presiding officer has to find the facts and 
determine an appropriate sentence.  Without this process the presiding officer 
will have no information regarding the offence, the offender or the impact the 
offence had on the military community and will not be able to impose an 
appropriate sentence.156 
 
The process of handing in the DD28 is exactly the same as in the case of a trial 
before a CSMJ or CMJ, with the only difference that the accused is not assisted 
by defence counsel and will have to argue matters pertaining to the DD28 
without such assistance.  The pre-sentencing process is similar to that followed 
at the CSMJ and CMJ, allowing for the differences necessitated by the absence 
of defence counsel.157  
 
                                               
152
 Rule 59(7) of the MDSMA. 
153
 Rule 59(8) of the MDSMA. 
154
 Rule 59(9) of the MDSMA. 
155
 Rule 59(11) of the MDSMA. 
156
 See S v Samuels 2011 (1) SACR 9 (SCA) paras 7-8; S v Siebert 1998 (1) SACR 554 (SCA) 
at 568c and 559a for a similar application in the civilian courts. 
157
 Rule 68 of the MDSMA. 
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The CODH can also only impose one sentence for all the charges158 and the 
presiding officer may not suspend any sentence imposed.  The orders are 
announced directly after the sentence.159 
 
5.7 Forms of punishment 
 
In terms of the Criminal Procedure Act, the forms of punishment for the 
commission of a crime can be described as a loss of freedom, forced payment 
of money, the loss of property, the payment of compensation, the provision of 
free services and the loss of certain privileges.160  The different courts within 
the South African judiciary have different sentencing jurisdictions prescribed by 
law, the High Court having inherent jurisdiction to sentence any offender and 
the Magistrate’s Court, being a creature of statute, having a more limited 
sentencing jurisdiction.161 
 
Similarly, military courts are also limited in their sentencing jurisdiction.  Being 
created in terms of the MDSMA its sentencing jurisdiction is also provided for 
and limited by the MDSMA.  Section 12 of the MDSMA provides: 
 
12(1)  Whenever a military court convicts any person of any offence, it 
may, subject to the maximum penalty provided by law for the offence, the limits 
of its own penal or disciplinary jurisdiction, and sections 32, 92 and 93 of the 
Code, impose upon the convicted person a sentence consisting of one or more 
of –  
 
(a) imprisonment; 
 
(b) in the case of an officer –  
 
                                               
158
 See discussion at para 5.7.2 below. 
159
 Rule 68(8) of the MDSMA. 
160
 Act 51 of 1977.  See also Terblanche (2007) at 4. 
161
 Van Zyl Smit (2002) at 49-3. 
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(i) cashiering; or 
(ii) dismissal from the South African National Defence 
Force; 
 
(c) in the case of any other rank than that of an officer –  
 
(i) discharge with ignominy from the South African National 
Defence Force; or 
(ii) discharge from the South African National Defence 
Force; 
 
(d) in the case of any other rank than that of an officer, detention for 
a period not exceeding two years; 
 
(e) in the case of a private or equivalent rank, field punishment for a 
period not exceeding three months; 
 
(f) in the case of an officer –  
 
(i) reduction to any lower commissioned rank; or 
(ii) reversion from any acting or temporary rank to his or her 
substantive rank; 
 
(g) in the case of any other rank than that of an officer –  
 
(i) reduction to any lower rank, to any non-commissioned 
rank or to the ranks; or 
(ii) reversion from any acting or temporary rank to his or her 
substantive rank; 
 
(h) reduction in seniority in rank; 
 
(i) a fine not exceeding R6000,00; 
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(j) in the case of a private or equivalent rank, confinement to 
barracks for a period not exceeding 21 days; 
 
(k) in the case of a private or equivalent rank, corrective punishment 
for a period not exceeding 21 days; 
 
(l) in the case of any other rank than that of an officer, extra non-
consecutive duties for a period not exceeding 21 days; or 
 
(m) a reprimand: 
 
Provided that for the purpose of this Act and of the Code, each penalty 
provided for in this section shall be deemed to be less severe and less serious 
than the preceding penalty for the relevant rank.162 
 
5.7.1 The right to equality and the military 
 
From a cursory reading of section 12(1) of the MDSMA it is clear that the Act 
distinguishes between punishments for officers163 and punishments for other 
ranks.164  The military court will in practice punish an officer more severely than 
the other ranks.  This may be because, with rank comes certain privileges not 
afforded lower ranks, and officers are consequently burdened with more 
responsibilities.  Because of the need for discipline and respect for rank in the 
military environment, a higher level of accountability is expected from officers in 
                                               
162
 The opinion of the British Judge Advocate General is that it cannot be said that, as is the 
case in s 164 of the Armed Force Act 2006, the sentences mentioned first are more severe 
than the subsequent sentences mentioned.  The impact of the specific offence on each 
individual person must be considered.  A sentence of detention imposed on a warrant officer 
may be more severe on the accused, taking into consideration the consequences of the 
punishment than a straightforward dismissal may for example have. 
163
 An “officer” as defined in s 1 of the Defence Act 42 of 2002 “in relation to the Defence Force, 
means a person on whom permanent or temporary commission has been conferred by or under 
this Act, and who has been appointed to the rank of officer.” 
164
 “Other ranks” as defined in s 1 of the Defence Act 42 of 2002 “in relation to the Defence 
Force, means any member thereof other than an officer.”  This would include members from the 
entry level rank of private (or airman for the Air Force and seaman for the Navy) up to the rank 
of warrant officer class 1, the highest non-commissioned officer’s rank. 
  
292 
the SANDF.165  The Ministerial Task Team is however of the opinion that the 
different treatment of offenders, depending on the seniority of the offender with 
regard to offences and sentencing, is a violation of the constitutional right to 
equality, resulting in unfair and unequal treatment.166  Would the different 
treatment of officers and other ranks or difference in treatment due to seniority 
amount to a violation of the right to equality as found in the Constitution? 
 
The relevant sub-sections of section 9 of the Constitution which find application 
in this regard state that 
 
(1)  Everyone is equal before the law and has the right to equal protection and 
benefit of the law. 
(3)  The state may not unfairly discriminate directly or indirectly against anyone 
on one or more grounds, including race, gender, sex, pregnancy, marital 
status, ethnic or social origin, colour, sexual orientation, age, disability, religion, 
conscience, belief, culture, language and birth. 
 
The idea of equality is that people who are in similar situations should be 
treated the same.  This right protects the “equal worth of the bearers of the 
right.”  It is therefore strictly speaking not a right to equal treatment, but a right 
                                               
165
 Although no policy documents and defence instruction regarding the status of officers could 
be found, it may be pertinent to refer to the South African National Defence Force Service 
Guide for Officers (1997) at 1 where it is stated that the “…President commissions selected 
members of the National Defence Force to take responsibility for the conduct of military 
operations.  The commission grants them the authority to exercise control over other members 
and requires that they obey the commands of those more senior in rank.  The individual officer 
must be prepared for the personal commitment that is demanded…to professionalism and the 
maintenance of high personal standards.  It is remarked (at 5) that “[i]n order to develop 
discipline, the officer must set a personal example of discipline both in word and deed.  An 
officer’s devotion to duty and integrity must be beyond reproach.”  It is also an accepted 
principle in other jurisdictions.  The same distinction is made in the British military where 
officers as offenders are more likely to receive a harsher punishment than other ranks “to reflect 
the fact that the highest standards of behaviour are expected of commissioned officers” (see 
OJAG at 38). 
166
 See Ministerial Task Team Report by the Ministerial Task Team on the Transformation of the 
Military Legal System (2005) para 135. 
  
293 
to have “one’s equal worth with others respected, protected, promoted and 
fulfilled.”167 
 
A distinction can be made between formal and substantive equality.  Formal 
equality means “sameness of treatment: the law must treat individuals in like 
circumstances alike.”168  Substantive equality “requires the law to ensure 
equality of outcome and is prepared to tolerate disparity of treatment to achieve 
this goal.”169  Substantive equality is the approach that best supports the 
fundamental values enshrined in the Constitution.170  It was found by the 
Constitutional Court that171 
 
[w]e need…to develop a concept of unfair discrimination which recognises that 
although a society which affords each human being equal treatment on the 
basis of equal worth and freedom is our goal, we cannot achieve that goal by 
insisting upon identical treatment in all circumstances…Each case, therefore, 
will require a careful and thorough understanding of the impact of the 
discriminatory action… 
Although section 9 contains five subsections it is submitted that when 
determining whether the difference in treatment between officers and non-
commissioned officers is unconstitutional, the two subsections quoted above, 
being subsections (1) and (3) are relevant to this enquiry. 
 
Section 9(1) refers to three aspects, namely “equality before the law” referring 
to the equal treatment when any law is executed, “equal protection of the law” 
                                               
167
 Rautenbach I M “Introduction to the Bill of Rights” Bill of Rights Compendium (2008) para 
1A57.1; Currie I & De Waal J The Bill of Rights Handbook 5 ed (2005) at 230-231. 
168
 Currie & De Waal (2005) at 232; Rautenbach at para 1A57.1; Albertyn C & Goldblatt B 
“Equality” in Woolman S & Bishop M (eds) Constitutional Law of South Africa 2 ed (2002) at 35-
6. 
169
 Currie & De Waal (2005) at 233; Rautenbach at para 1A57.1; Albertyn & Goldblatt at 35-7 
referring to Martha Minow who said that it “is not the characteristics of the individual or the 
group that are the concern, but the social arrangements that make the differences matter.” 
170
 Currie & De Waal (2005) at 233. 
171
 President of the Republic of South Africa v Hugo 1997 (4) SA 1 (CC) para 41; Currie & De 
Waal (2005) at 233. 
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referring to the concept that all laws must treat people equally and “equal 
benefit of the law” referring that every person should benefit equally from the 
law.172  This section contains a general prohibition against the unequal 
treatment of individuals. 
 
Section 9(3) refers to specific forms of unequal treatment.173  These listed 
grounds constitute unfair discrimination and they have more serious 
consequences than other forms of discrimination.  It prohibits direct as well as 
indirect discrimination and is not restricted to the grounds listed in this 
subsection.174 
 
The test for determining whether the right to equality has been infringed has 
been set out by the Constitutional Court in Harksen v Lane.175  A threshold test 
is firstly applied.  The question is firstly whether the provision or conduct 
differentiates between individuals or categories of individuals.  If there is no 
differentiation then there is no infringement of section 9 of the Constitution.176  It 
should be noted that the right to equality does not prevent the government from 
differentiating between individuals if there is a legitimate reason to do so.  
Differentiation is allowed as long as it does not amount to unfair 
discrimination.177 
 
Once it is found that the provision does differentiate between individuals, the 
two-stage analysis must be applied.  The first stage involves an evaluation of 
the provision against section 9(1).  This stage tests whether there is a rational 
basis for this differentiation, in other words whether there is “a rational 
                                               
172
 Rautenbach at para 1A57.2. 
173
 Rautenbach at para 1A57.2; Currie & De Waal (2005) at 235. 
174
 Rautenbach at para 1A57.2.  Indirect discrimination refers to those instances where the 
differentiation on face value seems not to discriminate against anyone but the impact or effect 
of the differentiation results in discrimination (see also Currie & De Waal (2005) at 260). 
175
 Harksen v Lane NO 1998 (1) SA 300 (CC) para 53; Currie & De Waal (2005) at 235-236; 
Rautenbach at para 1A57.5; Govindjee A & Vrancken P (eds) Introduction to Human Rights 
Law (2009) at 74-75; Albertyn & Goldblatt at 35-17. 
176
 Currie & De Waal (2005) at 236, Albertyn & Goldblatt at 35-17. 
177
 Currie & De Waal (2005) at 239; Albertyn & Goldblatt at 35-18. 
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connection between the differentiation in question and a legitimate 
governmental purpose that it is designed to achieve.”178  If that is not the case 
then the provision is in violation of section 9(1). 
 
However, if there is a rational basis this does not mean that the right to equality 
is not violated.  The differentiation may still constitute unfair discrimination in 
terms of section 9(3) or (4) of the Constitution.  This is the second stage of the 
enquiry.179  The third part of the test is determining whether the limitation clause 
of the Constitution can justify the unfair discrimination and differentiation.180 
 
There are therefore three ways in which the right to equality can differentiate 
between individuals:  Firstly “mere differentiation” which would not be in 
violation of section 9 as long as there is a rational connection between the 
provision and the governmental purpose it aims to achieve.181  Secondly there 
can be differentiation that amounts to unfair discrimination because it violates 
section 9(3) and (4)182 and the third instance refers to those instances of fair 
discrimination.183 
 
There are two aspects regarding the difference in treatment between members 
of the SANDF which concerns the Ministerial Task Team.  The first is the fact 
that only officers can be sentenced to cashiering and dismissal and that all 
other ranks are sentenced to discharge with ignominy or discharge from the 
                                               
178
 Currie & De Waal (2005) at 236; Albertyn & Goldblatt at 35-18; Govindjee & Vrancken at 76.  
See also Prinsloo v van der Linde 1997 (3) SA 1012 (CC) para 25 where the Constitutional 
Court held that “[i]n regard to mere differentiation the constitutional state is expected to act in a 
rational manner.  It should not regulate in an arbitrary manner or manifest ‘naked preferences’ 
that serve no legitimate governmental purpose, for that would be inconsistent with the rule of 
law…Accordingly before it can be said that mere differentiation infringes s 8 [now s 9 of the 
Constitution] it must be established that there is no rational relationship between the 
differentiation in question and the government purpose which is proffered to validate it.” 
179
 Currie & De Waal (2005) at 236; Govindjee & Vrancken at 77. 
180
 Currie & De Waal (2005) at 236. 
181
 Albertyn & Goldblatt at 35-18; Prinsloo v van der Linde 1997 (3) SA 1012 (CC). 
182
 Alberyn & Goldblatt at 35-19. 
183
 Currie & De Waal (2005) at 237. 
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SANDF.184  As will be shown below, there is no substantial difference in the 
execution or consequences of cashiering and discharge with ignominy from the 
SANDF.185  Other than in name, there is also no difference in the execution or 
consequences of a sentence of dismissal from the SANDF and discharge from 
the SANDF.  It is therefore submitted that, in following the test regarding the 
right to equality discussed above, there is no substantial difference between the 
treatment of officers and other ranks regarding these sentences.  Consequently 
there is no violation of section 9 in this regard.186 
 
The second aspect refers to the difference between the treatment of offenders 
depending on the seniority of the victim and the offender in terms of sections 
15187 and 16188 of the MDC.  Both sections refer to the crime of assault. Section 
15 of the MDC states that  
 
[a]ny person who assaults or points a firearm at or draws any weapon against 
his superior officer, shall be guilty of an offence and liable for conviction to 
imprisonment for a period not exceeding five years. 
 
Section 16 of the MDC states that 
 
[a]ny person who assaults or points a firearm at or draws any weapon against 
or ill-treats any person who is by reason of rank or appointment subordinate to 
him, shall be guilty of an offence and liable on conviction to imprisonment for a 
period not exceeding three years. 
 
                                               
184
 Section 12(1)(b)(i)-(ii) and s 12(1)(c)(i)-(ii) of the MDSMA. 
185
 See the discussion in ch 6 at paras 6.2.2 and 6.2.3 below on the process of cashiering and 
discharge with ignominy; SADF “Kassering en Ontslag met Oneer uit die SA Weermag” 
Appendix A to Army Departmental Standing Order SALO GS1/73 (1986). 
186
 This does not refer to the constitutionality of the sentences of cashiering (see ch 6 at para 
6.2.2 below) or discharge with ignominy (see ch 6 at para 6.2.3 below).  That aspect is 
discussed in ch 6 below. 
187
 Assaulting a superior officer. 
188
 Assaulting or ill-treating a subordinate. 
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What is clear from comparing these two sections with each other is that the 
assault on a superior officer is seen as a more serious offence than the assault 
on a subordinate and the subordinate can be sentenced more harshly merely 
because he is of a lower rank.  This, according to the Ministerial Task Team is 
a violation of the right to equality.  In applying the test as set out in Harksen v 
Lane,189 the following is relevant: 
 
The right to equality does not mean that every person must be treated exactly 
the same.  Law will inevitably differentiate between people.  The Constitutional 
Court distinguishes between “mere differentiation” and “differentiation that 
amounts to discrimination.”190  Albertyn and Goldblatt see discrimination as 
“distinctions made on the basis of prohibited grounds” to be those mentioned in 
section 9(3) of the Constitution and “mere differentiation” as the “myriad 
distinctions that are made by a modern state in the business of effective 
government.”191  As an example Albertyn and Goldblatt mention the sentencing 
of offenders for different crimes as “mere differentiation.”192  The question is 
whether the law has a legitimate reason to do so.193  The different treatment 
due to seniority of rank does not relate to any of the listed grounds of 
discrimination194 nor can it be seen as differentiation on analogous grounds.195  
It is submitted that the differentiation between individuals on the ground of rank 
seniority cannot be seen as discrimination, but merely as differentiation.   So, in 
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 Harksen v Lane 1998 (1) SA 300 (CC). 
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 Prinsloo v van der Linde 1997 (3) SA 1012 (CC) para 23. 
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 Albertyn & Goldblatt at 35-17. 
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 Albertyn & Goldblatt at 35-18. 
193
 Currie & De Waal (2005) at 239. 
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 Promotion within the ranks of the SANDF is governed by various personnel policies and 
race, ethnicity, sexual orientation, gender, etc, apart from affirmative action prescriptions, have 
no bearing on whether a member is promoted within the ranks.  Affirmative action will be 
considered fair discrimination, but falls outside this research.  Unfair discrimination is described 
as differential treatment of individuals that is hurtful or demeaning and has an unfair impact 
where “it imposes burdens on people who have been victims of past patterns of discrimination, 
or where it impairs to a significant extent the fundamental dignity of the complainant” (see 
Currie & De Waal (2005) at 242’ 244 and 246; Govindjee & Vrancken at 77). 
195
 Analogous grounds are differentiation on grounds that are analogous to those mentioned in 
s 9(3) of the Constitution and are “based on attributes or characteristics which have the 
potential to impair the fundamental dignity of persons as human beings, or to affect them 
seriously in a comparable serious manner” (see Currie & De Waal (2005) at 243-244). 
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accordance with the first step in the test, it is clear that the MDC differentiates 
between superior officers and their subordinates.  A determination must be 
made whether there is a rational governmental purpose for this differentiation to 
prevent it from being in violation of section 9(1) of the Constitution. 
 
 The Defence Act states that the SANDF must “perform its function in 
accordance with the Constitution”.196  The Constitution states that “the defence 
force must be structured and managed as a disciplined military force.”197  The 
important role of discipline was summarised in Minister of Defence v 
Potsane:198 
 
The ultimate objective of the military in time of peace is to prepare for war to 
support the policies of the civil government.  The military organisation to meet 
this objective requires, as no other system, the highest standard of 
discipline…[which] can be defined as an attitude of respect for authority that is 
developed by leadership, precept and training.  It is a state of mind which leads 
to a willingness to obey an order no matter how unpleasant the task to be 
performed.  This is not the characteristic of the civilian community.  It is the 
ultimate characteristic of the military organisation.  It is the responsibility of 
those who command to instill discipline in those who they command.  In doing 
so there must be the correction and punishment of individuals… 
 
The need for strict discipline was also accepted by O’Regan J in SANDU v 
Minister of Defence,199 quoting R v Généreux200 with approval: 
 
                                               
196
 Section 2 of the Defence Act 42 of 2002. 
197
 Section 200(1) of the Constitution. 
198
 Minister of Defence v Potsane; Legal Soldier (Pty) Ltd v Minister of Defence 2002 (1) SA 1 
(CC) paras 38 and 44 regarding the court’s discussion on a separate military justice system and 
the right to equality; Morris L J Military Justice: A Guide to the Issues (2010) at 3-4 and 5 where 
it is stated that the military justice system is not only meant to enforce discipline.  It provides 
“discipline coupled with justice.” 
199
 South African National Defence Union v Minister of Defence 1999 (10) BCLR 615 (CC) para 
28. 
200
 R v Généraux [1992] 1 SCR 259. 
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[T]he armed forces depend upon the strictest discipline in order to function 
effectively…Clearly, without the type of rigorous obedience to a rigid hierarchy 
which the military demands of its members, our national defence and 
international peace-keeping objectives would be unattainable. 
 
Because of the need for discipline offences exist in the MDC to enforce this 
discipline.  Offences such as using threatening or insubordinate language201 or 
the disobeying of lawful commands given by superior officers202 are punishable 
by imprisonment from six months to five years, depending on the 
circumstances. The Code of Conduct for Uniformed Members of the SANDF, 
which all members of the SANDF must obey, requires uniformed members to 
state inter alia that “I will obey all lawful commands and respect all 
superiors.”203 
 
The CMA found that an accused who attacked his superior officer with a 
kitchen knife badly affected morale and discipline.  The court held that the 
“[r]elationship of trust between leaders and subordinates and even between 
fellow soldiers is destroyed as no soldier wants to go into battle with someone 
that he or she cannot trust to cover his or her back.”204 
 
It should therefore be clear from the above discussion that respect for, and 
under certain circumstances the enforcement of the rank structure is imperative 
for the enforcement of discipline.  A differentiation between superior officers 
                                               
201
 Section 17 of the MDC states that “[a]ny person who uses threatening or insulting language 
to, or by word or conduct displays insubordination or behaves with contempt towards his 
superior officer, shall be guilty of an offence and liable on conviction to imprisonment for a 
period not exceeding six months.” 
202
 Section 19 of the MDC criminalises the disobeying of lawful commands.  There are various 
levels of accountability and ways in which the section can be contravened but by way of 
example reference is made to s 19(1) of the MDC which provides that “[a]ny person who in 
willful defiance of authority disobeys any lawful command given personally by his superior 
officer in the execution of his duty, whether orally, or in writing or by signal, shall be guilty of an 
offence and liable on conviction, if he committed the offence while on service, to imprisonment 
for a period not exceeding five years, and in any other case to imprisonment for a period not 
exceeding two years.” 
203
 Emphasis added. 
204
 S v Gaobonwe (CMA 19/2008). 
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and subordinates is necessary to comply with the unique situation of the 
SANDF.  This is also true for other jurisdictions.  British military law also makes 
this distinction.  The offence of “misconduct towards a superior officer” may 
under certain conditions carry a terms of imprisonment for a period of up to ten 
years while the punishment for “ill-treatment of subordinates” carries a term of 
imprisonment of up to two years.205  Both offences are however seen as 
serious.  The ill-treatment of subordinates is serious because it undermines 
morale and discipline, potentially causing loss of confidence in the chain of 
command.  However, the authority of superior officers must be upheld at all 
times since the “integrity and effectiveness of Armed Forces rely on obedience 
and respect to those in authority.”206  Disobedience or misconduct towards 
superior officers undermines the chain of command and can have a serious 
effect on the operational effectiveness of the Armed Forces.207 
 
It is therefore submitted that the need for a disciplined defence force will be a 
legitimate governmental purpose in attaching different degrees of seriousness 
to section 15 of the MDC and section 16 of the MDC.  It must also be kept in 
mind that the government need only show that the differentiation is rational and 
need not justify an enquiry into other possible methods of achieving its 
purpose.208 
 
It is further submitted that the difference in seriousness of the crimes does not 
result in unequal or different treatment of the individuals under the law.  They 
are treated equally by the law in that the same criteria apply for conviction.209  
                                               
205
 Manual of Service Law  (2011) 1(1) at 1-7-40 
206
 OJAG at 42. 
207
 OJAG at 49. 
208
 Currie & De Waal (2005) at 241; Albertyn & Goldblatt at 35-20.  The Constitutional Court 
held in Jooste v Score Supermarkets Trading (Pty) Ltd 1999 (2) SA 1 (CC) para 17 that “[i]t is 
clear that the only purpose of rationality review is an inquiry into whether the differentiation is 
arbitrary or irrational, or manifests naked preference and it is irrelevant to this inquiry whether 
the scheme chosen by the legislature could be improved in one respect or another.” 
209
 See also S v Rens 1996 (1) SA 1218 (CC) where the Constitutional Court held that the 
differentiation between appeals from the lower and superior courts did not result in 
discrimination as long as “persons appealing from or to a particular court are subject to the 
same procedures.” 
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Both assault on a superior and on a subordinate is illegal, both are serious and 
seen as criminal offences, one is just viewed as more serious than the other, 
just as certain types of assault in criminal law are viewed more seriously than 
others.  Although section 15 of the MDC potentially allows for harsher 
punishment, the sentencing discretion of the court must be considered since it 
does not preclude mitigating factors being taken into consideration by the court.  
Subordinates are seldom sentenced more harshly than the superior who 
commits a similar offence.  The CMA has on more than one occasion held that 
the seniority of the offender is in fact an aggravating factor when it comes to 
sentencing.210 
 
It is therefore submitted that the potential difference in treatment depending on 
the seniority in rank cannot be regarded as a violation of the right to equality.  It 
is seen as an integral part of the Defence Force and a necessity for the proper 
functioning of the Defence Force. 
 
5.7.2 Sentencing more than one crime at a time 
 
Section 280(1) of the Criminal Procedure Act authorises a court to impose 
multiple punishments when an accused has been convicted of multiple 
offences.211  This includes offenders who have already been sentenced and 
who have not yet completed the sentence, such as a person with a suspended 
sentence.212  In imposing more than one sentence the court retains its full 
jurisdiction with regard to each offence.213  It is further possible to impose 
sentences for different offences in combinations that would not be allowed for a 
single offence, as long as the imposed sentence remains appropriate and 
                                               
210
 In S v Jacob (CMA 13/07) the fact that the accused was a senior non-commissioned officer 
was seen as aggravating, as well as the accused being a warrant officer in S v Thys (CMA 
27/2009).  In the cases of S v Simelane (CMA 15/2000) and S v Mkhabela (CMA 134/2000) the 
fact that the accused were officers was seen as aggravating. 
211
 See also Terblanche (2007) at 179; Du Toit et al at 28-18Z; Kruger at 28-38(1). 
212
 Kruger at 28-39; Terblanche (2007) at 183. 
213
 Kruger at 28-39; Joubert at 318; S v Breytenbach 1988 (4) SA 286 (T) at 292G. 
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practicable.214 This may however result in a cumulative effect where the 
resultant punishment is too severe.215  The court must ensure that the 
cumulative effect is reduced considering all the circumstances and the “totality 
of the criminal behaviour” of the offender.216  The cumulative effect may be 
reduced by ordering that the sentences run concurrently, by reducing any of the 
sentences or by taking the counts together for the purpose of sentencing. 
 
Sections 280(2) and (3) of the Criminal Procedure Act allows the sentencing 
court to order that sentences consisting of imprisonment or correctional 
supervision run concurrently.  These are the only two sentences that the may 
be ordered to run concurrently and then only with the same punishment.217  The 
sentencing court must specifically order that the sentences run concurrently 
otherwise they will be served consecutively.218  It is also possible for the court 
to order that any part of the sentence run concurrently with another part of the 
sentence. 
 
The cumulative effect may also be countered by reducing each sentence so 
that the overall sentence is not excessive.219  Although it is one of the few ways 
in which the cumulative effect of multiple fines can be curbed, this method may 
be criticised on the grounds that the sentence, when viewed separately, may 
seem inadequate and inappropriate for the specific offence.220 
 
Another method followed by the courts but not specifically provided for by the 
Criminal Procedure Act is taking the counts together for the purpose of 
sentencing.221  This is usually done where the different charges are basically 
                                               
214
 Terblanche (2007) at 179. 
215
 Du Toit et al at 28-18N; Joubert at 318; S v Mpofu 1985 (4) SA 322 (ZHC) at 324G-J; S v 
Maseola 2010 (2) SACR 311 (SCA); S v Schrich 2004 (1) SACR 360 (C). 
216
 Terblanche (2007) at 180. 
217
 Joubert at 318; S v Jeffries 2011 (2) SACR 350 (FB) para 12. 
218
 Du Toit et al at 28-18Z; Kruger at 28-39; S v Brummer 1974 (4) SA 846 (N) at 847; S v 
Breytenbach 1988 (4) SA 286 (T) at 292H. 
219
 Joubert at 318. 
220
 Terblanche (2007) at 181-182; Joubert at 318. 
221
 Joubert at 318. 
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part of one transaction.222  It is however not a requirement that the offences 
should be closely connected.223  This method may be difficult to apply since the 
sentencing court must ensure that the eventual sentence imposed for the 
different counts is a competent one for each crime for which the accused is 
convicted and the court’s jurisdiction is limited as if the court was sentencing 
only one offence.224  The appeal court may experience difficulty with this 
method if it is of the opinion that the sentence should be varied or set aside and 
the use of this method is not encouraged.225 
 
The cumulative effect of the sentences may also apply in instances where the 
accused is already serving another sentence or has a suspended sentence that 
is still in effect.  When imposing a new sentence on such an accused, the 
sentencing court must take the possible cumulative effect into consideration 
when imposing sentence.226 
 
Although the court in S v Tshomi227 held that it is preferable to impose separate 
sentences for the separate charges,228 the military courts can impose only one 
sentence, irrespective of the number of charges of which the accused has been 
convicted.229  This rule must be read with section 92 of the MDC which also 
provides that where one sentence is imposed on all the charges, and that 
sentence is a valid sentence in respect of any one of the charges, the sentence 
will be regarded as a valid sentence in respect of all of the charges for which 
                                               
222
 S v De Klerk 2010 (2) SACR 40 (KZP) para 29; Kruger at 28-41; Terblanche (2007) at 182; 
Du Toit et al at 28-20. 
223
 Du Toit et al at 28-20; Kruger at 28-40; S v Pase 1986 (2) SA 303 (E). 
224
 Terblanche (2007) 182; S v Hayman 1988 (1) SA 831 (NC). 
225
 S v Ngubase 2011 (1) SACR 456 (ECG) where the court held that separate counts should 
only be taken together for sentencing in exceptional circumstances.  In this regard see also 
Kruger at 28-40; Rabie M A & Maré M Punishment: An Introduction to Principles 5 ed (1994) at 
319; Terblanche (2007) at 182; Du Toit et al at 28-20; S v Swart 2000 (2) SACR 556 (SCA) 
paras 20-21. 
226
 Kruger at 28-39; Terblanche (2007) at 183; S v Cele 1991 (2) SACR 246 (A) at 248j. 
227
 S v Tshomi 1983 (3) SA 662 (A) at 665F. 
228
 Kruger at 28-41; Joubert at 318; S v Swart 2000 (2) SACR 556 (SCA). 
229
 Rule 59(10) of the MDSMA; s 92 of the MDC.   
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the accused has been convicted.230  When imposing the one sentence, the 
court may however combine the sentences provided in section 12 of the 
MDSMA.231  Any combination of sentence is possible, subject to the provisions 
of section 93 of the MDC. 
 
Section 93 of the MDC sets out those sentences that cannot be combined and 
also provides for mandatory combinations.  Imprisonment cannot be combined 
with field punishment or detention and where an accused is sentenced to field 
punishment such field punishment cannot be combined with a sentence of 
detention.232 When an officer is sentenced to imprisonment, the sentence must 
be combined with one of cashiering and in the case of a non-commissioned 
officer or private it must be combined with a sentence of discharge with 
ignominy.233  If a non-commissioned officer or warrant officer is sentenced to 
detention, the sentence must be combined with one of reduction to the ranks.  
A sentence of detention may be combined with a discharge, but this is not 
compulsory.234 
 
Where the military court is faced with sentencing an accused to imprisonment, 
detention or field punishment at a time where the accused is already serving 
such a sentence the military court may not order that the sentences run 
concurrently.235  Such sentences will run consecutively, creating a risk of a 
cumulative effect.  This must be taken into consideration by the sentencing 
court.  As it cannot counter the cumulative effect by ordering that the sentences 
run concurrently, also not for suspended sentences, the only solution may be to 
impose a less severe punishment for the current offence, once again risking an 
inappropriate sentence when considering the current offence.  Allowing military 
                                               
230
 This is in contrast with the practice in the civilian courts that a sentence that is allowed in 
terms of one offence but not regarding the other offence cannot be imposed for both of the 
charges (see S v S 1981 (3) SA 377 (A); Kruger at 28-41). 
231
 Section 12(1) of the MDSMA. 
232
 See the discussions on these sentences in ch 6 at paras 6.2.5 and 6.2.6 below. 
233
 Sections 93(3)-(4) of the MDC. 
234
 Section 93(4)(b) of the MDC. 
235
 Rule 111(3) of the MDSMA. 
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courts to impose concurrent sentences under these circumstances may solve 
this problem. 
 
The sentencing of more than one offence by the British military courts depends 
on the type of military court.  Where an accused is found guilty of two or more 
charges at a summary hearing the presiding officer must impose one “global” 
sentence which may, as in the South African military courts, consist of a 
combination of more than one punishment.236  The presiding officer may 
combine any of the punishments within his jurisdiction, except for those 
expressly excluded in the Armed Forces Act 2006.237  Where an offender is 
convicted by a court martial the military judge may pass a separate sentence in 
respect of each offence of which he is convicted.238 
 
There is no clear reason why South African military judges are limited in their 
sentencing jurisdiction to the same state of affairs whether an accused is found 
guilty of one or of multiple offences.  Allowing multiple sentences for multiple 
convictions may also address the concerns of the CMA regarding sentences 
considered too lenient.239 
 
5.8 Suspension of sentences 
 
A suspended sentence is one240 
 
which has been imposed, in all the detail required for the proper imposition of 
such sentence, but the operation of which is suspended for a specified term, 
                                               
236
 Section 131(5) of the Armed Forces Act 2006; Manual of Service Law (2011) 1(2) at 1-13-
21. 
237
 For the permitted combinations see Manual of Service Law (2011) 1(2) at 1-13-23 to 1-13-
24.  For the prohibited combinations see s 38 of the Armed Forces Act 2006; regulation 5 of the 
Armed Forces (Minor Punishments and Limitations on Power to Reduce Rank) Regulations 
(2009). 
238
 Section 255 of the Armed Forces Act 2006; Manual of Service Law (2011) 2 at 2-29-41. 
239
 See the discussion on sentences considered too lenient in ch 7 at para 7.2.3.2 below. 
240
 Terblanche (2007) at 348; Krugel & Terblanche at 905. 
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subject to the offender’s fulfilling the conditions on which the suspension has 
been based. 
 
In terms of the Criminal Procedure Act any sentence, including a fine, can be 
suspended for a maximum period of five years.241  The civilian courts may 
impose a wide variety of conditions for the suspension of the sentence.242  
These conditions can be classified as either negative or positive conditions of 
suspension.243 
 
A negative condition consists of a requirement that the accused must not 
commit a specific crime or type of crimes within the specific period of his 
suspension.  It does not require any positive action from the offender, only that 
he refrains from doing something.  A positive condition requires positive action 
from the accused, such as the payment of compensation.244 
 
The suspension of sentences by military courts is governed by section 12(3) of 
the MDSMA which states that 
 
[w]hen a military court sentences any offender to detention or to imprisonment 
it may order the operation of the whole or any portion of the sentence of 
detention, or the whole of the sentence of imprisonment to be suspended for a 
period not exceeding three years on the conditions that it may determine in the 
order. 
 
                                               
241
 Section 297 of the Criminal Procedure Act; Terblanche (2007) at 348. 
242
 For a discussion of the various conditions of suspension see Du Toit et al at 28-45 to 28-46; 
Kruger 28-73 to 28-78; Joubert at 317-318.  The most common condition of suspension is that 
the accused abstain from committing the offence for a specified period of time (see Kruger at 
28-70). 
243
 Kruger at 28-70; Terblanche (2007) 349. 
244
 A perusal of CMA cases shows that nearly all suspensive conditions imposed by military 
courts consist of negative conditions.  It usually entails that the sentence is suspended on 
condition that the accused does not commit the same or a similar offence within the period of 
suspension.  However, see S v Swanepoel (CMA 44/2010) where the CMA changed the 
sentence of discharge to a suspended sentence on condition that the accused submits to a 
medical assessment and treatment.  This is a positive suspensive condition. 
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From this section it is clear that only detention and imprisonment can be 
suspended, either the whole sentence or a portion of the sentence of detention 
or when imprisonment is imposed, the whole of the imprisonment must be 
suspended.245  Since cashiering and discharge with ignominy are mandatory 
orders when an accused is sentenced to imprisonment, they can also be 
suspended, but only when imposed as part of the sentence of imprisonment.246  
When a discharge is imposed with the sentence of detention, the discharge 
cannot be suspended as it is not mandatory to impose a discharge together 
with detention.247 
 
Suspended sentences imposed by the military courts may only be suspended 
for a maximum period of three years.248  Where the military court imposes a 
suspended sentence, they must attach conditions to the suspension otherwise 
the sentence will be invalid.249  The MDSMA allows the court a wide discretion 
in the imposition of suspensive conditions and a clear set of guidelines has not 
yet been given by the CMA.  It is submitted however, that the military court 
would not be able to impose conditions that allow them more powers than they 
would normally have, for example the military court would not be able to set 
community service or the commitment to a treatment facility as a suspensive 
condition.250  The suspended sentence must in itself be an appropriate 
sentence since it may be implemented at a future date if the accused does not 
                                               
245
 See S v Qunto (CMA 19/99); S v Cuthalele (CMA 33/2000); S v Kagiso (CMA 39/2000); S v 
Mogorosi (CMA 007/2005); S v Sibeko (CMA 10/2000) where the CMA held that only detention 
and imprisonment could be suspended because the military court is “a creature of statute and 
its powers are limited to those provided for in the Act.” 
246
 The mandatory sentence of cashiering, when imposed as an independent sentence, cannot 
be suspended by the military court (see s 12(3) of the MDSMA). 
247
 Section 12(3) of the MDSMA read with s 93(4)(b) of the MDC which states that “[a] warrant 
officer or non-commissioned officer who is sentenced to detention…may also be sentenced to 
be discharged…” (see also S v Mnyengeza (CMA 51/2000)). 
248
 Section 12(3) of the MDSMA. 
249
 S v Jam-Jam (CMA 105/2000) where the CMA imposed conditions of suspension where the 
military court a quo failed to do so.  For the position in the civilian courts see Terblanche (2007) 
at 357. 
250
 Take note of Burger v Roos 1959 (4) 393 (A) at 398 where it was held that a general 
reference to the practice in civilian courts does not provide the military courts with a 
supplementary source of rules. 
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comply with the conditions.251  Any conditions must relate to the crime of which 
the accused has been convicted, but need not be restricted to it252 and the 
accused must understand the conditions of the suspension.253  This is 
particularly relevant where the accused is subject to a positive condition for 
suspension because the accused must know exactly what actions he must take 
to comply with the condition.254 
 
A further important guideline pertains to the requirement that the suspending 
condition must be reasonable.  “In essence this means that they should be 
formulated in such a manner that they will not cause future unfairness or 
injustice and that they have regard for human infallibility.”255  It should not be 
possible for a petty offence to trigger the suspended sentence.  This approach 
                                               
251
 Although the opinion is expressed that suspension of a sentence has a softening effect on 
that sentence (see Terblanche (2007) at 350; S v Toms; S v Bruce 1990 (2) SA 802 (A) at 
834D-E), the court held in S v Chipape 2010 (1) SACR 245 (GNP) para 35 that a suspended 
sentence “is not a light sentence.”  See also in this regard S v Rooi 2007 (1) SACR 668 (C) at 
671b-c; S v Peskin 1997 (2) SACR 460 (C) at 468i-469a.  The CMA also found that the 
suspension of a sentence does not make the sentence less severe (see S v Mogorosi (CMA 
007/2005)).  In S v Curtis (CMA 101/2002) the CMA held that a sentence of suspended 
imprisonment and discharge with ignominy was shockingly harsh and that “[a] suspended 
sentence of imprisonment must be taken as if it could be served” (see also S v Khumalo (CMA 
17/99)). 
252
 Kruger at 28-78; Terblanche (2007) at 358; R v Cloete 1950 (4) SA 191 (O).  Various 
examples exist in the CMA judgments.  Most conditions of suspension imposed by the military 
courts are conditions that the accused does not commit the same or similar crimes for which he 
has been found guilty by the court.  The conditions must also not be too narrowly defined.  In S 
v Molehe (CMA 06/20010) the accused was convicted of the contravention of s 20(a) of the 
MDC, which is the theft of public property.  The accused was sentenced to a fine as well as a 
suspended sentence of imprisonment and discharge with ignominy.  The condition of 
suspension entailed that the accused could not be convicted of the contravention of s 20 of the 
MDC within the period of suspension, but did not include common law theft.  “This means that if 
the accused commits theft of property that is not public property or does not belong to a 
comrade or an institution of the SANDF, the suspended sentence cannot be enforced.  It surely 
was the intention of the court to prevent the accused to steal again and not only to prevent him 
from stealing from the state or his comrades.”  The CMA varied the condition of suspension to 
read that the accused must not be convicted of theft during the time of his suspension, thereby 
including common law theft, s 20(a) and (b) of the MDC instances. 
253
 Kruger at 28-79.  It has been found on numerous occasions that conditions that refer to 
groups of crimes are too wide and “not sufficiently clear” (see in this regard S v Tsanshana 
1996 (2) SACR 157 (E) 159d-e; S v Mjware (1990) (1) SACR 388 (N); S v Manqina 1996 (1) 
SACR 258 (E)).  This matter has however not yet been raised in the CMA where numerous 
cases refer to such conditions such as “crimes of which dishonesty is an element.” 
254
 Terblanche (2007) at 361. 
255
 Terblanche (2007) at 360. See also S v Grobler 1992 (1) SACR 184 (C); S v Titus 1996 (1) 
SACR 540 (C); S v Robberts 2000 (2) SACR 522 (SCA).   
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was followed by the CMA in S v Khumalo256 where the accused was sentenced 
to a fine as well as a suspended sentence of nine months’ imprisonment and 
cashiering, suspended on condition that the accused does not contravene 
section 14(a) of the MDC (absence without leave) during the three year period 
of suspension.  The CMA was of the opinion that the suspending condition was 
too harsh since one day AWOL may subsequently trigger the suspended 
sentence and send the accused to prison.  The CMA consequently varied the 
condition to one where “the accused is not convicted of the contravention of 
section 14(a) of the Code for a consecutive period of 15 days or more, 
committed during the period of suspension.” 
 
The conditions of suspension will fall away after the period of suspension has 
elapsed, when the accused is promoted to his next rank257 or where he is 
discharged from the SANDF.  It makes no difference whether he receives his 
discharge as a sentence, by means of resignation or whether his contract 
expires and is not renewed.  Once a member leaves the employ of the SANDF, 
the suspended sentence imposed by the military court becomes unenforceable.  
In S v Strydom258 the military court sentenced the accused to discharge with 
ignominy from the SANDF and six months’ imprisonment suspended for a 
period of two years on condition that the accused does not commit common law 
theft during the period of suspension.  The CMA varied the sentence to one of 
discharge with ignominy from the SANDF.  The court held that “[t]he sentence 
imposed should be executable.  The accused is leaving the Force in any event, 
which would make the suspended sentence unenforceable.”  The Criminal 
Procedure Act259 requires that the court that imposed the suspended sentence 
or a court of equal or higher jurisdiction must put the sentence into operation if 
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 S v Khumalo (CMA 17/99). 
257
 No policy documentation supporting this practice could be found, but it was confirmed by the 
CMA in S v Kanu (CMA 17/2010).  Since members of the SANDF are generally due for 
promotion after a period of three years in their current rank, it can only be speculated that this 
fact may contribute to the limit of three years imposed on the suspension of military sentences. 
258
 S v Strydom (CMA 151/2001). 
259
 Section 279(9)(a) of the Criminal Procedure Act. 
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the offender does not comply with the conditions of suspension.260  Civilian 
courts have concurrent jurisdiction with military courts over offences committed 
in terms of the MDC.261  The military court however only retains jurisdiction as 
long as the offender is a member of the SANDF.262  After a discharge from the 
SANDF the military court no longer has such jurisdiction and the civilian court 
consequently no longer has concurrent jurisdiction.  There will be no grounds 
on which to enforce a military court sentence.  It must also be kept in mind that 
offences committed in the SANDF for which a member is sentenced by the 
military court are not entered into the civilian criminal record of the accused and 
civilian courts will therefore have no knowledge of the offences committed 
during the accused’s employ in the SANDF. 
 
5.8.1 Bringing into operation of suspended sentences 
 
There are two situations in which a suspended sentence may be brought into 
operation:263 
 
1. Where, during the reading of the previous convictions on the 
DD28, it becomes apparent that the accused was convicted of an 
offence during his current trial which violated the conditions of 
suspension of a previous suspended sentence.264 
 
2. When a condition of suspension (other than a condition relating to 
the commission or conviction of a specific offence) has not been 
fulfilled.265 
 
                                               
260
 Du Toit et al at 28-51. 
261
 Section 105(1) of the Defence Act 44 of 1957. 
262
 Section 3 of the MDSMA. 
263
 A suspended sentence can only be brought into operation where a hearing is conducted 
regarding the alleged contravention of the suspensive conditions (see Terblanche (2007) at 
374; S v Payachee 1973 (4) SA 531 (NC) 536B-C). 
264
 Section 33(2) of the MDSMA.   
265
 Section 36 of the MDSMA.  This is generally in the event that an allegation is made that the 
accused did not comply with a positive suspensive condition (see Terblanche (2007) at 375). 
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In the first instance, the court will inform the prosecution and defence counsel 
of the possibility as soon as the DD28 has been read so that both parties may 
lead evidence or address the court on whether the suspended sentence should 
be brought into operation.  All the evidence and arguments must be recorded 
and attached to the record of proceedings.  The court has a discretion and 
need not bring a suspended sentence into operation.  Where they decide not to 
bring the suspended sentence into operation the court may further suspend the 
sentence.  Although civilian convictions are also recorded on the DD28, the 
military court does not have the jurisdiction to bring a suspended sentence 
imposed by a civilian court into operation. 
 
In the second instance the accused has received a suspended sentence for 
which certain other conditions of suspension relating to the non-commission of 
the offence were laid down.  A subsequent complaint or allegation is then made 
that one or more of these suspensive conditions were not fulfilled.266 
 
A prosecution counsel will be assigned to the case and the matter will be 
brought before a CSMJ or a CMJ which must investigate the allegation that the 
individual did not comply with the conditions.267 
 
Where the court is satisfied that the accused did in fact violate his conditions of 
suspension, the court may order that the accused be committed to serve the 
sentence or any unexpired portion of that sentence.  If the court is not satisfied 
that the accused did in fact violate the conditions, they may further suspend the 
sentence.268 
 
                                               
266
 In S v Swanepoel (CMA 44/2010) the CMA varies a sentence of discharge to a sentence of 
180 days’ detention and reduction to the ranks suspended on condition that the accused 
undergoes re-evaluation of his medical classification and undergoes the prescribed treatment.  
If he should fail to undergo the re-evaluation as stipulated, the unit could request that the 
suspended sentence be imposed. 
267
 The procedure of proving that the accused did not comply with the suspensive conditions is 
similar to those described in S v Gantsha 1990 (2) SACR 104 (Ck) at 107e-108a; Terblanche 
(2007) at 375-376. 
268
 See also Terblanche (2007) at 376. 
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5.9 Post-sentence procedures 
 
After the sentence and all court orders are announced in open court, the 
military judge must inform the accused that where he was sentenced to 
imprisonment (including suspended imprisonment), discharge with ignominy or, 
dismissal or discharge from the SANDF, the sentence will not be executed until 
the finding and the sentence is reviewed by the Court of Military Appeal.269  He 
is also informed of his rights in terms of appeal and review.270 
 
Depending on the offence of which the accused was convicted he may be 
released from custody of his case immediately after the sentence is 
pronounced.271  The accused must be kept in custody pending the automatic 
review of his case but may apply to the local representative of the Adjutant 
General for release pending his review.272  The accused may then be released 
subject to certain conditions for his release and where he refuses to attend the 
promulgation of his sentence when it is upheld on review, he will be re-arrested 
and kept in custody. 
 
5.9.1 Promulgation of sentence 
 
Every finding by a military court, irrespective of whether it is a conviction or an 
acquittal, sentence and order made by the military court must be promulgated 
as soon as possible after the completion of the trial.273 Promulgation of the 
sentence must be done on parade according to the customs of the relevant arm 
                                               
269
 Rule 59(12)(a) of the MDSMA. 
270
 Rule 59 of the MDSMA and r 68 of the MDSMA applicable to the CODH.  See the discussion 
regarding the right of appeal and review in ch 7 at para 7.6.2 below. 
271
 Sections 34(9)-(10) of the MDSMA which provides that individuals sentenced to a reprimand, 
extra duties, corrective punishment, confinement to barracks, a fine, reversion of acting to 
temporary rank, reduction to any lower rank, seniority in rank or reduction to the ranks as well 
as a sentence of detention or imprisonment that is wholly suspended, may be released 
immediately. 
272
 Section 34(11) of the MDSMA.  Where the accused is released, the period that he was not in 
custody will not be included when calculating the period of his sentence (see in this regard s 
34(12) of the MDSMA). 
273
 Section 35 of the MDSMA. 
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of service or in another manner as determined by the officer commanding of the 
unit.  The finding, sentence and orders must also be published in the unit 
orders.274 
 
All relevant information regarding the force number, rank and name, the 
particulars of the offence, the finding and sentence and orders, where 
applicable, is noted on a certificate of promulgation and read out during the 
promulgation.  The unit must indicate on the certificate which manner of 
promulgation was followed, the date on and the unit order in which the 
promulgation was published to ensure that units comply with the promulgation 
requirements.275 
 
Where an accused was sentenced to imprisonment, suspended imprisonment, 
cashiering, discharge with ignominy, dismissal from the SANDF or discharge 
from the SANDF, which must be confirmed by the CMA before it can be 
executed, the sentence will be executed on parade simultaneously with the 
promulgation of that sentence.276 
 
Although the promulgation of the sentence is not part of the sentencing 
process, it holds an element of shaming.277  The reason for the ‘shaming’ in this 
context is not the stigmatisation of the offender.  Promulgation should rather be 
seen as ‘re-integrative shaming’ which “strengthens the moral bonds between 
the offender and the community.”278  By promulgating the sentence, the 
community can see that justice was done.  It is not only guilty findings that are 
promulgated but also findings of not guilty.  This is an important aspect for the 
accused because often, especially in a close knit environment of a unit, people 
                                               
274
 Rule 69(1) of the MDSMA.  Other methods of promulgation may include reading out the 
finding, sentence and orders at the regular communication session scheduled between the 
officer commanding and members of the unit or at the monthly Big Tea. 
275
 Rule 70(1) of the MDSMA. 
276
 Rule 69(2) of the MDSMA read with s 34(2) of the MDSMA. 
277
 See the discussion on shaming punishments as discussed in ch 6 at para 6.2.2.2 below. 
278
 Claasen L H “Shaming as a Form of Restorative Justice – a Possible South African 
Application” (2006) Primus 11 at 17. 
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may hear that the accused was charged.  It is a positive aspect for the 
restoration of the accused’s dignity if those same individuals also hear that he 
was found not guilty and that his name has been cleared.  The deterrent value 
of reading out the particulars of the accused, the finding and sentence must not 
be underestimated. 
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ADDENDUM A TO CHAPTER 5 
 
Periods of imprisonment prescribed by the Military Discipline Code 
 
Maximum period 
of imprisonment 
Offence Description 
30 years Sec 4 MDC Offences that relate to the endangering of the 
safety of forces.  These offences relate to 
shameful conduct, such as shamefully 
abandoning or surrendering an aircraft or 
garrison, treacherously communicating with 
the enemy, having been a prisoner of war and 
subsequently serving the enemy voluntarily, 
and other related conduct. 
These offences relate to the offence of 
treason. 
10 years Sec 5 MDC Where a person in command of troops fails to 
engage the enemy in an appropriate manner 
or withdraws from action without proper cause. 
 Sec 6 MDC This section pertains to shameful conduct in 
action that does not amount to section 4 
instances.  It includes shamefully abandoning 
arms or ammunition, harbouring or protecting 
the enemy or showing cowardice in behaviour 
towards the enemy. 
 Sec 7 MDC These include behaviour that amounts to a 
failure to report activities that are likely to 
endanger the safety of the forces, such as 
reporting a person who is assisting the enemy 
in acquiring arms or ammunition.  
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 Sec 13 MDC Where the accused deserts from the SANDF 
while on service. 
 Sec 20 MDC Where the accused steals property belonging 
to the SANDF or to an institution of the SANDF 
or the receiving of such property, knowing it to 
be stolen. 
 Sec 21 MDC These offences relate to the acquisition or the 
disposal of public property.  This includes 
selling, disposing or lending public property 
without the necessary authority or accepting 
any fee or reward for the acquisition of the 
property. 
5 years Sec 10 MDC Where an accused commits mutiny or 
conspires with others to commit mutiny. 
 Sec 11 MDC The interference with any guards, watch 
keepers and sentries or giving false alarms 
committed while the accused is on service. 
 Sec 15 MDC Assault of a superior officer, pointing a firearm 
at the superior or drawing any weapon against 
a superior officer. 
 Sec 18 MDC Where an accused malingers, feigns disease 
or injures himself or someone else with the 
intention of avoiding service or rendering 
another person unfit to do their service or duty. 
 Sec 19(1) 
MDC 
Where an accused willfully defies the lawful 
commands given to him personally by his 
superior officer in the execution of his duty 
while on service. 
 Sec 22 MDC Where an accused willfully or negligently 
allows a vessel or aircraft to be hazarded, 
stranded or wrecked. 
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3 years Sec 16 MDC This offence pertains to the ill-treatment of, 
assault of or pointing of a firearm at a 
subordinate by a superior officer. 
2 years Sec 8 MDC These relate to offences relating to signals, 
watchwords and the unauthorised disclosure of 
information.  This includes the altering or delay 
of signals and making watchwords known to 
individuals who are not authorised to know 
them.  Unauthorised disclosure of troop 
movements or regarding aircraft and vessels 
are also punishable under this offence. 
 Sec 9 MDC Any unauthorised interference with aircraft or 
vessels that so amounts to an offence under 
one of the other provisions is prohibited in 
terms of this section. 
 Sec 12 MDC Dereliction of duty by a sentry or a watch 
keeper is prohibited under this provision.  This 
includes instances where the accused leaves 
his post before being properly relieved, sleeps 
on duty or is under the influence of alcohol or 
drugs. 
 Sec 13 MDC All other instances of desertion that are not 
committed while the accused is on service. 
 Sec 19(1) 
MDC 
The willful defiance of authority and disobeying 
of a lawful command in those instances where 
the accused is not on service. 
 Sec 20(b) 
MDC 
Where the accused steals property belonging 
to another person who is also subject to the 
MDC.  These are instances of theft from a 
comrade or fellow soldier. 
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 Sec 23 MDC This includes instances where a person 
willfully abandons, damages or destroys public 
property or property belonging to an institution 
of the SANDF or diverts or detains supplies 
without sufficient cause.  
one year (these 
are categorised 
as disciplinary 
offences.) 
Sec 11 MDC Interfering with guards, watch keepers or 
sentries or giving a false alarm in 
circumstances where the accused is not on 
service. 
 Sec 12 MDC Where the accused is found guilty of 
dereliction of duty by sleeping on duty, leaving 
his place of duty before being properly relieved 
or being intoxicated on duty in circumstances 
where the accused is not on service. 
 Sec 14 MDC This includes any of the offences that pertain 
to absence without leave or failing to report for 
duty or at a place of parade. 
 Sec 19 MDC The disobeying of lawful orders given by a 
superior officer in circumstances not 
amounting to a contravention of section 19(1) 
MDC.  This also includes the disobeying of 
directions given by the commander of a vessel 
or aircraft, irrespective of the rank or status of 
such commander. 
The commander of the aircraft or vessel may 
also be a civilian. 
 Sec 24 MDC This constitutes the negligent loss, damage or 
destruction of kit, equipment or public property 
that was issued to the offender in the use of 
his duty. 
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 Sec 25 MDC This is the willful or negligent damage or 
destruction of public property.  This offence 
also includes a failure to prevent the willful or 
negligent damage or destruction of such 
property. 
 Sec 26 MDC Where a person is responsible for stores, stock 
or money in any SANDF store, office or 
institution and subsequently negligently 
performs their duties, resulting in deficiencies 
in the stores. 
 Sec 27 MDC Where a person takes or uses an article issued 
to another person without permission or uses it 
otherwise than in the public interest. 
 Sec 28 MDC This section regulates the negligent or reckless 
driving of a motor vehicle that is public 
property or flying an aircraft in a negligent or 
reckless manner while under the influence of 
alcohol or narcotics. 
 Sec 29 MDC Fraudulent enlistment which includes enrolling 
in any portion of the SANDF without disclosing 
that he has not been regularly discharged from 
another portion of the SANDF or the Armed 
Forces of another country or willfully giving a 
false answer on an enrolment paper. 
 Sec 30 MDC Making false entries or statements on official 
documents. 
 Sec 31 MDC Making false accusations or statements 
against another person who is subject to the 
MDC. 
 Sec 37 MDC Where an accused resists or willfully obstructs 
any member of the SANDF in the performance 
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of any of his duties relating to the arrest, 
custody or confinement of a person subject to 
the MDC or where he refuses or neglects to 
hand over any person under his control who is 
accused of an offence punishable by a civil 
court when requested to do so by an 
appropriate civil authority. 
 Sec 46 MDC This section includes any conduct that causes 
actual or potential prejudice to good order and 
military discipline. 
6 months Sec 17 MDC The contravention of this section entails the 
use of threatening, insubordinate or insulting 
language or displaying insubordination or 
contempt towards his superior officer. 
 Sec 19(4) 
MDC 
Where a patient in a hospital willfully disobeys 
any lawful direction concerning his hospital or 
medical treatment that is given to him by the 
hospital staff. 
 Sec 19(5) 
MDC 
The negligent disobeying of a unit, formation or 
force order where it was the duty of the 
accused to obey the order and he was under 
an obligation to have knowledge of the 
particular order. 
 Sec 34 MDC This section includes various offences that 
relate to military courts, such as failing to 
attend as a witness after he has been 
summoned to appear as such or refusing to 
produce a document in his possession or 
under his control which he is in terms of law 
required to produce. 
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 Sec 38 MDC These include offences related to the arrest of 
members, such as where the accused orders 
another into arrest without just cause or 
unnecessarily detains a person in arrest or 
custody. 
 Sec 43 MDC This refers to instances where the accused 
makes any false representation regarding his 
rank. 
 Sec 45 MDC This relates to the behaviour of the accused at 
any time where the accused behaves in a 
riotous or unseemly fashion or fails to 
suppress any riotous or unseemly behaviour 
by any other person subject to the MDC. 
3 months Sec 33 MDC Where a person is drunk on or off duty or unfits 
himself for the proper performance of his duty 
due to the excessive consumption of alcohol or 
narcotics. 
 Sec 36 MDC Where an accused refuses to answer 
questions, produce documents or gives false 
evidence at a preliminary investigation or a 
board of inquiry. 
 Sec 44 MDC Where an accused wears any decoration or 
medal that he is not entitled to or wear any 
badge, emblem, colours or any insignia of a 
political organisation. 
one month Sec 42 MDC This offence relates to the redress of wrongs 
procedure and punishes an accused where he 
received a complaint but unduly delayed 
addressing the complaint or sending it up to 
higher authority.  This section is also 
contravened where the accused puts in a 
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redress of wrongs but fails to follow the correct 
channels of command. 
21 days Sec 34(2) 
MDC 
This concerns the willful conduct of an 
individual that is likely to bring a military court 
into contempt or disrepute and the court may 
summarily order the accused to be imprisoned 
for the period or any lesser punishment. 
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CHAPTER 6 
 
MILITARY SENTENCES 
 
6.1 Introduction 
 
In order to appreciate the possible impact of the Bill of Rights on the 
punishments imposed by military courts, it is important to investigate the 
various punishments available to the military courts, their possible 
consequences and constitutional vulnerabilities.  The discussion is mainly 
centered on the unique military punishments, but will also include a short 
section on imprisonment, fines and reprimands which, although not unique to 
the military environment, may find different application than in the civilian 
environment. 
 
6.2 Punishments 
 
6.2.1 Imprisonment 
 
Imprisonment is one of the most severe punishments that can be imposed by 
our courts1 and is defined as “admission into a prison and confinement of an 
offender in a prison for the duration determined by a court.”2  Imprisonment is 
governed by Act 111 of 1998 and a prison is defined as “any place established 
under this Act as a place for the…detention, confinement training or treatment 
of persons liable to detention in custody.”3 
 
                                               
1
 Krugel W F & Terblanche S S Praktiese Vonnisoplegging (2010) at 206; Van Zyl Smit D 
“Sentencing and Punishment” in Woolman S & Bishop M (eds) Constitutional Law of South 
Africa 2 ed (2002) at 49-26; Joubert J J (ed) Criminal Procedure Handbook 9 ed (2009) at 297.  
This is also true for military courts. 
2
 Terblanche S S A Guide to Sentencing in South Arica 2 ed (2007) at 211; Kruger A Hiemstra’s 
Criminal Procedure (2008) at 28-27. 
3
 Section 1 of the Correctional Services Act 111 of 1998; Terblanche (2007) at 211. 
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Although section 276(1) of the Criminal Procedure Act provides for six forms of 
imprisonment as punishment, these forms of punishment are essentially the 
same since the prisoner is treated the same regardless of the type of 
imprisonment imposed by the court.4  Imprisonment is not clearly defined in the 
military sentencing context.  The definition in terms of the MDC is vague and 
defined as “imprisonment with or without compulsory labour”.5  It is not clear 
whether the imprisonment authorised by section 12 of the MDSMA would 
include a reference to the other forms of imprisonment or is only referring to a 
determinate period of imprisonment. 
 
The following should be considered.  The CSMJ is not limited in the extent to 
which it can sentence a military offender to imprisonment.  Although section 12 
of the MDSMA only refers to a sentence of “imprisonment” in general the 
military court may impose determinate as well as life imprisonment.  The 
maximum period of imprisonment provided for in the penalty clauses of the 
military offences indicates a determinate term of imprisonment.  Therefore 
military courts may only, when sentencing an offender to imprisonment, impose 
a determinate period of imprisonment, subject to a maximum period of two 
years in the case of a CMJ.  The minimum period for which imprisonment can 
be imposed by the military courts is 30 days6 with no limit on the maximum 
                                               
4
 Imprisonment includes determinate imprisonment, imprisonment for life, indefinite 
imprisonment following a declaration as a dangerous or habitual criminal, periodical 
imprisonment as well as imprisonment from which an accused can be released on correctional 
supervision (see Terblanche (2007) at 26); Kruger at 28-13 to 28-14; Du Toit E et al 
Commentary on the Criminal Procedure Act (1997) at 28-9; Joubert at 298 who regards these 
forms as “different terms of imprisonment, rather than completely separate kinds of 
punishment.” 
5
 Section 1 of the MDC.  This definition is however outdated and should be reconsidered. 
Imprisonment with hard labour was abolished by the Criminal Law Amendment Act 16 of 1959 
and it is doubtful that any court may still order imprisonment with any form of labour (see Van 
Zyl Smit D “Sentencing and Punishment” in Woolman S & Chaskalson M (eds) Constitutional 
Law of South Africa (1996) at 28-2).  It is submitted that the definition as found in the Criminal 
Procedure Act and the Correctional Services Act may provide valuable guidelines in formulating 
an appropriate definition in military law.  Of relevance is the opinion of the South African Law 
Reform Commission Discussion Paper 123 Statutory Law Revision: Legislation Administered 
by the Department of Defence Project 25 (2011) at 23. 
6
 Section 93(2)(a) of the MDC.  The use of threatening or insulting language at a military court 
serves as excepetion when an accused willfully causes a disturbance or performs any other act 
that may bring the military court into contempt or disrepute.  In such instances the court can 
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period of time for the CSMJ, except the limits provided in the penalty clause 
itself.  For common law offences, with no prescribed maximum period, the 
MDSMA merely authorises the military courts to impose “imprisonment” as a 
sentence without indicating which forms of imprisonment may be imposed on 
the offender.  Although not specifically provided for, the CSMJ may in fact 
impose a sentence of imprisonment for life.7  
 
Whether other forms of imprisonment, such as periodical imprisonment or 
declaration as a dangerous criminal, might be imposed by military courts is a 
different matter altogether.  Since the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977 limits 
the power to declare any person a habitual or dangerous criminal to “a superior 
court or a regional court,”8 it is submitted that no form of indefinite imprisonment 
is available to military courts.  The same argument applies to a sentence of 
imprisonment from which the accused can be released on correctional 
supervision:9  Military courts cannot impose correctional supervision and would 
therefore not be able to impose a sentence of imprisonment which could result 
in that very sentence.  Rule 21 of the MDSMA clearly states that the “criminal 
procedure as applied by the civilian courts of the Republic does not supplement 
the powers of the military courts or these rules” and since correctional 
                                                                                                                                         
summarily order that the offender be imprisoned for a period not exceeding 21 days (see s 
34(2) of the MDC).  Compare the minimum period of imprisonment by a military court with that 
of a civilian court of four days (see s 284 of the Criminal Procedure Act; Du Toit et al at 28-20C; 
Kruger at 28-45; Joubert at 299). 
7
 At the trial for the murder of a 14-year old Burundi prostitute while he was on deployment, 
flight-sergeant Flippie Venter was found guilty by a CSMJ in 2007 and sentenced to 24 years’ 
imprisonment.  The prosecution counsel argued for a sentence of life imprisonment but the 
senior military judge was satisfied that 24 years’ imprisonment would be an appropriate 
sentence (see Hlala P “’24 Years’ Jail For Killing Burundi Teen” Pretoria News 05/09/07).  The 
CMA however found that 24 years’ imprisonment was too harsh and amended the sentence to 
one of 18 years’ imprisonment and discharge from the SANDF with ignominy (see S v Venter 
(CMA 72/2008)).  The authority to impose life imprisonment creates an interesting contradiction.  
In the civilian environment only the High Court may impose life imprisonment due to the limited 
sentencing jurisdiction of the lower courts (see Krugel & Terblanche at 205).  In ch 4 above it 
was intimated that the CSMJ and CMJ may have the status analogous to a Magistrate’s Court, 
yet here is an example of a lower court with a much higher sentencing jurisdiction regarding 
imprisonment than the ordinary court of similar status.  The maximum penalty allowed by British 
court martial is life imprisonment (see Office of the Judge Advocate General Guidance on 
Sentencing in the Court Martial (2009) at 12). 
8
 Sections 286 and 286A respectively. 
9
 Section 276(1)(i) of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977. 
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supervision is not a sentencing option in terms of section 12 of the MDSMA, it 
is not a sentence that they may impose.  A sentence to periodical 
imprisonment, as provided for in terms of section 285 of the Criminal Procedure 
Act would not violate rule 21 of the MDSMA since periodical imprisonment does 
not give the military court more sentencing powers than it already has.  It is also 
a determinate sentence.  It may further be justified in terms of section 124 of 
the MDSMA which provides that where a matter arises for which no provision 
has been made, the court must follow the course that is consistent with the 
MDSMA, the MDC and which serves the requirements of justice.  However, one 
of the main reasons for imposing periodical imprisonment is to allow the 
offender to keep his employment and provide for his family.10  Where an 
offender is sentenced to imprisonment by a military court he must also be 
discharged from the SANDF, thereby removing the incentive for imposing 
periodical imprisonment.  It is submitted, therefore, that it would not be possible 
to argue convincingly that it is the intention of the legislature that periodical 
imprisonment should be available to military courts. 
 
Although not specifically stated in the Correctional Services Act 111 of 1998, 
the purpose of imprisonment is to punish the offender, to prevent further crime 
and to rehabilitate the offender. 11  
 
Determinate imprisonment is the form of imprisonment most commonly 
imposed by civilian courts.12  Although imprisonment is not a sentence that is 
commonly imposed in military law, determinate imprisonment is the form 
usually imposed by military courts when sentencing to imprisonment.13  This 
                                               
10
 Du Toit et al at 28-21; Joubert at 302. 
11
 Terblanche (2007) at 211-212.  The CMA found in S v Hunter (CMA 66/2002) that 
“[i]mprisonment as punishment should be aimed at, inter alia, rehabilitating a person from 
repeating the unacceptable behaviour of committing offences.” 
12
 Terblanche (2007) at 217; Joubert at 298.  OJAG at 12 argues that the length of the sentence 
imposed by the military court should follow the civilian court’s example. 
13
 It is possible for the military court to sentence an offender to life imprisonment but after a 
perusal of CMA judgments from 1999 to 2011 no example could be found of any other form of 
imprisonment than determinate imprisonment imposed by the military courts. 
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type of imprisonment entails that the court “determines the duration of the 
sentence, without any strings attached.”14 
 
The decision to impose imprisonment is a difficult one and outside of the Zinn 
triad,15 there are no real guidelines in our law on when to impose 
imprisonment.16  What is clear however is that imprisonment should not be 
imposed if it can be avoided.17  There are other sentences available that could 
be regarded as appropriate sentences without resorting to imprisonment.  
Under certain circumstances correctional supervision might be one such 
sentence.18  However, this does not mean that imprisonment should never be 
imposed.  The punishment must ultimately fit the seriousness of the crime.19  
Military courts do not have the option of imposing correctional supervision but 
section 12 of the MDSMA provides for a range of sentences differing in severity 
between a fine and imprisonment and which might be considered appropriate 
sentences.  Since imprisonment is not an appropriate sentence for a 
disciplinary offence, a sentence of imprisonment should not be imposed by a 
military court for an offence unless the same offence would also attract a 
sentence of imprisonment in the civilian courts.20  In the military, with the 
emphasis on the enforcement of discipline, it would be more acceptable to 
                                               
14
 Terblanche (2007) at 217. 
15
 See S v Zinn 1969 (2) SA 537 (A); ch 5 at para 5.4. 
16
 Terblanche (2007) at 219.  The CMA found in a number of cases that effective imprisonment 
may in fact be an appropriate sentence for first offenders.  See in this regard S v Ntetema 
(CMA 14/2007) where the court found that effective or suspended imprisonment may be an 
appropriate sentence for a first offender in cases of assault with the intent to do grievous bodily 
harm; S v Schmahl (CMA 13/2007) where effective imprisonment was seen as an appropriate 
sentence for members of the military police convicted of criminal offences, even though they 
were first offenders; S v Radebe (CMA 49/2008) where the court stated that the accused, who 
was convicted of theft of paper worth R2375 and was sentenced to discharge with ignominy, 
should consider himself lucky that he was not sentenced to effective imprisonment, which 
would have been an appropriate sentence under the circumstances. 
17
 Krugel & Terblanche at 203; Persadh v R 1944 NPD 357 at 358; S v Seoela 1996 (2) SACR 
616 (O) at 620c. 
18
 Du Toit et al at 28-10H; Kruger at 28-33; S v Chipape 2010 (1) SACR 245 (GNP) para 28. 
19
 S v Holder 1979 (2) SA 70 (A) at 77H-78A; S v Samuels 2011 (1) SACR 9 (SCA) paras 9-10; 
Du Toit et al at 28-10B-4. 
20
 OJAG at 12.  It should be kept in mind that certain offences may be seen as more serious in 
a military context and may therefore attract a sentence of imprisonment while a civilian court 
may hold a different opinion. 
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sentence an offender to forms of punishment that have the improvement of 
discipline as main purpose, as the enforcement of discipline could hardly be a 
legitimate reason for imposing imprisonment.21  In the military context 
imprisonment should only be imposed for serious criminal offences. 
 
In determining the duration of the prison sentence, courts have a wide 
discretion, limited only by their jurisdiction and the nature of the crime.  Most 
offences heard by military courts are of a disciplinary nature and the criminal 
offences generally cannot be seen as serious enough to justify a long term of 
imprisonment.  Criminal offences justifying long-term imprisonment would be 
those committed outside the borders of the Republic, such as murder, rape, 
treason and culpable homicide.  It is submitted that offences over which the 
military court has jurisdiction inside the country’s borders are not sufficiently 
serious to justify long-term imprisonment.  The reason for imposing long-term 
imprisonment is to protect the community by removing dangerous criminals 
from it.22  The case of flight-sergeant Venter, who was sentenced to 18 years’ 
imprisonment, serves as extreme example.23  In S v Timakwe24 the CMA 
confirmed a sentence of effective imprisonment for a period of 23 years plus 
discharge from the SANDF with ignominy for a conviction, inter alia, of murder 
committed in Burundi.   If imprisonment is considered an appropriate sentence, 
military courts will generally impose relatively short periods of imprisonment. 25  
                                               
21
 See S v Miya (CMA 195/2001) where the accused was convicted of several charges of 
absence without leave (AWOL) for a combined period of 20 days, 23 hours and 15 minutes.  
He was sentenced to a fine of R3000, 2 months imprisonment and discharge with ignominy, of 
which the whole period of imprisonment and discharge with ignominy was suspended for a 
period of 3 years.  The CMA found that the sentence of imprisonment and discharge with 
ignominy was not an appropriate sentence for purely disciplinary offences and varied the 
sentence to one of a fine of R3000.  In S v Mogajane (CMA 68/2000) the court similarly found 
that a sentence of a fine of R600 and a suspended sentence of imprisonment of 30 days and 
discharge from the SANDF was not an appropriate sentence for disciplinary offences. 
22
 Kruger at 28-29.  Most military offences are of a disciplinary nature and the military offenders 
cannot be regarded as dangerous criminals. 
23
 S v Venter (CMA 72/2008). 
24
 S v Timakwe (CMA 64/2005). 
25
 In S v Afrika (CMA 88/2000) the accused was found guilty, inter alia, of attempted fraud and 
sentenced to a fine of R1000, 12 months imprisonment and cashiering of which the 
imprisonment and cashiering were wholly suspended for a period of three years.  The CMA 
found that although imprisonment is an appropriate sentence for fraud, the period of 
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Short periods of imprisonment may in fact be advantageous under certain 
circumstances in that26  
 
[a] short term of imprisonment is sometimes necessary to denounce an offence 
which, whilst serious, is not so serious as to merit lengthy imprisonment.  It may 
also be required in order to give effect to the principle of deterrence either in 
respect of the particular wrongdoer or as an exercise in general deterrence. 
 
This statement, which predates the introduction of correctional supervision, 
may no longer be true as correctional supervision has to a certain extent taken 
over from short-term imprisonment as the sentence to impose when a fine is 
not sufficiently severe.27  Correctional supervision can be imposed in those 
instances where the court would like to show its condemnation of the offence 
but does not feel that it is appropriate to merely impose a fine.  Military courts 
may not impose correctional supervision but there are a number of 
punishments between imprisonment and a fine that will show the condemnation 
of the military court and act as a deterrent without having to imprison the 
offender, such as the reduction of an accused rank, detention or a discharge 
from the SANDF. 
 
Not only is imprisonment a serious sentence in its own right, the consequences 
of a sentence of imprisonment in the military environment also warrants 
consideration. 
 
                                                                                                                                         
imprisonment was shockingly inappropriate for a first offender and considering other mitigating 
factors varied the sentence to suspended period of three months’ imprisonment and cashiering.  
In S v Hunter (CMA 66/2002) a period of three years’ imprisonment and cashiering was seen as 
“disturbingly inappropriate” for a conviction of 12 charges of common law fraud and varied to a 
suspended sentence of six months’ imprisonment and cashiering. 
26
 S v Sakabula 1975 (3) SA 784 (C) at 786D.  Short periods have however in other instances 
been seen as inappropriate (see Krugel & Terblanche at 205; Du Toit et al at 28-10B-9; S v Abt 
1975 (1) SA 214 (A) at 219H; Director of Public Prosecutions, KwaZulu-Natal v Ngcobo 2009 
(2) SACR 361 (SCA)). 
27
 See S v R 1993 (1) SACR 476 (A) at 488F-H. 
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An officer sentenced to imprisonment must also be sentenced to cashiering.28  
The cashiering must take place before the officer is committed to prison.  When 
any other rank than that of an officer is sentenced to imprisonment that 
individual must also be sentenced to discharge with ignominy.29  Where an 
individual is cashiered or discharged with ignominy, that individual’s 
employment is terminated and he is no longer a member of the SANDF.30  He 
will therefore no longer be subject to the MDC and military law.  However, the 
sentence of imprisonment imposed by the military court will continue to run 
even though the accused is no longer subject to the military court that imposed 
the sentence in the first place.31 
 
Unlike other military sentences, a sentence of imprisonment does not 
commence immediately after it has been announced in open court.32  
Imprisonment is one of the punishments where the sentence will not be 
executed until such time as the matter has been reviewed by the CMA.33  Once 
it has been reviewed and confirmed, the sentence is deemed to have 
commenced at the time it was announced in open court.34 
 
                                               
28
 Section 93(3) of the MDC.  See the discussion on cashiering at 6.3.2.2 below. 
29
 Section 93(4) of the MDC. 
30
 Section 59(1)(d) of the Defence Act 42 of 2002. 
31
 Section 93(6)(b) of the MDC.  This is also the case where the accused is sentenced to 
detention (see Prinsloo v Union Government (Minister of Defence) 1946 TPD 132). 
32
 Section 118 of the MDC. 
33
 Section 34(2) of the MDSMA states that “[e]very sentence of imprisonment, including a 
suspended sentence of imprisonment, cashiering, discharge with ignominy, dismissal or 
discharge shall be reviewed by a Court of Military Appeals and shall not be executed until the 
review has been completed” (see also r 59(2)(a) of the MDSMA). 
34
 Rule 113 of the MDSMA.  This rule must be read with s 118(2) of the MDSMA.  Where a 
sentence is varied by the CMA to imprisonment, detention or field punishment, the sentence is 
deemed to have started at the time that the sentence was varied by the CMA.  Rule 113 of the 
MDSMA created some difficulty in the recent past in that an accused who was released from 
custody in terms of s 34(9) of the MDSMA usually returned to work pending review of his case 
and received his salary as usual.  Once the sentence is confirmed however, the date of 
termination of sentence is backdated from the date of the CMA judgment to the date of the 
pronouncement of the sentence in court.  The personnel system then automatically read the 
months of remuneration as an overpayment and erronously deducted all money paid to the 
accused as his salary for the period awaiting review from his pension money.  This unintended 
consequence seems to be rectified. 
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Where the accused is sentenced to imprisonment that accused must be 
detained pending the review of his case.35  However, the CMA only sits on an 
ad hoc basis resulting in a situation where a case may take up to 18 months 
before it is reviewed by the CMA.36  It would be a gross violation of the 
accused’s rights to keep him in custody for an extended period of time pending 
the outcome of the review process.  The MDSMA therefore provides for the 
release of the accused pending the review of his case.  After completion of the 
trial the accused may apply to the local representative of the Adjutant General37 
to be released pending the finalisation of his review.  The local representative 
of the Adjutant General may impose certain conditions for the release of the 
accused.38  Any period spent in custody awaiting review will be included in the 
calculation when determining the date of completion of his sentence of 
imprisonment.39 
 
An accused is also not compelled to perform any duties in terms of his 
sentence of imprisonment until such time as the finalisation of the review by the 
CMA.40  Where an accused has to perform certain duties or labour due to a 
sentence of imprisonment, he must first be medically examined prior to being 
required to perform the duty and in the event of being found medically unfit, he 
is not compelled to do such duty or labour.41 
 
                                               
35
 Section 34(9) of the MDSMA.  Where the sentence of imprisonment is wholly suspended the 
accused must be released immediately after announcement of the sentence: see s 34(10) of 
the MDSMA. 
36
 This situation might have changed since the CMA currently convenes on a more regular 
basis (see the discussion in ch 7 at para 7.5.3.1 below). 
37
 This person is normally the Officer in Charge (OIC) of the relevant Legsato. 
38
 Section 34(11) of the MDSMA; S v Visagie (CMA 34/2000) where the CMA stated that the 
local representative of the Adjutant General should not hesitate to exercise their discretion.  
The conditions of release may vary since no guidelines are provided by law. However, it has 
been this author’s experience that one such condition is invariably that the accused must report 
to work every day, failure of which will result in his re-arrest and subsequent confinement.  It is 
also generally provided that the accused must report to a superior every day he is required to 
attend his place of duty. 
39
 Rule 113 of the MDSMA. 
40
 Rule 113 of the MDSMA. 
41
 This applies equally to sentences of detention and field punishment (see r 111(b) of the 
MDSMA in this regard). 
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The court is not the only role-player that influences a sentence of imprisonment.  
The Minister of Defence and Military Veterans may establish one or more 
prisons in the RSA to which offenders sentenced to imprisonment by military 
courts may be committed to complete their sentence or she may determine that 
they serve their sentence in a prison established by the Department of 
Corrections in terms of the Corrections Services Act.42  There are currently no 
prisons established by the Minister and all offenders sentenced by military 
courts serve their sentences in prisons under the control of the Department of 
Corrections.43 
 
The Minister may order that a person who has been sentenced to imprisonment 
serves their sentence in another place in lieu of a prison under the control of 
the Department of Corrections.  In the event that a sentence of less than 14 
days is imposed the Minister may also order that the sentence be served in this 
other appointed place.44  A sentence of imprisonment need therefore not 
necessarily mean that the military offender must serve their sentence in a 
prison.  The Adjutant-General may in fact also order that a sentence of 
imprisonment be served at the detention barracks.45 
 
Although no instance was found where such an order had been made, it is a 
more likely scenario where an accused is prosecuted and sentenced outside 
                                               
42
 Section 120(1) of the MDC.  In the unlikely event that the Minister does establish such a 
prison, she is authorised to make regulations governing this prison (see s 120(3) of the MDC for 
the guidelines regarding these regulations). 
43
 Section 120(1) of the MDC.  British Service members sentenced to imprisonment are also 
sent to a civilian prison under the auspices of the Department of Prisons.  The US military 
corrections system is however operated independently from the US Bureau of Prisons.  The 
Army has overall responsibility with the various arms of service operating subordinate 
correctional facilities.  Military prisoners do not serve their sentence in civilian prisons.  Very few 
inmates, if any, return to service upon completion of their sentence.  Although rehabilitation is a 
goal set for military prisons in terms of their Regulations, this is interpreted as rehabilitation of 
inmates in preparation for their return to civilian life (see Morris L J Military Justice: A Guide to 
the Issues (2010) at 119-120). 
44
 Section 112 of the MDC.  Although the minimum period of imprisonment is in fact 30 days, 
this probably refers to contempt of court punishments in terms of s 34(2) of the MDC where the 
prescribed punishment is imprisonment not exceeding 21 days. 
45
 Section 119 of the MDC.  No record could be found of such an order and the current position 
is that offenders sentenced to imprisonment are handed over to the Department of Corrections 
for the execution of their sentences. 
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the borders of the RSA.  Military courts have extra-territorial jurisdiction over 
their members46 and specific provision is made for sentences of imprisonment 
and detention that must be served outside the borders of the Republic.47  The 
General Officer Commanding, SANDF, may authorise any officer in command 
of troops outside the borders of the Republic to establish detention barracks 
where offenders can be committed and serve their sentence.48  Where a 
person is sentenced to imprisonment outside the borders of the Republic he is 
usually returned to the Republic to serve his sentence.  However, if it is not 
possible to do so under the circumstances, then the accused will serve his 
sentence in the detention barracks that were established by the officer in 
command of the troops on service.49 
 
All the regulations applicable to the detention barracks in South Africa are 
applicable to any detention barracks outside of the Republic and while the 
General Officer Commanding is authorised to make written changes to these 
regulations as required, he may not make any of the conditions more severe for 
any inmates.50 
 
                                               
46
 Section 3(1) of the MDSMA states that “[t]his Act shall…apply to any person subject to the 
Code irrespective whether such person is within or outside the Republic.”  Section 5 of the 
MDSMA further states that “[w]henever this Act is enforced outside the Republic, any finding, 
sentence, penalty, fine or order made, pronounced or imposed in terms of its provisions shall 
be as valid and effectual, and shall be carried into effect, as if it had been made, pronounced or 
imposed in the Republic.” 
47
 Section 121 of the MDC. 
48
 Section 121(1) of the MDC. 
49
 Section 121(2) of the MDC.  The case of flight-sergeant Venter once again serves as 
example.  The trial was started in Burundi but later moved to South Africa and he is currently 
serving his sentence in a South African prison.  From interviews with a number of military legal 
practitioners who have deployed, it can be stated that all members on deployment will be 
returned to South Africa to serve their sentences.  It must also be kept in mind that only serious 
offences will be punished with effective imprisonment and a member who has committed such 
a serious offence while on deployment will be returned to South Africa in order to avoid further 
embarrassment for the SANDF.  Information regarding the offences committed by SANDF 
members on deployment and subsequent sentences is regarded as classified information by 
the SANDF and was not available for the purposes of this research, except those cases 
reviewed by the CMA. 
50
 Section 121(5) of the MDC. 
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Where a sentence of imprisonment is imposed on an accused where that 
accused is already serving a sentence of imprisonment, the new sentence will 
only commence after the expiration of the first sentence, irrespective of any 
provisions to the contrary.51  A sentence of imprisonment can be wholly 
suspended by the military court for a period of three years.52 
 
Whenever a person is sentenced to imprisonment by a military court, the 
person in charge of the prison must receive, admit and keep the offender in 
custody in compliance with a warrant of committal.53  The warrant of committal 
can be signed by the presiding military judge, the commanding officer of the 
offender, the adjutant of the offender, the Adjutant General or the local 
representative of the Adjutant General.54 
 
Since military members sentenced to imprisonment serve their sentence at 
prisons from the Department of Corrections, the release policy of the 
Department will apply.  The military judge cannot make any recommendation 
regarding the release of the military offender and offenders may be released on 
parole in accordance with policy.  Where an offender is sentenced to a period 
of less than 24 months’ imprisonment the National Commissioner may release 
the prisoner on parole or correctional supervision without any period of effective 
imprisonment actually being served.55  Other than when released on 
community corrections by the National Commissioner, no further formalities are 
required.56 If an offender is sentenced to a determinate period of imprisonment 
                                               
51
 Rule 111(c) of the MDSMA.  This will result in flight-sergeant Venter’s 18 year prison term 
only commencing once he has completed the 10 year sentence he was serving at the time of 
the military trial for killing his children and assaulting his wife, imposed by a civilian court. 
52
 Section 12(3) of the MDSMA.  Imprisonment and detention are the only two sentences 
imposed by a military court that can be suspended.  Although detention can be wholly or 
partially suspended, this section does not provide for the partial suspension of imprisonment. 
53
 Section 122 of the MDC. 
54
 Section 37 of the MDSMA. 
55
 Section 75(7)(a) of the Correctional Services Act; Terblanche (2007) at 228; Krugel & 
Terblanche at 209-211.  Anecdotal evidence from military defence counsel shows that this 
practice is frequently employed by the Department of Correctional Services regarding offenders 
sentenced by military courts.   
56
 Section 52 of the Correctional Services Act 111 of 1998. 
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of two years or more the prisoner must generally serve at least half of his 
sentence before he can be considered for parole.57 
 
It is not only sentences of imprisonment imposed by military courts that 
influence members of the SANDF.  In cases where an accused has been found 
guilty by a civilian court and sentenced to imprisonment without the option of a 
fine, the accused’s employment in the SANDF is also terminated.58 
 
6.2.2 Cashiering 
 
Cashiering originates from British military law and has not changed 
fundamentally, even after the advent of the Constitution.  The punishment is not 
defined in the defence legislation but in Collins English Dictionary59 is defined 
as “to dismiss with dishonour from the armed forces.”60  The South African Law 
Reform Commission defines it as “the dishonourable dismissal (separation from 
the service) of an officer coupled with the cancellation of that officer’s 
commission, thus barring the convicted offender from holding military office.”61 
 
The defence legislation also does not set out how a sentence of cashiering 
must be executed.  The only document setting out the process of cashiering is 
a standing order from 1986,62 still applicable today. 
 
The process can be described as follows:63 
                                               
57
 Section 73(6) of the Correctional Services Act.  Where the offender has served 25 years of a 
sentence he must also be considered for parole.  See further s 73 of the Correctional Services 
Act for the different periods applicable to the different forms of imprisonment before parole can 
be considered. 
58
 Sections 54(7)(b) and 59(1)(d) of the Defence Act 42 of 2002. 
59
 Collins English Dictionary 6 ed (2009) at 114. 
60
 The Ministerial Task Team, in its discussion on cashiering, refers to the definition found in the 
Longman Dictionary of Contemporary English as “to dismiss (someone usually an officer) with 
dishonour from service in the armed forces” (see Ministerial Task Team Report by the 
Ministerial Task Team on the Transformation of the Military Legal System (2005) para 4). 
61
 SA Law Reform Commission at 18-19. 
62
 SADF Kassering en Ontslag met Oneer uit die SA Weermag: Aanhangsel A tot SA Leër 
Order SALO GS1/73 (1986). 
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Where an accused is sentenced to be cashiered, the sentence must be 
executed in public on parade.  Where the case is of a sensitive nature, the 
execution of the sentence can be done on office bearing.64 
 
The parade consists of members of the unit or at least a smaller formation of 
the unit.  Where members of the unit are not on parade, they must attend as 
spectators.65  A military band, an escort and the accused will also be in 
attendance.  The single escort must be of the same rank as the offender. 
 
The members on parade march onto the parade ground, forming three sides of 
a square.  The band stands behind the back row of the parade.  After the 
parade has formed up, the accused and his escort march onto the parade 
ground and halt in front of the adjutant. 
 
The unit officer commanding takes his position on parade next to the adjutant.  
The officer commanding orders the adjutant to announce the sentence.  As 
soon as the adjutant starts reading out the sentence, the drummers of the band 
start drumming and continue until the end of the ceremony.  As soon as the 
accused’s number, rank and name are called he will come to attention and step 
                                                                                                                                         
63
 The process described in the SADF Standing Order is only available in Afrikaans and the 
description below is paraphrased from this document. 
64
 An office bearing is not a formal process regulated by law.  The process may differ from unit 
to unit and between the various Arms of Service, but the basic principles remain the same.  It 
can best be compared to a disciplinary interview between an employer and employee in the 
civilian environment.  The procedure is known in the SA Air Force as “office bearing”, in the SA 
Army and Health Services as “office orders” and in the SA Navy as “defaulters”.  The 
procedures currently being used date from the inception of the SANDF with the most recent 
document describing the office bearing procedure being Algemene Riglyne vir die Uitvoering 
van Kantoorhouding: Aanhangsel B tot SA Leër Order GS1/5 (1985).  Office bearings are not 
only conducted in cases of ill discipline where it is referred to as “negative” office bearing.  It 
can also have a positive aspect such as informing the member of his promotion or transfer.  
Office bearings can be seen as a means of formal communication between a superior and a 
subordinate.  For the purpose of this discussion any reference to office bearings will be a 
reference to “negative” office bearings. 
65
 General deterrence is one of the major purposes of this punishment and compelling all 
members from the accused’s unit to attend ensures that all members are aware of the 
consequences of the accused’s conduct, possibly deterring them from committing similar 
offences. 
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forward.  After the sentence has been read out the accused is ordered to leave 
the parade ground. 
 
The accused is led off the parade ground by the escort and escorted to the duty 
room.  The accused changes into civilian clothes after which he is escorted 
outside unit lines.  The drummer stops drumming as soon as the accused and 
his escort leave the parade ground.  The rest of the parade is excused. 
 
Where the cashiering is executed on office bearing, the accused and his escort 
report to the office of the commanding officer where the adjutant will read out 
the sentence.  The accused is marched out of the office and is taken to change 
into civilian dress after which he will be escorted off the unit.66 
 
The accused is not allowed to wear any headdress, decorations or medals on 
parade and may also not wear his dagger (if in the South African Air Force) or 
sword (if in the Navy) on parade.  All administrative documentation must be 
completed before the accused leaves the unit since the accused may not return 
to the unit as a visitor after execution of the sentence.   
 
The effect of cashiering is that the accused’s medals are withdrawn and he 
forfeits the pension contribution made by the state.  Only the contribution to the 
pension fund made by him will be paid out.  The commission of the officer is 
terminated and regarded as having been cancelled and his Deed of 
Commission must be returned.67 
 
Because of the seriousness of the sentence this is not a punishment imposed 
lightly by the court.  The sentence is considered in those circumstances where 
the court views the accused’s conduct as disgraceful and to the detriment of the 
                                               
66
 Due to the constitutional concerns discussed below, cashiering is mostly carried out on office 
bearing. 
67
 Section 54(7)(a) of the Defence Act 42 of 2002.  A Deed of Commission is signed and issued 
by the President on the appointment of all officers and warrant-officers. 
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reputation of the SANDF.  Cashiering is not regarded as an appropriate 
sentence for purely disciplinary offences.68  A perusal of CMA judgments shows 
that very few officers have been sentenced to cashiering as an independent 
sentence and since 2009 no such sentences could be found.  Cashiering 
currently only appears in the CMA judgments as part of the mandatory 
combination when an officer is sentenced to imprisonment.  The sentences of 
imprisonment are mostly suspended, resulting in the cashiering also being 
“suspended” since being coupled to the imprisonment it is only be executed if 
the imprisonment is activated. 
 
6.2.2.1 Cashiering as a mandatory sentence 
 
Cashiering is clearly not a sentence that is favoured by the military courts.  
There are however two instances where the imposition of cashiering is 
mandatory, namely (1) in the case of an officer who contravenes section 32 of 
the MDC by behaving “in a scandalous manner unbecoming the character of an 
officer and a gentleman”,69 or (2) an officer who is sentenced to any term of 
imprisonment.70  
 
The definition of section 32 of the MDC is very wide.  Any act by an officer 
which is regarded as “scandalous”, whether committed intentionally or 
negligently, would comply with the definition of the proscription and the officer 
may be found guilty.  Although no definition exists in the defence legislation of 
what constitutes “scandalous” behaviour the Collins English Dictionary defines 
                                               
68
 In S v Magama (CMA 49/2005) the accused was found guilty of five charges of AWOL and 
one charge of disobedience to orders and sentenced to be cashiered.  The CMA found that 
cashiering is an inappropriate sentence for offences of a disciplinary nature.  In casu the court 
varied the sentence to one of dismissal from the SANDF.  In S v Mabye (CMA 103/2004) a 
sentence of cashiering was confirmed by the CMA subsequent to a conviction of crimen iniuria, 
common law indecent assault and four charges of riotous or unseemly behaviour. 
69
 Section 32 states that “[a]ny officer who behaves in a scandalous manner unbecoming of the 
character of an officer and a gentleman, shall be guilty of an offence and shall on conviction be 
cashiered.” 
70
 Section 93(3) of the MDC.  The cashiering must be executed before the accused is taken to 
prison to serve his sentence. 
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it as “shame or outrage arising from a disgraceful action of event.”71  
“Disgraceful” is defined as “a condition of shame, loss of reputation or 
dishonour…exclusion from confidence or trust.”72  The CMA have found that 
cashiering “should only be considered in matters where the conduct of the 
accused is seen as criminal or taints the image of the SANDF or brings the 
Force into disrepute”.73   
 
Civilian courts are not likely to consider a penalty clause as mandatory unless 
the wording of the penalty clause makes it very clear,74 as mandatory 
sentences interfere with the courts’ sentencing discretion.  It is submitted that 
the wording of section 32 of the MDC is very clear as it reads “…shall on 
conviction be cashiered.”75  Whereas the other penalty clauses in the MDC 
state that a person is “liable on conviction” to a certain punishment, section 32 
of the MDC states that the offender “shall on conviction be cashiered.”  In 
following the argument put forward in S v Toms; S v Bruce76 regarding the 
interpretation of the penalty clause,77 section 32 of the MDC leaves the court 
with no discretion to deviate from the sentence.  No mitigation, aggravation or 
the level of culpability of the offender will make a difference to the 
implementation of the sentence.  If found guilty, the offender will be cashiered. 
 
Because of the fact that the court has no sentencing discretion when it convicts 
an accused of the contravention of section 32 of the MDC, it has become the 
practice of military prosecutors to add alternative charges to the charge sheet, 
in order to give the court some sentencing discretion.78 
                                               
71
 Collins English Dictionary at 710. 
72
 Collins English Dictionary at 218. 
73
 S v Magama (CMA 49/2005).  Offences of a sexual nature would also constitute scandalous 
behaviour (see S v Mabye (CMA 103/2004)). 
74
 Terblanche (2007) at 41. 
75
 Emphasis added.  See S v Toms; S v Bruce 1990 (2) SA 802 (A) at 811H where the court 
held that the legislature must indicate clearly whether it intends a mandatory sentence. 
76
 S v Toms; S v Bruce 1990 (2) SA 802 (A) at 811B and 822C-D. 
77
 See also Terblanche (2007) at 24 in this regard. 
78
 For example, although officers would traditionally have been charged with the contravention 
of s 32 of the MDC, such officers are now preferably charged with, for example, crimen iniuria, 
indecent assault, the contravention of s 45 of the MDC (riotous or unseemly behaviour) or 
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6.2.2.2 Cashiering and the right to dignity 
 
The manner in which the cashiering is executed raises possible constitutional 
concerns.  The cashiering of the officer results in the dismissal of that officer 
from the SANDF.  Dismissal from the SANDF may be constitutionally 
unproblematic, but the way in which the dismissal is effected might be 
unconstitutional.79  However, the ceremony attached to the sentence of 
cashiering makes it a more severe punishment than ordinary dismissal.  The 
public nature of the ceremony has the potential to humiliate the accused.  Not 
only is he dismissed from the SANDF, but all his former colleagues and 
subordinates bear witness to his dishonour.  
 
Section 10 of the Constitution states that 
 
[e]veryone has inherent dignity and the right to have their dignity respected and 
protected. 
 
Human dignity is one of the core values of the Constitution and must be 
respected at all times.80  South Africa is founded on “[h]uman dignity, the 
achievement of equality and the advancement of human rights and 
freedoms.”81  The right to dignity forms the basis for the interpretation of all the 
                                                                                                                                         
similar offences.  This does not prevent the court from imposing a sentence of cashiering, but it 
allows them some discretion in this regard, depending on the aggravating and mitigating factors 
applicable.  See S v Store (CMA 03/2003) where the accused was found guilty of the 
contravention of s 45(a) MDC (riotous or unseemly behaviour) which is generally regarded as a 
disciplinary offence, depending on the facts of the case.  He was sentenced to cashiering. 
79
 Van Zyl Smit (2002) at 49-30. 
80
 Currie I & De Waal J The Bill of Rights Handbook 5 ed (2005) at 272. 
81
 Section 1(a) of the Constitution; Dawood v Minister of Home Affairs; Shalabi v Minister of 
Home Affairs; Thomas v Minister of Home Affairs 2000 (3) SA 936 (CC) para 34.  In S v 
Makwanyane 1995 (3) SA 391 (CC) para 44 the Constitutional Court stated that the right to 
dignity, together with the right to life, can be seen as the most important human rights. 
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other rights and applies to those specific rights that “give effect to the value of 
human dignity.”82 
 
In the context of sentencing the right to dignity is therefore closely linked to the 
right not to be treated in a cruel, inhuman or degrading way as provided by 
section 12(1)(e) of the Constitution.83 
 
In S v Williams84 the court found that 
 
…measures that assail the dignity and self-esteem of an individual will have to 
be justified; there is no place for brutal and dehumanising treatment and 
punishment…Respect for human dignity is one such value; acknowledging it 
includes an acceptance by society that…even the vilest criminal remains a 
human being possessed of common human dignity. 
 
All punishments undermine human dignity to some degree.  The right to dignity 
is therefore one of the rights that must be taken into consideration when 
determining if a punishment constitutes cruel, inhuman or degrading 
punishment.85  The right against cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment or 
punishment can be divided into three distinct concepts.86  When a punishment 
is imposed it need not violate all three to be regarded as unconstitutional.  The 
                                               
82
 Currie & De Waal (2005) at 275; Dawood v Minister of Home Affairs; Shalabi v Minister of 
Home Affairs; Thomas v Minister of Home Affairs 2000 (3) SA 936 (CC) para 35 where the 
Constitutional Court held that “[h]uman dignity…informs constitutional adjudication and 
interpretation at a range of levels.  It is a value that informs the interpretation of many, possibly 
all, other rights.” 
83
 Van Zyl Smit (2002) at 49-30; Currie & De Waal (2005) at 276; S v Williams 1995 (3) SA 632 
(CC) para 35; Mohamed v President of the Republic of South Africa (Society for the Abolition of 
the Death Penalty in South Africa and Another Intervening) 2001 (3) SA 893 (CC) paras 54-55.  
This right is found in various international human rights documents (see as example Article 5 of 
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights which prohibits “torture or…cruel, inhuman or 
degrading treatment or punishment” and Article 3 of the European Convention for the 
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms which states that “torture or…inhuman 
or degrading treatment or punishment.” 
84
 S v Williams 1995 (3) SA 632 (CC). 
85
 Currie & De Waal (2005) at 276; Van Zyl Smit (1996) at 28-13; S v Makwanyane 1995 (3) SA 
391 (CC) paras 94 and 135. 
86
 These concepts are cruel punishment, inhuman punishment and degrading punishment. 
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right may be violated if the punishment violates any one of these concepts.  
However, the impairment of human dignity must be involved in the specific 
concepts tainted by the punishment in order to constitute a violation of section 
12(1)(e) of the Constitution.87 
 
In defining what should be understood under the concept of “cruel” and 
“inhuman” the Constitutional Court in S v Williams88 used the Oxford English 
Dictionary which defines “cruel” as “causing or inflicting pain without pity”, 
“inhuman” is defined as “destitute of natural kindness or pity, brutal, unfeeling, 
savage, barbarous” and “degrading” is defined as “lowering in character or 
quality, moral or intellectual debasement.”  In evaluating these definitions it is 
submitted that cashiering does not inflict pain nor does it qualify as inhuman.  
However, considering the explanation given by the European Court of Human 
Rights89 that degrading conduct is conduct “which [arouses] in the victims 
feelings of fear, anguish and inferiority leading to humiliation and debasement 
and possible breaking of the physical or moral resistance”, it is submitted that 
cashiering can be classified as a degrading punishment. 
 
Cashiering may violate section 12(1)(e) in two respects:  
1. it may be considered cruel, inhuman or degrading punishment because 
of the mandatory nature of the offence for a conviction of section 32 of 
the MDC.  The punishment must fit the crime and where the punishment 
is not proportional to the crime it may constitute cruel, inhuman or 
degrading punishment.  The test to be applied is whether the sentence is 
grossly disproportionate to the circumstances under which the crime was 
committed as well as the offender’s circumstances.90 
                                               
87
 S v Dodo 2001 (3) SA 382 (CC) para 35; S v Saayman 2008 (1) SACR 393 (E) at 398c; Van 
Zyl Smit (1996) at 28-13. 
88
 S v Williams 1995 (3) SA 632 (CC) para 24. 
89
 Denmark et al v Greece Report of 5 Nov 1969 (1969) XII Yearbook of the European 
Convention on Human Rights at 186 as quoted in S v Williams 1995 (3) SA 632 (CC) para 27. 
90
 S v Dodo 2001 (3) SA 382 (CC) para 37; S v Vries 1996 (12) BCLR 1666 (Nm); Van Zyl Smit 
(1996) at 28-6; R v Smith (Edward Dewey) [1987] 1 SCR 1987 at 1046 where the court held 
that ‘in assessing whether a sentence is grossly disproportionate [the court] must consider the 
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2. it may be considered cruel, inhuman or degrading because of the way in 
which the sentence is executed.91 
 
In determining whether punishment can be seen as cruel or inhuman the 
Canadian Supreme Court suggested three characteristics against which the 
punishment can be weighed:92 
 
1. The punishment or the duration must be such “as to outrage the 
 public conscience or be degrading to human dignity.” 
 
2. The punishment must go beyond what is required for the 
 achievement of a legitimate social aim, taking into account the 
 purposes of punishment and possible adequate alternatives. 
 
3. The punishment is imposed in an arbitrary fashion in “the sense 
 that it is not applied on a rational basis in accordance with 
 ascertained or ascertainable standards.” 
 
The execution of cashiering on parade, but also on office bearing, is an 
extremely humiliating experience, not only for the offender but also for those 
compelled to attend the parade.93  The public shaming of an accused as part of 
                                                                                                                                         
gravity of the offence, the personal characteristics of the offender, and the particular 
circumstances of the case to determine what range of sentences would have been appropriate 
to punish, rehabilitate, deter or protect society from this particular offender.” 
91
 In R v Smith (Edward Dewey) [1987] 1 SCR 1987 at 1046 the court held that the “court must 
also measure the effect of the sentence, which is not limited to its quantum or duration but 
includes also its nature and the conditions under which it is applied.”  See the process of 
execution as described above.  Van Zyl Smit (1996) 28-21 states that “[o]ffenders should not be 
publicly humiliated or compelled to do things which undermine their dignity as human beings.” 
92
 R v Smith(Edward Dewey) [1987] 1 SCR 1987 at 1049 
93
 This has been the author’s experience and the perceptions gathered from subsequent 
interviews with attendees after the cashiering parade of Chaplain Siwali who was sentenced to 
12 months imprisonment and cashiering on a conviction of indecent assault in 2006.  
Irrespective of the seriousness of the conviction, it was the general feeling amongst attendees 
that the imprisonment alone would have been appropriate and the cashiering parade was 
extremely degrading and harsh.  The sentence was confirmed in S v Siwali (CMA 34/2006). 
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a sentence is difficult to justify.94  However, shaming could be acceptable under 
limited circumstances in terms of certain principles of restorative justice.  
Braithwaite95 distinguishes between “shaming that is ‘stigmatization’ and 
shaming that is ‘reintegrative’” but shaming must not be done in a degrading or 
humiliating way.96  Stigmatisation shaming sets the offender apart from the rest 
of society and makes him an outcast.97  This type of shaming will not withstand 
constitutional scrutiny.  It is submitted that the public nature of the cashiering 
parade can be classified as stigmatisation shaming. 
 
The purpose of the punishment is ultimately to sever the employ of the offender 
but in a way that expresses the military community’s condemnation of the 
scandalous, “despicable, contemptuous or ignominious”98 nature of his actions.  
The aim can be achieved just as well by dismissing the offender from the 
SANDF.  It is the opinion of the South African Law Reform Commission that 
cashiering is in violation of section 12(1)(e) of the Constitution due to “blatant 
unconstitutionality and obsoleteness in the South African military justice 
system.”99  Although the Commission suggests that cashiering should be 
replaced with “dismissal with ignominy”,100 it is submitted that this proposal 
would not address the violation of section 12(1)(e) since the execution of a 
discharge with ignominy is essentially the same as in the case of cashiering.  
Actual change can only be brought about if the manner of execution of the 
sentence is changed. 
 
 
 
                                               
94
 See S v Saayman 2008 (1) SACR 393 (E); Dawood v Minister of Home Affairs; Shalabi v 
Minister of Home Affairs; Thomas v Minister of Home Affairs 2000 (3) SA 755 (CC) para 35. 
95
 Braithwaite J “Setting Standards for Restorative Justice” (2002) 42 The British Journal of 
Criminology 563 at 567 
96
 This was in principle accepted in S v Saayman 2008 (1) SACR 393 (E) at 400d-e.  
97
 Claasen L H “Shaming as a Form of Restorative Justice – A Possible South African 
Application” (2006) Primus 11 at 17. 
98
 S v Quvane (CMA 22/99). 
99
 SA Law Reform Commission at 19. 
100
 SA Law Reform Commission at 19. 
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6.2.2.3 Dishonourable discharge in other jurisdictions 
 
In order to find possible solutions it is necessary to consider the different forms 
of dismissal available in other jurisdictions. 
 
The approach in Canada and Britain seem to be similar in the sense that both 
jurisdictions distinguish between “dismissal with disgrace from Her Majesty’s 
Service” and “dismissal from Her Majesty’s Service.”101 
 
In Canada no distinction is made between the punishments for officers and 
those of non-commissioned officers and both are sentenced to the same 
sentence, which is dismissal with disgrace from the Canadian Armed Forces.102  
It is further provided that a sentence of dismissal with disgrace may be coupled 
with a sentence of imprisonment.  Where an individual is sentenced to such 
dismissal he may not serve in any military or civilian capacity in service of the 
Government of Canada again, unless there is some emergency or his sentence 
is set aside.103  There is no parade in the execution of this sentence.104 
 
This punishment is also regarded as one of the most severe punishments 
which affect the benefits of the individual upon his release from the Canadian 
forces.105  Although dismissal with disgrace is one of the punishments that can 
be imposed for the offence of behaving in a disgraceful manner,106 it differs 
from the South African equivalent in that the dismissal is not mandatory upon 
conviction.  It is merely one of the possible sentences that may be imposed.  
One of the principles of sentencing followed by the Canadian military courts is 
that the punishment ultimately imposed should constitute the minimum 
                                               
101
 For the Canadian position see s 139(1) of the National Defence Act (R.S.C., 1985, c. N-5); 
Queen’s Regulations and Orders: Volume II – Chapter 104: Punishments and Sentences 
(2008); for the British position see s 164(1) of the Armed Forces Act 2006. 
102
 Section 141(1) of the National Defence Act. 
103
 Section 141(2) of the National Defence Act; R v Semrau, 2010 CM 4010 para 50. 
104
 Personal correspondence with Professor D McNairn of the Faculty of Law, Ottawa 
University, Canada on 25/10/2011. 
105
 R v Semrau, 2010 CM 4010 para 50. 
106
 Section 93 of the Code of Service Discipline, Part III of the National Defence Act. 
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intervention that can be regarded as adequate in the specific circumstances.107  
The Canadian court martial held in S v Semrau108 that a disgraceful manner 
requires behaviour that is shockingly unacceptable in the circumstances and 
although the accused was found guilty of killing a wounded and unarmed 
insurgent while deployed in Afghanistan, dismissal with disgrace was not 
regarded as an appropriate sentence.  He was instead sentenced to a 
reduction in rank and dismissal from the Canadian Armed Force.109 
 
Dismissal with disgrace is not a sentence that is imposed lightly.  In 2004 
Private Kyle Brown was convicted by court martial of manslaughter for his role 
in the torture and death of a Somali teenager.  He was sentenced to five years’ 
imprisonment and dismissal with disgrace.110  In other cases, also constituting 
serious offences, the military court did not impose dismissal with disgrace.  
Where an accused was convicted of a number of offences of a sexual nature 
he received a sentence of a fine and a reprimand111 and in a case of the sexual 
abuse of a minor the accused was sentenced to imprisonment and dismissal 
from the Armed Forces.112  It seems that the implementation of this sentence is 
reserved for rare occasions and remains totally within the discretion of the trial 
judge to impose.  This sentence is not of a mandatory nature in Canada. 
 
As in Canada, British military law does not distinguish between discharges as 
sentence for officers and non-commissioned officers.  Non-commissioned 
officers and warrant officers are reduced to the ranks and commissioned 
officers also forfeit their rank.113  The offender may subsequently not work in 
any military or civilian capacity in the employ of the Crown for a period of ten 
                                               
107
 R v Semrau, 2010 CM 4010; R v Leading Seaman J.R. Lueke, 2008 CM 3007. 
108
 R v Semrau, 2010 CM 4010. 
109
 R v Semrau, 2010 CM 4010 paras 9 and 53.  An accused sentenced to an ordinary 
dismissal from the Armed Forces does not automatically forfeit his rank.  If the rank is reduced 
when sentenced to dismissal it will have an impact on the money paid out to the offender at the 
severance of his employment. 
110
 Létourneau G Report on the Somalia Commission of Enquiry (1997). 
111
 R v Ex-Warrant Officer J.A.G. Deschamps, 2009 CM 1013. 
112
 R v Corporal M.A. Wilcox, 2009 CM 2014. 
113
 Sections 295(2) and (4) of the Armed Forces Act 2006. 
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years when sentenced to dismissal with disgrace and seven years for ordinary 
dismissal.114  It is seen as an exceptional form of punishment that is only 
imposed where the nature and the circumstances make a sentence of ordinary 
dismissal inadequate to reflect the gravity with which the court regards the 
conduct.115  Unlike the opinion of the South African CMA, the British military 
court is of the opinion that the offence itself need not be disgraceful to attract 
dismissal with disgrace as a punishment.  Any conduct that is of such a nature 
that the court wishes to “mark its displeasure” may attract this punishment.  In 
determining the appropriateness of the sentence the court will consider the 
nature of the offence, the surrounding circumstances, the rank of the accused 
and the degree of responsibility expected of him, as well as whether the 
sentence would be in the best interests of the state.116 
 
The United States military allows for three comparable types of discharge.117  
As is the case in South Africa, a distinction is made between the separation 
from service of an officer and a non-commissioned officer.  Officers are 
sentenced to dismissal and this is a sentence that can only be imposed by a 
general court martial.118  The US Armed Forces also used to distinguish 
between a dismissal and a cashiering of officers.  A dismissal was the ordinary 
“dishonorable termination of service” and a cashiering entailed a parade.119 The 
execution of the parade was done in a similar way to the South African 
cashiering parade but this has been eliminated, resulting in dismissal losing 
“the original lasting sting inherent in this punishment, i.e., degradation, loss of 
reputation and disgrace…”120  The accused does however lose certain 
                                               
114
 Rant J W & Blackett J Courts-Martial, Discipline, and the Criminal Process in the Armed 
Services 2 ed (2003) at 328. 
115
 OJAG at 15, Rant & Blackett at 329. 
116
 OJAG at 15; Rant & Blackett at 328. 
117
 There are in fact six types of discharges, but undesirable discharge, general discharge and 
honourable discharge are considered administrative discharges which fall outside the scope of 
this discussion (see Bednar R J “Discharge and Dismissal as Punishment in the Armed Forces” 
(1962) Military Law Review 1 at 6). 
118
 Bednar at 7; Morris at 105. 
119
 Bednar at 6. 
120
 Bednar at 7.  Cashiering parades in the US Armed Forces ended in 1890 (see Bednar at 6). 
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veterans’ benefits, pension money and may consequently not be employed in 
the civil service. 
 
Non-commissioned officers are sentenced to a dishonourable discharge 
imposed by a general court martial.  Such sentence is reserved for those “who 
should be separated under conditions of dishonour, after having been convicted 
of …felonies, or of offenses of a military nature requiring severe 
punishment.”121  A dishonourable discharge is seen as the equivalent of a 
dismissal imposed on officers.  This sentence is also common in instances 
where an accused was sentenced to lengthy confinement periods.122  
 
A bad-conduct discharge can be imposed by either a general or a special court 
martial and is only available in case of enlisted personnel.  This type of 
discharge is regarded as less severe than the dishonourable discharge and the 
offender will not lose all his benefits as a consequence.123  This type of 
discharge is mostly imposed for military offences, a serious criminal offence 
considered to be an isolated incident or in the case of a series of minor 
violations of the law.124   
 
6.2.2.4 Cashiering: possible solutions for South Africa 
 
In Britain and the USA dishonourable discharges are not executed on parade.  
There is no difference between the execution of a dishonourable discharge and 
an ordinary discharge.  The difference lies in the consequences regarding, inter 
alia, pension payouts, medals and the retaining of rank. 
 
                                               
121
 Bednar at 3. 
122
 Morris at 105.  The consequences of a dishonourable discharge are severe.  An accused 
loses most of the privileges associated with military status, e g most benefits due to military 
veterans, such as education and home loans and they also lose the privilege of being buried in 
a national cemetery.  Originally an offender also lost his US nationality when sentenced to a 
dishonourable discharge but in 1958 this was declared unconstitutional (see Bednar at 8). 
123
 Morris at 105. 
124
 Bednar at 8-9; Morris at 105. 
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They do however maintain the distinction between a dishonourable discharge 
and an ordinary discharge.  There is a need in the military environment to retain 
this distinction.  It is therefore not argued that cashiering in the sense of the 
dishonourable discharge be done away with.  It is a sentence that should be 
retained if the concerns regarding its execution are addressed. 
 
The issues regarding the implementation of cashiering are twofold: (1) it may 
result in an arbitrary sentence or (2) it may constitute degrading punishment.  
Firstly, if cashiering is imposed irrespective of whether the crime, 
circumstances of the offender or the interests of society are considered, it 
would result in the imposition of an arbitrary sentence that might be 
disproportionate to the seriousness of the crime and the blameworthiness of the 
offender.  It is submitted that cashiering should be removed from the statute as 
a mandatory sentence for the contravention of section 32 of the MDC.  An 
alternative penalty clause should be provided so that the court’s discretion to 
impose an appropriate sentence is restored. 
 
Secondly, in circumstances where the offence is serious enough to justify the 
dishonourable severance of the offender’s employ in the SANDF, the execution 
of the sentence might be contrary to section 12(1)(e) of the Constitution and 
constitute degrading punishment.  It is suggested that the sentence of 
cashiering remains but that the execution of the punishment be changed.  It is 
not an absolute requirement that the sentence should be executed on either 
parade or office bearing.  It can be executed in the same manner as dismissal 
or discharge from the SANDF.  This is also the manner in which the sentence is 
approached in the jurisdictions discussed above.  Because of the negative 
connotation to the term “cashiering” and the practice in other jurisdictions, 
consideration should be given to changing the sentence to one of 
“dishonourable dismissal or discharge” from the SANDF. 
 
 
  
350 
6.2.3 Discharge with ignominy 
 
Discharge with ignominy is the equivalent of cashiering, but is imposed on 
ranks other than officers, in other words privates to warrant officers.  It is seen 
as a very severe punishment.125  It is not defined in the defence legislation but 
the Collins English Dictionary defines it as “disgrace or public shame.”126  It is 
the equivalent of a dishonourable discharge. 
 
The CMA has accepted the definition in the Military Justice Study Guide of the 
Naval Justice School (Newport Rhode Island) and ‘discharge with ignominy’ 
can therefore be defined as127 
 
the most severe punitive discharge; reserved for the warrant officers (W-1) and 
enlisted members who should be separated under conditions of dishonor, after 
being convicted of serious offenses of a civil and military nature warranting 
severe punishment; it may be awarded only by a General Court-Martial. 
 
The process followed in the execution of the sentence is similar to that of 
cashiering.128 The only difference lies in the escort of the accused, in this case 
the Regimental Sergeant-Major (RSM)129 of the unit who joins the escort next to 
the accused.  On parade the RSM gives the orders to the accused and not the 
escort. 
 
The consequences regarding the accused’s medals and pension fund 
contribution are the same as with cashiering.  As with imprisonment and 
cashiering, whenever an accused is sentenced to discharge with ignominy, the 
accused must be detained until review of his case is completed, but can, on 
                                               
125
 In S v Kholomba (CMA 13/99) the court opined that such a sentence could prevent or make 
it extremely difficult for an accused to find future employment. 
126
 The Ministerial Task Team para 4 defines ignominy as “a state of shame or dishonour.” 
127
 S v Kholomba (CMA 13/99). 
128
 SA Army SALO GS1/73 para 1.   
129
 The Regimental Sergeant-Major is a warrant officer class 1 appointed at a unit and is 
responsible for maintaining discipline and regimental standards at the unit. 
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application to the local representative of the Adjutant General, be released from 
custody under certain conditions.130  
 
As is the case with cashiering, discharge with ignominy is not an appropriate 
sentence for purely disciplinary offences.  In S v Kholomba131 the Court of 
Military Appeal quoted the Manual for Courts-Martial United States (1994 ed) 
with approval where it is stated that 
 
[a] dishonorable discharge should be reserved for those who should be 
separated under conditions of dishonor, after having been convicted of 
offenses usually recognized in civilian jurisdictions as felonies, or of offenses of 
a military nature requiring severe punishment. 
 
The CMA has found that such a discharge is appropriate for offences involving 
a lack of integrity and dishonesty.132  Although discharge with ignominy is not a 
mandatory sentence for any specific offence, it is mandatory whenever an 
accused of any rank other than an officer has been sentenced to 
imprisonment.133  Where such imprisonment is suspended, the discharge with 
ignominy is also suspended.  The sentence of discharge with ignominy will be 
executed before an accused is sent to prison to serve his sentence.  The same 
concerns regarding the constitutionality raised about cashiering pertaining to 
cruel, inhuman and degrading punishment as well as human dignity are 
relevant with a sentence of discharge with ignominy. 
 
 
 
                                               
130
 Section 34(9) of the MDSMA. 
131
 S v Kholomba (CMA 13/99).  This approach was confirmed in S v Nxumalo (CMA 20/99).  In 
S v Quvane (CMA 22/99) the accused was convicted of AWOL and had one previous 
conviction of AWOL.  The court stated that “the evidence did not reveal any despicable, 
contemptuous or ignominious behaviour on the part of the accused.”  The sentence was varied 
to one of discharge from the SANDF.   
132
 S v Makwela (CMA 01/2009); S v Visagie (CMA 16/2004); S v Khalankomo (CMA 47/2004); 
S v Reddy (CMA 201/2000); S v Makhanya (CMA 58/2001). 
133
 Section 93(4)(a) of the MDC. 
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6.2.4 Discharge or dismissal from the SANDF 
 
A discharge or a dismissal from the SANDF is imposed by a military court in 
those instances where the court is of the opinion that the accused’s further 
employment in the SANDF is undesirable.  A dismissal is imposed on an 
officer134 and a discharge on any rank other than an officer.135  The same 
principles apply to both. The effect of this sentence is that the accused is no 
longer in the employ of the SANDF.136  He does however retain any medals 
received during his time of service and there are no financial implications with 
regard to the pension payout of the accused.137 
 
A discharge is however still considered a serious punishment.  Considering the 
CMA’s findings as discussed above that imprisonment, cashiering or discharge 
with ignominy are not appropriate sentences for disciplinary offences, dismissal 
or discharge have been found to be “the most severe sentence that could be 
considered [for a disciplinary offence] and should only be imposed if the court 
finds that there is no mitigation that warrants a less severe sentence.”138 
 
A discharge will not be given lightly.  A perusal of CMA judgments shows that 
discharges or dismissals are only considered as appropriate sentences in those 
instances of serious transgressions or where the accused has a long record of 
previous convictions and that most of the other, lesser sentencing options have 
been exhausted and did not have the desired effect of rehabilitation or 
deterrence on the accused.139  In S v Pono140 the CMA stated the following in 
this regard: 
                                               
134
 Section 12(b)(ii) of the MDSMA. 
135
 Section 12(c)(ii) of the MDSMA. 
136
 Section 59(1)(d) of the Defence Act 42 of 2002. 
137
 Personal experience as prosecutor in the military courts. 
138
 S v Makhanya (CMA 58/2001). 
139
 S v Maphosa (CMA 198/2001) where, after numerous convictions and sentences of fines, 
suspended detention and reduction to the ranks, the court found that the accused was not 
“susceptible to discipline and should no longer be subjected thereto.”  The accused was 
subsequently discharged from the SANDF.  According to S v Msibi (CMA 52/2008) the accused 
was no longer considered a candidate for rehabilitation since he had previously been 
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The accused has a poor service record, one that is riddled with charges of 
absence without leave.  He was sentenced to fines, suspended detention, extra 
duties and effective detention.  None of these sentences seems to have had 
any rehabilitating or deterring effect.  The only appropriate sentence, therefore, 
is one of discharge from the SA National Defence Force. 
 
Where a warrant officer or non-commissioned officer is sentenced to detention, 
they may also be sentenced to a discharge from the SANDF. 141 The CMA has 
however found that it is not advisable to sentence an accused to detention and 
a discharge from the SANDF.142  The purpose of detention is to rehabilitate an 
accused within the military organisation and by discharging the accused after 
he has served his term of detention would defeat the object of the sentence of 
detention.143   
 
Where an accused has been sentenced to dismissal or discharge from the 
SANDF, the accused must be kept in custody pending the review of his case.144  
                                                                                                                                         
sentenced to a fine, suspended detention and detention but went on AWOL again.  The 
accused was discharged.  During 14 years of service the accused in S v Mkhencele (CMA 
58/2008) served only one year in which he was not absent without leave.  Fines, extra duties 
and suspended detention with the possibility of losing his rank did not deter him.  He was also 
not considered a candidate for rehabilitation and subsequently was sentenced to discharge 
from the SANDF. 
140
 S v Pono (CMA 10/2008). 
141
 Section 93(4)(b) of the MDC. 
142
 See S v Mzayifani (CMA 148/2003).  In S v Makitle (CMA 27/99) the accused was sentenced 
to a period of six months detention and discharge from the SANDF.  The Court was of the 
opinion that detention would serve no purpose because of the accused’s lack of discipline 
during deployment.  They stated that [t]here is no purpose whatsoever to attempt rehabilitation 
by means of detention.  He is simply not fit for service in a defence force.”  The sentence was 
amended to one of discharge with ignominy from the SANDF.  The approach is different in 
British military law.  Offenders who are sentenced to discharge are frequently also sentenced to 
detention.  The Military Corrective Training Centre (MCTC) Colchester provides a training 
programme for those individuals who are to be discharged on completion of their sentence of 
detention.  These inmates receive less military training but their programmes comprise a 
significant element of pre-release training aimed at assisting the offender in making a 
successful transition from military to civilian life (see OJAG at 18). 
143
 S v Khoza (CMA 82/2001). 
144
 Section 34(9) of the MDSMA.  Such an individual will be kept in the detention barracks 
pending his appeal.  Although an officer cannot be sentenced to detention, an officer may be 
kept in the detention barracks in custody, pending his appeal.  The treatment of the officer is 
different to that of a sentenced accused.  See the discussion below. 
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The accused may apply to the local representative of the Adjutant General for 
his release, pending the finalisation of his review.145 
 
6.2.5 Detention. 
 
Although detention involves the deprivation of a person’s liberty, it cannot be 
equated with a sentence of imprisonment.146  Detention was introduced as a 
punishment so that soldiers whose offences did not justify a discharge would 
not be subjected to the stigma of imprisonment.147  Where the purpose of 
imprisonment is to remove the offender from society, the reason for imposing a 
sentence of detention is to afford the offender the opportunity to rehabilitate 
himself and remain in the employ of the SANDF.148  For the same reason a 
sentence of imprisonment cannot be combined with a sentence of detention.149 
 
Under certain circumstances, such as where the accused is serving outside the 
borders of the Republic or is serving at sea, the court sentencing the accused 
                                               
145
 Section 34(11) of the MDSMA; S v Visagie (CMA 34/2000).  The situation is handled exactly 
the same as in the case of imprisonment, cashiering and discharge with ignominy. 
146
 In R v Ball, R v Rugg [1998] EWCA Crim 473 the Courts Martial Appeal Court held that a 
sentence of detention could be harsher than a similar period of imprisonment due to the fact 
that remission granted for imprisonment is half of the sentence whereas detention only remits 
one third of the sentence.  The court further did not distinguish between a sentence of 
imprisonment and detention since both constitute a deprivation of liberty.  This is clearly not 
correct.  In the subsequent case of R v Holmes [2004] EWCA Crim 3180 the Courts Martial 
Appeal Court did acknowledge the difference between imprisonment and detention.  See also S 
v Kloppers 1986 (1) SA 657 (T) for the South African approach. 
147
 Department of Defence Military Discipline Code, Regulations and Orders and Instructions 
(1940) at 496 and para (g) where it is stated that “[a] soldier who is convicted by a court-martial 
of a purely military offence, and who, at the expiration of his sentence, will rejoin his corps, 
should not ordinarily be sentenced to imprisonment.”  At this stage of its development, military 
law only required cashiering for officers sentenced to imprisonment.  Other ranks could be 
discharged, but it was not compulsory as is currently the situation (see also OJAG at 19). 
148
 S v Khoza (CMA 82/2001).  In S v Mbunga (CMA 36/2008) the accused had previous 
convictions and sentences of a reprimand, extra duties and a fine.  The CMA found that the 
military court should try and rehabilitate the offender by means of detention.  The sentence of 
discharge from the SANDF was varied to 60 days detention and reduction to the ranks.  In S v 
Seroke (CMA 44/2008) the accused had previously been sentenced to a reprimand, fines and a 
suspended sentence of detention.  It stated that “[a]t no stage was the rehabilitative effect that 
effective detention might have on the accused put to the test.”  They opined that the accused 
“deserves a final opportunity to show discipline” and his sentence of discharge from the SANDF 
was varied to 60 days’ detention and reduction to the ranks. 
149
 Section 93(2)(b) of the MDC. 
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to detention may be of the opinion that it is impractical for the accused to serve 
the period of detention and may then sentence the accused to deprivation of 
pay in lieu of detention.150 
 
Detention can be imposed by a CMJ or CSMJ for a maximum period of two 
years.151  This sentence can only be imposed on those ranks other than an 
officer, i.e. from the rank of private to warrant officer.152  Since no rank carrying 
person may serve a sentence of detention, any non-commissioned officer 
above the rank of private will also be sentenced to reduction to the ranks. 
 
This means that the accused is reduced to the rank of private, irrespective of 
his rank at the time of sentencing.  This has severe salary implications for the 
accused.  His salary is adjusted to the minimum salary of a private and he loses 
all rank seniority.  He is then on the same level as a newly appointed private.  
This has future implications for his pension payout as well.  Detention is 
therefore a very severe sentence to impose on a senior non-commissioned 
officer.  The removal of his rank is also not temporary.  Once he completes his 
sentence of detention he rejoins his colleagues at his unit as a private.  Apart 
from the monetary implications, this sentence is a very humiliating one, 
especially for senior non-commissioned officers.153  Because of the inevitable 
                                               
150
 Section 12(2) of the MDSMA.  This also applies to a sentence of confinement to barracks.  
The deprivation of pay is calculated at “the rate of one-half day’s pay for every day’s detention 
or one-quarter day’s pay for every day’s confinement to barracks, which, but for this provision, 
the military court would have imposed upon the offender.” 
151
 This is also the situation in the British Armed Forces.  The court martial may impose a 
maximum period of two years’ detention.  Detention is however also a sentence that can be 
imposed by a commanding officer at a summary hearing.  Commanding officers may sentence 
an accused below the rank of lance corporal to detention.  The maximum period that can be 
imposed by a commanding officer with basic powers is 28 days and where the commanding 
officer has extended powers the maximum period of detention that can be imposed is 90 days. 
152
 Section 12(1)(d) of the MDSMA read with r 112 of the MDSMA. 
153
 It has been the author’s experience that senior non-commissioned officers would rather ask 
for a sentence of discharge from the SANDF than one of detention.  Notice should be taken of 
the situation in the British Armed Forces.  Where a warrant officer or non-commissioned officer 
is sentenced to detention by the court martial, the accused is not automatically reduced to the 
ranks.  The court martial may reduce him to the ranks or to any lower rank than the one held at 
the time of sentencing.  Where he is not reduced to the rank, the non-commissioned officer is 
treated as a private for the duration of his sentence of detention and after completion of his 
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consequences of this sentence, effective detention is not a sentence that is 
imposed lightly by the court.  A perusal of CMA judgments shows that an 
accused is more likely to receive a sentence of suspended detention.  
Detention can be suspended either wholly or partially.154 
 
Because of the serious consequences attached to this punishment, the court 
must be of the opinion that the offence is serious enough to warrant a sentence 
of detention.  If the crime is serious enough, the court must consider, taking into 
account all factors, whether detention would be an appropriate sentence.  Once 
the court determines that it is an appropriate sentence, the court must decide 
on the length of the sentence.  Although the period imposed must be the 
shortest period that would be appropriate under the circumstances, it should be 
long enough so that rehabilitation can take place.155  The CMA does not 
provide any guidelines in this regard nor do the South African military detention 
barracks currently have any rehabilitation programmes.  No research has been 
done on the effectiveness of the drill and physical training regime currently 
used in rehabilitating offenders.  Much can therefore be learned from the British 
rehabilitation programme followed at MTCT Colchester.156 
 
A person sentenced to detention must be kept in custody pending the review of 
his case and may apply to the local representative of the Adjutant General for 
release from custody pending finalisation of the review.157  A sentence of 
detention will continue to run even if the offender ceases to be subject to the 
                                                                                                                                         
sentence he regains his original rank or the lower rank that he has been sentenced to (see s 
294(1) of the Armed Forces Act 2006; OJAG at 17). 
154
 Section 12(3) of the MDSMA.  See the discussion on the suspension of sentences in ch 5 at 
para 5.8 above. 
155
 See also Manual of Service Law (2011) 1(2) at 1-13-16 and 1-13-25. 
156
 See the discussion at para 6.2.5.2 below. 
157
 Section 34(9) and (11) of the MDSMA.  The accused is kept in the detention barracks 
pending his appeal.  He is however treated differently from sentenced individuals.  See the 
discussion below.  In British military law the question whether the accused will start serving his 
detention sentence depends on the accused.  The accused must, after sentence, indicate 
whether he wants to start his sentence immediately or postpone it with 14 days to allow him to 
appeal the sentence. 
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MDC during the time of serving his sentence,158 such as when the offender’s 
contract expires while he is still serving his sentence of detention.  He will only 
be discharged from the SANDF on completion of the sentence. 
 
Detention must be served in the detention barracks (military correctional 
facilities).159  The Minister may establish one or more detention barracks or 
appoint certain premises to be used as detention barracks.160  There are 
currently only two detention barracks operational in South Africa.  One is 
situated in Wynberg, Cape Town and the other in Bloemfontein.  There are 
currently no other premises directed as detention barracks.  The Minister is also 
responsible for drawing up regulations for the detention barracks.  The current 
regulations are outdated.161  The General Officer Commanding of the SANDF in 
command of troops on deployment outside the borders of the Republic may 
establish a detention barracks where offenders sentenced to detention outside 
the borders may serve their sentence.162  The Minister may also authorise an 
offender outside the borders to serve detention in any detention barracks or 
                                               
158
 Section 93(6)(b) of the MDC.  In terms of s 104(5)(c) of the Defence Act 44 of 1957 the MDC 
applies to all persons lawfully detained or serving a sentence of detention or imprisonment in 
terms of the MDC.  This was confirmed n Nyaphuli v Minister of Defence [2008] JOL 22381 (O) 
at 3, where the court applied s 104(5)(c) to a former member of the SANDF serving a sentence 
of imprisonment in a civilian prison although the offender was no longer a member of the 
SANDF since being sentenced to imprisonment and discharge with ignominy by a military court. 
159
 Section 119 of the MDC.  Detention barracks are defined in the Detention Barracks 
Regulations as “any place, prison or detention barracks appointed or established in terms of 
section one hundred and twelve of the Act [Act 44 of 1957] or section one hundred and twenty 
or one hundred and twenty-one of the Code.” 
160
 Section 120(2) of the MDC.  The British Armed Forces only has one detention facility, the 
MCTC Colchester. 
161
 Section 120(3) of the MDC; s 82(1)(u) of the Defence Act 42 of 2002.  The detention 
barracks are regulated by the Detention Barracks Regulations – GN R1190/61, published under 
Government Notice R1190 in Government Gazette Extraordinary 131 of 8 December 1961, as 
amended by GN R1949 in GG 5317 dated 22 October 1976 and GN R569 dated 1984.  The 
Regulations are to be replaced by Military Police Agency Instruction (MPAI) 29/2006: 
Procedures on the Management and Administration of Military Correctional Facilities in the 
DOD pending the approval of the Department of Defence Instruction (DODI)/MPA/00001/2006:  
Management and Administration of Military Correctional Facilities in the DOD, but to date the 
instruction has not been approved. 
162
 Section 121(1) of the MDC. 
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place of confinement established or controlled by a commander of another 
force serving in co-operation with the SANDF.163 
 
Where an offender is serving his sentence in the detention barracks he may be 
removed to any other detention barracks to serve the rest of the unexpired 
portion of his sentence.164  Outside of the Military Police Agency, who is 
responsible for the detention barracks, few people are aware of what the 
sentence actually entails.  Concern has been raised regarding the nature of the 
sentence and the detention barrack’s compliance with the United Nations 
Convention against Torture.165  Detention is a harsh punishment but to 
determine whether it is so harsh that it contravenes the UN Convention Against 
Torture, a brief overview is given of the current management regime followed in 
the detention barracks. 
 
6.2.5.1 The detention barracks 
 
In its evaluation of the detention barracks the Department of Defence (DOD) 
made the following policy statement:166 
 
The MPA [military police agency] is responsible for the management and 
administration of MCF’s167 in the SANDF.  A quantum leap must, however, be 
taken that will shed the present negative image of MCF’s and move to that of 
                                               
163
 Section 121(3) of the MDC. 
164
 Rule 114 of the MDSMA. 
165
 See Munting L Guide to the UN Convention Against Torture in South Africa (2008) at 23.  
Munting could not evaluate the regulations to see whether the regime and management of the 
detention barracks comply with the UN Convention since the DOD was busy redrafting the 
regulations.  These regulations have to date not been finalised.  See also Jobson M and 
Bantjes M South African No Torture Consortium Launched (2008) who said that “[r]esearch has 
shown that the understanding of torture and the necessity of its absolute prohibition is 
completely absent from the operational procedures of military detention barracks…” 
166
 MPAI 29/2006 at 1-10.  This view is also in line with the opinion of the CMA regarding the 
rehabilitative value of the sentence of detention (see S v Makitle (CMA 27/99); S v Msibi (CMA 
52/2008)). 
167
 The colloquial term “detention barracks” was replaced with the term “military correctional 
facility” or MCF.  “Detention barracks” is used throughout this thesis since it is the most widely 
known term. 
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an institution of educators, facilitators and mentors of constructive development 
that facilitate positive behavioural change.  This implies that all involved with 
MCF’s will have to ensure that military offenders confined in MCF’s will be 
accepted back into society as productive contributors. 
 
It was consequently identified that the detention barracks’ regulations had to be 
brought in line with the Constitution, the Correctional Services Act, the Defence 
Act and the international principles for the treatment of inmates.168 The SANDF 
based its new procedures on the UN standards and minimum rules for the 
treatment of offenders.  It should be noted at this stage that although the 
relevant Department if Defence Instruction (DODI) has not yet been approved, 
the MCF’s have as far as possible already implemented the procedures set out 
in this document.169 
 
The basis for the treatment of inmates at the detention barracks is grounded in 
the international principles that all persons under confinement must be treated 
in a humane manner with respect for the inherent dignity of all individuals.  No 
person must be subjected to torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment 
and individuals who are awaiting trial should be kept separately from those who 
have already been sentenced.170 
 
Male and female inmates are segregated.  All meals, training, free time and 
outdoor programmes are rotated so that contact between these two groups is 
prevented.  Provision is also made for pregnant females and female inmates 
                                               
168
 MPAI 29/2006 at 1-1 and 1-5. 
169
 The MPAI and the Department of Defence Instruction (DODI) of 2006 provides for the 
implementation of skills upliftment training that must be presented to the inmates.  Due to the 
fact that the relevant departmental instructions have not yet been approved, skills upliftment 
training has not yet been implemented.  Discussions are currently underway to determine 
whether Bloemfontein MCF should be designated as a rehabilitation correctional facility and 
Wynberg as the disciplinary correctional facility.  It may however be more cost effective to treat 
both MCF’s equally where it is not necessary to transfer an inmate from one MCF to another. 
170
 MPAI 29/2006 at 1-5; United Nations Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of 
Prisoners (1977) as adopted by the First UN Congress on the Prevention of Crime and 
Treatment of Offenders. 
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with infants.171  Arrested and sentenced members are kept separately and short 
and medium-term sentenced members are segregated from long-term 
sentenced members.172 
 
Certain requirements are set out for cell accommodation such as sufficient floor 
space so that the inmate can sleep comfortably and move freely within the cell, 
sufficient light, ventilation and access to ablution facilities.  Although provision is 
made that inmates may share cells, due to the low number of inmates at the 
detention barracks, inmates are kept in separate cells.173  They are also 
allowed visits by professional officers.174 
 
6.2.5.2 Admission procedures 
 
On admission to the detention barracks the offender is searched and must 
surrender all property.  No staff member is allowed to do a body cavity search 
and if it is determined that such a search is necessary, a medical officer must 
be called to conduct the search. 175  His family and his unit are informed by 
means of a letter setting out inter alia his schedule for visits, telephone calls 
and his envisaged release date. 176 
                                               
171
 MPAI 29/2006 at 2-4.  It is almost unheard of for females to be sentenced to detention.  In a 
perusal of the CMA judgments of 1999 to February 2011 no example was found of a female 
sentenced to effective detention. 
172
 MPAI 29/2006 at 2-4.  Short-term sentences are those sentenced to between 1 to 30 days 
detention, medium terms to between 31 and 60 days and long-term sentences as periods 
longer that 61 days. 
173
 MPAI 29/2006 at 2-5.  For example, during June/July 2011 the Wynberg MCF only had two 
inmates in custody. 
174
 MPAI 29/2006 at 2-14.  Professional officers include health care workers, environmental 
health officers, the chaplain, social work officer, psychologist, military legal practitioner, medical 
officer or any other person with statutory inspection authority.  These officers have unrestricted 
access to the inmates and may make appointments at any time to see inmates. 
175
 MPAI 29/2006 at 3-5.  Where an officer is admitted the admission procedures are exactly the 
same except that no private or non-commissioned officer may search an officer.  Only an officer 
can search another officer. 
176
 MPAI 29/2006 at 3-9.  Remission of sentence means “that portion of a sentence of a person 
serving a sentence that is remitted by one quarter of his sentence” (see MPAI 29/2006 at 1-4).  
Remission will therefore always be a quarter of the sentence, irrespective of the length of the 
sentence imposed.  Remission at MCTC Colchester is calculated depending on the length of 
the sentence imposed.  No remission is allocated up to a period of 24 days’ detention imposed.  
Where the offender is sentenced to 25 days, 35 days are allocated on a sliding scale of up to 
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The inmate is informed of his rights in terms of section 35 of the Constitution 
and he is informed of the Legal Satellite Office Hotline number after which 
certificates are issued in this regard which the inmate signs as 
acknowledgement.177 
 
The inmate is brought on office bearing at the commanding officer of the MCF 
within the first working day of his admission.  The commanding officer informs 
him of the classification system,178 the privileges that he should strive for, the 
routine as well as discipline expected from him. 
 
Where the inmate is a rank bearing member he will be informed of his choice to 
wear his rank for the duration of his confinement.  No rank bearing members 
                                                                                                                                         
one third remission to ensure that the inmate actually serves at least 24 days’ detention.  
Additional remission can be earned for a sentence of over 90 days to be allocated at the 
discretion of the commandant of the MCTC of up to one sixth of his sentence (see Manual of 
Service Law (2011) 1(2) at 1-13-25; OJAG at 18). 
177
 MPAI 29/2006 at 3-7.  The Legsato Hotline number is the cellphone number of the military 
defence counsel who is on duty at the relevant legal satellite office.  See also Munting L 
Preventing and Combating Torture in South Africa: A Framework for Action Under CAT and 
OPCAT (Torture Booklet) (2008) at 7; S v Makwanyane 1995 (3) SA 391 (CC) para 143 where 
the court held that people in prison “retain all the rights to which every person is entitled under 
chap 3, subject only to limitations imposed by the prison regime that are justifiable.” 
178
 There are four categories within this system.  A-class inmates receive the most privileges 
and are identified by means of a red identification ribbon worn on the left breast pocket.  They 
are allowed to wear their field dress belt (webbelt) during their daily routine and are allowed to 
wear their camouflage uniform on Fridays.  B-class inmates have less privileges and are 
identified by wearing a blue identification ribbon on the left breast pocket.  They are allowed to 
wear their field dress belt on Fridays.  C-class inmates wear the normal MCF overall and have 
restricted allocated privileges.  All inmates are classified as C-class inmates on admission to 
the MCF.  D-class inmates are the lowest category and have no privileges.  They wear the 
normal MCF overall and are identified by wearing the red combat helmet inner (doiby) when in 
the unit lines.  Outside unit lines the doiby is substituted with the camouflage hat.  If the inmate 
commits an offence during his period of detention and is tried by disciplinary hearing, he will 
immediately be demoted to D-class (see MPAI 29/2006 at 4-7).  The classification system is 
implemented as a reward system where positive actions are rewarded and the inmate is held 
accountable for his actions by demotion to a lower category if he does not comply with the set 
standard (see MPAI 29/2006 at 4-1).  The staff officers complete evaluation sheets for the 
classification system.  Evaluations are done twice daily and inmates are evaluated on the 
cleanliness of their cells, their personal appearance and hygiene, their conduct, which includes 
their discipline and military bearing, as well as their behaviour.  Where the inmate is a first 
offender, he is considered for re-classification after a period of 21 days and a repeat offender is 
only considered for reclassification after a period of 35 days.  Thereafter reclassification is 
considered on a monthly basis (see MPAI 29/2006 at 4-7). 
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may undergo a sentence of detention but it may happen that a rank bearing 
member is admitted either because he was arrested for an offence and is now 
awaiting trial, or he has been sentenced to imprisonment, dismissal or 
discharge but is awaiting review of his sentence. 
 
He may choose to either wear his rank insignia, in which case he will be kept in 
segregation,179 or choose not to wear his rank and participate in the soldiership 
training.  He will be addressed by his rank but will not be afforded any saluting 
and compliments for the duration of his confinement.180  Where he refuses to 
exercise a choice, the commanding officer will choose on his behalf and he will 
be kept in segregation. 
 
6.2.5.3 Detention barracks routine 
 
Different routine are followed on weekdays than over the weekends and public 
holidays.181 
 
During the week inmates are woken at 04h00 each morning when they must 
immediately leave their beds and start preparation for their morning cell 
inspection in accordance with precise military specification.  After reveille it is 
morning hygiene and cleaning of the cells, ablution and offices, followed by the 
morning inspection of the cells, ablution blocks, beds, trunks and the 
                                               
179
 If an inmate is kept in segregation he is allowed to eat in his cell, conduct his ablution routine 
in isolation and smoke in the demarcated area of his cell block.  The rest of the time he is 
mostly confined to his cell and his daily fitness exercises are also done in isolation.  Where a 
rank bearing member is detained pending his trial, he need not make a choice.  He will 
automatically be kept in segregation and his rank will be respected, except that no saluting and 
compliments will be shown. 
180
 MPAI 29/2006 at 6-1.  The other inmates will be informed on parade of the status of the rank 
bearing inmate so that they may know to address him on his rank.  He will however not be 
saluted by the staff officers or the other inmates and they will not stand to attention when 
addressing him.  He is not in command and control of the staff or other inmates, irrespective of 
his rank. 
181
 This discussion is based on MPAI 29/2006. 
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inmates.182  It is usually during this time that inmates can report sick and must 
then be referred to the medical officer. 
 
Inmates are released from their cells for the breakfast parade.  Breakfast is 
eaten in the mess hall and no conversation is allowed between inmates.  They 
wash their utensils in the kitchen area and all utensils are handed back to the 
staff officers.  This is followed by a smoke parade, where those inmates who 
smoke are issued with a cigarette.183  This is followed by medicine parade 
where inmates are issued with their prescribed medication.  All appointments 
with specialist officers are confirmed at this time. 
 
Soldiership training is started with a morning parade where scripture reading 
and prayers are held, but religious observance is voluntary.  Training consists 
of a period of parade ground drill sessions, which would include punishment 
drill, overseen by a qualified drill instructor, followed by a period of physical 
training (PT) given by a qualified PT instructor to enhance the inmates’ fitness 
and preparedness. 
 
Provision is made for a period of skills upliftment training,184 but as mentioned, 
this has not yet been implemented.  In lieu if skills upliftment, the detention 
barracks continues with soldiership training.185  Periods are however made 
                                               
182
 Hygiene is important and a hygiene register is kept.  A compulsory weekly hygiene 
inspection is done on inmates’ feet, hands and skin, weekly inspections are done by an 
environmental health officer who must inspect the offices and facilities and a quarterly 
fumigation is done. 
183
 Inmates are not allowed to borrow, take or give cigarettes to or from other inmates.  If they 
do not have a cigarette then they do not smoke. 
184
 It is forseen that skills upliftment training will be presented to medium and long-term inmates.  
Such training will be presented by qualified instructors or teachers and a qualification certificate 
will be presented to the inmate on completion of the training.  Language proficiency and basic 
numeracy has been identified by the Centre for Advanced Training as two of the most 
significant shortcomings of DOD personnel.  It is also suggested that inmates undergo 
awareness training in topics such as domestic violence, equal opportunities, HIV and AIDS and 
stress management. 
185
 Soldiership training includes constructive labour such as external labour in work teams.  The 
commanding officer may authorise the use of work teams where sentenced inmates will be 
taken outside the MCF to conduct maintenance.  They are not allowed to do any other labour 
and before work teams are authorised, the commanding officer must first consider the Bill of 
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available to professional officers on an ad hoc basis for presentations to the 
inmates on various issues such as HIV/AIDS awareness lectures. 
 
Lunch, smoke parade and medicine parade is handled the same way as during 
breakfast.  If any of the inmates have an appointment with a specialist officer, 
the appointments will be conducted after lunch.  This is once again followed by 
soldiership training, including parade ground drill, PT and constructive labour. 
 
The evening programme consists of supper parade, smoke and medicine 
parade.  This is followed by evening hygiene parade which includes personal 
hygiene and cleaning of the ablution facilities after which inmates are given the 
opportunity for reading or studies.186  At lights out a final cell inspection is done. 
 
During weekends no training is done and it is up to the commanding officer to 
determine the programme for the weekends.  Reveille, morning parade, 
inspections and meals are the same as during week days.  During the time 
when training would have been done, opportunity is given to inmates to receive 
visitors and visit the MCF library, in accordance with their privileges.  Time is 
allocated to wash and iron uniforms and personal items, to write letters and 
make telephone calls.  The attendance of church parade is not compulsory and 
those who do not wish to attend are locked in their cells for the duration of the 
parade.  Although no constructive labour is done over weekends, inmates may 
request to be allowed to do constructive labour.  The senior staff member must 
then allow the inmates to do such labour if MCF control staff are available. 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                         
Rights and the possible harm to the dignity of the inmate when working outside the MCF.  They 
will only be allowed to work in military units.  Rank bearing members are not allowed to work in 
work teams, unless they have requested to do so in writing. 
186
 Although inmates will not be allowed to start with studies at state expense while in detention, 
if an inmate was busy with study at state expense he may get authority to continue with his 
studies while he is serving his sentence of detention. 
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6.2.5.4 Parole 
 
A military inmate can be released on parole.187  It can however not be 
compared with the parole granted to an inmate from a civilian prison.  In terms 
of the regulations an inmate may apply in writing to the commanding officer for 
release on parole who may then grant parole to the inmate for a maximum 
period of seven days on certain conditions.188  Parole in this context should 
rather be classified as leave.  When an inmate is released on parole, any 
vacation leave that he has available must be utilised for the period on parole 
and if he has no leave credit available special leave without pay must be 
used.189  After the period of seven days he must return to complete his 
sentence of detention.  The period for which parole has been granted cannot be 
used to extend the sentence. 
 
6.2.5.5 Solitary confinement and mechanical restraints 
 
Another matter that may be of concern regarding the UN Convention against 
Torture is the use of solitary confinement and mechanical restraints. 
 
The MCF Regulations provides for two types of solitary confinement: 
 
                                               
187
 Parole is defined in MPAI 29/2006 at 1-4 as “conditional release of an inmate in terms of the 
MCF Regulations.” 
188
 Clause 14(2) of the Detention Barracks Regulations of 1961, as amended by Government 
Notice R1949 GG 5317 dated 22 October 1976.  Parole can be granted where there is, inter 
alia, death or serious illness of a wife or relative by consanguinity or affinity in the 1st or 2nd 
degree, serious domestic difficulty or any other circumstances that the commanding officer may 
deem sufficient. 
189
 Clause 14(5) of the Detention Barracks Regulations.  In S v Mathibela (CMA 28/2002) the 
accused was granted parole [the court referred to it as leave] from the detention barracks to 
attend his mother’s funeral.  While on parole, he requested an extension of his leave which was 
not granted.  He only returned after 20 days and was subsequently charged for AWOL.  In 
terms of the Detention Barracks Regulations he had to serve an extra 25 days of detention, 
which seems to be the whole period of his absence and he forfeited the three months remission 
he was entitled to in terms of the Regulations.  The court a quo sentenced him to discharge 
from the SANDF but the CMA regarded the 25 days extra detention and forfeiture of remission 
as mitigation, even though it was because of his own actions, and varied the sentence to a 
R5000 fine and a further suspended sentence of  120 days of detention. 
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1. Administrative close confinement. 
 
2. Disciplinary solitary confinement. 
 
Administrative close confinement can be imposed by the commanding officer of 
the MCF for a number of reasons.  It is usually given for protective reasons, 
either to protect the inmate from other inmates or from himself, where it is 
necessary to protect evidence in a criminal investigation, where the inmate 
intentionally acts disorderly for a continuous period of time or when requested 
by the inmate.  Such an application by the inmate must be accompanied by a 
professional officer’s report.  A close confinement order must be reviewed on a 
weekly basis and special quarters must be provided.190 
 
Disciplinary solitary confinement can only be imposed as a court sentence, as 
discussed below.  The detention barracks cannot confine an inmate to solitary 
confinement as a punishment for poor discipline or behaviour. 
 
Where an inmate is sentenced to solitary confinement the inmate will forfeit his 
privileges linked to his category of privileges, he will not be allowed to do 
constructive work and will do his PT periods of 30 minutes each in isolation.  He 
must keep his cell clean and may not be deprived of his normal cell 
furnishings.191 
 
The question that must be answered is which court can impose a sentence of 
solitary confinement.  Military courts, including the CODH, can only impose 
those sentences provided in section 12 of the MDSMA.  There is no provision in 
the MDSMA, Defence Act or the MDC that provides for solitary confinement as 
part of the sentence of detention.  The regulations do however provide for a trial 
                                               
190
 MPAI 29/2006 at 7-1. 
191
 MPAI 29/2006 at 7-2.  Cell furnishings may only be removed where an inmate shows serious 
destructive tendencies, in which case the inmate must be provided with a sleeping mat, or 
where an inmate has suicidal tendencies when everything is removed that he can use to harm 
himself. 
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by a superintendent of the detention barracks.192  In the current terminology it 
would refer to a trial by the detention barracks’ commanding officer.  In terms of 
the regulations such a court may sentence an inmate to inter alia solitary 
confinement, forfeiture of privileges or extra labour.  Since the MPAI was 
drafted in 2006, after the implementation of the new military court system, one 
would expect the drafters to have taken the sentencing jurisdiction in terms of 
section 12 of the MDSMA into consideration.  However, since an inmate 
serving detention remains subject to the MDC, any offences committed during 
the serving of his sentence will fall under the jurisdiction of the commanding 
officer.  The commanding officer of the detention barracks in Wynberg, for 
example, holds the rank of captain and is therefore not authorised to conduct 
disciplinary hearings.  It should be kept in mind that where there is a conflict 
between the MDSMA and any other legislation, or in this instance the 
regulations, the MDSMA will prevail.193  It is submitted that disciplinary solitary 
confinement is not a punishment that can be imposed.  Currently, pending 
approval of the Department of Defence Instructions, solitary confinement is not 
used in the detention barracks. 
 
The commanding officer does however have a limited disciplinary jurisdiction 
over inmates.  Depending on the seriousness and nature of the transgression 
by the inmate, the commanding officer may have the inmate appear before him 
on office bearing. The commanding officer may impose such corrective 
measures as he may deem appropriate, for example limiting the inmate’s 
privileges for a certain period of time.194  All such actions must be recorded. 
 
 
 
 
                                               
192
 Clause 2 Chapter IV “Discipline” in the Detention Barracks Regulations of 1961. 
193
 Section 4(1) of the MDSMA. 
194
 In an interview with the warrant officer in charge of the Wynberg MCF it was indicated that a 
typical disciplinary measure would be for example to take way an inmate’s smoking privileges 
for a period of five days.  No limitation may be placed on meals, medical appointments, etc. 
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6.2.5.6 MTCT Colchester training and education programmes 
 
The CMA propagates detention as a rehabilitative sentence.  However, as 
discussed above, programmes to this effect are not yet operational in the South 
African detention barracks.  The detention barracks also have no experience in 
running rehabilitation programmes.  Since the British military justice system 
provides for detention as a sentence it may be of some assistance to compare 
the MCF with MTCT Colchester as a possible benchmark for the 
implementation of rehabilitative programmes.  MTCT Colchester makes 
provision for three types of inmates.  Those who have been arrested and are 
kept in custody pending trial; those who have been sentenced and are housed 
in A-company and those who has been sentenced to discharge on completion 
of their detention housed in D-company.  The South African detention barracks 
only makes provision for the first two of these categories. 
 
The MTCT have extensive training facilities which include an outdoor range, a 
small arms trainer, sports field and an assault course.  The education wing 
offers a wide range of courses and is central to the rehabilitative function of the 
centre.195  The training regime is designed on a six month rotational basis.196  
This is in stark contrast to the South African detention barracks which have 
none of these facilities.  All weapon ranges and sports fields are situated 
outside the barracks and inmates do not have access thereto. 
 
Colchester has three different training programmes.  The basic programme 
consists of a four week programme concentrating mainly on fitness training and 
weapons handling.  Any accused sentenced to 42 days detention or less 
undertakes this programme.197 
 
                                               
195
 Manual of Service Law (2011) 1(2) at 1-13-C-1; Ministry of Defence A Guide to the Military 
Corrective Training Centre (2011) in general. 
196
 OJAG at 18. 
197
 Manual of Service Law (2011) 1(2) at 1-13-C-2. 
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There is a twenty week modular programme covering subjects such as 
weapons, field craft, aircraft recognition, map reading, health and hygiene and 
education.  This programme is presented to inmates that have been sentenced 
to periods of longer than 42 days.198 
 
Inmates that are sentenced for periods of more than two rotations (more than 
12 months) take part in special programmes for the completion of advanced 
training which may include work in the community.199 
 
Apart from the above programmes inmates must also attend modules designed 
to cover individual training.200  These modules include themes such as 
substance abuse, equality and diversity training.  The education wing is 
responsible for improving the inmates’ verbal and written communication skills 
so that they can be more receptive to further training.  It also offers course work 
to facilitate the attainment of nationally recognised qualifications.201 
 
Those inmates who are sentenced to discharge after completion of their period 
of detention (D-company), are also subjected to training.  They do not receive 
as much military training as A-company, but have to do a number of PT periods 
each week to keep up their level of fitness.  They carry out resettlement, 
education and vocational training.  Some examples of vocational training are 
plumbing or training as motor mechanics.  They are also involved in community 
projects such as literacy and numeracy instruction where required.202 
                                               
198
 Manual of Service Law (2011) 1(2) at 1-13-C-2. 
199
 Manual of Service Law (2011) 1(2) at 1-13-C-2; OJAG at 18. 
200
 Manual of Service Law (2011) 1(2) at 1-13-C-2.  A retired officer and his assistant, usually a 
senior non-commissioned officer, are appointed to take responsibility for the welfare of all the 
inmates.  These individuals are trained in sentence planning where the training, education and 
individual training modules are determined.  Sentence planning is done for each inmate upon 
arrival at MCTC Colchester.  An individual approach is favoured by the MCTC because 
“[i]nmates at MCTC can range from those accused of serious offences, to immature people who 
have had difficulty coping with Service life.  Many need to learn self-discipline or require help to 
establish their self-confidence and to develop a positive approach to life” (see in this regard 
Manual of Service Law (2011) 1(2) at 1-13-C-3). 
201
 For a more detailed account see Manual of Service Law (2011) 1(2) at 1-13-C-2. 
202
 Manual of Service Law (2011) 1(2) at 1-13-C-2. 
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Discharged individuals are therefore also rehabilitated and retrained to make a 
positive contribution when leaving the Armed Forces. 
 
If the SANDF is really serious about the rehabilitation of ill-disciplined soldiers, 
and turning them into productive, disciplines individuals, then serious 
consideration should be given to similar training programmes as those run by 
MTCT Colchester.  Although the SANDF would probably be hampered by 
budget constraints it is suggested that the SANDF utilises the various experts 
already in the employ of the SANDF to assist in this regard. 
 
6.2.5.7 The military detention barracks and CAT 
 
Although an attempt is being made towards the better treatment of inmates in 
the detention barracks, serious shortcomings remain.  In spite of the DOD’s 
policy statement that the MCF management and regime must be brought in line 
with the Constitution and international UN standards, it is a serious concern that 
the provisions of the UN Convention against Torture, and Other Cruel, Inhuman 
or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CAT)203 and the Optional Protocol to 
CAT (OPCAT) 204 have not been implemented in the context of MCF’s. 
 
With the prominence of human dignity as a core value of the Constitution, the 
humane treatment of inmates in places of detention cannot be over-
emphasised.205  People who are deprived of their liberty are vulnerable and at 
                                               
203
 Ratified by South Africa in 1998.  The emphasis of CAT is on the criminalisation, prosecution 
and the punishment of perpetrators of CAT (see Munting Torture Booklet at 2). 
204
 Signed by South Africa in 2006, but not yet ratified.  The emphasis of OPCAT is the 
prevention of torture and cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment (see Munting 
Torture Booklet at 2; Streater O Review of Existing Mechanisms for the Prevention and 
Investigation of Torture and Cruel, Inhuman and Degrading Treatment or Punishment in South 
Africa (2008) at 2. 
205
 See ss 10, 12(1)(e) and 37 of the Constitution; Stanfield v Minister of Correctional Services 
2003 (12) BCLR 1384 (C) para 88; Strydom v Minister of Correctional Services 1999 (3) BCLR 
342 (W) para 14; Munting at 8. 
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risk of human rights violations.206  They must be protected against such 
violations. 
 
The right not to be tortured or subjected to cruel, inhuman or degrading 
punishment and treatment was realised in various international human rights 
documents.207  Because of our history this right is also enshrined in our 
Constitution208 but Munting warns against understanding it from a purely 
historical and political perspective.209  It is not only political prisoners that are at 
risk but in fact any person who “is deprived of their liberty at the mercy of 
officials of the state.”210 
 
Where people are detained they have no freedom of choice and are totally 
dependent on the officials who are detaining them.  Any pressure placed on 
such an individual can consequently be seen as an interference with the 
individual’s dignity.211 Prisons are not the only institutions that deprive 
individuals of their freedom.  Other such institutions include police detention 
cells, foreign national repatriation centres and psychiatric hospitals.212  The 
military detention barracks clearly also deprives its inmates of their freedom.213  
As such this means that the MCF must comply with the requirements for the 
protection of individuals against torture or cruel, inhuman and degrading 
treatment or punishment.214 
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 Munting Torture Booklet at 6. 
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 The prohibition on torture has been recognised since 1948 by its inclusion in the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights (see Streater at 14 for a list of international treaties ratified by 
South Africa). 
208
 Section 12(1)(d)-(e) of the Constitution. 
209
 Munting at 15; Streater at 2-3. 
210
 Munting at 15; Munting Torture Booklet at 4. 
211
 Munting at 16.  According to Novak M & McArthur E “The Distinction Between Torture and 
Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Punishment” (2006) Torture 16(3) 147 at 150 the distinction 
between torture and cruel, inhuman or degrading punishment does not lie in the intensity of the 
pain or suffering, but in the powerlessness of the victim.  
212
 Munting at 17; Streater at 6. 
213
 Munting at 17.  . 
214
 Deprivation of liberty is described as “…any form of detention or imprisonment or the 
placement of a person in a public or private of custodial setting which that person is not 
permitted to leave at will by order of any judicial, administrative or other authority” (see Streater 
at 6; article 4(1) of the OPCAT).  Inmates at the MCF are not completely left to the mercy of the 
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The main concern raised by Munting in this regard is the fact that the MCF’s 
are not subject to any independent oversight and inmates’ recourse are limited 
to internal complaints procedures.215  The internal complaints procedure is 
inadequate in protecting an individual inmate who complains.  Because the 
inmate is still a member of the SANDF and subject to military law and 
discipline, any complaint must follow the official command and control channel.  
A complaint is registered during the morning hygiene period to the MCF 
personnel on duty who makes the required entry into the occurrence book 
where the matter will be attended to by the MCF commanding officer.  Matters 
that the commanding officer cannot attend to are forwarded to the MCF 
Committee for attention.  The MCF commanding officer gives feedback to the 
inmate and where he is not satisfied with the outcome the matter can be 
referred to the MCF Committee again.  Where required, a final decision on the 
matter can be taken by the Chief of the Military Police Agency and his decision 
is final. 
 
External, independent oversight is however extremely important in the context 
of detention.  Because detention facilities are not open to public scrutiny, 
inmates are particularly vulnerable to human rights violations.  There can be no 
                                                                                                                                         
staff officers.  Although CAT has not been implemented, staff officers must comply with the 
South African Army Order setting out guidelines for the prevention of ill-treatment of members 
of the SA Army.  These guidelines will apply to other arms of service as well (see in this regard 
South African Defence Force Maatreëls Ter Voorkoming van Mishandeling van Lede van die 
SA Leër (1993)).  This order generally defines ill-treatment as “enige optrede wat neig om ‘n 
persoon fisies of geestelik te benadeel of sy selfrespek of waardigheid aan te tas.”  It re-iterates 
that intensive training within the prescribed training guidelines cannot be seen as ill-treatment.  
It further, inter alia, gives guidelines for the imposition of extra drill, imposed as corrective 
punishment or corrective training and physical training.  Both extra drill and physical training 
whether as punishment or training, must be given within the acceptable training guidelines 
provided.  No bad language may be used and any physical training or drill may only be given by 
qualified instructors.  Parade ground drill and physical training presented at the detention 
barracks must comply with these guidelines. 
215
 Munting at 23.  The internal complaints procedure is set out in MPAI 29/2006 at 5-14 to 5-15. 
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accountability if there is no transparency.216  This is why the provisions of 
OPCAT are of importance. 217 
 
OPCAT aims to prevent torture and improve conditions of detainees through 
regular visits to places of detention by an international body (the Sub 
Committee to the Prevention of Torture (SPT)) and national bodies (known as 
National Preventive Mechanisms or “NPM”s) and by confidential and open 
dialogue with the state. 
 
Torture has been defined as218 
 
any act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is 
intentionally inflicted on a person for such purposes as obtaining from him or a 
third person information or a confession, punishing him for an act he or a third 
person has committed or is suspected of having committed, or intimidating or 
coercing him or a third person, or for any reason based on discrimination of any 
kind, when such pain or suffering is inflicted by or at the instigation of or with 
the consent or acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in an 
official capacity.  It does not include pain or suffering arising only from, inherent 
in or incidental to lawful sanctions. 
 
However, acts which do not qualify as torture are also prohibited.  See Article 
16 of the CAT which states that 
 
[e]ach State Party shall undertake to prevent in any territory under its 
jurisdiction other acts of cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment 
which do not amount to torture as defined in article 1, when such acts are 
committed by or at the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a 
public official or other person acting in an official capacity. 
 
                                               
216
 Munting Torture Booklet at 12. 
217
 Streater at 1. 
218
 Article 1 of the CAT. 
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It is not always clear what the difference between torture and cruel, inhuman 
and degrading treatment or punishment in terms of CAT is.  When considering 
whether the conditions of the detention constitutes torture or should rather 
qualify as cruel, inhuman or degrading, the European Court and European 
Commission on Human Rights have found that the cumulative effects of inter 
alia overcrowding, inadequate sanitation, heating, light, food and contact should 
be considered and that such conditions, which on their own may constitute 
cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment, may cumulatively amount to torture.219 
 
The ill-treatment of prisoners has received wide attention by the South African 
courts.  The court has on occasion found that the confinement of awaiting trial 
prisoners in “punishment cells” was a “wrongful and intentional interference with 
the absolute rights relating to personality, to which every man is entitled.”220 
 
This approach was confirmed in Goldberg v Minister of Prisons221 where the 
court found that 
 
[i]t seems to me that fundamentally a convicted and sentenced prisoner retains 
all the basic rights and liberties of an ordinary citizen except those taken away 
from him by law, expressly or by implication, or those inconsistent with the 
circumstances in which he, as a prisoner is placed.  Of course, the inroads 
which incarceration necessarily makes upon a prisoner’s personal rights and 
liberties…are very considerable.  He no longer has freedom of movement and 
has no choice in the place of his imprisonment.  His contact with the outside 
world is limited and regulated.  He must submit to the discipline of prison life 
and the rules and regulations which prescribe how he must conduct himself 
and how he is to be treated while in prison.  Nevertheless, there is a substantial 
residuum of basic rights which he cannot be denied… 
                                               
219
 See Streater at 13 and the international precedents cited there. 
220
 Whittaker and Morant v Roos and Bateman 1912 AD 92 at 122-123.  However, the court 
also found (at 104) that awaiting trial prisoners will lawfully be subjected to a certain amount of 
prison discipline and “personal restraint”. 
221
 Goldberg v Minister of Prisons 1979 (1) SA 14 (A) at 39C-F; Minister of Justice v Hofmeyr 
1993 (3) SA 131 (A) at 142C. 
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A prisoner’s right not to be subjected to cruel, inhuman and degrading 
treatment was confirmed and his section 35(2)(e) rights re-iterated in Stanfield 
v Minister of Correctional Services.222  S v Makwanyane223 confirms that 
prisoners do not lose all their rights, although their right to dignity is inevitably 
impaired by the imposition of imprisonment as a sentence.224   
 
Treatment of inmates in the MCF’s cannot objectively be seen as torture, nor is 
there any infringement of their rights in terms of section 35(2)(e) of the 
Constitution.  Inmates receive the same medical treatment as other members of 
the SANDF.  They are treated by the same medical officers in the same military 
hospitals as all other members.  They also have access to the services of 
military psychologists, social work officers and other professional officers.  Their 
food is prepared by the same mess kitchen that prepares the meals for the 
living-in members of the messes of the units where the MCF’s are situated.  
They eat the same food as is provided for other members of the mess.  There 
is no overcrowding and hygiene is viewed very seriously. 
 
The only question that remains is whether the enforced periods of parade 
ground drill and physical training (PT) can be seen as cruel, inhuman or 
degrading treatment.  Drill is seen as the cornerstone of military discipline.225  
That is the reason why corrective training imposed on office bearing often 
imposes punishment drill for minor disciplinary transgressions.  The parade 
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 Stanfield v Minister of Correctional Services 2003 (12) BCLR 1384 (C) para 89; Strydom v 
Minister of Correctional Services 1999 (3) BCLR 342 (W) para 14.  Section 35(2)(e) of the 
Constitution states that every detained person is entitled “to conditions of detention that are 
consistent with human dignity, including at least exercise and the provision, at state expense, of 
adequate accommodation, nutrition, reading material and medical treatment.” 
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 S v Makwanyane 1995 (3) SA 391 (CC). 
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 S v Makwanyane 1995 (3) SA 391 (CC) paras 142-143. 
225
 South African Army Infantry Formation Drill All Arms Précis (2006) at 1-1 describes the 
importance of drill on discipline as follows:  “The object of drill is to develop, in the individual 
soldier, that sense of instinctive obedience that will assist him, at all times, to carry out his 
orders.  That the foundation of discipline is based on drill has been proved over and over again.  
Good drill, well rehearsed, closely supervised and demanding the highest precision, is an 
exercise in obedience and alertness.  It sets the standard for the execution of any duty, both for 
the individual and the unit” and at 2-2 states “[d]iscipline is the aim – drill is the method.” 
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ground drill undertaken during a sentence of detention is a combination of 
normal drill instruction and punishment drill, which although harsh, is designed 
to enhance a soldier’s discipline. 
 
The physical training periods are also not imposed as punishment but are done 
to enhance the fitness of the soldier.226  Only acceptable PT exercises 
presented by a qualified PT instructor are allowed.  Inmates undergoing PT and 
drill instructions are compelled to take water breaks.  It is by no means 
suggested that the drill and PT is conducted in exactly the same manner as 
would be the case during drill and PT periods in units to members of the 
SANDF who are under training.  The regimen is harsh and the conditions under 
which it is conducted are not relaxed.  However, one must keep in mind why 
the inmate is serving a sentence of detention.  Detention will only be imposed in 
cases of a serious lack of discipline.  It is not an appropriate sentence for 
criminal offences.  Inmates in the MCF’s are very rarely first offenders.  A 
perusal of CMA judgments in fact reveals that detention is usually imposed as a 
last chance by the court to try and rehabilitate the soldier for future service as a 
disciplined member of the SANDF.227  It is therefore submitted that due to the 
actual treatment of offenders serving detention and the unique nature of military 
life and its requirements for discipline,228 the imposition of detention as a 
sentence does not constitute cruel, unusual or degrading treatment or 
punishment. 
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 All uniform members of the SANDF are subject to bi-annual fitness tests and inmates serving 
a sentence of detention are not exempted from these fitness tests. 
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 See S v Mbunga (CMA 38/2008) as discussed above.  Detention is however not always 
successful on rehabilitating offenders.  In S v Msibi (CMA 52/2008) the CMA was satisfied that 
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 Minister of Defence v Potsane; Legal Soldier (Pty) Ltd v Minister of Defence 2002 (1) SA 1 
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This is also the opinion held in other jurisdictions.  The Judge Advocate 
General is of the opinion that the treatment of inmates at MTCT Colchester is 
similar to that received during basic military training.  The aim of the training is 
to “return retrained Service personnel to their service to continue their 
career.”229 
 
This does not however absolve the SANDF of its responsibility in terms if 
OPCAT to have an independent oversight body to ensure compliance with 
CAT.  The type of punishment in the form of drill and physical training may be 
easily abused and could be used in a cruel or degrading way.  It is imperative 
that staff officers at the MCF’s receive training in this regard. 
 
No policy exists in the SANDF regarding torture.  Currently the South African 
Police Service is the only governmental body which has created policy 
regarding the prevention of torture and cruel, inhuman and degrading 
punishment.230  Since the Military Police Agency has the same powers as the 
SAPS it is suggested that the MPA peruse the SAPS document in drawing up a 
policy document for the prevention of torture and cruel, inhuman and degrading 
punishment in the military.231 
 
There are no clear guidelines on what the national preventative measure (NPM) 
must look like and the state may decide to either establish a new structure, use 
an existing structure to fulfill the mandate of OPCAT or to amend the mandate 
of an existing structure to perform the functions of an NPM.232  It is suggested 
that the Judicial Inspectorate of Prisons established in terms of the Correctional 
Services Act 111 of 1998 can be used as an NPM with minor changes to its 
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 OJAG at 18. 
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 Policy on the Prevention of Torture and Treatment of Persons in Custody of the South 
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 Section 31 of the Defence Act 42 of 2002 regarding the military police functions. 
232
 Munting Torture Booklet at 15. 
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mandate.233  Since the MCF is a detention facility where people are deprived of 
their liberty, the Judicial Inspectorate of Prisons may be the most appropriate 
body to act as independent oversight body for the MCF.  This would be the 
most plausible option since the MPAI already makes provision for access to 
inmates by “any person with a statutory inspection authority” and limited 
statutory changes need to be made to defence legislation.234 
 
It is submitted that a sentence of detention, when imposed early on in the 
career of the young, lower-ranking offender, may be of great value to the 
SANDF.  Unfortunately, effective detention is seldom imposed and is usually 
suspended.   With the correct programmes for skills development the MCF can 
be critical in the retraining and retaining of skilled personnel who are showing a 
lack of discipline.  The military courts are, in the author’s experience, hesitant to 
impose effective detention as a sentence because of the consequences 
attached to the sentence. 
 
Here the example of the rehabilitation programmes used by MTCT Colchester 
could be of great assistance.  If the legislation is amended to allow for the 
retention of the accused’s rank when sentenced to detention, it is a sentence 
that can be used more effectively.  The procedures of the South African 
detention barracks already make provision for the treatment of rank bearing 
members who are awaiting trial.  If such treatment is not seen as a viable 
option, it is submitted that the temporary suspension of the accused’s rank 
should be considered so that he is returned to his original or a lower rank after 
completion of the sentence.  The SANDF will benefit from the retraining and 
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rehabilitation of a member without the severe financial and humiliating 
consequence to the member who loses his rank. 
 
It is also submitted that consideration be given to sentencing members to a 
discharge coupled with a period of detention as is done in Britain.  This is 
already a sentencing option in terms of the MDC.  Millions of rands are spent 
on the training of soldiers, housing, feeding and clothing them and providing 
free medical care to all soldiers and their dependents.  The SANDF is already 
involved in skills development and upliftment in terms of recruitment of short-
term members.  By simply discharging members who do not conform to the 
disciplinary standard of the SANDF, the courts are sending highly trained 
undisciplined individuals with no other skills than weapons and combat training 
into an unsuspecting community.  This may have some serious consequences 
when such individuals turn to a life of crime because they have no other way of 
supporting their families.  By providing vocational training and other life skills, 
such individuals may be better equipped to cope with life outside the Defence 
Force.  The Education, Training and Development (ETD) Division within the 
SANDF may be of some assistance in this regard.  The SANDF may also liaise 
with NGO’s in assisting discharged members undergoing detention. 
 
6.2.6 Field punishment 
 
Field punishment can be imposed as a sentence in the case of a private for a 
period not exceeding three months.235  It is imposed for any offence committed 
outside the borders while the accused is on active service or serving on a ship 
at sea.236 
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 Section 12(1)(e) of the MDSMA.  The sentence commences immediately after the sentence 
has been announced in open court (see s 118(1) of the MDC).  In the event that the accused is 
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It is defined as the “performance in custody in the field of such labour and extra 
drills and duties as may be prescribed.”237  There is currently no clearer 
description of what field punishment entails. This is a punishment that 
originated from the British Army in 1881 and has basically shown little 
development ever since. Historically, however, field punishment was divided 
into field punishment no1 and field punishment no 2.238 
 
6.2.6.1 Historical position of field punishment 
 
Field punishment no 1 consisted of the offender being kept in irons or handcuffs 
and secured to a fixed object, such as a gun wheel to prevent his escape.  He 
was attached to the fixed object for a maximum period of two hours per day, but 
not more than three out of four consecutive days, for a maximum period of 21 
days.  Where irons were not used, straps and ropes were used to secure the 
offender.  He was also subjected to labour and restraints as if he had been 
sentenced to imprisonment with hard labour. 
 
Field punishment no 2 was executed in the same way as field punishment no 1, 
except that the offender was not secured to a fixed object. 
 
It was further required that field punishment had to be executed in such a way 
that it did not cause injury or leave any permanent mark on the offender.  
Where a medical practitioner indicated that a continuation of the field 
punishment would be prejudicial to the health of the offender, the punishment 
had to be ceased. 
 
When the unit of the offender was on the move, the punishment had to be 
carried out regimentally, but where the unit was halted there was a provost 
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 Section 1 of the MDC.  This definition has been applicable since the advent of the Defence 
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 War Office Manual of Military Law (1914) at 721. 
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marshal239 who was responsible for carrying out the punishment.  When the 
unit was on the move the offender would not be secured to a fixed object, but 
marched with their unit and performed all their military and extra fatigue 
duties.240 
 
Little has changed regarding the implementation of field punishment during the 
time of the Union Defence Force.  The court martial could impose field 
punishment as directed by the rules made from time to time by the Governor-
General and consisted of personal restraint or hard labour, but did not include 
flogging or attachment to a fixed object.  The accused was treated the same as 
“defaulters”.241  The field punishment was not allowed to inflict injury to “life or 
limb.”242 
 
6.2.6.2 Current position of field punishment 
 
While undergoing field punishment, the offender may be required to perform his 
normal military duties.243  Whenever the accused’s unit is on the move, is about 
to move or the chief disciplinary officer is not available, field punishment may 
be carried out regimentally.244  The Adjutant General may order that the 
sentence of field punishment or any portion thereof may be served in the 
detention barracks.245  The accused may be handcuffed or otherwise secured 
while doing his field punishment to prevent his escape.246  If the chief 
disciplinary officer is available and the unit is not on the move, the offender 
must be handed over to the chief disciplinary officer to undergo his sentence.247 
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The disciplinary officer must execute the sentence in accordance with the MDC 
and the warrant handed over in which he is authorised and required to execute 
the sentence.248  Before being required to perform the field punishment, the 
offender must be declared medically fit and in the event that he is not medically 
fit, he will not be required to do such duties.249  Where the offender is 
sentenced to another sentence of field punishment while he is already serving 
such a sentence, the first sentence must be completed before the new 
sentence can be served.250 
 
It is clear from the above discussion that vestiges of the historic guidelines have 
remained.  The current definition, as shown above, refers to “…such labour…as 
may be prescribed” while historically the punishment included hard labour.  The 
enforcement of the punishment while the unit is moving has also remained the 
same.  The constitutional rights regarding cruel, inhuman and degrading 
punishment have not been considered in the continued existence of this 
punishment.  However, for the same reasons as set out above regarding the 
sentence of detention, it is submitted that the “forced performance of physical 
exercise” in the military cannot be regarded as cruel, inhuman or degrading 
punishment. 251   
 
What may however be open to constitutional challenge is the vagueness of the 
definition of what constitutes field punishment.  In terms of the requirement of 
legality or the common law principle nulla poena sine lege a punishment must 
be sufficiently defined to meet the requirements of legality.252 What exactly 
                                               
248
 Rule 111(a) of the MDSMA. 
249
 Rule 111(b) of the MDSMA. 
250
 Rule 111(c) of the MDSMA. 
251
 See in this regard Muntingh at 23 where the opinion is raised that field punishment may 
possibly be in contravention of the Constitution and the Convention against Torture since it 
entails “forced performance of physical exercise.”  
252
 Van Zyl Smit (1996) at 28-2.  The same argument may be raised with the sentence of 
‘confinement to barracks’ which is also not clearly defined by statute or regulation.  Military 
courts are however required to clearly indicate on the Record of Proceedings what the content 
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constitutes field punishment must be defined by the Minister by means of the 
Defence Regulations.253  This has not been done. Although the Defence 
Regulations are in the process of being redrafted, it is not clear to what extent, 
if at all, the new regulations will address this definition.254  In S v R255 the court 
discussed the difficulties with uncertain content in the context of the different 
forms of correctional supervision.  It held that the court had to determine the 
content of the correctional supervision and that this detail should not be left in 
the hands of the correctional authorities. This view could also be applied to the 
overbroad definition of field punishment.  No guidelines currently exist in 
explaining what would constitute “such labour and extras drills and duties as 
may be prescribed.”  One would suppose that “extra drills” may be similar to 
those ordered when the offender is sentenced to corrective punishment and 
that “duties” would receive a similar interpretation to extra duties imposed as a 
sentence.  However, what would constitute “labour” is not clear.  Is it different 
from “duties”?  There are a wide range of actions that may constitute military 
“labour”.  This leaves too much discretion in the hands of the disciplinary officer 
when no clear guidelines exist.  It must also be kept in mind that clear 
guidelines exist in terms of policy documents for punishments such as 
corrective punishments, as discussed below.  The military court must specify 
what specific duties are to be included in the punishment.  It is not left to the 
unit to decide the content of the punishment.  However, without the legislative 
guidelines of the Defence Regulations, as required, it is submitted that the 
                                                                                                                                         
of the punishment of “confinement to barracks” must entail and may therefore comply with the 
requirement of legality. 
253
 Ministerial Task Team at para 19. 
254
 Budget speech by the Minister of Defence and Military Veterans on 13 April 2011 states that 
the new Defence Regulations are ready for submission to Parliament in 2011. 
255
 S v R 1993 (1) SA 476 (A) at 492A the court held that “die verantwoordelikheid om ‘n 
gepaste vonnis te vel, rus altyd op die regterlike beampte en mag nie, selfs by die oplegging 
van korrektiewe toesig, geabdikeer word nie.  Tydens die uitdiening van sy straf is die 
toesiggeval in groot mate uitgelewer aan die amptenate van die Departement van Korrektiewe 
Dienste; om die bepaling daarvan ook aan hulle oor te laat, sou pligsversaking wees.”  See 
also S v Tsanshana 1996 (2) SACR 157 (E) at 160d; S v Ndaba 1993 (1) SACR 637 (A); S v 
Somers 1994 (2) SACR 401 (T); Du Toit et al at 28-10P.  In  S v Sekoboane 1997 (2) SACR 32 
(T) at 41g the court held that “[d]ie strafkomponent moet soos alle straf wat ‘n hof toemeet 
behoorlik begrens word en deur die hof (en nie ‘n ander instansie nie) opgele word” and 42H 
that “[o]m ‘n straf te onskryf is niks anders as goeie regspraak nie en myns insiens ‘n regterlike 
plig ten einde burokratiese vergrype waarteen daar geen appel is nie te voorkom.” 
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military court will not be in a position to determine the content of the 
punishment of field punishment. 
  
It is foreseen that the Defence Regulations will probably not address the 
definition of field punishment as it is not a future punishment option for a 
military court in terms of the Military Discipline Bill.256  The Ministerial Task 
Team postulates that this punishment is not currently available to the military 
courts because it is not defined by the Minister.257  However, “duties” and “extra 
drill” are already covered by other punishments available to the military courts 
and therefore it is submitted that there is in fact no need for field punishment as 
a sentencing option. 
 
6.2.7 Reduction in rank or to the ranks 
 
An officer can be sentenced by a CSMJ or a CMJ to reduction to any lower 
officer’s rank.258  Other ranks can be reduced to any lower non-commissioned 
officer’s rank or to the ranks.259  For this sentence to be imposed the offender 
must have a substantive rank and can therefore not be imposed on a private. 
                                               
256
 Clause 40 of the Military Discipline Bill prescribed the punishments that can be imposed by 
the military courts.  Field punishment has been removed as a sentencing option. 
257
 Minsiterial Task Team para 20. 
258
 Section 12(1)(f)(i) of the MDSMA.  See S v Matjila (CMA 163/2002) where, inter alia, two co-
accused with the ranks of colonel were sentenced to reduction to the substantive rank of major 
(which is two ranks lower than the current ranks of the accused).  The CMA found that under 
the circumstances the relevant mitigating factors were not sufficiently considered and the 
sentence was varied to reduction to the substantive rank of lieutenant colonel (which is one 
rank lower). 
259
 Section 12(1)(g)(i) of the MDSMA.  Reduction to the ranks means to be reduced to the rank 
of a private.  In S v Mogorosi (CMA 009/2004) a warrant officer class 1 was sentenced to 
discharge from the SANDF for a conviction of theft and conduct to the prejudice of military 
discipline.  The sentence was varied by the CMA to one of reduction to the rank of warrant 
officer class 2.  In S v Manamela (CMA 32/2005) the accused, who was a lance corporal, was 
sentenced to discharge from the SANDF for a conviction of fraud, forgery and the unlawful use 
of a military vehicle.  The CMA was of the opinion that the trial court did not take sufficient 
notice of the mitigating factors and that the accused was a first offender and varied the 
sentence to reduction to the ranks.   In terms of s 135 of the Armed Forces Act 2006 in British 
military law, reduction in rank can only be imposed on warrant officers and non-commissioned 
officers.  This also applies to reduction from a temporary to substantive rank.  This is a 
sentence that can be imposed by a commanding officer at a summary hearing.  Where the 
accused is of the rank of lance corporal, he can be reduced in rank by a commanding officer 
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Reduction in rank or reduction to the ranks is considered where the conduct of 
the accused does not comply with the conduct expected from a person of his 
rank.260  Although the accused still has value to the military, he no longer 
deserves the responsibility of his current rank level.261  It results in a reduction 
in responsibility and status of the accused.  He will however have the 
opportunity in future to rise through the ranks and increase his responsibility.  
The effect of these sentences is that the salary will change to the minimum 
salary of the lower rank.  The promotion seniority is also reduced to the lowest 
in the new rank.262  This is a punishment that may have a general deterrent 
effect on other members of the SANDF because it is a visible sentence.  The 
offender has to wear his lower rank and it is visible for all to see.  This is also a 
sentence that offenders may find extremely humiliating.263 
 
When considering reduction to a lower substantive rank the court must hear 
evidence on the current salary of the offender, the benefits linked to the rank, 
                                                                                                                                         
with basic powers.  However, for the reduction in rank of any accused holding the rank of 
corporal to warrant officer, the commanding officer needs extended powers.  The summary 
hearing may reduce an accused with one rank.  At the court martial the accused may be 
reduced by more than one rank.  The accused is also, as in South African law, reduced to the 
lower salary of the demoted rank (see Manual of Service Law (2011) 1(2) at 1-13-36). 
260
 In S v Zitha (CMA 86/2000) the accused, a warrant officer class 2, was reduced to the ranks 
because his lack of discipline showed that he “does not deserve to be a non-commissioned 
officer.”  This is a reduction of five rank levels. 
261
 Vowell D K “To Determine an Appropriate Sentence: Sentencing in the Military Justice 
System” (1986) 114 Military Law Review 87 at 107.  This sentence can be seen as a 
commitment to the rehabilitation of the offender, since his services are retained and he will be 
able to once again attain his former rank over time. 
262
 Rule 112(1) of the MDSMA.  The Ministerial Task Team at 102 do not see the reduction of 
rank as a severe punishment, but it is submitted that the inevitable consequences of loss of 
salary and rank seniority, coupled with the negative effect this has on the offender’s pension, 
makes this a severe punishment.  The value of the pension that a member receives at 
retirement is calculated by taking into consideration the salary received in his final two years of 
service.  Reduction in rank will mean a lower salary level on exiting the SANDF and 
consequently a lower monthly pension. 
263
 In terms of British military law any warrant officer who has been reduced to the lowest rank 
as a result of a sentence by a military court or administrative procedure has the right to claim 
his discharge rather than suffering the reduction.  The warrant officer must apply for such a 
discharge within 28 days of the reduction of his rank and the discharge must be affected as 
soon as possible, unless warlike operations are in force.  This allows a warrant officer to leave 
the armed forces if he does not wish to remain in service as a private (see Manual of Service 
Law (2011) 1(2) at 1-18-B-1). 
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the seniority of the member, ie when his next promotion is due as well as the 
salary of the lower rank.  When considering reduction to the ranks as a 
sentence the prosecutor and defence counsel are given the opportunity to 
present argument or to lead evidence on the member’s current salary level, the 
minimum salary of a private as well as any other factor that may influence the 
court in deciding on the appropriateness of this sentence.264 
 
6.2.8 Reduction from a temporary rank to a substantive rank 
 
It may happen from time to time that a member of the SANDF is promoted to a 
temporary senior rank for command purposes.  If the conduct of the person 
does not fit the behaviour expected from a person occupying that rank, the 
sentence will reduce the person from his temporary rank to his substantive 
rank.265 
 
If the offender received remuneration in accordance with his temporary rank, 
the effect of the reduction will be that he will revert back to the salary he 
received in his substantive rank.266  Generally a promotion to a temporary rank 
does not result in the member receiving a higher salary and a reduction to his 
substantive rank will have no pecuniary effect.  The prosecution and defence 
counsel will have to present argument or lead evidence before the court in this 
regard. 
 
This is not considered to be a severe sentence. 
 
 
                                               
264
 Rule 58(6) of the MDSMA.  In S v Miya (CMA 185/2000) the accused was sentenced to a 
reduction in rank but the court did not hear any evidence in this regard.  The CMA stated that 
“[r]eduction of rank will amount to severe loss of income to the accused.  As the military judge 
did not hear any evidence or address in mitigation with regard to the effect of that, a sentence 
of reduction to the ranks will have on the financial position of the accused.  He should have 
requested the prosecutor and defence counsel to address him on the matter before it can be 
said that he applied his mind to affect such a sentence.”  The sentence was varied to a fine. 
265
 Sections 12(1)(f)(ii) and 12(1)(g)(ii) of the MDSMA. 
266
 Rule 112(2) of the MDSMA. 
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6.2.9 Reduction in seniority of rank. 
 
Where the court is of the opinion that the conduct of the accused does not 
warrant him being promoted to his next rank promotion at that time, the court 
may sentence the accused to a reduction in seniority of rank.267  The accused 
does not lose his rank.  The effect of the sentence is that his next promotion 
date is effectively postponed.268 This is not a sentence that will be imposed if 
the main purpose of punishment is one of general deterrence.  The deterrent 
effect of the punishment is mainly limited to the accused who is sentenced 
since there is no outward manifestation of this sentence.   
 
To assist the court in deciding whether this would constitute an appropriate 
sentence, the prosecution and defence counsel must present argument or lead 
evidence regarding the date of the appointment of the accused to his current 
rank as well as to any other factor that the court must take into consideration.  
Although this sentence may have some monetary implication in the long run 
due to the postponement of the accused’s promotion, it is submitted that this is 
not a severe sentence.  It often happens that a person in the SANDF does not 
get promoted on their due date because of various factors, such as the 
unavailability of posts or the completion of promotional courses.  A date on 
which the member becomes due for promotion does not automatically 
guarantee that the member will be promoted on time.  It is however suggested 
that before the court imposes this sentence, evidence must be heard from the 
                                               
267
 Section 12(1)(h) of the MDSMA.  In British military law this sentence can only be imposed on 
an officer in terms of s 134 of the Armed Forces Act 2006 (see Manual of Service Law (2011) 
1(2) at 1-13-33). 
268
 A person’s seniority date is the day upon which he was promoted to his current substantive 
rank.  From that day on he begins building up seniority in the rank and promotion to his next 
higher rank will partly depend on achieving a certain amount of seniority in that rank.  If the 
accused was promoted to his rank for example on 1 January 2008 and the court is of opinion 
that he should forfeit seniority for a period of three years, it is regarded as if he was promoted 
on 1 January 2011.  It will therefore postpone his next promotion with a period of three years.  
See S v Brits (CMA 41/2004) where the accused, a flight-sergeant, was sentenced to reduction 
in seniority of rank as if he was promoted on 13 September 2002, the date of the trial on a 
charge of indecent assault.  The accused requested a review of his case by the CMA.  
According to the CMA the sentence was not in accordance with real and substantive justice 
and was varied to one of discharge from the SANDF. 
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accused’s career manager.  Certain posts are coupled to certain ranks and if 
the accused had been identified for a certain position requiring a certain rank, 
the long-term effect should be taken into consideration when deciding whether 
reduction in seniority would be an appropriate sentence. 
 
6.2.10  A fine. 
 
A fine is “a sentence by the court which orders the offender to pay a specific 
amount of money to the State.”269  It is regarded as the most frequently 
imposed sentence in the South African civilian courts and is mainly imposed for 
less serious offences.270  This contention is also true for military courts. 
 
It had been found by the courts that the purpose of the fine is to keep offenders 
out of prison.271  Terblanche however states that the purpose of a fine “being 
punishment, is to punish the offender by reducing the offender’s financial ability 
and, in this manner, to worsen the quality of life for some time.”272  A fine 
should also be a deterrent. 
 
A fine can be imposed for any common law crime and in terms of the criminal 
procedure applicable to civilian courts, for all statutory offences for which it is 
prescribed.273  Although imprisonment is the prescribed punishment for almost 
all statutory military offences, military courts are authorised to impose fines for 
any of these offences.274 
 
                                               
269
 Terblanche (2007) at 261. 
270
 Terblanche (2007) at 261; Joubert at 304. 
271
 Krugel & Terblanche at 493; Kruger at 28-53; R v Nhlapo 1954 (4) SA 56 (T) at 58G.  This 
purpose does not find application in military law since military courts do not have the jurisdiction 
to impose imprisonment as default for the payment of the fine.  The exception is in terms of s 
93(6)(a) of the MDC where the court sentences an accused who at conviction is no longer 
subject to the MDC and sentences that accused to a fine, and may sentence the accused “to a 
period of imprisonment not exceeding two months in default of payment of the fine.” 
272
 Terblanche (2007) at 261; Kruger at 28-56; S v Dreyer 1990 (2) SACR 445 (A) at 449f. 
273
 Terblanche (2007) at 262; Krugel & Terblanche at 109 and 404; Kruger at 28-53; Joubert at 
305. 
274
 Section 51 of the MDC.  See the discussion in ch 5 at para 5.5 above. 
  
389 
In military courts the maximum fine that may be imposed by the court is R6000 
and in the case of an CODH, the maximum of the fine that can be imposed is 
R600.275 
 
In its decision to impose a fine as a sentence, the court must first of all 
determine if the crime is not too serious for the imposition of a fine.276  If that is 
the case, the military court has various options as discussed above which may 
reflect a more appropriate sentence.  The court must then determine what 
would constitute an appropriate fine.  Once this is determined, the financial 
means of the accused can be taken into consideration and the fine adjusted 
either upward or downward.277 
 
When considering the offender’s ability to pay the fine, the amount of the fine 
should not be reduced to such an extent that it loses its deterrent effect or is no 
                                               
275
 Section 12(1)(i) of the MDSMA read with s 11(2) of the MDSMA.  The Adjustment of Fines 
Act as applied by civilian courts does not find application in military law.  In terms of clause 40 
of the Military Discipline Bill it is foreseen that fines will, once it comes into operation, be 
determined in terms of the Adjustment of Fines Act.  British courts-martial are only limited by 
the maximum amount prescribed by statute and there is no limit to the fine awarded for Service 
disciplinary offences.  Summary hearings are limited to a fine of maximum 28 days’ pay of the 
accused where the accused is of the rank below a warrant officer.  The maximum amount 
deductable for officers and warrant officers is up to 14 days’ pay.  Where an accused chose to 
be tried by court martial, the court martial’s jurisdiction is limited to the maximum amount the 
accused would have received at the summary hearing, ie 28 days’ pay (see OJAG at 21; 
Manual of Service Law (2011) 1(2) at 1-13-37). 
276
 Joubert at 305. 
277
 Terblanche (2007) at 262; Krugel & Terblanche at 406; Kruger at 28-57 to 28-58.  Where a 
fine is considered an appropriate sentence, the court should impose a fine and the accused’s 
inability to pay the fine should not prevent the court from imposing an appropriate fine (see S v 
Seoela 1996 SACR 616 (O) at 622a-b).  For a contrary position see S v Ncobo; S v 
Zwelibhangile; S v Dlamini 1988 (3) SA 954 (N) at 956C; R v Nhlapo 1954 (4) SA 56 (T).  A 
perusal of the CMA judgments at the author’s disposal does not give a clear indication of 
factors that the court will consider specific to the imposition of fines.  This is because fines are 
not sentences that are reviewed by the CMA unless requested by the accused.  However, in S 
v Maduba (CMA 51/2008) the CMA was of the opinion that a fine of R5000 was too lenient 
where “dishonesty of officers are concerned.  A more serious sentence would not have been 
inappropriate.”  In S v Ngako (CMA 165/2002) the accused was sentenced to a fine of R600 for 
a conviction of unauthorised use of a military vehicle.  Under the circumstances the court felt 
that the sentence was “lenient in the extreme and cannot be regarded as conducive to military 
discipline.”  In general, however, a fine is seen as appropriate in disciplinary offences and in the 
case of first offenders (see S v Feni (CMA 28/99); S v Mbatha (CMA 07/99)).  For the 
determination of an appropriate fine in British military law see the guidelines set out in s 249 of 
the Armed Forces Act 2006 and discussed in Manual of Service Law (2011) 1(2) at 1-13-38.  
The process is similar to that followed in South African law. 
  
390 
longer appropriate considering the seriousness of the crime.278  The difficulties 
experienced in the civilian environment regarding the collection of fines279 are 
not of concern to the military courts.  When sentenced to a fine, the accused is 
placed under deduction of pay and the Chief Paymaster of the SANDF will 
automatically deduct the fine from the salary of the accused.280  A sentence of a 
fine is effective immediately.281   
 
6.2.10.1 Deductions from pay in terms of section 130 of the MDC 
 
Where an accused is sentenced to a fine, the court may place the accused 
under deduction of pay for the amount of the fine.282  The fine may be deducted 
from his salary in installments as determined by the Chief Paymaster. 
 
Where the court proceeded with or commenced with a trial where the accused 
is no longer subject to the MDC at the time of the trial and is sentenced to a fine 
by the military court, the accused will only be released from custody when he 
has paid his fine.283 
 
 
 
                                               
278
 Terblanche (2007) at 266; Kruger at 28-57; R v Motlagomang 1958 (1) SA 626 (T) at 630A-
B; S v Vekueminina 1993 (1) SACR 561 (Nm) at 564; S v De Beer 1977 (2) SA 161 (O) at 
164A; S v Solani 1978 (1) SA 432 (Tk) at 433H. 
279
 Terblanche (2007) at 261. 
280
 Section 130 of the MDC as discussed at para 6.2.10.1 below.  Where the accused has 
difficulty in affording the fine, he can apply to the Chief Paymaster for payment of the fine in 
installments.  Experience has shown that installments of three months at most is usually 
authorised.  The accused submits a request for such installments via the personnel section of 
the unit, attaching proof of income and expenditure and it is submitted to the Chief Paymaster 
through the normal channels of command.  A similar process is followed by the British military 
courts, except that the judge advocate presiding over the court martial or the commanding 
officer will make a determination regarding the payment of the fine in installments.  It is 
generally accepted that a fine should not be repaid over more than 12 months.  If after some 
time, the accused’s circumstances have changed and he can no longer afford the installments, 
the accused may request the commanding officer to vary the fine (see Manual of Service Law 
(2011) 1(2) at 1-13-38).  This is not possible in South African military law. 
281
 Rule 59(12)(b)(i) of the MDSMA. 
282
 Section 130 of the MDC. 
283
 Section 34(1)(b) of the MDSMA. 
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6.2.11  Confinement to barracks. 
 
Confinement to barracks is a sentence available to all military courts.  It can 
only be imposed on offenders of the rank group private or equivalent rank.284  It 
can be imposed for a maximum period of 21 days.285 
 
Experience has shown that this sentence is ideally suited for offenders 
undergoing regimental training where it would not be suitable to remove the 
offender from the training environment.  Because of the nature of the sentence, 
it is advisable that the court investigate or hear evidence on the facilities 
available at the unit to determine whether implementation of the sentence is 
feasible. 
 
Confinement to barracks is described in the Military Discipline Code of 1940 as 
follows:286 
 
Defaulters will be required to answer to their names at uncertain hours 
throughout the day, and will be employed on fatigue duties to the fullest 
practicable extent with a view to relieving well-conducted soldiers there-from.  
Defaulters will attend parade, and take all duties in regular turn.  When the 
fatigue duties required are not sufficient to keep the defaulters fully employed, 
the O.C.287 may order them to attend punishment drill (provided that they shall 
not be liable to punishment drill after the expiration of ten days from the date of 
award of confinement to barracks.)  Confinement to barracks in the case of the 
S.A.M.C.288 will not carry with it punishment drill if awarded to men actually at 
                                               
284
 A “private” is the term used in the South African Army and the Medical Health Services for a 
non-rank bearing member.  The equivalent of a private in the other Arms of Service is an 
“airman” for the South African Air Force and a “seaman” for the South African Navy.  For 
disciplinary matters candidate officers (CO’s) are also regarded as the equivalent of a private. 
285
 Section 12(1)(j) of the MDSMA read with s 11(2) of the MDSMA. 
286
  Military Discipline Code, Regulations and Orders and Instructions at 452.  The punishment 
has not changed significantly over the years and remains the same. 
287
 Commanding officer of the defaulter. 
288
 South African Medical Corps. 
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the time doing duty in hospital.  Confinement to barracks shall commence from 
the time of award. 
 
Currently, execution of the sentence is as follows: 
 
1. The member is restricted to the unit lines.  He is not detained but 
 his movements after hours are very restricted.  Within the unit 
 lines the accused has relative freedom of movement. 
 
2. The member forfeits the use of the recreational facilities on the 
 unit. 
 
3. He is easily identifiable because he wears distinguishing 
 clothing.289 
 
4. He is required to move in double march wherever he goes within 
 a unit.290  
 
5. The maximum period of 21 days may be adjusted to fit the 
 offence.  Any lesser amount of days may be imposed. 
 
6. The trial officer may also add variants to the punishment 
 depending on the nature of the offence.  Any variation must be 
 documented on the trial documentation.  It may include any or all 
 of the following: 
 
(i) Reporting to the officer on duty as stipulated; 
(ii) Punishment drill with or without equipment;291 
                                               
289
 The accused undergoing this punishment must wear a red combat helmet inner also known 
as a doiby.  This can be classified as a form of “stigmatisation shaming” (see the discussion at 
para 6.2.2.2 above) and can be regarded as unconstitutional degrading punishment. 
290
 Double march means at a slow jog or 180 paces per minute. 
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(iii) Report in different types of uniform at specified times to 
ensure the uniform is clean and tidy; and 
(iv) Stand inspection in his room. 
 
The period of confinement to barracks starts immediately after the sentence 
has been announced in open court.292 
 
Concern has been raised whether confinement to barracks complies with the 
objectives of the UN Convention against Torture, because it “imposes 
additional duties and prohibits extra-mural and leisure activities” on the 
offender.293 
 
The same argument regarding the necessity of a disciplined forced raised in the 
discussion on detention is relevant here.  This is not a unique punishment and 
variations are found in other jurisdictions. 
 
6.2.11.1 Similar punishments in other jurisdictions 
 
As example of similar punishments the “stoppage of leave order”, “restriction of 
privileges order” and “service supervision and punishment orders” (SSPO) as 
found in the British Armed Forces may be used. 294  “Stoppage of leave” may 
be imposed by summary hearing or court martial on all accused of and below 
                                                                                                                                         
291
 Extra drill will be executed outside normal working hours, up to a maximum of one hour and 
may not be executed for more than 15 minutes continuously without the accused being allowed 
to stand at ease for at least 30 seconds.  Members must be allowed to drink water as they 
require prior to and during the extra drill.  Double time drill may only be ordered during the last 
five minutes of the first half-hour and again during the last five minutes of the second half-hour.  
All extra drill must be done in camouflage uniform with skeleton kit which includes a water bottle 
and may be with or without a weapon.  All drill movements may only be done in accordance 
with the SADF Order Drill All Arms of 1971. 
292
 Rule 59(12)(b)(i) of the MDSMA. 
293
 See Muntingh at 23. 
294
 Manual of Service Law (2011) 1(2) at 1-13-40.  The following discussion is based mainly on 
this source material.  Service supervision and stoppages orders and the minor punishments, 
which include “stoppage of leave” and “restriction of privileges” are authorised in terms of s 132 
of the Armed Forces Act 2006 for summary hearings and s 164 of the Armed Forces Services 
Act 2006 for courts martial.  The minor punishments are set out in The Armed Forces (Minor 
Punishment and Limitation on Power to Reduce in Rank) Regulations (2009). 
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the rank of warrant officer.295  The punishment entails that the accused may not 
leave his ship or unit for a specified number of days without the permission of 
his commanding officer.296  This punishment does not prevent the accused from 
having contact with his family outside the unit per telephone or e-mail.  Further 
restriction may also be imposed on the accused as the commanding officer 
deems fit.  These administrative restrictions may entail that the accused must 
report on parade several times during the day to ensure that he is present on 
the ship or within the unit.297  He may be required to report in different uniforms 
throughout the day to ensure that his uniform is correct and neat.  He may also 
be prohibited from going into certain areas within the unit, such as the bar or 
canteen.   This punishment may be imposed for a maximum period of 14 
days.298 
 
“Stoppage of leave” is frequently combined with the punishment of “restriction 
of privileges”.  This punishment is only available to an accused of the rank of 
private299 and is seen as a useful punishment in assisting with the reformation 
and rehabilitation of the accused.  The punishment requires the accused to 
perform certain extra duties for the duration of the punishment.  The nature of 
the extra duties is determined by the commanding officer and may include any 
work, training or other military duty that the commanding officer deems 
appropriate.  The punishment is imposed for a maximum period of 14 days and 
may be ordered to run consecutively with the punishment of stoppage of 
leave.300 
 
Extra duties may start two hours before the start of the accused’s normal 
working day and may end six hours after the end of the accused’s normal 
working day.  Extra duties may be imposed for a period of five and a half hours 
                                               
295
 Section 2 of The Armed Forces Regulations. 
296
 Section 3(1) of The Armed Forces Regulations. 
297
 The maximum number of musterings (parades) is six within a 24 hour period. 
298
 Section 3(2) of The Armed Forces Regulations. 
299
 Section 2 of The Armed Forces Regulations. 
300
 Manual of Service Law (2011) 1(2) at 1-13-42; s 4 of The Armed Forces Regulations. 
  
395 
per 24 hours.301  He may also be required to report on parade up to six times 
per 24 hours and this is seen as one of his extra duties. 
 
A service supervision and punishment order is available to the accused of the 
rank private or equivalent.302  This sentence is usually imposed where a junior 
member frequently misbehaves despite the imposition of other lesser 
punishment.  This punishment is deemed an appropriate alternative to 
detention.303  The punishment is divided into two periods, firstly the initial period 
after which the commanding officer will review the conduct of the accused to 
determine whether he should be released from the punishment and the 
secondary period consisting of the remainder of the sentence.304 
 
Certain mandatory and discretionary requirements must be adhered to with the 
imposition of the sentence.  The commanding officer will include such 
discretionary requirements as he deems fit unless the operational requirements 
of the unit dictate otherwise.305  The mandatory requirements are that the 
accused forfeits one sixth of his salary306 and that he may not apply for leave 
during this period without the permission of the commanding officer.  The rest 
of the requirements, which is within the discretion of the commanding officer, is 
that he may order the accused to perform extra duties as directed, he may be 
prevented from entering specific areas of the ship or unit without the permission 
of the commanding officer and he will not be allowed to leave the ship or unit 
for the duration of the punishment without the permission of the commanding 
officer.307 
 
                                               
301
 Section 4(8) of The Armed Forces Regulations. 
302
 Section 173 of the Armed Force Act 2006 defines a service supervision and punishment 
order as “an order that imposes on the offender, for a period specified in the order, such 
requirements as regulations made by the Defence Council may prescribe.” 
303
 Manual of Service Law (2011) 1(2) at 1-13-31. 
304
 Manual of Service Law (2011) 1(2) at 1-13-31. 
305
 Manual of Service Law (2011) 1(2) at 1-13-31. 
306
 Section 173(1)(b) of the Armed Forces Act 2006. 
307
 Manual of Service Law (2011) 1(2) at 1-13-32. 
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Service supervision and punishment orders can be imposed for periods of 30, 
60 or 90 days.308  The duration of the initial period depends on the length of the 
sentence imposed.  When the order is for 30 days, the commanding officer will 
review the accused for the first time after a period of 14 days has elapsed to 
determine whether the accused has shown sufficient progress and 
improvement of his discipline to be released from the sentence.309  The initial 
period for a sentence of 60 days is 18 days and for a period of 90 days it is 21 
days.  If the accused has not shown sufficient improvement he will serve the 
remainder of the service supervision and punishment order (the secondary 
period).  The commanding officer will thereafter review the accused every 14 
days for possible release from the punishment.310  It is therefore up to the 
accused whether he will serve the whole sentence.  It is an excellent incentive 
for the accused to improve his discipline and behaviour. 
 
The service supervision and punishment order closely resembles confinement 
to barracks as a punishment although the period of the punishment is much 
longer than what can be imposed by South African military courts.  However, 
the “stoppage of leave” and “restriction of privileges” orders also have certain 
characteristics in common.  It can be argued that these punishments cannot be 
regarded as cruel, inhuman or degrading since members of the armed forces 
are used to restrictions of their movements and the places they may enter, 
especially in an operational environment and it can therefore not be seen as 
cruel or inhuman to restrict the movements soldiers or give them extra duties to 
do.  The environment that soldiers operate in is vastly different from those that 
civilians are used to and although it would never be acceptable to treat soldiers 
in a cruel, inhuman or degrading way, it is submitted that the concept of what is 
                                               
308
 Section 173(2) of the Armed Forces Act 2006. 
309
 Section 174 of the Armed Forces Act 2006. 
310
 Manual of Service Law (2011) 1(2) at 1-13-31.  The commanding officer may also vary the 
requirements imposed during sentencing on review after the initial period.  If there are 
overriding medical or compassionate grounds the commanding officer may conclude the 
punishment (see Manual of Service Law (2011) 1(2) at 1-13-33. 
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acceptable restrictions will necessarily be different from what is understood to 
be acceptable in the civilian environment. 
 
6.2.11.2 Confinement to barracks: not cruel, inhuman or degrading 
 
Experience has shown that confinement to barracks is generally imposed on 
single, living-in members undergoing training.  During military training it is often 
the case that members are restricted to the unit lines for the first part of the 
course.  Certain areas within the unit or even outside the unit lines, which may 
include leisure facilities, may be declared out of bounds.  Movement on double 
march while on course and room and uniform inspections are common 
occurrences in the military.311  Requiring soldiers used to these conditions to 
perform them as a punishment should not be regarded as cruel, inhuman or 
degrading. 
 
This is however not an appropriate sentence to impose on members not living 
in the single quarters or barracks, such as married members.  Since the 
offender is restricted to his room and surrounding area, has to stand room and 
uniform inspection and report to the officer on duty at different times, this 
sentence is only appropriate for those members living in the barracks. 
 
6.2.12  Corrective punishment 
 
Corrective punishment can be imposed by a military court on any accused with 
the rank of private.312  It is defined as “additional supervised training, work or 
drill for two hours per working day, done or carried out within unit lines”.313  The 
main component of this punishment is usually the extra drill. 
 
                                               
311
 This has been the experience of the author during basic military training and officer’s 
formative training. 
312
 Section 12(1)(k) of the MDSMA. 
313
 Section 1(viii) of the MDSMA. 
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The same principles applicable to punishment drill imposed as a requirement of 
confinement to barracks are applicable to extra drill imposed as corrective 
punishment.314  The same concerns regarding the constitutionality and the 
Convention against Torture as with field punishment has been raised in 
connection with this punishment.315   
 
This punishment is imposed where the court is of opinion that the offender 
shows a lack of discipline and proper conduct.  Corrective punishment, which is 
a sentence imposed by a military court, should not be confused with corrective 
training, a non-judicial punishment imposed on members regarding matters of 
minor ill-discipline.  Non-judicial punishment however falls outside the scope of 
this thesis. 
 
6.2.13  Extra non-consecutive duties 
 
This sentence can be imposed by any military court on any other rank than an 
officer, for a maximum period of 21 days.316  This sentence may be imposed by 
the court where the accused shows a lack of discipline.317  The accused may 
still be required to perform his normal duties after which he will be required to 
perform the extra duties.  Since the punishment commences immediately after 
being announced in open court, the period in which the duties must be 
performed starts immediately after sentencing.  The court must therefore 
explore the feasibility of the implementation of this sentence before it is 
imposed.318 
                                               
314
 All drills are done in accordance with Drill All Arms and Maatreëls ter Voorkoming van 
Mishandeling van Lede van die SA Leër: Aanhangsel C tot SALO GS1/65/86 (1993). 
315
 Muntingh at 23.  See the discussion above regarding confinement to barracks as a 
constitutionally sound punishment. 
316
 Section 12(1)(l) of the MDSMA. 
317
 Morris at 159 describes extra duties as “a few hours work at the end of the duty days, 
sometimes also on weekends, designed to fatigue the soldier and to prompt the reflection that, 
it is hoped, makes him aware of the consequences of his actions and deters him – as well as 
fellow soldiers who see him perform these duties – from further misconduct.” 
318
 From personal observation the implementation of extra duties could be said to be an 
effective sentence if the accused is convicted of being absent without leave for short periods.  
The following serves as an example:  Members of the security squadron work in shifts, during 
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A period of 24 hours must elapse between duties, which means that the 
offender will not perform 21 duties over the 21 day period.  He will at most be 
able to perform ten to eleven duties over the maximum period of time. 
 
6.2.14  Reprimand 
 
A reprimand may be imposed where the court is of the opinion that although the 
offence is not too serious and the accused should be treated leniently, the 
offence still warrants a sentence.  It is a sentence typically imposed at a CODH 
for first offenders.  This is a punishment that can be imposed on all rank 
groups.319 
 
This punishment is comparable to a caution and discharge in terms of the 
Criminal Procedure Act,320 in that a caution is imposed where the offence is “so 
trivial or technical that the trial process itself amounts to sufficient punishment” 
                                                                                                                                         
which they work for five days and are then off for five days.  If a member absents himself 
without leave, a sentence of extra duties for a period of five days could effectively prevent him 
from going on leave during his off days.  He will have to work non-consecutive duties over this 
period, resulting in him being on duty every other day for the period where he was supposed to 
be off.  It is submitted that this is a better deterrent than, for example, a fine. 
319
 Section 12(1)(m) of the MDSMA.  As a punishment it has not yet received attention from the 
CMA since it is not a sentence that is subject to automatic review, nor is it a sentence that is 
likely to be submitted for review by the accused because of being “shockingly harsh and 
inappropriate”. British military law provides for severe reprimands, reprimands and 
admonishments.  Severe reprimands and reprimands can be given to officers, warrant officers 
and non-commissioned officers.  It is not a sentence available for the rank of private.  It can be 
given as a written or verbal reprimand and is frequently coupled to sentences with financial 
implications such as a fine or a service compensation order.  A reprimand is seen as more 
severe than an admonishment indicating a stronger degree of displeasure in the accused’s 
behaviour.  Reprimands may in fact have a negative effect on the future promotion of the 
accused (see in this regard OJAG at 23).  An admonition on the other hand is available as 
sentence for all ranks, is recorded on the accused’s formal disciplinary record and is taken into 
consideration as a previous conviction at subsequent trials of the accused.  An admonishment 
is given where the mitigating factors indicate that the trial itself is sufficient punishment and he 
does not deserve a more severe punishment (see Manual of Service Law (2011) 1(2) at 1-13-
43 and 1-13-44).  An admonition closely resembles the reprimand given by the South African 
military courts.  The US military makes a distinction between admonitions and reprimands 
similar to the British Military (see Morris at 158). 
320
 Section 297 of the Criminal Procedure Act. 
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and the sentence should therefore not be too serious.321  This punishment 
finalises the case without burdening the accused more than what has already 
been done in terms of the trial.  
 
Although the Criminal Procedure Act provides that a caution and discharge will 
“have the same effect of an acquittal”, it does not mean that the accused is 
acquitted of the charges but that322 
 
…one should not understand  “acquittal” to mean what it normally does, but 
that it should be interpreted in such a way that the extenuation the legislature 
intended to bring about by this provision is given effect to.  This implies that 
“acquittal” should not be interpreted as meaning that the accused walks free as 
if she has not been convicted to all intents and purposes…and as such 
“acquittal” may be accepted as a conviction… 
 
However, although caution is a sentence, it cannot be seen as a punishment 
since it does not contain any additional element of discomfort for the 
accused.323 
 
Although the sentence of a reprimand is similar to a caution, the MDSMA does 
not provide that the reprimand can be seen as an ‘acquittal’ as is the case of 
the Criminal Procedure Act.  There is no doubt that it is regarded as a sentence 
and is taken into consideration as a previous conviction.  It is however, as is a 
caution, not a punishment since it adds no discomfort for the accused.   
Anecdotal evidence as well as the experience of the author has shown that 
when sentencing an accused to a reprimand, most military judges merely 
pronounce the sentence as: “You are hereby sentenced to a reprimand” and 
then discharge the accused.  No actual reprimand is given.  Consequently the 
                                               
321
 Terblanche (2007) at 389; Krugel & Terblanche at 803; Kruger at 28-89; S v Magidson 1984 
(3) SA 825 (T) at 833F (a caution and discharge is the least severe sentence that can be 
imposed); R v Glynn 1951 (4) SA 4 (T) at 6F. 
322
 Terblanche (2007) at 390-391; R v Keschner 1961 (3) SA 309 (A) at 313E; S v Erasmus 
1970 (4) SA 400 (NC). 
323
 Terblanche (2007) at 392. 
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opinion expressed after completion of the trial by spectators is often that 
nothing happened to the accused. 
 
6.3 Court orders 
 
After announcement of the sentence and the decision on implementation of the 
suspended sentence the court announces and records its decision on any court 
orders that are to be made.324  These orders are compulsory under certain 
circumstances and should be taken into consideration when the sentence is 
imposed.325  Whether this is in fact the case with the military courts could not be 
determined.  Since the CSMJ and CMJ cases are not published it cannot be 
ascertained what the military judges’ reasons for imposing specific sentences 
are and no CMA judgments were found in this regard. 
 
6.3.1 Forfeiture of full pay326 
 
The court must order that the offender forfeits full pay for the period which the 
offender was: 
 
1. Absent without leave or absent due to desertion and subsequently 
convicted by the court;327 
2. Detained or in custody pending his trial and then subsequently 
sentenced to imprisonment;328 
                                               
324
 Section 95 of the MDSMA authorises military courts to order deductions from or forfeitures of 
pay when imposing any sentence as is authorised in terms of the MDC. 
325
 See also Terblanche (2007) at 381; Attorney-General, Transvaal v Steenkamp 1954 (1) SA 
351 (A) at 357A. 
326
 Section 128(1) of the MDC. 
327
 Section 128(1)(a) of the MDC.  In terms of s 128(3) of the MDC, when a member of the 
SANDF goes on AWOL, his full pay will be withheld as from the date upon which he went 
AWOL or on desertion until such time as it is established whether he must forfeit his pay in 
terms of ss 128(1) or (2) of the MDC.  This stoppage of pay is a personnel action that is taken 
after a member has been AWOL for a period of 72 hours.  This is to prevent possible losses to 
the state.  It is often the reason why a member returns from AWOL  - he did not receive his 
salary.  This money will be paid back to the accused in the event that he is found not guilty (see 
s 128(4) of the MDC).  The calculation of the amount to be forfeited is done in terms of r 110 of 
the MDSMA.  Any absence of six hours or less is not taken into account and a period of 24 
hours is deemed to be one day. 
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3. Detained or in custody pending his trial and was sentenced to detention 
and then discharged from the SANDF;329 
4. Where he is serving a sentence of imprisonment330 
5. Is serving a sentence of detention where the detention is linked to a 
sentence of discharge from the SANDF;331 
6. In hospital as a consequence of a contravention of section 18(b) 
MDC;332 
7. Detained by the South African Police Service for an offence of which he 
has been convicted by a competent court;333 
8. Absent from duty as a prisoner of war (POW) because of his own willful 
act or omission;334 
9. Released on bail or on his own recognisance by a civilian court but 
subsequently failed to return to duty335 
10. Voluntarily serving the enemy;336 
11. Not on duty where the Chief SANDF ordered the accused not to return to 
duty.337 
                                                                                                                                         
328
 Section 128(1)(b)(i) of the MDC. 
329
 Section 128(1)(b)(ii) of the MDC. 
330
 Although the offender will normally be discharged from the SANDF where he is sentenced to 
imprisonment, the exception created by ss 54(7)(b) and 59(5)(b) of the Defence Act 42 of 2002 
must be kept in mind.  A member of the SANDF’s service will be terminated when sentenced by 
a civilian court to imprisonment without the option of a fine.  Where he was sentenced to a fine 
with imprisonment as default for non payment of the fine, he will not automatically be 
discharged from the SANDF and will therefore forfeit pay for the period he is imprisoned. 
331
 Section 128(1)(d) of the MDC.  Usually an accused will still receive part of his salary when 
serving a sentence of detention (see the discussion on s 128(2) of the MDC below).  However, 
if the detention is coupled to a sentence of a discharge he forfeits full pay for the period of 
detention.  Notice should be taken of the CMA’s opinion on imposing a sentence of detention 
coupled with a discharge (see S v Khoza (CMA 82/2001) discussed above).  It is consequently 
doubtful whether an accused will receive such a sentence in future and this s 128(1)(d) of the 
MDC may become obsolete. 
332
 Section 128(1)(e) of the MDC.  A contravention of s 18 of the MDC refers to the offence of 
malingering.  In terms of s 18(b) of the MDC malingering is committed where the accused 
maims or injures himself with the intention of avoiding service and the prescribed punishment is 
imprisonment for a maximum of five years.  If the accused is found guilty of this offence he will 
forfeit full pay for the period that he had to hospitalised as a consequence of his actions. 
333
 Section 128(1)(f) of the MDC. 
334
 Section 128(1)(g) of the MDC. 
335
 Section 128(1)(i) of the MDC.  Where the accused fails to return to duty the accused is in 
fact on AWOL and must forfeit pay for the period absent. 
336
 Section 128(1)(h) of the MDC. 
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6.3.2 Forfeiture of part of pay338 
 
When the accused is sentenced to any sentence other than imprisonment or 
detention coupled to a discharge, the accused will forfeit one-third of his pay if 
he is married, a widower or is divorced and maintains a child for the period he 
was held in custody or was under arrest before his trial.  This deduction is also 
made where the accused serves a sentence of detention which is not coupled 
to a discharge.339 
 
If the accused is unmarried with no dependents he will forfeit two-thirds of his 
pay for the period he was in custody or under arrest pending his trial.  The 
forfeiture is also applicable for the period for which he is serving a sentence of 
detention.  The serious financial consequences of a sentence of detention is 
clear – not only is the accused’s salary reduced to the bottom scale of that of a 
private, he also loses a considerable portion, either one-third or two-thirds, of 
the salary that is left, for the period he is serving detention which can be up to 
two years. 
 
Of concern is the provision in the MDC that the General Officer Commanding of 
the SANDF340 may remit the whole or a portion of any forfeiture ordered by the 
                                                                                                                                         
337
 Section 128(1)(j) of the MDC.  This provision also applies to individuals who have been 
convicted but are awaiting appeal or review of their case.  In terms of s 42 of the MDSMA the 
Chief SANDF may order a person not to return to duty during any period subsequent to that 
person appearing before a civilian or military court as an accused, or if he has been convicted 
by the court and intends appealing the conviction or applying for review of the case where the 
CSANDF is of the opinion that it would be in “the interest of the good governance or reputation 
of the South African National Defence Force, or in the interest of justice”.  Written notice must 
be given to the accused and he must be given the opportunity to make representations in this 
regard. 
338
 Section 128(2) of the MDC. 
339
 Where an accused is unmarried but maintains a child, he will also forfeit one-third of his 
salary.  The child must however be registered on the personnel administration (Persol) system 
of the SANDF before the court will accept that child as a dependent.  To be registered as a 
dependent of a single father, DNA tests must be done to prove paternity.    
340
 Section 1 of the MDC defines the General Officer Commanding as “the chief military 
executive officer of the South African Defence Force, and in section one hundred and twenty-
  
404 
court in terms of section 128 of the MDC341 if he is of the opinion that the 
forfeiture, taking into consideration the nature of the offence, will result in undue 
hardship for the accused.  This would result in a serious interference by the 
executive in the sentencing jurisdiction of the military court.342  Although section 
128 of the MDC is a court order, and not a sentence, it forms part of the 
sentence that is imposed by the court and as such is a judicial act.  If the 
executive can interfere after the sentence has been imposed it could be 
regarded as executive interference with the military judiciary and therefore this 
provision is contrary to the ideal of judicial independence of the military courts.  
This provision seems to be a vestige of the previous court martial system where 
“the convening authority [had] the power to confirm or vary convictions and 
sentences imposed by the ordinary court martial.”343  It is doubtful whether this 
provision would stand constitutional scrutiny in terms of the current legal order. 
 
6.3.3 Deductions from pay in terms of section 129 of the MDC 
 
Whenever an accused is convicted of an offence that results in any loss or 
damage to public property or property belonging to an institution of the State344, 
the court must also place the accused under deduction of pay to the amount of 
the loss or the damage.345  In the event that the court finds that the accused 
                                                                                                                                         
eight includes the officer commanding any portion of the South African Defence Force on 
service beyond the borders of the Republic.” 
341
 Section 133 of the MDC. 
342
 See in this regard Freedom of Expression Institute v President, Ordinary Court Martial 1999 
(2) SA 471 (C).  Although the decision was rendered prior to the implementation of the 
MDSMA, it is submitted that the arguments raised regarding executive interference and the 
court’s independence remain relevant to s 133 of the MDC.  The court held (at para 11) that “[i]t 
invites arbitrary interference by an executive official with the due process of an ordinary court 
martial.  No democratic society will tolerate a system whereby the executive is given the power 
to interfere with the judicial process in any court, thereby tainting its independence.” 
343
 Freedom of Expression Institute v President, Ordinary Court-Martial 1999 (2) SA 471 (C) 
para 20. 
344
 This would, for example, include property belonging to the mess or regimental fund.  Any 
payment deducted from the accused’s salary for the loss of or damage to property belonging to 
an institution will be paid over to the particular institution (see s 129(1)bis of the MDC). 
345
 In S v Bartman (CMA 21/2009) the CMA held that “a military court needs to make an order in 
terms of Section 129 [of the] MDC to empower the State to lawfully deduct the loss owing to the 
SANDF from an accused’s pay as the loss resulted from a crime the accused committed.”  This 
does not include damage caused to military vehicles due to negligent driving, ie a contravention 
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acted negligently rather than willfully, the court may order that the accused pay 
a reduced amount for the losses or damages incurred. 
 
In the event where more than one person has been found guilty, the court must 
make an order that all the accused be placed under deduction of pay in order to 
ensure that the amount is completely recovered from them “jointly or 
severally”.346 
 
Where the accused is convicted of contravening section 24 of the MDC347 for 
the negligent loss, damage or destruction of property, kit or arms issued to him 
“for personal use in the execution of his duties”, the court must order that it be 
replaced or repaired and that the costs involved be recovered from the 
accused.348 
 
6.3.4 Restitution or confiscation of property 
 
If an accused is convicted of theft or an offence where he is found in 
possession of unlawfully obtained property, the court may order that the 
accused return the property to the lawful owner.349 
 
Where the accused has used any “weapon, instrument or other article 
produced to the court” in the execution of any offence and he is convicted of 
                                                                                                                                         
of s 28(a) of the MDC.  Such damage will be recouped from the accused by the State 
Attorney’s office.  However, where an accused causes damage to a vehicle while on an 
unauthorised trip, which would amount to a charge in terms of s 27(1) of the MDC, the court 
must make an order in terms of s 129(1) of the MDC to recover the damage to the vehicle (see 
in this regard S v Ngako (CMA 165/2002)). 
346
 Section 129(2) of the MDC; S v Mjoli (CMA 70/2005) where the loss to the state was divided 
equally between the two accused. 
347
 This section creates a reverse onus on the accused in that the accused is presumed to have 
acted negligently if the state proves that the equipment was issued to the accused and is no 
longer in his possession. 
348
 Section 129(3) of the MDC.  Where the accused is sentenced to cashiering, dismissal or 
discharge with ignominy or discharge from the SANDF, the court will not make an order in 
terms of s 129(3) of the MDC if the equipment becomes the property of the accused in terms of 
the regulations. 
349
 Section 148(1) of the MDSMA. 
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that offence, the court may order the weapon or instrument forfeited to the state 
where it sees fit to do so.350 
 
6.3.5 Victim compensation 
 
With the current focus on restorative justice and the rights of victims, the 
SANDF should take notice of the imposition of service compensation orders 
imposed by British military courts.351  Such orders are not given as court orders 
but are seen as sentences imposed in conjunction with other sentences.  The 
importance of this punishment not only lies in the compensation of the victim 
but in the fact that it “also emphasises to the offender the full personal 
consequences of his actions.”352 
 
When the court sentences an accused to repay damages to the victim, the 
financial effects of the punishment are taken into consideration when 
considering whether to combine this order with other punishments as well.  
Where the court considers the imposition of a fine and a service compensation 
order but the accused is financially unable to pay both, preference is given to 
the service compensation order.353  There is no limit to the amount that may be 
imposed by the court martial, but the damages or loss must be proven.  The 
maximum amount that can be awarded by a summary hearing is one thousand 
pounds, depending on the severity of the loss or damage.354  Damages may be 
difficult to quantify and may vary between judges and commanding officers.  
Therefore the court is given comprehensive guidelines regarding the awarding 
of damages.355  The court may still exercise its discretion and use its judgment 
                                               
350
 Section 148(2) of the MDSMA. 
351
 These orders are made where the accused before a British military court is found guilty of 
any offence that caused personal injury, loss or damage to the accused (see Manual of Service 
Law (2011) 1(2) at 1-13-46). 
352
 Manual of Service Law (2011) 1(2) at 1-13-46. 
353
 Manual of Service Law (2011) 1 (2) at 1-13-48. 
354
 Manual of Service Law (2011) 1(2) at 1-13-44. 
355
 Manual of Service Law (2011) 1(2) at 1-13-47.  The guidelines given are in accordance with 
the Criminal Injuries Compensation Scheme awarded by civilian courts.  Where the injury is a 
graze which is accompanied with some pain for a few days, an award of between 50 and 75 
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when awarding damages.  The recovery of the money as ordered is handled 
the same way as the recovery of a fine.  The amount must be paid over to the 
victim and where the accused is ordered to pay in installments, the victim will 
receive his money in installments.356 
 
This may be an important aspect to consider since the SANDF is not the only 
party or sector of the community that is affected by military offences.  It is 
submitted that victims, especially civilian victims, should be compensated for 
damages caused by military offenders. 
                                                                                                                                         
pounds can be made depending on the size.  A black eye can be awarded 100 pounds and a 
simple, small uncomplicated fracture between 1000 and 3000 pounds. 
356
 Manual of Service Law (2011) 1(2) at 1-13-45. 
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CHAPTER 7 
 
MILITARY APPEALS AND REVIEW – A FINAL SAY ON SENTENCING 
 
7.1 Introduction 
 
The processes of appeal and review exist to prevent wrongful convictions and 
inappropriate sentences.1  This is true for both the civilian and the military courts.  
It is regarded as a constitutional right, forming part of the fair trial rights, without 
which justice cannot be said to be done.2  Criminal proceedings, which include 
sentencing, are only completed once the review and appeal process has been 
completed.3  Through review the court can better judge the factual conclusions 
reached, enhancing the fairness of the proceedings as well as achieving 
consistency and thereby equality before the law.4 
 
7.2 Review and appeal: the general principles 
 
The processes and principles regarding review and appeal are governed by the 
common law, various legislative provisions as well as the Constitution which 
makes the framework in which it operates rather complicated.5  The following is a 
general overview of the general principles applicable to appeal and review as 
applied in the civilian courts.6 
 
 
                                               
1
 Currie I & De Waal J The Bill of Rights Handbook 5 ed (2005) at 789; S v Twala (South African 
Human Rights Commission Intervening) 1999 (2) SACR 622 (CC); S v Steyn 2001 (1) SA 1146 
(CC); Du Toit E et al Commentary on the Criminal Procedure Act (1997) at 30-1. 
2
 Mbambo v Minister of Defence 2005 (2) SA 226 (T) at 229C-D. 
3
 Steytler N Constitutional Criminal Procedure (1998) at 392. 
4
 Steytler (1998) at 393. 
5
 Terblanche S S A Guide to Sentencing in South Africa (2007) at 407. 
6
 The principles of appeal and review in the civilian courts are discussed briefly only as far as it is 
deemed of assistance in placing military appeal and review in its proper context.  For a full 
discussion on appeal and review see Kruger A Hiemstra’s Criminal Procedure (2008) at Chapter 
30; Du Toit et al at Chapter 30; Joubert J J (ed) Criminal Procedure Handbook 9 ed (2009) at 
Chapters 20-21. 
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7.2.1 Differences between appeal and review 
 
Although appeal and review provide an aggrieved litigant with the opportunity to 
have the matter reassessed by a higher authority, there are distinct differences 
between these two processes.7 The main difference is that they serve different 
purposes.8  Where the complaint is against the result of the trial proceedings, the 
appropriate remedy is one of appeal and where the method of the trial 
proceedings are attacked by the accused, the matter should be referred to 
review.9 
 
It is trite that during the appeal process the appellant is bound by the four corners 
of the record and the court must confine itself to these facts.  Review, on the 
other hand, can refer to matters not appearing on the record of the proceedings.  
Evidence may be lead and generally review will be done, inter alia, where the 
court exceeded its jurisdiction,10 where the judge was biased,11 a gross 
irregularity occurred12 or inadmissible evidence was received by the trial court. 
 
During an appeal the attack on the finding or sentence is confined to grounds set 
out in the notice of appeal13 but during a review the attack on the finding or 
sentence is brought in terms of the High Court’s review authority prescribed by 
                                               
7
 Kruger at 30-4; Du Toit et al 30-1, 30-23. 
8
 Carnelley M “The South African Military Court System – Independent, Impartial and 
Constitutional?” (2005) 33(2) Scientia Militaria 55 at 74. 
9
 S v Mwambazi 1991 (2) SACR 149 (NM) at 151g-h; S v Block 2011 (1) SACR 622 (NCK) at 
para 14; Terblanche at 407; Carnelley at 74; Kruger at 30-4; Du Toit et al at 30-1; Joubert at 334-
335. 
10
 Langerman v Alport 1911 CPD 376; Mratsho v Rickert 1949 (3) SA 1127 (E); S v Siwela 1981 
(2) SA 56 (T) at 59A; S v Mwambazi 1991 (2) SACR 149 (NM) at 152a.  
11
 See Bernert v Absa Bank Ltd 2011 (3) SA 92 (CC). 
12
 Whether a gross irregularity occurred would depend on the circumstances of the case.  In SA 
Motor Acceptance Corp (Pty) Ltd v Venter 1963 (1) SA 214 (O) the court held that a judicial 
officer making an order against the party without giving him the opportunity of being heard would 
constitute a gross irregularity.  See also Pitso v Additional Magistrate, Krugersdorp 1976 (4) SA 
553 (T); Adonis v Additional Magistrate, Bellville 2007 (2) SA 2147 (C); S v Chukwu 2010 (2) 
SACR 29 (GNP); S v Le Grange 2009 (1) SACR 125 (SCA); S v Block 2011 (1) SACR 622 
(NCK).  
13
 However, in Legal Aid Board v The State 2011 (1) SACR 166 (SCA) the court held that if a 
ground of appeal was of sufficient merit to warrant consideration, the court can allow the party to 
argue those grounds even though it was not set out in the grounds for appeal. 
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the Supreme Court Act and the Criminal Procedure Act.14  An appeal must also 
be brought within the prescribed time limits whereas a review is not subject to a 
time limit although the courts have indicated that the review must be brought 
within a reasonable time.15 
 
In practice, however, the distinction is not as clear and it is not always possible to 
separate the merits from the rest of the case.16  It is further complicated by the 
existence of administrative review and appeal, which are briefly discussed below. 
 
7.2.2  Judicial review 
 
7.2.2.1 The High Court’s inherent review authority 
 
The High Court of South Africa has always had an inherent jurisdiction to review 
matters originating from an inferior court.  Over time judicial review became 
legislated and the question arose whether the High Court should rely on its 
inherent jurisdiction, which originated from common law, or whether it should 
exercise only a statutory authority.17 
 
The Supreme Court Act authorises the local and provincial divisions of the High 
Court to review all cases from “inferior courts” within the area of their 
jurisdiction.18  The court has interpreted this as meaning that the High Court may 
                                               
14
 Section 24(1) of the Supreme Court Act 59 of 1959; ss 302, 304(4), 305, 306 and 309(3) of the 
Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977 (see Kruger at 30-5). 
15
 Kruger at 30-4; R v Mbokazi 1958 (3) SA 742 (N); S v Mayo 1974 (4) SA 325 (R); Kader v 
Assistant Magistrate, Cape Town 1954 (3) SA 648 at 656H (“[a]lthough there is no fixed time limit, 
review proceedings must, having regard to the circumstances of each particular case, be taken 
within a reasonable time”). 
16
 Hoexter C Administrative Law in South Africa (2007) at 106. 
17
 Kruger at 30-5; Terblanche at 408.  The answer to this question is important for the purpose of 
establishing whether the military accused has a right to appeal or review to the High Court of 
South Africa.  This matter is discussed in para 7.6 below. 
18
 Section 19(1)(a)(ii) of the Supreme Court Act.  An “inferior court” is defined in s 1 of the 
Supreme Court Act as “any court (other than the court of a division) which is required to keep a 
record of its proceedings, and includes a magistrate or other officer holding a preparatory 
examination into an alleged offence.” 
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only review cases from lower courts in terms of authority granted by legislation.19  
However, section 19(3) of the Supreme Court Act retains the High Court’s 
existing powers in terms of the common law.20  In those instances not covered by 
sections 19(1)(a) and (3) of the Supreme Court Act, the High Court may rely on 
its inherent jurisdiction. Since the advent of the Constitution the courts, in 
deciding whether they have authority for review in terms of the common law or 
statute, must also keep in mind that section 173 of the Constitution has 
broadened the inherent jurisdiction of the High Courts, allowing them to protect 
and regulate their own processes and to develop the common law, taking into 
account the interests of justice within the context of the values of the 
Constitution.21 
 
7.2.2.2 Grounds for review of criminal proceedings 
 
The South African law generally recognises various forms of review.22  These 
are, inter alia, review of proceedings from a lower court, from another tribunal,23 
automatic review and reviews provided for by specific legislation.24 
 
The grounds for review are to be found in section 24 of the Supreme Court Act25 
and section 304 of the Criminal Procedure Act.  Section 24(1) provides that, inter 
alia, an absence of jurisdiction on the part of the court, bias, malice or corruption 
                                               
19
 Kruger at 30-5; Du Toit et al at 30-2; Sefatsa v Attorney-General, Transvaal 1989 (1) SA 821 
(A) at 833E (“[a] superior court – including this court – is a creature of statute, and it is not correct 
to state, as a general proposition, that it has a jurisdiction which is general and unlimited unless 
cut down or forbidden by law”). 
20
 S v Zungu 1984 (1) SA 376 (N) at 379H. 
21
 Hansen v Regional Magistrate, Cape Town 1999 (2) SACR 430 (C) at 433e-f; Du Toit et al at 
30-2.  The court further held that the concept of “the interests of justice” is a wider concept than 
provided for in terms of ss 19(1)(a) and (3) of the Supreme Court Act, the provisions on which the 
decision in Sefatsa v Attorney-General, Transvaal 1989 (1) SA 821 (A) was based. 
22
 Kruger at 30-5; Joubert at 328; Johannesburg Consolidated Investment Co v Johannesburg 
Town Council 1903 TS 111 at 114-116; Du Toit et al at 30-3. 
23
 These reviews refer to common law reviews.  See Hira v Booysen 1992 (4) SA 86 (A) at 93A-
94A for the position of common law review. 
24
 Kruger at 30-5. 
25
 Read with r 53 of the Uniform Rules of Court providing for the procedures to be followed for 
review by a lower court.  These rules are applicable to all reviews, including those done in terms 
of common law jurisdiction (see the Uniform Rules of Court; Kruger at 30-7; Du Toit et al 30-3). 
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on the part of the presiding officer, a gross irregularity during the proceedings or 
the admission of inadmissible evidence or rejecting admissible evidence are 
considered grounds for review.  The Criminal Procedure Act provides even 
vaguer criteria, in that a matter can be taken on review if the conviction and or 
sentence are “not in accordance with justice”.26   These provisions should be 
read together and are so wide that they cover virtually every possible 
infringement. 
 
This is especially true since the advent of the Constitution.  Reviews must be 
judged in accordance with the fair trial rights and the courts must now adhere to 
the general “spirit and purport” of the Bill of Rights.27  If anything the 
constitutional application of fair trial rights now requires an even broader 
interpretation of section 24 of the Supreme Court Act and section 304 of the 
Criminal Procedure Act.28  Consequently the court is not limited to the 
proceedings during the trial in considering the review.  It may take cognisance of 
matters outside the proceedings.  The ultimate goal of review, when applying the 
values proposed in the Bill of Rights, is to determine the fairness of the 
proceedings. Acting in the “interests of justice” means that the court may take 
trial-related as well as extraneous factors into consideration.29 
 
7.2.2.3 Scope of irregularity 
 
Irrespective on which grounds the review is done, not just any irregularity 
necessarily leads to the vitiation of the proceedings.  The requirement for the 
setting aside is a broad one that “the proceedings are in accordance with 
                                               
26
 Kruger at 30-9. 
27
 Section 35(3)(a)-(o) of the Constitution; Kruger at 30-6. 
28
 S v Block 2011 (1) SACR 622 (NCK) at para 16. 
29
 S v Block 2011 (1) SACR 622 (NCK) para 18; S v Dlamini; S v Dladla; S v Joubert; S v 
Schietekat 1999 (2) SACR 51 (CC) para 46 (the “interests of justice” is “a useful term denoting in 
broad and evocative language a value judgment of what would be fair and just to all concerned.  
But while its strength lies in its sweep, that is also its potential weakness.  Its contents depend on 
the context and applied interpretation”). 
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justice.”30  The test to be applied in this regard is whether the court of review is of 
the opinion that the remaining evidence which was not affected by the irregularity 
still constitutes proof beyond a reasonable doubt.31  Potential prejudice is not 
sufficient.  The irregularity must in fact lead to a failure of justice.32 
 
The advent of the Constitution introduced the fair trial rights of the accused as a 
factor to consider.  Any irregularity must now be judged with reference to the 
accused’s right to fair trial.33  The constitutional context has not, however, 
changed the test applied by the court for the setting aside of the finding or the 
sentence.  The question is still whether a reasonable trial court would have 
convicted the accused despite the irregularity.34 Not all irregularities are sufficient 
to result in an unfair trial.  Irregularities vary in nature and degree.35  Kruger 
identifies two categories of irregularities from common law.36 The first is a 
“general category”. The question in this instance is whether the evidence and the 
credibility of the findings remain unaffected by the irregularity.37  The court must 
establish whether the irregularity deviated from the procedural rules, principles 
and formalities necessary for credible evidence.  Such irregularities only lead to 
setting aside a finding where it leads to a failure of justice due to serious 
                                               
30
 Kruger at 30-9. 
31
 Kruger at 30-9; S v Tuge 1966 (4) SA 565 (A) at 568F-G. 
32
 Kruger at 30-9; Du Toit et al at 30-24; S v Gaba 1985 (4) SA 734 (A) at 750G.  However, in 
Adonis v Additional Magistrate, Bellville 2007 (2) SA 147 (C) the court was prepared to interfere 
in incomplete proceedings where a gross irregularity has caused or is likely to cause prejudice to 
the applicant.  In this instance potential prejudice was sufficient but it must be considered against 
the fact that this related to incomplete proceedings were it is still possible to prevent the 
prejudice. 
33
 Section 35(3) of the Constitution; S v Coetzee 1995 (2) SACR 742 (C); S v Chukwu 2010 (2) 
SACR 29 (GNP) para 8. 
34
 S v Chukwu 2010 (2) SACR 29 (GNP) at 29g; S v Mkhise; S v Mosia; S v Jones; S v Le Roux 
1988 (2) SA 868 (A) at 872G where the court held that the “enquiry is whether it is of so 
fundamental and serious a nature that the proper administration of justice and the dictates of 
public policy require it to be fatal to the proceedings.” 
35
 S v Le Grange 2009 (1) SACR 125 (SCA) paras 29-30; S v Naidoo 1962 (4) SA 348 (A) 354D; 
Kruger at 30-11 for examples of irregularities. 
36
 Kruger at 30-10. 
37
 In S v Naidoo 1962 (4) SA 348 (A) at 354D the court referred to this category as “irregularities 
of a lesser nature.”  See also S v Le Grange 2009 (1) SACR 125 (SCA) para 30. 
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prejudice of the accused.38 The second category is the “exceptional category”, 
where the irregularity is so fundamental and serious that it leads to a failure of 
justice per se, which voids the trial ab initio.39  Such an irregularity is also referred 
to as a gross irregularity.40  Such cases will be set aside without referring to the 
merits of the case.  The accused may be tried again. 
 
7.2.2.4 Powers of the court of judicial review 
 
After consideration of the review, the High Court has wide powers regarding the 
ratification of the conviction and sentence on review.41 The court may confirm or 
change the finding, confirm, change or set aside a sentence or a court order, 
correct the proceedings of the magistrate’s court or substitute the finding or 
sentence of the trial court with one that it should preferably have given.  The 
court may also deal with the matter in the manner as ordered by the High Court. 
 
Section 304(2) of the Criminal Procedure Act does not authorise the review court 
to impose a heavier sentence on review.  The review court may change a 
conviction in terms of one statute to a conviction in terms of another statute as 
long as it does not prejudice the accused.42  But where the offender was given an 
incompetent sentence, the review court can replace it with the correct sentence, 
even if the new sentence is a more severe sentence.43  Although the review court 
may substitute the sentence it is preferable, in light of the accused’s right to a fair 
trial, that the matter should rather be referred back to the trial court for 
sentencing, giving the accused the opportunity to respond.44 
                                               
38
 Du Toit F “Onreëlmatighede in die Strafproses: Is ‘n Absolute Klassifikasie Moontlik?” (1996) 1 
Stell LR 85 at 85; Kruger at 30-10; S v Naidoo 1962 (4) SA 348 (A) 354F; S v Mkhise; S v Mosia; 
S v Jones; S v Le Roux 1988 (2) SA 868 (A) at 871G. 
39
 S v Mkhise; S v Mosia; S v Jones; S v Le Roux 1988 (2) SA 868 (A) at 871F where the court 
refers to such irregularities as “fatal irregularities”; S v Naidoo 1962 (4) SA 348 (A) at 354D-F; Du 
Toit at 86; Kruger at 30-10. 
40
 S v Le Grange 2009 (1) SACR 125 (SCA) para 30. 
41
 Section 304(2)(c) of the Criminal Procedure Act; Kruger at 30-21; Du Toit et al at 30-16A. 
42
 Kruger at 30-24; Du Toit et al at 30-16B. 
43
 Kruger at 30-24; Du Toit et al 30-16B, 30-38. 
44
 Du Toit et al at 30-16B. 
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7.2.3 Judicial appeal 
 
In terms of the Criminal Procedure Act any person who has been convicted of an 
offence by any lower court may appeal to a High Court with the necessary 
jurisdiction against his conviction, sentence or court order.45  The accused may 
appeal against any sentence.  An acquittal is final and cannot be appealed.46 
 
The Criminal Procedure Act however only provides for an appeal from a lower 
court as well as from the High Court.47  For the purpose of this thesis only appeal 
from the lower court is discussed, being the appropriate forum for consideration 
of appeal from a military court.  However, in terms of section 1 of the Criminal 
Procedure Act a “lower court” means “any court established under the provisions 
of the Magistrate’s Courts Act, 1944.”  Any tribunal or court other than that 
defined in the Magistrate’s Courts Act can consequently not be regarded as a 
“lower court” for purposes of appeal and provision must be made in other 
statutes for such a court or tribunal to gain the right to appeal to the High Court.48 
 
7.2.3.1 The powers of the court of appeal 
 
The High Court derives its authority to hear appeals from both the Supreme 
Court Act and the Criminal Procedure Act.  The Supreme Court Act provides that 
the local and provincial divisions of the High Court has jurisdiction to hear 
appeals within their area of jurisdiction.49  It may further hear evidence regarding 
the appeal or it may return the case to the trial court to lead further evidence.  
                                               
45
 Section 309 of the Criminal Procedure Act; Du Toit et al at 30-16B.  Although the court found in 
S v Steyn 2001 (1) BCLR 52 (CC) that a lower court cannot be treated the same as the High 
Courts and that a requirement for leave to appeal from the lower court is an infringement on the 
accused’s right to a fair trial in terms of s 35(3)(o) of the Constitution, ss 309B and 309C of the 
Criminal Procedure Act were amended and came into operation on 1 January 2004 (see Kruger 
at 30-31; Du Toit et al at 30-22).  All persons now require leave to appeal. 
46
 Kruger at 30-45. 
47
 See ss 309 and 316 of the Criminal Procedure Act respectively. 
48
 Kruger at 30-32(1).  See further the discussion at para 7.6.2 below. 
49
 Section 19(1)(a)(i) of the Supreme Court Act. 
  
416 
Any finding or court order can be confirmed, changed, set aside or substituted 
with another appropriate finding.50  This should not be read as giving the High 
Court the authority to change an acquittal into a conviction.51 
 
The wide authority of the High Court on appeal also includes the authority to 
impose a more severe sentence or finding.52  The court of appeal can substitute 
a finding on a lesser offence with the more serious main charge.  Under the 
circumstances the court may then increase the punishment to reflect the 
appropriateness of the sentence.  The court of appeal has two options in this 
regard.  It may set aside the sentence and remit the case to the trial court to 
exercise its discretion on sentence anew or the court of appeal may substitute 
the sentence of the court a quo with its own sentence.53  It may be preferable to 
remit the matter to the trial court for reconsideration of sentence so that the 
accused may receive the opportunity to address the court in this regard where it 
will “better serve the interests of justice.” 54 
 
The court of appeal has the same powers as those conferred on the review court 
by the Criminal Procedure Act.55  The court of appeal is further entitled to 
increase the sentence imposed by the trial court where the case is brought on 
appeal on the grounds of the finding, sentence or both.56    
 
7.2.3.2 Principles applied by the court of appeal 
 
The principles which the court should apply in considering an appeal was 
comprehensively set out in S v Dhlumayo57 and remain relevant today.58 The 
                                               
50
 Section 22 of the Supreme Court Act. 
51
 Kruger at 30-45; S v van der Walt 1963 (2) SA 525 (T) at 527C. 
52
 Section 309(3) of the Criminal Procedure Act; s 310 of the Criminal Procedure Act (where the 
state appeals against the sentence); Kruger at 30-51. 
53
 Director of Public Prosecutions, Transkei v Dubo 2011 (1) SACR 191 (ECM) para 11. 
54
 Director of Public Prosecutions, Transkei v Dubo 2011 (1) SACR 191 (ECM) para 15. 
55
 See the discussion on s 304(2) of the Criminal Procedure Act at 7.2.2.4 above. 
56
 Section 309(3) of the Criminal Procedure Act. 
57
 S v Dhlumayo 1948 (2) SA 677 (A). 
58
 See also Kruger at 30-45; Du Toit et al at 30-37. 
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court held that with an appeal the accused is entitled to a re-hearing otherwise 
the right to appeal is illusionary.59  It must however be kept in mind that the trial 
court has an advantage over the appeal court since it saw and heard the 
witnesses whilst the appeal court does not have the opportunity to observe the 
demeanour of the witnesses.  For this reason the appeal court is reluctant to 
reject the findings of the trial court.  It is therefore seldom that the appeal court 
can be in as good a position to assess the witnesses as the trial court.60  It will 
only reject the trial court’s assessment of the evidence where it is of the opinion 
that the trial court’s assessment is wrong.61 
 
It is sometimes possible for the appeal court to be in as good a position as the 
trial court in drawing inferences from the facts.  Where there is no misdirection on 
the part of the trial judge, the appeal court assumes that his inferences are 
correct and the appeal court will only interfere where it is of the opinion that the 
trial judge’s inferences are incorrect.  
 
The court of appeal may find a misdirection to have occurred when the reasons 
put forward by the trial judge are unsatisfactory or if certain facts or probabilities 
have been overlooked.62  Under such circumstances the court of appeal could 
disregard the trial court’s finding on facts and come to its own conclusion. 
However, the appeal court should not approach the record with the expectation 
that something not mentioned in the record means that the trial court did not 
consider it. 
 
The mere fact that the trial court might have been misdirected on a point of law 
does not mean that the appeal will be successful.  The conviction could be 
                                               
59
 See also S v Leve 2011 (1) SACR 87 (ECG) (where the court confirmed that this principle is a 
fundamental rule of appeal); Protea Assurance Co Ltd v Casey 1970 (2) SA 643 (A) at 648E; Du 
Toit et al 30-37. 
60
 See also S v Francis 1991 (1) SACR 198 (A) at 204c-f; S v Hadebe 1997 (2) SACR 641 (SCA) 
at 645; S v Leve 2011 (1) SACR 87 (ECG) para 8. 
61
 Kruger at 30-45. 
62
 S v Hanekom 2011 (1) SACR 430 (WCC) para 30. 
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upheld if the court of appeal is of the opinion that, despite the misdirection, the 
guilt of the accused was still proven beyond a reasonable doubt.63 
 
These principles apply to the court’s power on interfering with sentences as well.  
The court of appeal does not interfere with the trial court’s sentencing jurisdiction 
lightly.64  The trial court has the advantage of seeing and hearing the witnesses 
and the appeal court will not easily differ from the trial court’s assessment of the 
facts.  In Director of Public Prosecutions, Transkei v Dubo65 the court held that 
 
[a] mere difference between the sentence imposed by the trial court and the 
sentence the appeal court would have imposed, is not a sufficient ground for 
interference with the sentence of the trial court.  The difference between the two 
sentences must be of such a nature and degree that it appears that the trial court 
exercised penal discretion unreasonably. 
 
This should not be interpreted as if the court of appeal is hesitant to interfere in 
the sentencing discretion of the trial court where it is of the opinion that the trial 
court did not exercise its sentencing discretion properly.66  In S v Di Blasi67 the 
court held, in setting aside a sentence it deemed too lenient, that “the sentence 
imposed by the learned Judge [is] shockingly inappropriate” and in Attorney-
General, Eastern Cape v D68 held that  
 
 “[i]n not properly weighing up the relevant factors the trial magistrate clearly 
 misdirected himself which entitles the court to interfere with the sentence on 
                                               
63
 S v Dhlumayo 1948 (2) SA 677 (A). 
64
 Du Toit et al at 30-39.  In S v Salzwedel 1999 (2) SACR 586 (SCA) the appeal court increased 
the sentence imposed where the trial court had overestimated the personal circumstances of the 
accused and underestimated the seriousness of the offence.  In S v Sadler 2000 (1) SACR 331 
(A) the court substituted direct imprisonment for the suspended sentence imposed by the trial 
court where it found that the original sentence was inappropriate and contrary to the interests of 
justice. 
65
 Director of Public Prosecutions, Transkei v Dubo 2011 (1) SACR 191 (ECM) para 7; Du Toit et 
al at 30-39; S v Anderson 1964 (3) SA 494 (A) at 495G-H. 
66
 Director of Public Prosecutions, Transkei v Dubo 2011 (1) SACR 191 (ECM) para 14. 
67
 S v Di Blasi 1996 (1) SACR 1 (A) at 10f. 
68
 Attorney-General, Eastern Cape v D 1997 (1) SACR 473 (EC) at 478a-b; Du Toit et al at 30-39; 
Director of Public Prosecutions v Mngoma 2010 (1) SACR 427 (SCA) paras 13-14. 
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 appeal…the sentence imposed by the magistrate is shockingly inappropriate and 
 the leniency of the sentence imposed has, in my view, given rise to a miscarriage 
 of justice.”  
 
7.3 Administrative review and appeal 
Some of the processes prescribed in terms of military criminal justice show 
substantial similarities with administrative decisions. In fact it is possible that a 
trial before a Commanding Officer would have been seen as an administrative 
action, had it not been for the MDSMA declaring this forum to be a court for 
purposes of military law. As a result it might be useful to briefly consider the basic 
principles involved in review and appeal of administrative decisions. 
 
7.3.1 Administrative review 
 
Administrative review allows a higher authority to reconsider administrative 
decisions and actions.69  An administrative appeal (or review) is an appeal from 
one administrative official to another.70 Administrative action entails “the use of 
public powers or the performance of public functions”71 and refers in general to 
“the conduct of public administration.”72  The application of administrative law is 
very wide, mainly because of the extent of government powers and activities.73  
Generally, administrative action certainly includes the implementation of policy 
and the making of adjudicative decisions.  The latter, which could involve 
administrative judicial acts, often amount to processes quite similar in nature to 
                                               
69
 Hoexter C Administrative Law in South Africa (2007) at 63. 
70
 Hoexter C & Lyster R in Currie I (ed) The New Constitutional and Administrative Law: Volume 
Two: Administrative Law (2003) at 37. 
71
 Hoexter (2007) at 9; Currie & De Waal (2005) at 653. 
72
 Hoexter (2003) at 3.  Public administration refers to the public service or employees of all 
government departments.  This would include the SANDF. 
73
 See Hoexter (2007) at 10 where she states that “[a]s the state attempts to secure social justice, 
the executive branch assumes immense power and the functions of the modern administration 
acquire an enormous capacity to affect the rights and liberties of the people.” 
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disciplinary trials.  However, this is not the place to go into the difficulties of 
determining the exact nature of administrative actions.74 
  
Where action is classified as administrative in nature it will be subject to section 
33 of the Constitution, as well as the Promotion of Administrative Justice Act 3 of 
2000 (PAJA), which gives effect to the rights set out in section 33.75  Section 33 
gives every individual the right to procedurally fair administrative action and the 
provisions in the PAJA provides more detailed guidelines on the procedures to 
be followed before administrative action is taken to make sure that the action 
taken is procedurally fair.76 
 
Administrative action can be reviewed either by a court or by a higher 
administrative authority.  The legality of the administrative action is reviewed by 
the High Court and assessing the merits of the action is the responsibility of the 
executive.77   
 
The types of review discussed above in the context of judicial review also apply 
to administrative review.78  Hoexter elaborates on the “traditional” forms and 
includes constitutional review allowed in terms of the Bill of Rights and judicial 
review “in the administrative-law sense” governed by the PAJA.79  Constitutional 
review refers to the power of the court to declare any type of legislation or state 
                                               
74
 See, in this regard, Hoexter (2007) at 167-168; President of the Republic of South Africa v 
South African Rugby Football Union 2000 (1) SA 1 (CC) paras 141, 143; Sidumo v Rustenburg 
Platinum Mines Ltd 2008 (2) SA 24 (CC) paras 82, 203, 205 and 219; Van Wyk D “Administrative 
Justice in Bernstein v Bester and Nel v Le Roux” (1997) South African Journal on Human Rights 
249 at 255; Transnet Ltd v Goodman Brothers (Pty) Ltd 2001 (1) SA 853 (SCA) para 34; 
Despatch High School v Head, Department of Education, Eastern Cape 2003 (1) SA 246 (CkH) 
para 19. These issues become more and more pertinent, because of the establishment of more 
and more tribunals by the executive (Hopkins K “Some Thoughts on the Constitutionality of 
“Independent” Tribunals Established by the State” (2006) 27 Obiter 150 at 152). 
75
 See in this regard Currie & de Waal (2005) at 644, 647-650. 
76
 Currie & De Waal (2005) at 665; s 3 of the PAJA. 
77
 Hoexter (2007) at 61. 
78
 Hoexter (2007) at 108 discusses the same types of review as discussed at para 7.2.2 above.  
See specifically the discussion on “special statutory review” which application is the same as 
when applying judicial review. 
79
 Hoexter (2007) at 109. 
  
421 
conduct invalid due to an infringement of a right in terms of the Bill of Rights.80  
Administrative judicial review refers to the power of the courts to set aside 
administrative decisions or rules on the basis of section 33 of the Constitution 
and the PAJA.81 
 
7.3.2 Administrative appeal 
 
Administrative appeals are, broadly speaking, governed by administrative law.82 
Such appeals differ from judicial appeals in that the person or entity deciding the 
appeal will step into the shoes of the original administrative body and consider 
the matter anew.  In this manner administrative appeals are regarded as an 
internal check on the justice and correctness of the decision.83 There are several 
examples of administrative appeal bodies responsible for administrative 
appeals.84  Hoexter mentions internal appeals from tribunal decisions to a 
superior departmental official or the relevant Minister, appeals to a national 
control body where the administrative system acts under the auspices of that 
body, appeals to an administrative tribunal specifically created to hear 
administrative appeals, and appeals to special courts presided over by judges 
and expert assessors. Finally, it is usually also possible to approach the ordinary 
courts. 
 
7.4 Appeal and review in terms of military law 
 
The aim of the MDSMA is, inter alia, to ensure a fair military trial and an 
accused’s access to the High Court of South Africa.85  To give substance to this 
right the defence legislation now provides for a process of military appeal and 
review.  Two processes are relevant in this regard.  The one involves Review 
                                               
80
 Hoexter (2007) at 108. 
81
 Hoexter (2007) at 109. 
82
 Hoexter (2007) at 107. 
83
 Hoexter (2007) at 63. 
84
 Cf Hoexter (2007) at 65-66. 
85
 Section 2(c) of the MDSMA. 
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Counsel, which includes the Director: Military Judicial Reviews and the other 
involves the CMA.  The Review Counsel and the Director: Military Judicial 
Reviews are responsible for reviews. The CMA has powers of review and appeal.  
A brief history on military appeals and review is discussed below followed by an 
overview of the general principles applicable to military appeal and review. 
 
7.4.1 Military review and appeal:  A short history 
 
Although a right to review existed, no provision was made for any appeal 
process, either within the military or to the civilian courts. 86  The military review 
process provided for could not be regarded as a constitutionally sound 
procedure.  Different levels of review existed.  At the lowest level was the 
convening authority, then review at the level of the various Chiefs of Staff and 
finally, at the highest level review by the Council of Review.  The convening 
authority was “any person empowered by warrant to convene courts martial.”87  
He was usually an officer higher in rank to the commanding officer of the unit, in 
command of a formation, usually of the rank brigadier88 or above.  The convening 
authority, in effect the entity deciding on proceeding with the charges against the 
accused, was also the reviewing authority who had to determine whether a 
conviction and/or sentence imposed by the court martial he had convened should 
be upheld.89  The finding and sentence of the court martial could not be executed 
before confirmation by the convening authority.90  Where the convening authority 
exercised its discretion to vary the finding or the sentence, the changed finding or 
                                               
86
 Freedom of Expression Institute v President, Ordinary Court Martial 1999 (2) SA 471 (C) para 
15 and 20; Tshivhase A E “Transformation of Military Courts” (2009) SA Public Law 450 at 453; 
van der Westhuizen H “An Introduction to the Military Courts in South Africa and Some 
Recommended Changes” (1994) African Defence Review 18 at 20.  See also the now repealed s 
107 of the Defence Act 44 of 1957 which stated that “[t]here shall be no appeal from the finding or 
sentence of a military court, but nothing in this Act shall be construed as derogating from the right 
of any division of the Supreme Court of South Africa to review the proceedings of a military court.” 
87
 Section 1 of the MDC (now repealed). 
88
 The rank of brigadier is now known as the rank of brigadier general. 
89
 Freedom of Expression Institute v President, Ordinary Court Martial 1999 (2) SA 471 (C) para 
20. 
90
 Sections 96, 98 and 106 of the MDC (now repealed); Anderson G C The Legal Classification of 
Military Tribunals as Courts of Law (1988) at 123. 
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sentence was regarded as the finding and sentence of the court a quo.91  
Although the accused was afforded the opportunity of making representations to 
the convening authority regarding his finding and sentence, the prosecution was 
not afforded the same opportunity.92 
 
After confirmation by the convening authority, court martial decisions were 
subject to an automatic review at various levels.  The level of review depended 
on the level of the convening authority.93  Decisions by general and ordinary 
courts martial convened by chiefs of staff were reviewed automatically by the 
Chief of Staff Personnel who forwarded the case with his comments for final 
decision by the Chief of the Defence Force.94  In practice this meant that the 
record of proceedings was forwarded to the military law officer at the office of the 
Chief of the Defence Force in the Adjutant General’s office.  The MDC refers to 
the Adjutant General in this regard but the relevant functions were taken over by 
the Chief of Staff Personnel.95  Ordinary courts martial convened by convening 
authorities other than chiefs of staff were automatically reviewed by the Chief of 
Staff and then forwarded to the Chief of Staff Personnel for further review.96  In 
practice the record of proceedings was forwarded to the military law officer at the 
office of the Chief of the Arms of Service, such as the Chief of the Air Force.  The 
accused could also make representations to the relevant convening authority.97 
 
The accused could further apply for review by the Council of Review, which was 
the highest reviewing authority within the SANDF.98  Where the accused brought 
                                               
91
 Section 116 of the MDC (now repealed).  The convening authority could not vary the finding or 
sentence to the detriment of the accused (see s 101(1)(d) of the MDC (now repealed)). 
92
 Section 100 of the MDC (now repealed).  
93
 Sections 64-65A of the MDC (now repealed). 
94
 Section 109 of the MDC (now repealed).   
95
 Anderson at 125. 
96
 Sections 108 and 110 of the MDC (now repealed).   
97
 Section 111 of the MDC (now repealed). 
98
 Section 112 of the MDC; r 99 of the MDC (now repealed).  For the procedure see r 99 of the 
MDC.  The accused had to apply for review within a period of three months after his conviction.  
In terms of the transitional provisions in the MDSMA, s 44(1) provides that “every Council of 
Review established and constituted by the Minister of Defence under section 145 of the Code 
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such an application the prosecution was given the opportunity to also make 
representations to the Council of Review.  The MDC provides that the chairman 
of the Counsel could be a Supreme Court judge, although this was not a fixed 
requirement.99  Sentences of cashiering, discharge with ignominy, dismissal from 
the SANDF and imprisonment for a period of longer than three months were 
subject to automatic review to the Counsel of Review.100  Such sentences were 
not submitted for review to any convening authority.101  The Counsel of Review 
had the same powers as the other reviewing authorities, except where the 
accused applied for review the Counsel of Review had the authority to increase 
his sentence.102  Any finding, sentence or court order that was confirmed or 
varied by the Council of Review was regarded as being the finding or sentence 
made by the trial court.103 
 
The review process was not necessarily the final say of the process.  The MDC 
authorised the General Officer Commanding of the SADF to mitigate, remit or to 
commute any sentence that was imposed on an offender.104  This is as clear an 
example of executive interference as can be found in the previous defence 
legislation. 
 
The application of this review process negates the doctrine of separation of 
powers and judicial independence.  The executive, in the guise of the convening 
authority, was involved in instituting prosecutions as well as reviewing the trial.  
Where the independence of the judiciary was suspect, as was the case with 
courts martial, an independent review of the case may at least have provided 
some guarantee of independence and justice.  This is not possible if reviews are 
conducted by the executive and there is no further avenue of appeal. 
                                                                                                                                            
prior to the commencement of this Act, shall be deemed to have constituted and established as a 
Court of Military Appeal under this Act.” 
99
 Section 145 of the MDC (now repealed). 
100
 Section 103 of the MDC (now repealed) and Anderson at 126. 
101
 Rule 98(4) of the MDC. 
102
 Section 115(4) of the MDC (now repealed). 
103
 Section 116 of the MDC (now repealed). 
104
 Section 117 of the MDC (now repealed). 
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As explained previously, the MDSMA has brought about radical changes to the 
military review process since 1999.  Review authority was removed from the 
sphere of the commanders and placed under the jurisdiction of a military Review 
Counsel.105  Review Council are law officers in the SANDF who are appropriately 
qualified and who hold a law degree.106  They are assigned to their function by 
the Adjutant General and there is no requirement, as is the case with the military 
judges, that they should have any experience as a practicing attorney or 
advocate or in the administration of criminal or military justice.  The only 
requirement is that they perform their functions competently.107  Review Council 
answers to the Director: Military Judicial Reviews. 
 
The Director: Military Judicial Reviews must be an appropriately qualified officer 
holding a degree in law and must be of the rank of at least a colonel.  He must 
possess at least five years experience as a practicing attorney, advocate or in 
the administration of criminal or military justice.  He is assigned to his post in the 
same way as the other directors, eg Director: Military Judges.108  Military judicial 
reviews form a separate directorate from the military judges. 
 
Where once there was no military appeal court, now the legislation provides for a 
Military Court of Appeal, being the highest military court in South Africa.109  At 
first glance it would seem as if the principles founded by the common law and 
                                               
105
 Section 26(1) of the MDSMA.  
106
 Appropriately qualified means “including the passing of a departmental course in military law” 
(see s 1 of the MDSMA). 
107
 Section 26(2) of the MDSMA. 
108
 See ss 13(1) and (2)(b) of the MDSMA 
109
 Section 6(3) of the MDSMA; Tshivhase A E “Military Courts in a Democratic South Africa: An 
Assessment of their Independence” (2006) New Zealand Armed Forces Law Review 98 at 108; 
Tshivhase (2009) at 455; Borman v Minister of Defence 2007 (2) SA 388 (C) para 14; Kruger at 
30-32(1). 
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constitutionalised in the Constitution110 now find application in defence legislation 
concerning review and appeal.111 
 
All acquittals and discharges of an accused by the military courts are final and 
not subject to review.  Every finding of guilty, sentence imposed or court order 
made is subject to the review procedures prescribed by the MDSMA.112  Section 
25 of the MDSMA provides that  
 
[e]very person subject to the Code who is convicted and sentenced by a 
military court has the right to automatic, speedy and competent review of 
the proceedings of his or her trial to ensure that any proceedings, finding, 
sentence or order is either valid, regular, fair and appropriate, or 
remedied. 
 
Each accused therefore has the right to an automatic and speedy review of his 
case.113  The accused may also apply for the review of his trial proceedings to 
the CMA.114  A perusal of the MDSMA shows that only the right to and the 
processes of review are addressed in the relevant sections.  Section 25 refers to 
the “right to review of trial” and section 34 of the MDSMA only addresses 
reviews, although the heading to the section refers to both appeal and review.  
The only clear reference to an appeal authority is found in the section addressing 
the powers of the CMA.115  Because the MDSMA confers “full appeal and review 
competencies” on the CMA, it is submitted that the procedures and regulations 
regarding reviews apply mutatis mutandis to matters of appeal before the CMA 
as well as those serving before the Director: Military Judicial Reviews.116 
 
                                               
110
 Section 35(3)(o) of the Constitution (“[e]very accused person has a right to a fair trial, which 
includes the right of appeal to, or review by, a higher court”); Steyn v Minister of Defence [2004] 
JOL 13059 (T) para 4. 
111
 Section 25 of the MDSMA read with ss 8 and 34 of the MDSMA. 
112
 Carnelley at 61; Tshivhase (2006) at 124; s 34(1) of the MDSMA. 
113
 Tshivhase (2006) at 124; Tshivhase (2009) at 459. 
114
 Section 34(5) of the MDSMA. 
115
 Section 8(1) of the MDSMA. 
116
 Section 34(3) of the MDSMA.  This matter is discussed in para 7.5.2 below. 
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A general discussion on military appeals and reviews follows before the specific 
problems with regard to military reviews and appeals are addressed.  Although 
the legislation makes no discernable distinction between these two processes, 
the two are separated for the discussion as far as possible. 
 
7.4.2 Military review 
 
Of the different forms of review military review can best be described as a “wider 
form of statutory review.”117  This type of review invests the courts with wider 
powers of review and a court conducting such a review “possesses not only the 
powers of a court of review in the legal sense, but it has the functions of a court 
of appeal…”118  This type of review is not unlimited but is subject to the specific 
statutory provision as well as “the nature and the extent of the functions 
entrusted to the person or body making the decision under review.”119  Military 
reviews also have some comparable features with the automatic review process 
in terms of section 302 of the Criminal Procedure Act although the military 
process differs markedly from the civilian review process with regard to the entity 
responsible for the review. 
 
Military convictions can follow one of two paths in the process of review, namely 
automatic review by review counsel or automatic review by the CMA. 
 
7.4.3 Automatic review by review counsel 
 
All guilty findings, whether at a CODH, CSMJ or CMJ, are subject to review by 
Review Counsel, except where the accused has been sentenced to 
imprisonment (including suspended imprisonment), cashiering, discharge with 
                                               
117
 Hoexter (2007) at 108; Kruger at 30-5. 
118
 Johannesburg Consolidated Investment Co v Johannesburg Town Council 1903 TS 111 at 
117; Nel v The Master 2005 (1) SA 276 (SCA) para 23. 
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 Nel v The Master 2005 (1) SA 276 (SCA) para 23. 
  
428 
ignominy and dismissal or discharge from the SANDF.120  The accused is 
informed of this right to review upon the completion of his trial.121 
 
The accused is informed that he can make written representations to the relevant 
review counsel.122  He has 14 days in which to make the representations if he is 
not satisfied with the finding or the sentence.123  The implication of this section is 
that the accused must act swiftly if he is of the opinion that the trial court did not 
handle the trial in accordance with justice since the sentence, except for the 
exceptions in terms of section 34(2) MDSMA,124 is of immediate effect.125  Where 
the accused cannot submit his representations within 14 days the local 
representative of the Adjutant General may extend the period up to 28 days.126  If 
the accused fails to comply with the extended period for submission, he is barred 
from furnishing any written representations.  The matter is still reviewed, but 
without the benefit of the accused’s representations.127  Although 14 days may 
not seem sufficient, the actual review of the case only starts once Review 
Counsel receives the transcriptions of the trial which is approximately 14 days 
after the trial.  Since the accused has 14 days from when the review starts, the 
accused in actual fact has more time to make the written representations. 
 
A person assigned as Review Counsel exercises his powers within the area of 
jurisdiction to which he has been assigned by the Adjutant General.128  In terms 
of statutory review powers the review authority may only exercise those powers 
conferred on it in terms of legislation and although statutory review powers are 
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 Rules 71(2) and 71(3)(c) of the MDSMA. 
121
 Rule 58(12)(b)(ii) of the MDSMA; s 33(7) of the MDSMA. 
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 This is similar to the civilian automatic review where an accused may submit a written 
statement with the record of proceedings which replaces the formal affidavits required in terms of 
s 24 of the Supreme Court Act. 
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 Section 34(7) of the MDSMA.   
124
 Imprisonment, suspended imprisonment, cashiering, discharge with ignominy, dismissal or 
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125
 Section 118 of the MDC. 
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 See S v Hola (CMA 05/07). 
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generally wide, the statute may also limit the review powers of an entity.129  The 
review powers of military Review Counsel at Legsato level are limited.  He may 
only uphold the finding and sentence.  Any further power must be exercised by 
the Director: Military Judicial Reviews.  When Review Counsel receives the trial 
documentation on automatic review he will peruse the documentation.  If he is 
satisfied that justice was done he will uphold the finding.  No evidence is lead at 
the CODH and therefore no assessment can be made on the merits of the 
case.130  With review from a CSMJ or CMJ on the other hand, evidence is 
recorded by the court a quo and an assessment on the merits can be done.  The 
test applied in deciding whether the review will succeed is wider than a mere 
absence of irregularities.  This is the same test applied in the civilian courts.131 
 
Where Review Counsel is not satisfied that the finding, sentence or the court 
order are in accordance with real and substantial justice he must submit the 
proceedings together with his view on the matter to the Director: Military Judicial 
Reviews who has the authority to set the finding, sentence or court order 
aside.132  The Director has the same powers as the CMA regarding the review of 
cases.133  The MDSMA does not distinguish between the powers of review and 
those of appeal and therefore confirms the contention that this is the type of 
review where the court “has powers of both appeal and review with the additional 
power, if required, of reviewing new evidence…”134 
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 Nel v The Master 2005 (1) SA 276 (SCA) para 23 where the court held that “[a] statutory power 
of review may be wider than the ‘ordinary’ judicial review…but it may also be narrower, ‘with the 
court being confined to particular grounds of review or particular remedies.” 
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7.4.4 Automatic review to the CMA 
 
Whenever an accused is sentenced to imprisonment (including suspended 
imprisonment), cashiering, discharge with ignominy or dismissal or discharge 
from the SANDF the proceedings are forwarded to the CMA on automatic 
review.135  None of these sentences may be executed before they have been 
confirmed by the CMA.136 
 
In these cases the review counsel merely acts as a “post office”.  It receives the 
record of proceedings from the trial and forwards it to the Director: Military 
Judicial Reviews for submission to the CMA.137  Automatic review to the CMA is 
also done subject to the statutory power of review authorised in terms of the 
defence legislation.138 
 
7.4.5 Referral to the CMA by the Director: Military Judicial Reviews 
 
Where military Review Counsel is of the opinion that a finding, sentence or court 
order should not be upheld, he refers the matter to the Director: Military Judicial 
Reviews who will exercise his powers in terms of the MDSMA.139  The Director 
may however, instead of exercising his powers, refer the matter to the CMA for 
decision.140  Where he decides to refer the matter to the CMA he must notify the 
Adjutant General of his decision.141  It is not clear why this is required but it may 
create a further opportunity for executive interference. 
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 Rule 71(1) MDSMA; s 34(6) MDSMA. 
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 Section 34(2) of the MDSMA. 
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 Rules 71(3)(a) and 74 of the MDSMA. 
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7.4.6 Application by the offender for review or appeal to the CMA 
 
The MDSMA does not specifically make provision for the accused to appeal his 
case to the CMA.  The Act only provides for an application of review to the 
CMA.142  It is however submitted that the process of appeal is by necessary 
implication included.143 
 
The accused must apply for the judicial review or appeal of his case within six 
months after the date of his conviction and must specify the grounds for which 
the relief is sought in his application.144  If the accused does not submit the 
application within the six month period, the CMA may condone a late application 
no later than two years after the date of the conviction.  The application must 
show good cause for the lateness of the application and must also contain the 
grounds on which review is sought.145  The mere notice of intention to bring an 
application is not sufficient to bar prescription.  The application must be lodged in 
time and must contain proper grounds for appeal or review.  Successful grounds 
for review would for example be the existence of a gross irregularity during the 
trial proceedings resulting in a miscarriage of justice or preventing the accused 
from receiving a fair trial.146 The inability of the offender to pay the page fees for 
the records cannot be used as good cause for condonation.147  Successful 
grounds for appeal would result in the CMA interfering with the finding or 
sentence of the court a quo. 
 
Where the application for condonation indicates a reasonable prospect of 
success the court will more likely grant the application and grant the accused 
leave to appeal. In S v Zulu148 the accused applied for condonation and 
requested that the conviction and sentence be set aside on a number of technical 
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 Section 34(5) of the MDSMA read with r 72 of the MDSMA; Carnelley at 75. 
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 Section 8 of the MDSMA provides for full review and appeal powers of the CMA. 
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grounds.  The accused did not apply for appeal on the merits of the case.  The 
matter was however brought to the CMA more than two years after conviction 
and the application for condonation could not be granted.  The court stated, 
however, that it “did consider the applicant’s appeal on its merits.  The court 
found no prospect of success in appeal and therefore the application for 
condonation would have been refused in any case.”  In S v Pheko149 the 
applicant failed to show good cause for not complying with the prescribed time 
limits and the review was not granted because there was “no prospect of success 
on the merits of the case”.  In an appeal against sentence the CMA found that 
one of the grounds for a successful consideration of condonation includes a 
reasonable prospect of success, but found no such prospect for reduction of the 
sentence in that instance.150 
 
However, if the accused brings the application for condonation after expiration of 
the two year period, the CMA no longer has jurisdiction to hear the matter.  The 
accused will have to apply for review to the High Court of South Africa and 
comply with their rules and procedures.151  Whether the High Court of South 
Africa will entertain such a late application on review would depend on the 
circumstances of the case.  The High Court holds that although there is no fixed 
time limit to review proceedings in civilian courts, review must be taken within a 
reasonable time.  Where “there is either no explanation or an unsatisfactory 
explanation – having regard to the circumstances, the Court will not exercise its 
discretion in favour of an applicant for review”.152 
 
It should be noted that the MDSMA makes no distinction between appeal and 
review in terms of the time limits attached to the applications to the CMA 
whereas the civilian courts do make this distinction. 
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7.4.7 CMA procedures in the application for appeal and review 
 
On receipt of the application the Director: Military Judicial Review provides the 
accused with a copy of the record of proceedings necessary for drawing up the 
heads of argument containing his representations to the CMA.153 
 
Any application to the CMA is submitted through the office of the review counsel.  
He attaches his view on the matter and forwards it to the Director who, with the 
inputs from the prosecution, submits the case to the CMA. 
 
The CMA has wide powers in considering appeals, in certain respects a wider 
power than the High Court of South Africa.  In allowing the CMA to hear 
argument, and receive further evidence and affidavits, the MDSMA provides for 
appeal in the wide sense which may include a complete re-hearing and re-
determination of the merits of the case.154  Where the civilian courts are limited to 
deciding an appeal within the four corners of the record of proceedings, the CMA 
is not so limited.  The CMA can even hear further oral evidence under oath. 155 
 
The CMA considers all evidence heard, if applicable, “in private” at a time and at 
a place fixed by the Adjutant General in consultation with the Chairperson of the 
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 Rule 72(3) of the MDSMA.  Rule 72(3) read with r 72(5) creates an anomaly – the accused 
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CMA.156  It is not clear why the legislature makes use of the words “in private” but 
it is submitted that within this context it should be interpreted as “closed 
proceedings.”  Once the CMA has made its decision it is recorded and endorsed 
by the members of the court and the Director informs all relevant parties of the 
result.157 
 
7.4.8 Powers of the CMA on appeal and review 
 
The CMA has full appeal and review powers with regard to any trial conducted by 
a military court.158 
 
The court may decide to uphold the finding and the sentence or to change the 
sentence imposed by the court a quo.  Where a matter serves before the CMA 
on automatic review, the court may not increase the punishment of the accused.  
The CMA may only increase punishment in those instances where the accused 
brought the matter on appeal or review.159  This has also been a long standing 
practice in the civilian courts.160 
 
A civilian court may either increase the sentence mero motu or on application 
from the prosecutor.  In the military only the first instance is applicable.  The 
defence legislation does not allow the prosecution counsel to appeal a sentence.  
Although it is a rule of practice to inform the civilian appellant of a possible 
increase in sentence, this is also not done by the CMA.161 
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In light of comments by the CMA regarding sentences imposed by the military 
courts a quo which are considered to be too lenient, it is submitted that 
consideration should be given to allowing the prosecution to appeal the sentence 
of an accused.  In S v Nel162 the CMA upheld a sentence of dismissal on 
automatic review from the SANDF which the court regarded as “very lenient”.  
They opined that “a more severe sentence would not have been out of order”.  In 
S v Kanu163 the court regarded the fine and suspended sentence as “shockingly 
inappropriate” as it was too lenient.164  The court did not agree that the court a 
quo had properly considered all the aggravating factors during sentencing.  As 
the matter came before the CMA on automatic review the court could not 
intervene and impose a more severe sentence.  The court remarked that  
 
[m]ilitary courts have to remember that they are the guardians of the values and 
good character in the SANDF.  Military criminals can be seen as the “enemy” that 
destroys the organisation from within.  Military courts should not err by being too 
lenient when they impose sentences for crimes committed in the organisation.  
By doing so, they actually leave a message to soldiers and offenders that the 
military law has “lost its teeth” and that the guardians of the law will tolerate the 
ongoing spree of violence against fellow soldiers within the organisation by 
ensuring military criminals of a continued career in the SANDF. 
 
A R600 fine for the unauthorised use of a military vehicle in S v Ngako165 was 
seen as “lenient in the extreme and cannot be regarded as conducive to military 
discipline.”  It is therefore submitted that it would be in the interest of justice to 
allow the prosecution to appeal sentences in such cases.  It should be kept in 
mind that the court held that the right to a fair trial includes fairness to society as 
well.  The court should therefore be empowered to rectify a miscarriage of 
justice, also where a sentence is deemed to be too lenient.166 
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Where the court is in agreement that the finding or sentence is not in accordance 
with real or substantial justice, the court may refuse to uphold the finding and set 
the sentence aside.  It may further substitute a finding with any other finding 
supported by the evidence.  It may however not substitute the finding with a more 
serious one, even if it would have been more appropriate under the 
circumstances.167  The CMA may further correct any error in the finding, 
sentence or the court order or refer a matter back to the trial court to rectify the 
error.168 
 
7.5 The current application of military appeal and review: Some concerns 
 
The general principles of military appeal and review do not clearly explain the 
type of appeal or review in fact followed by the military courts and review 
authorities.  The following is a summary of the military appeal and review 
avenues, followed by the concerns created through the application of these 
processes. 
 
7.5.1 The current application of military appeal and review: A summary 
 
7.5.1.1 Military appeal 
 
The South African law mainly distinguishes between two types of appeals – 
appeals from lower courts of law to higher courts of law and administrative 
appeals falling within administrative law.169  The question here is which form of 
appeal does the military appeal represent? 
 
                                               
167
 Section 8(3) of the MDSMA provides that any benefit of the doubt must be given to the 
offender with respect to any finding, sentence or order. 
168
 Section 8(2) of the MDSMA.  See S v Taylor (CMA 165/2001); S v Masiko (CMA 166/2001); S 
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Any accused who is not satisfied with the finding, sentence or court order made 
by the military court a quo may apply for an appeal to the CMA. 
 
It has been argued that proceedings before the CSMJ and CMJ are regarded as 
criminal proceedings and, despite certain concerns regarding the independence 
of the military judges at these forums, these military courts can be considered 
ordinary courts for the purposes of the Constitution.170  Proceedings conducted 
by these courts are therefore classified as judicial proceedings.  Since the CMA 
is also regarded as an ordinary court in terms of the Constitution, an appeal from 
the CMJ or CSMJ to the CMA is considered an appeal from a lower (military) 
court of law to a higher (military) court of law. 
 
The situation of an appeal from a CODH is at first glance not as clear as that of 
the CMJ.  It has been argued earlier that the CODH cannot be considered an 
ordinary court in terms of the Constitution.171  However, taking into account the 
brief discussion on administrative action above, it is clear that the CODH does 
not conduct administrative actions.  It was submitted that the CODH should be 
classified as a court sui generis and as such conduct judicial proceedings, albeit 
not of a criminal nature.172  Consequently an appeal from the CODH can be 
considered a judicial appeal from a lower military court sui generis to a higher 
(military) court of law. 
 
7.5.1.2 Military reviews 
 
The South African law distinguishes between various forms of review.173  As with 
the question posed above it must be established which form of review is 
applicable to the military courts. 
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The first form identified is the review of a decision by an inferior court.  This is 
governed by section 24 of the Supreme Court Act.  Reviews within the military 
law environment are not governed by the Supreme Court Act or the Criminal 
Procedure Act.  This form of review is therefore not applicable to reviews 
conducted from one military court to another.  It will however be applicable in 
those instances where a military accused applies for the review of his case to the 
High Court of South Africa.174 
 
A second form of review is that of common law review where the court conducts 
the review in terms of its inherent authority to do so.175  Military courts are 
creatures of statute and as such have only those powers provided by the 
enabling legislation.  They do not posses inherent powers of review. 
 
Although reviews may reach the reviewing authority through automatic review, it 
is submitted that the military courts’ reviewing authority is not exactly the same 
as the civilian equivalent.  Automatic review authority is usually wide, similar to 
an informal appeal and not only limited to irregularities.  It usually gives the court 
a wide jurisdiction regarding the review.176  This form of review does not 
adequately explain the limited review jurisdiction of the Review Counsel at the 
Legsato level.  The military courts are also not restricted to automatic reviews. 
 
Judicial review in the constitutional sense does not find application in the military 
courts.  Although all courts must consider the Bill of Rights in their decisions, the 
military courts cannot declare any type of legislation or state conduct 
unconstitutional.  Since it is argued that the proceedings before the military 
courts do not constitute administrative action, military review cannot be classified 
as judicial review in the administrative law sense. 
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Reference is however made to a wider form of statutory review.177  In this 
instance the legislature confers a statutory power of review on the reviewing 
authority.  This is sometimes a wider power of review than the ordinary one with 
many similarities to appeal.178  As mentioned earlier, military courts are creatures 
of statute with the powers provided by the legislation.  The legislation may give 
the reviewing authority wide powers of review179 or it may limit the powers of the 
review authority, as is the case of Review Counsel at Legsato level.180  It is 
submitted that reference to reviews in terms of military law refers to this type of 
statutory review. 
 
A matter can serve before a military review authority in one of two ways: (1) in 
terms of automatic review as determined by the legislature and (2) referral to the 
CMA by the Director: Military Judicial Reviews. 
 
All guilty findings in a military court are subject to automatic review.  The review 
authority is largely determined by the sentence imposed by the military court.  All 
sentences of imprisonment (including suspended imprisonment), cashiering, 
discharge with ignominy and dismissal or discharge from the SANDF are referred 
to the CMA on automatic review.  All other sentences are referred to Review 
Counsel at the relevant Legsato. 
 
Military review done by the CMA, for the same reasons mentioned above with 
regards to appeals, can be regarded as a judicial review.  The concern lies with 
the review done by Review Counsel and the Directory: Military Judicial Reviews.  
Two aspects are of concern: 
 
1. The non-judicial review of the military court proceedings; and 
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2. The constitutional right to review by a “higher court”. 
 
7.5.2 Non-judicial review of military court proceedings 
 
All guilty findings, even those in a CSMJ where the senior military judges preside, 
are subject to review by Review Counsel at the level of the Legsato.181  In terms 
of the defence legislation Review Counsel need no criminal or military law 
experience to be assigned as Review Counsel.  Yet they have the authority to 
review the decisions of the most experienced military judges. 
 
Although their powers of review are limited to confirming guilty findings, the same 
cannot be said about the Director: Military Judicial Reviews.  The Director: 
Military Judicial Reviews has the same powers of review as the Court of Military 
Appeal.182  Since the review authority is extremely wide this in effect means that 
the Director: Military Judicial Reviews has appeal and review authority.183  The 
MDSMA provides that the Director may “exercise in those proceedings, the 
powers conferred on a Court of Military Appeals by this Act.”184  The powers that 
are conferred on the CMA are set out in the MDSMA which states that185  
 
[a] Court of Military Appeals shall exercise full appeal and review competencies 
in respect of the proceedings of any case or hearing conducted by any military 
court… 
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 For an explanation on the qualifications and appointment of Review Counsel and the Director: 
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These powers include the hearing of argument or further evidence, either by 
means of affidavit or oral evidence.186  After hearing additional evidence the 
Director may uphold the finding and sentence, refuse to uphold the finding and 
set the sentence aside, substitute a finding with one supported by the evidence 
as a competent alternative verdict, or where the finding is upheld, the Director 
may vary the sentence. 
 
In exercising these wide powers of review, Review Counsel holds a lot of power 
over the trial court.  It may, inter alia, set aside and substitute findings or 
sentences imposed by more experienced military judges.  This is in spite of the 
fact that review counsel does not form part of the military judiciary.  They 
exercise powers that are similar to those of the CMA in spite of the fact that they 
are not a court of law.  Since the review of cases still form part of the accused’s 
trial the review by a non-judicial entity such as the Review Counsel and their 
Director poses some concerns in light of the accused’s constitutional right to a 
fair trial before an independent and impartial tribunal. 
 
As discussed in Chapter 4 above, independence and impartiality is not only a 
reference to the de facto independence and impartiality of the military court.  
Perceptions play an important role.187  Review counsel at all times form part of 
the executive.  When not conducting reviews the function of the Director: Military 
Judicial Reviews is purely administrative.188  His authority to interfere with the 
finding and sentence of the military court can arguably be perceived as executive 
interference. 
 
This is even more pronounced in the case of CODH.  The CODH can at best be 
seen as a court sui generis.  It does not entitle an accused to the wider protection 
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provided by section 35 of the Constitution.  It is only in highly exceptional cases 
that the matter will be considered by the CMA189 and the Director: Military 
Judicial Reviews will generally be the final level of review for this court.190 
 
Concerns were raised by the Ministerial Task Team regarding the Director: 
Military Judicial Review’s power to set aside proceedings and sentences 
imposed by military courts by means of powers similar to those of the CMA.191  
Review by a non-judicial authority is however not a concern unique to the South 
African military justice system. 
 
7.5.2.1 Non-judicial review of military cases: An international perspective 
 
The question of the independence of the courts martial system following an 
automatic review of convictions by a non-judicial entity served before the 
European Court of Human Rights (ECHR).  In Morris v The United Kingdom192 
the ECHR stated with reference to a non-judicial reviewing authority that 
 
[t]he authority was empowered to quash the applicant’s conviction and the 
sentence imposed by the court martial.  More importantly, it had powers to reach 
any finding of guilt which could have been reached by the court martial and to 
substitute any sentence which would have been open to the court martial, not 
being in the authority’s opinion more serious than that originally assessed.  Any 
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substituted verdict or sentence was treated as if it had been reached or imposed 
by the court martial itself. 
 
In these circumstances, strikingly similar to the South African situation, the ECHR 
held that such a review conducted by a non-judicial reviewing authority is 
contrary to the international concept of the independence of the courts.193  The 
court did not accept that the infringement was vitiated by the fact that the 
existence of this review was in the best interests of the soldiers or that an 
essentially fair procedure was followed by the authority in conducting the review.   
 
Subsequently, however, the House of Lords came to a different conclusion than 
the ECHR and found in R v Spear; R v Boyd; R v Saunby194 that although a 
reviewing authority seems anomalous since a binding decision by a court cannot 
be changed in another way than by a superior appellate court, a review within the 
system could only be advantageous to the accused since the reviewing authority 
could not substitute the finding or sentence with a more serious one.195  It was 
further argued that the rights of the accused to appeal to a court of law should be 
regarded as a safeguard against a non-judicial reviewing authority. 
 
In Cooper v The United Kingdom196 the ECHR once again considered, inter alia, 
whether the accused’s right to a fair trial by an independent and impartial tribunal 
was violated by the application of automatic review to a reviewing authority.197  
The court held that due to the automatic nature of the review to the reviewing 
authority, such authority formed part of the process at the end of which the 
finding and sentence became final.198  At this time the British reviewing authority 
had similar powers as the South African Review Counsel.  The court found that 
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where the final say in the case lies with an appellate court, the non-judicial review 
of the trial would not breach the independence of the judiciary.199 
 
7.5.2.2 Non-judicial review:  Application in South African military courts 
 
Review Counsel and the Director: Military Judicial Reviews, as discussed above, 
is not a court of law.  It is not listed in the MDSMA with the various military 
courts.200  The Director, in reviewing the sentences of the military courts does not 
create binding precedent.  The CMA remains the highest military court, binding 
all military courts below it.201  Yet, the Director, as a non-judicial entity may 
change the military court’s findings and sentences. 
 
Review by the Review Counsel and the Director results in a non-judicial entity 
exercising wide review powers conferred on it by statute.  This is a clear breach 
of the doctrine of separation of powers and the independence and impartiality of 
the military judiciary.  The independence of the courts is governed by section 165 
of the Constitution.202  This section lies outside of the Bill of Rights and is 
therefore not subject to limitation in terms of section 36 of the Constitution.  The 
powers given Review Counsel in terms of the MDSMA can therefore not be used 
to limit the constitutional requirement of an independent court, even if one could 
argue the justifiable governmental requirement in support of a disciplined force. 
 
Although the right to appeal is provided to all accused, in practice very few 
military trials reach the CMA.  For most trials Review Counsel or the Director is 
the last stop in the trial process.  Having a non-judicial entity with such powers 
over the military judiciary is a constitutional untenable situation and cannot be 
justified.  Although this matter has not reached the Constitutional Court it is 
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submitted that the functions of Review Counsel will not withstand constitutional 
scrutiny.  A possible alternative is discussed below.203 
 
7.5.3 The right to review or appeal to a higher court 
 
The right to review or appeal is constitutionalised and section 35(3)(o) of the 
Constitution provides that 
 
 (3)  Every accused person has a right to a fair trial, which includes the right – 
  (o)  of appeal to, or review by, a higher court. 
 
The meaning of the right to appeal and review is not immediately clear since, 
according to Steytler, the rules and procedures of appeals and reviews are not 
constitutionalised by section 35(3)(o).204 He identifies the core elements that can 
be afforded constitutional status in terms of section 35(3)(o) as a reconsideration 
of a court decision by a higher court, a reconsideration on the merits of the case 
on facts or law, a hearing of the appeal or review upon completion of the case 
and the exercising of the right within a reasonable time.205  The right is further 
limited to a one-level appeal or review and the accused must be informed of his 
rights in this regard.206 
 
Military courts must comply with these constitutional elements of a right to review 
or appeal.  Section 25 of the MDSMA seems to echo the constitution in that it 
affords any accused convicted in a military court the right to an “automatic, 
speedy and competent review of the proceedings.”  Section 25, however, only 
confers a right of review on a military accused.  It is notably silent on the right to 
appeal.  It is however submitted that the MDSMA cannot take away an accused’s 
constitutional right to appeal and the MDSMA’s silence in this regard should not 
be construed as an attempt to do so.  Section 25 further fails to specify the right 
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to review is to a higher court.  In fact, no reviewing authority is specified by this 
section.  The question is whether the MDSMA complies with the constitutional 
requirement of a right to review or appeal. 
 
A comparison between the military appeal and review process and Steytler’s 
analysis above brings the following to light – at first glance the military process 
seems to comply with all of these requirements.  Both the Director: Military 
Judicial Reviews and the CMA exercise full appeal and review powers.  Appeals 
and reviews are only heard upon completion of the case.  Time limits imposed 
upon the accused ensure that the application is brought within a reasonable 
time.207  The CMA or Review Counsel provides the one level appeal and review 
process and the accused is always informed of these rights upon completion of 
his trial.208 
 
The concern regarding the powers of the Director: Military Judicial Reviews with 
regard to the review of military trials has been discussed above.  Two further 
concerns become apparent in the comparison: 
 
 1. Exercise of the right within a reasonable time; and 
 2. Reconsideration of the proceedings by a higher court. 
 
7.5.3.1 Exercise of right within a reasonable time 
 
Compliance with the time limits by the accused does not create much difficulty.  
The MDSMA clearly provides the time periods.209  Where the accused attempts 
to submit an appeal or review outside the limits provided, the CMA cannot hear 
the matter and the accused has to apply to the High Court of South Africa for 
review. 
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These time limits are placed on the accused to give effect to his right to a speedy 
trial and to expedite the process of appeal and review.210  One would 
consequently expect the courts to complete an accused’s appeal or review within 
a reasonable time.  The problem with the older CMA cases, however, lies with 
the time between the date of the conviction and the date that the matter is heard 
by the CMA.  The CMA does not sit permanently but on an ad hoc basis, 
previously about two to three times a year.  A limited number of cases can then 
be heard.  In proceedings that the accused was sentenced to imprisonment, 
cashiering, discharge with ignominy and dismissal or discharge from the SANDF, 
the long time may not necessarily be detrimental to the accused per se since the 
sentence cannot be executed until the CMA has confirmed the finding and 
sentence and the accused consequently remains in the employ of the SANDF 
until completion of the review. 
 
The long period between conviction and execution of the sentence may however 
be detrimental to the administration of justice.  It would also violate the provisions 
of section 25 of the MDSMA which should ensure a “speedy and competent 
review … to ensure that any proceedings, finding, sentence or order is valid, 
regular, fair and appropriate, or remedied.”  Since the sentences mentioned 
above cannot be executed before confirmation by the CMA, members who 
should no longer be in uniform or who should be in prison are employed for the 
further period it takes the CMA to hear the matter.  This has a negative impact on 
morale on the unit because justice is not seen to be done and the accused, 
knowing that they may lose their employment at any time when the CMA 
provides feedback, is not motivated to act in the best interest of his employer.  
Such members are also not able to deploy operationally, placing unwarranted 
strain on manpower. 
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In Zulu v Minister of Defence211 a decision of the CMA was brought before the 
High Court on review.  The military court a quo sentenced the accused to 
discharge from the SANDF on 29 May 2001.  The CMA only heard the matter on 
7 July 2004 at which stage it confirmed the finding and sentence.212  A perusal of 
the CMA record indicates that no record of service (DD28) was attached, making 
it highly unlikely that the CMA had any indication of the previous record of the 
accused at its disposal.  The CMA judgment only contained the personal 
particulars of the accused, identified the presiding military judge, the prosecution 
counsel and the defence counsel.  The offences on which the accused was 
convicted were listed without further detail and the sentence given.  A short 
paragraph indicated that “after perusal of record of proceedings and after hearing 
counsel the Court is satisfied that the findings and sentence are in accordance 
with real and substantial justice and they are accordingly upheld.”  No reasons 
were given.213  Regarding the application for review to the High Court, Mojapelo J 
commented that “I cannot help observing that the period of over three years that 
lapsed from the initial decision to the date of hearing of the review/appeal is 
inordinately long.”214 
 
All other sentences are, however, effective immediately, which means that if the 
CMA takes an inordinately long period to complete the review or appeal the 
accused can for example have served the period of detention imposed by the 
trial court before the CMA hear the matter.  In administering the court roll, cases 
where more severe punishments are imposed, such as imprisonment, cashiering 
or discharge, are given priority.215  Since all punishments except those in terms 
of section 34(2) of the MDSMA are of immediate effect this may result in severe 
prejudice to the accused sentenced to a supposedly less severe punishment 
where the sentence is executed before the review is completed. 
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A perusal of CMA judgments indicates on average a lapse of between 10 and 20 
months between the date of conviction and date of the CMA judgment.  Various 
examples exist but the following two will suffice:  On 24 June 2003 the accused 
was convicted and sentenced to dismissal from the SANDF.  Being one of the 
more serious punishments in terms of priority on the CMA court roll, the matter 
served before the CMA only on 6 March 2006 where the sentence was varied to 
a fine of R6000.216  On 17 January 2004 another accused was sentenced to 
three months effective imprisonment and discharge with ignominy from the 
SANDF.  This, once again being a high priority case, only served before the CMA 
on 6 March 2006 where the sentence was varied to a fine of R400.217  Apart from 
the lapse in time between the date of conviction and the date of the CMA 
judgment a further concern is the huge discrepancy between the sentence 
imposed by the court a quo and the sentence substituted by the CMA.  Long 
periods before confirmation and the serious disparity between sentences of the 
trial courts and the CMA are not in the interest of justice.  One of the main 
justifications for a separate military justice system, as mentioned earlier, is the 
ability to complete trials in less time than civilian courts thereby enforcing swift 
justice.  Seen in this context the CMA did not succeed in its aim. 
 
This matter does however appear to be resolved.  In 1999 a moratorium was 
placed on all military trials because of the invalidation of the courts martial 
system.218  Offenders continued committing offences, wrongly believing that they 
could not be charged and once the MDSMA was promulgated, the new military 
courts had a tremendous backlog to work through.  At that time the CMA only 
convened two to three times per year and it took a number of years to complete 
the outstanding appeals and reviews.  Since fairly recently, however, the CMA 
has started convening on average every two months.  It now appears that the 
time between conviction and the decision by the CMA averages only two to four 
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months.219  This may be due to a variety of reasons.  The huge backlog created 
by the 1999 moratorium on military trials has been resolved.  There has also 
been a sharp decrease in cases brought before the CMA.  Where the CMA heard 
over 200 cases per year in early 2000, they now only have approximately 50 
cases to review per year.  Since long-term AWOL cases of more than 30 days 
are now administratively discharged fewer cases with serious consequences are 
tried by the military courts.220  Review Counsel opines that some military judges 
are currently also imposing more lenient sentences.  The last effective 
imprisonment reviewed by the Review Counsel at Legsato Cape Town, for 
example, was a case of cashiering and 12 months’ imprisonment in 2005.221 
 
7.5.3.2 Reconsideration of the proceedings by a higher court 
 
The only criteria required in terms of section 35(3)(o) of the Constitution for 
compliance with the accused’s right to appeal and review is that the review 
should be done by “a higher court”.222  This refers to a court that is higher on the 
judicial hierarchy and which can bind the lower courts.223  In the context of the 
military judiciary only decisions by the CMA bind the military courts as it is seen 
as the highest military court.224  In Mbambo v Minsiter of Defence225 the court 
held that the right to appeal or review by a higher court does not mean the right 
to appeal or review to the High Court of South Africa.  The accused has the right 
of appeal to or review by a higher court that has been properly established in 
terms of section 166(e) of the Constitution.226  Seen in the light of Potsane227 
where the court held that the MDSMA “introduced an hierarchical system of 
courts staffed by legally trained military officers and, at the higher levels, 
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presided over and even wholly staffed by fully pledged High Court judges”, the 
CMA is a “higher court” within the hierarchy of the military courts, thereby 
complying with section 35(3)(o) of the Constitution.228 
 
The same can however not be said regarding the non-judicial level of review of 
Review Counsel and the Director: Military Judicial Reviews.  The Director 
performs a purely administrative function, yet is given the powers of a court of 
appeal.229  Where the accused does not apply for further appeal or review to the 
CMA, the Director: Military Judicial Reviews is the final level of review.  The 
Director: Military Judicial Review cannot be seen as a “higher court” for purposes 
of section 35(3)(o) of the Constitution and therefore this avenue of review does 
not satisfy the accused’s constitutional right to appeal and review.230 
 
Although the same process of review is followed with regard to the CODH, this 
argument may not be relevant to these cases.  Since an accused at this forum 
does not qualify as an accused before a criminal court, the rights to a fair trial in 
terms of the Constitution, of which section 35(3)(o) forms part, do not apply as it 
would in the case of trial by military judges.  However, the process must at least 
be fair and provide a form of appeal and review against a decision by the 
commanding officer to ensure that the procedures were just and fair in 
compliance with the minimum constitutional requirements for such action.  Apart 
from the constitutional concern regarding the reviewing authority as a non-judicial 
entity, review by Review Counsel, read with section 25 of the MDSMA, may in 
fact comply with the minimum requirements of fair procedures regarding the 
aspect of review. 
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7.6 The right to review and appeal to the High Court of South Africa 
 
Does the fact that the CMA satisfies the constitutional requirement of appeal and 
review by a “higher court” prevent the accused from applying to the High Court of 
South Africa for appeal and review?  Despite this question receiving attention by 
the High Court, there is no clear answer to what the current state of affairs 
entails. 
 
7.6.1 Review and appeal to the High Court from the military court: A brief history 
 
In terms of the common law an accused before a military court did not have the 
right to appeal to a civilian court.  The position has been summarised in the 
following terms: 231 
 
I have no doubt that this Court, as a Civil Court, has no power to intervene in 
matters which concern military conduct and purely military law affecting the rules 
and regulations prescribed for the guidance of officers and their military 
discipline, I am entirely in accord with what WILLIS, J. said in the case of 
Dawkins v Lord Rokeby.  These are his words: ‘It is clear that, with respect to 
those matters placed within the jurisdiction of the military forces, as far as 
soldiers are concerned, military men must determine them….With respect to 
persons who enter into military state, who take Her Majesty’s pay, who are 
content to act under her commission, although they do not cease to be citizens in 
respect of responsibility, yet they do, by a compact which is intelligible, and which 
requires only this statement of it to the consideration of anyone of common 
sense, become subject to military rule and military discipline….They are subject 
to a test of law which is different from that administered in civil courts.’ 
 
This dictum might create the impression that no civilian court had any authority to 
reconsider the findings and sentences of military courts.  This does not however, 
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reflect the full picture.  As early as 1900 it was confirmed that the Supreme Court 
has jurisdiction to review the proceedings of a court martial.232  In Union 
Government and Fisher v West233 the question before the court was whether the 
Supreme Court could review the proceedings of a trial and subsequent conviction 
by a commanding officer of a soldier for an offence in terms of the MDC on the 
grounds that it constituted a decision by an inferior court.234  The court held that it 
had an inherent right to review cases and that proceedings of courts martial were 
subject to review by higher civilian courts.  The common law review jurisdiction 
was based on the military courts acting outside of their jurisdiction or in an 
irregular manner.235 
 
The common law position clearly shows that the Supreme Court had review 
jurisdiction over military courts.  It must however be kept in mind that these 
decisions were taken at a time when the military justice system did not allow for a 
CMA.  Although the Council of Review generally performed a similar function, the 
current system of appeal and review was not available to the aggrieved accused.  
With a constitutionally sound military justice system in place and a CMA 
exercising extensive appeal and review powers the question posed is whether 
the High Court of South Africa would still have review authority over the military 
courts.  If after considering the common law, the High Court’s statutory powers 
and the Constitution, and the High Court retaining such powers of review, can it 
be said that the accused before a military court now also has the right to such 
review?  
 
In consideration of these issues the right to appeal or review from a military court 
to the High Court of South Africa will be discussed in relation to three aspects: 
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1. whether an accused has the right to appeal a decision from the 
 CSMJ, CMJ or CMA to the High Court of South Africa; 
 
2. whether an accused has the right of review by the High Court of 
 South Africa against a decision by the CSMJ or CMJ; and  
 
3. whether an accused has the right of review by the High Court of 
 South Africa following a decision by the CMA. 
 
7.6.2 The right to appeal to the High Court of South Africa 
 
The right to appeal from a military court to the High Court of South Africa has 
served before the High Court on more than one occasion.  The courts seem to 
have reasonable consensus that there is no right of appeal from the military 
courts to the High Court. 
 
The Criminal Procedure Act provides that the High Court has jurisdiction over 
any person convicted of an offence by a lower court and that person may appeal 
such conviction.236  A “lower court” is defined in the Criminal Procedure Act as 
“any court established under the provisions of the Magistrate’s Court Act, 
1944.”237  A military court is established in terms of the MDSMA and not the 
Magistrate’s Court Act.  It can therefore not be seen as a “lower court” for the 
purposes of the High Court’s appeal authority.  In Steyn v Minister of Defence238 
it was argued on behalf of the applicant that an accused person convicted by a 
military court would have access to the High Court on the grounds of an appeal 
from a lower court to a higher court.239  The court, however, held that there is no 
provision in the legislation for an appeal to the High Court against the finding of 
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the CMA.240  It held that the accused had his opportunity to appeal to the CMA 
and that all decisions by the CMA are final.241  In casu the court held that there is 
no right to review or appeal against the decision of the CMA, since the decision 
of one judge cannot be taken on appeal by another judge.242  
 
The status of appeals from the military court to the High Court was subsequently 
confirmed in Mbambo v Minister of Defence.243  The issue surrounding the right 
to appeal was considered based on two aspects, namely (1) whether the 
accused had an additional right, apart from the right to appeal to the CMA, to 
appeal from the CMJ and (2) whether the MDSMA gives the accused the right to 
appeal against a decision of the CMA.244  The court confirmed that an accused 
may only apply for reconsideration of his case on appeal where legislation 
provides for the right to appeal.  If no such provision is made then no right to 
appeal exists.245  This rule must however be interpreted  in light of the 
constitutional imperative that common law rules must be developed in order to 
“promote the spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of Rights”.246  Although the 
accused before the military court, is recognised as an accused for the purposes 
of section 35(3) of the Constitution and therefore entitled protection of his right to 
appeal and review, the court held that section 35(3)(o) of the Constitution does 
not enshrine the right to appeal in a technical sense but rather “the right to the 
meaningful reconsideration by a higher court of a conviction and sentence.”247  
This means that248 
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the common-law rule (that a right of appeal only exists if there is a statutory 
provision for it) does not limit the right enshrined in s 35(3)(o) of the Constitution 
provided that, if an accused person has no statutory right of appeal, there must 
be a right of review amounting to a meaningful reconsideration of the conviction 
and the sentence.  
 
Since the MDSMA provides a constitutionally sound military court hierarchy, 
section 35(3)(o) is satisfied if “an accused person has the right to the meaningful 
reconsideration of his conviction and his sentence by a higher court within the 
military court hierarchy.”249   
 
Although the second aspect of whether an appeal from the CMA to the High 
Court is possible did not serve before the court, the court opined that the 
MDSMA does not provide for it and it would therefore not be possible.250 
 
In light of the court’s decision regarding a separate military justice system in 
Potsane251 read with section 200(1) of the Constitution, it is found that an appeal 
from the CSMJ or CMJ to the CMA would therefore comply with the constitutional 
right to appeal.252  The court found that military appeals should be conducted by 
military courts and states that253 
 
While a civil court such as the High Court may be in as good a position as any to 
ensure the regularity of the proceedings of military courts, the military courts are 
better able to ensure that the SANDF’s constitutional obligation to maintain 
discipline is fulfilled.  In particular, military courts are better suited to judge the 
seriousness of offences in military context.  Accordingly, a military court system 
that ensures military discipline with the High Court ensuring that it is done 
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regularly and constitutionally better fits in the Constitutional scheme of the 
defence force than one whereby the civil courts have full power to interfere on 
appeal with decisions of the military courts.  This is even more so if regard is had 
thereto  that the court of military appeals has full review and appeal powers and 
may be approached by any person convicted in a military court.  There is no 
need for soldiers to have the choice of an appeal forum, a choice the other 
citizens do not ordinarily have. 
 
One should however also take cognisance of the court’s decision in Moriana and 
Others v Minister of Defence254 where the applicants brought the constitutionality 
of the court martial proceedings as well as the sentence imposed by the court 
martial on appeal.  The court did not address the constitutional questions raised 
since, at the time of the appeal in casu, the issues had already been addressed 
in the Freedom of Expression Institute255 decision.  The proposed MDSMA was 
also under discussion at that time.  The court did however dismiss the appeal on 
sentence due to the fact that the application held no merit in this regard.  Of note 
is that the appeal was not dismissed because the appellant did not have the right 
to appeal to the High Court.  There is no indication in the judgment that the court 
considered the question of whether they had the jurisdiction to hear the appeal 
and by implication it would seem that if the application had merit, the court would 
have considered it. 
 
Nevertheless, apart from the above anomaly, the courts are in agreement that an 
accused before a military court does not have any right to appeal to the High 
Court of South Africa.  The same can however not be said of the right to review.   
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7.6.3 The right of review by the High Court against a decision by the CSMJ or 
CMJ 
 
The High Court’s inherent jurisdiction to review matters from inferior courts was 
broadened by section 24 of the Supreme Court Act.256  These grounds find 
application before the military courts as well.257  These grounds would include 
instances where the inferior court did not have the required jurisdiction over the 
accused.  In S v Dippenaar258 the CMA reviewed the matter of a warrant officer 
who was tried by a CMJ without the preliminary investigation being done in 
contravention of section 29(3)(f) of the MDSMA.  The CMA held that without the 
preliminary investigation the court had no jurisdiction over the accused and 
therefore acted ultra vires.  The court declared the proceedings null and void ab 
initio. 
 
An allegation of the presiding officer’s bias may also constitute grounds for 
review.  In Mönnig259 the accused applied for review to the Supreme Court on the 
grounds that the trial officer presiding over the court martial was biased and 
should have recused himself.  The court held that the right of recusal is a rule of 
natural justice to ensure the accused receives as fair trial.260  The court found 
grounds on which the trial officer at the court martial should have recused 
himself.  Since military courts are “in substance a court of law…the propriety of 
its proceedings should be judged by the normal standards pertaining to a court of 
law.”261  The irregularity was “fundamental and irreparable” and was set aside. 
 
Where a gross irregularity occurred the court may also exercise their review 
jurisdiction.  As discussed earlier, irregularities generally fall within one of two 
                                               
256
 See the discussion on the grounds for review at para 7.2.2.2 above; Terblanche at 408; Kruger 
at 30-7. 
257
 Kruger at 30-8. 
258
 S v Dippenaar (CMA 38/2004). 
259
 Council of Review, South African Defence Force v Mönnig 1992 (3) SA 482 (A). 
260
 Council of Review, South African Defence Force v Mönnig 1992 (3) SA 482 (A) at 491E-F. 
261
 Council of Review, South African Defence Force v Mönnig 1992 (3) SA 482 (A) at 490A-B. 
  
459 
categories.262  The first category refers to rights, principles and formalities that 
are not adhered to.  The negation of these rights only results in the setting aside 
of the conviction or sentence if the irregularity causes serious prejudice to the 
accused.  In S v Hoffman263 the CMA held that the accused was not afforded a 
“realistic opportunity to consult with new counsel” or with the appointed military 
counsel.  The findings and sentence were set aside.  The second category refers 
to rights, principles and formalities which are regarded as being fundamental to 
due process.  A negation of these rights would result in an injustice per se and 
the case will be declared null and void ab initio.  This was the case in S v Prins264 
where the accused was tried without the required preliminary investigation.  The 
court regarded this as a “gross irregularity” and the finding and sentence was set 
aside.  In S v Magwa265 the trial court failed to follow proper court procedures in 
that the prosecutor did not lead any evidence in respect of the charges after 
certain formal admissions were made by the accused.  The court failed to explain 
the accused’s rights to him and did not give the defence an opportunity to apply 
for an acquittal or lead any evidence.  The CMA held that the accused did not 
receive a fair trial and the finding and sentence were set aside. 
 
The admittance of inadmissible evidence or the rejection of admissible evidence 
may further lead to the court exercising its review authority.  In S v Ngwane266 the 
court a quo relied on hearsay evidence for a conviction of theft of state property.  
The CMA set the finding on that charge aside. 
 
In spite of statutory regulation of reviews by the High Court, the courts have 
always held onto their inherent powers of review.  It is however stated that these 
powers of review should be used sparingly.267  If any of the grounds mentioned 
above are present before the military courts of the first instance, the High Court 
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may exercise its jurisdiction.  In Van Duyker v District Court Martial268 the court 
classified military courts as statutory tribunals and held that where they acted in 
excess of their powers either in conviction or sentence, the Superior Court should 
have the required jurisdiction to set aside the conviction or sentence.  In Wessels 
v General Court Martial and Another269 it was found that military courts did not 
stand in any different position from any other statutory body regarding the High 
Court’s right to review.  The High Court has a right to review the proceedings 
before a court martial where it acted outside its jurisdiction or acted in violation of 
its rules of procedure.270 
 
This inherent power of the High Court to review proceedings of the military courts 
did not however create a right to review by the High Court.  The court held that 
the Defence Act of 1957 did not create an automatic right of review to the High 
Court.  It held that “Art 107…bewaar daardie magte wat ‘n Hooggeregshof mag 
hê om sekere verrigtinge te hersien.  Dit skep geen hersieningspligtigheid nie.” 
271
  Did the situation remain the same under the new constitutional dispensation? 
 
In evaluating a military accused’s right to review to the High Court the following 
constitutional provisions must be kept in mind: 272 
 
Section 35(3)(o) of the Constitution which provides that 
 
 (3)  Every accused person has a right to a fair trial, which includes the right – 
  (o)  of appeal to, or review by, a higher court. 
 
Also of importance is section 173 of the Constitution stating that Higher Courts 
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have inherent power to protect and regulate their own process, and to develop 
the common law, taking into account the interests of justice. 
 
The core elements of the constitutional right to review as discussed above must 
also be considered.  An accused is entitled to a court decision by a higher court, 
which constitutes a one-level review, to a reconsideration on the merits of the 
case, on a hearing of review upon completion and the exercise of this right within 
a reasonable time.  The accused must also be informed of this right in order to 
exercise it.  At the completion of his trial, the accused before a military court is, 
inter alia, informed of the right to approach the High Court of South Africa for 
relief.273  Since an accused does not have the right to appeal to the High Court 
the question is what “right to relief” is referred to?  In Mbambo274 the court held 
that section 33(7)(c) of the MDSMA merely directs the military court to inform the 
accused of the existing rights that he may have.  Since the right to appeal to the 
High Court does not exist, this cannot be one of the rights explained to the 
accused.  The MDSMA does not create the right to appeal.  Section 33(7)(c) 
therefore refers to other rights that the accused may have and on which he may 
approach the High Court, apart from the right to appeal.  This right to approach 
the High Court for relief in section 33(7)(c) would then be a “right of review 
amounting to a meaningful reconsideration of the conviction and the 
sentence.”275 
 
In an application to the High Court for bail pending an application to review the 
proceedings in a military court, the High Court held that superior courts have 
always had an inherent jurisdiction to enable then “to function with justice and 
good reason.”276  This is further augmented by a constitutionally entrenched 
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inherent power to protect and regulate their own processes and to develop the 
common law in terms of section 173 of the Constitution.  The court stated that277 
 
[t]he inherent jurisdiction of the Superior Courts, now bolstered by the power to 
uphold the founding values of the rule of law and constitutional supremacy, as 
well as the remedial powers granted them by s 38 and s 172 of the Constitution, 
enables them to review all exercises of public power, including exercises for 
public power by military courts. 
 
Therefore, although the Criminal Procedure Act, the Defence Act, the MDC and 
MDSMA do not make any provision for the granting of bail to military accused by 
a superior court, the court held that the legislation does not contain any ouster 
clause either and that the High Court does in fact have the inherent jurisdiction to 
grant bail.278  The court held that “the superior courts exercise a supervisory 
jurisdiction over [a military courts] that is similar in all material respects to the 
supervisory jurisdiction that they exercise over magistrates courts.”279  According 
to Carnelley this dictum supports the contention that the accused has a right to 
review to the High Court.280 
 
7.6.4 The right to review by the High Court against a decision by the CMA 
 
In spite of a tradition of accepting that the High Court has review authority over 
inferior courts, it was subsequently found in Steyn v Minister of Defence281 that 
an accused has no right to review against a decision by the CMA.  This was not 
addressed in Mbambo282 where the court held that the High Court has the power 
to review proceedings from a military court of the first instance – being the CSMJ 
and CMJ - but left the question open on whether the High Court may review the 
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proceedings of the military court once the CMA has confirmed the conviction and 
sentence.283 
 
Zulu v Minister of Defence284 again raised the issue of the right to review from 
proceedings before the CMA.  The court held that the Steyn285 decision was not 
binding authority on the question whether the court could review proceedings 
from the CMA since the judge’s opinion was obiter as the question was not 
before the court for consideration.  The matter was also left open in the 
Mbambo286 decision.  The court referred to Van Winsen, Cilliers and Loots 
Herbstein and Von Winsen The Civil Practice of the Supreme Court of South 
Africa at 938 where it is stated that287 
 
[s]ubject to statutory limitation or modification in a particular case, a Superior 
Court has an inherent right to review proceedings of any body or tribunal on 
which statutory duties are imposed, without the necessity of any special 
machinery or review created by Legislature.  This form of review has 
consequently been termed “review under the common law”.  The mere creation 
of a statutory right of review or appeal does not oust the Court’s inherent 
jurisdiction to review unless it is excluded expressly or by necessary implication. 
 
Since a clear objective of the MDSMA is to “ensure a fair military trial and an 
accused’s access to the High Court of South Africa” Mojapelo J consequently 
finds that any provision deemed to exclude access to the jurisdiction of the High 
Court will have to be clear and explicit.288 
 
The Chairman of the CMA is a High Court judge appointed by the Minister.289  It 
is contended that the decision of one judge cannot be reviewed by another 
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judge.290 The court further qualifies this contention in Zulu v Minister of 
Defence291 regarding the reviewability of a judge’s decision to limit it to those 
instances where the judge exercises his judicial function in the capacity of a High 
Court judge.  In instances where such a judge acts or sits in another capacity, 
such as Chairman of the CMA, the judge is not acting in his capacity as High 
Court judge and his decision may become reviewable.292  The court’s conclusion 
in casu was therefore that the High Court does have the power to review 
proceedings from the CMA. 
 
Because of the contradictory decisions in Steyn293 and Zulu,294 the subsequent 
matter of Tsoaeli v Minister of Defence295 was referred to a full bench of the 
Transvaal Provincial Division to decide on whether a judge of the High Court 
sitting as a chairperson of the CMA can be taken on review to the High Court of 
South Africa. 
 
The court held that although the decision of a High Court judge acting in his 
capacity as judge is not reviewable, there is no general rule stating that the 
decision of a High Court judge is not reviewable regardless of the capacity in 
which he is acting.296  Section 19(1)(a)(ii) of the Supreme Court Act297 provides 
that the High Court has the power to review the proceedings from all inferior 
courts within its jurisdiction and the court finds that the CMA falls within the 
definition of an “inferior court” and is therefore subject to review in terms of 
section 19(1)(a)(ii).298 The court held that the CMA does not qualify as a “Court of 
a Division” of the High Court because although it is composed of High Court 
judges, it is not the composition of the court or the identity of the presiding officer 
that determines the status of the court.  The status of the court is determined by 
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the Constitution from which all courts derive their power and status.  The system 
of South African courts is established in section 166 of the Constitution where 
section 166(a)-(d) provides for the Constitutional Court, the Supreme Court of 
Appeal, the High Courts and the Magistrate’s Courts.  Courts not mentioned in 
these subsections are established in terms of section 166(e), including military 
courts established in terms of the MDSMA, being an Act of Parliament.  There is 
nothing in any Act that gives the military courts the same status as that of the 
High Court.  Therefore the CMA can only be an inferior court, irrespective of its 
composition.299  The court consequently held that the High Court has the power 
to review the proceedings of the CMA, including those proceedings where a 
judge of the High Court presides over that court.300 
 
It would seem clear from the above discussion that the High Court has the power 
to review proceedings from all the military courts, irrespective of whether the 
decision was reached by the CSMJ, CMJ or CMA.  However, all these decisions 
were reached in the Transvaal Provincial Division but in Borman v Minister of 
Defence301 the Cape Provincial Division came to a different conclusion.  The 
court held that although the High Court possesses the power to review 
proceedings from the CSMJ, it does not have the power to review a decision of 
the CMA after a confirmation of the conviction and sentence on automatic 
review.302  Although not clearly stated, the reasoning adopted by the court is that 
the CMA, unlike the CSMJ which is regarded as a court of the first instance, 
cannot be regarded as an inferior court.  Review by the High Court is therefore 
not possible. 
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7.6.5 The current status of the right to appeal and review to the High Court 
 
It can safely be said that the courts agree that in the absence of legislation 
specifically providing for the right to appeal decisions from the military courts to 
the High Court, no such power of appeal exists.  The courts are generally also in 
agreement that the High Court has the inherent right to review decisions from the 
CSMJ and CMJ as a court of the first instance. 
 
The matter of the right to review a decision of the CMA however remains 
problematic.  Decisions between the Transvaal and Cape Provincial Divisions 
differ.  It would not be fair to say that military cases heard within the jurisdictional 
area of the Transvaal Provincial Division would have the right to such a review 
and those within the jurisdictional area of the Cape Provincial Division would not 
have such a right.  It must also be kept in mind that an offence committed in 
Cape Town can be tried by a military court in Pretoria.  Due to the operational 
requirements of the SANDF the military courts are not bound by area in terms of 
their jurisdiction.  The CMA is also not bound by jurisdictional area and can sit at 
any place within or outside the borders of the Republic.303  It is therefore of 
importance that clarity is reached on whether a right to review of decisions by the 
CMA exists.  This matter has not yet served before the Constitutional Court.  
There is a lacuna in the defence legislation in this regard.  It creates uncertainty 
and is not in the interest of justice.  When a military judge is compelled to inform 
an accused that he has the right to approach the High Court for relief, what is he 
explaining to the accused?  Should he explain to the accused that by 
approaching the CMA for review, he is possibly excluding his right to a review by 
the High Court?  Would this be in the interest of the accused when the courts are 
generally in agreement that it is better that the military courts handle appeals and 
reviews within their own hierarchy?304  This matter should be addressed by the 
MDSMA.305 
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Although appeal by the CMA alone complies with the constitutional requirement 
of the right to appeal to a “higher court”, it is submitted that consideration should 
be given to allowing an accused the right to appeal a decision by a military court 
to the High Court of South Africa.  This must be done in terms of express 
provisions in the MDSMA.  Such an amendment would do much to alleviate any 
possible concern regarding perceptions of bias by the military courts. 
 
7.7 Appeal and review procedures in military law: A brief comparative study  
 
South Africa’s issues regarding the appeal and review procedures in military 
courts are by no means unique.  Various other jurisdictions have over time faced 
similar challenges.  A brief discussion follows on the appeal and review 
procedures followed in the British and American military courts.  In the discussion 
two aspects are highlighted – the review of military trials by non-judicial entities 
and a military accused’s right to appeal to the civilian appeal courts. 
 
7.7.1 The British military appeal and review procedures 
 
The process of review and appeal followed by the British military courts depends 
on the type of military trial.  Where an accused was found guilty in a summary 
hearing (the British equivalent of the CODH) the matter may be referred for 
review to the Summary Appeal Court306 and in the case of a court martial the 
matter may be referred to the Court Martial Appeal Court for either appeal or 
review.307  The Court Martial Appeal Court is discussed below in relation to 
military appeals. 
 
                                                                                                                                            
11; Minister of Defence v Potsane; Legal Soldier (Pty) Ltd v Minister of Defence 2002 (1) SA 1 
(CC). 
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 This would bring the de facto situation in line with the aim of the MDSMA as stated in s 2(c) to 
ensure “an accused’s access to the High Court of South Africa.” 
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(2011) 1(2) at 1-15-4. 
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British military review procedures 
 
7.7.1.1 Summary Hearing Review 
 
Before submission to the Summary Appeal Court all summary hearings are 
submitted for automatic review.308  One of the purposes of the review is to 
determine if any reasons exist for referring the finding, sentence or order by the 
summary hearing to the Summary Appeal Court.309  These types of reviews are 
also seen as an opportunity to identify disciplinary trends and may assist in 
achieving “a common approach to summary findings and punishments…within 
the services as a whole.”  Review of the summary hearing is usually carried out 
by reviewing officers who have no legal qualification and who do not perform any 
judicial function.  Their review powers are restricted in that they may only rectify 
minor typographical errors that hold no disadvantage for the accused.  If the error 
is disadvantageous to the accused or is substantial, the reviewing officer must 
refer the matter to the Summary Appeal Court for decision.310  Their review 
authority is limited to instances such as whether the correct procedures were 
followed or a reasonable punishment imposed.  Where they are of the opinion 
that a possible error in law occurred, they must refer the matter to the Summary 
Appeal Court for decision.  No time limit is placed on the review although the 
efficacy of the review will be undermined if there is a substantial delay between 
the summary hearing and the review.311 
 
The actions that may be taken by the reviewing officers are limited.  They may 
review the finding and sentence by confirming, inter alia, that the offence was 
capable of being heard by summary hearing, consider the legality of the 
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punishment and whether the punishment imposed was appropriate considering 
the rank of the accused and the seriousness of the offence.312 
 
Whenever the reviewing officer refers a matter to the Summary Appeal Court, it 
is deemed as if the accused had brought the matter on appeal.313 
 
British military appeal procedures 
 
The British military justice system makes provision for two types of military 
appeal courts:  the Summary Appeal Court and the Court Martial Appeal Court. 
 
7.7.1.2 Summary Appeal Court 
 
The purpose of the Summary Appeal Court is to hear appeals from summary 
hearings.  Proceedings from summary hearings are referred to the Summary 
Appeal Court either by the review officer, as discussed above, or on application 
by the accused within 14 days of completion of his summary hearing.314  The 
accused may appeal against the sentence alone or the finding and the sentence, 
in which case the Director of Service Prosecutions may decide to contest the 
appeal.315  The Summary Appeal Court is a permanent court and may sit 
anywhere within or outside the borders of the UK.316  The appeal is presided over 
by a judge advocate317 and the approach followed is of an inquisitorial nature.318 
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7.7.1.3 Contested hearings before the Summary Appeal Court 
 
In contested hearings the Director Service Prosecutions contests the appeal 
against the finding and the matter is heard before a judge advocate and two lay 
members.319  There is a rehearing of the charge against the accused in open 
court.320  The appellant and the Director Service Prosecutions are each given 
one opportunity to address the court regarding the case.321  The Summary 
Appeal Court may confirm the finding, set it aside or substitute it with a finding on 
another charge supported by the evidence.322  Whenever a finding is set aside, 
the sentence must also be set aside. 
 
When rehearing evidence regarding the sentence, the Summary Appeal Court 
may confirm the punishment, set it aside or substitute it with another punishment, 
provided that the substituted punishment is one that the hearing officer who 
awarded the original punishment was authorised to impose and may not be more 
severe than the original sentence.323 
 
7.7.1.4 Uncontested hearings before the Summary Appeal Court 
 
Where the Director Service Prosecutions does not contest the appeal, the finding 
against which the appeal is based will be set aside.324  The matter will be heard 
by a judge advocate sitting alone, without the two lay members and he may set 
aside the finding and sentence without a hearing.325 
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7.7.1.5 Appeal against sentence alone 
 
When an appeal is brought before the court on sentence alone the court may 
either confirm the punishment or set it aside and award a substituted 
punishment.326  The substituted sentence must be one that is in the power of the 
officer who originally imposed the sentence and it may not be harsher than the 
original one imposed.327 
 
The court will consist of the judge advocate and two lay members.  In such 
appeal cases the Director Service Prosecutions must address the court on the 
facts of the case.  Where there are any disputed facts, the court may try any 
issue of fact.  The judge advocate may then instruct the Director Service 
Prosecutions to give evidence or call witnesses and the Director and the 
appellant may adduce evidence with leave from the court.328  The court will close 
to consider the facts and the decision and reasons for the decision are 
announced in open court. 
 
The appellant may call any witness in mitigation of punishment and may also 
address the court in person.329  Where the appellant wishes to hand in 
documents or written reports he may do so without strict compliance with the 
rules of evidence.330  The court then closes to consider sentence and the 
decision and the reasons are announced in open court.331 
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7.7.1.6 Court Martial Appeal Court 
 
This court hears appeals from court martial proceedings.  The Court Martial 
Appeal Court was established in 1951 and is regarded as a superior court of 
record.332  This court consists of two to three judges from the civilian Court of 
Appeal (Criminal Division) and they sit in the High Courts of Justice.333 
 
An appeal to the Court Martial Appeal Court may reach the court in one of three 
ways – either by means of an application by the Attorney General, referral by the 
Criminal Cases Review Commission or by application from the person convicted 
by the court martial. 
 
7.7.1.7 Application for review of unduly lenient sentences 
 
The Attorney General may also request leave to appeal334 to the Court Martial 
Appeal Court where he is of the opinion that the sentence or order imposed on 
the accused is too lenient.335  The application is brought where the court martial 
“erred in law as to its powers of sentencing” as long as the sentence imposed is 
not a mandatory sentence.336  The accused is informed so that he may make 
representations.337  If the Attorney General is successful the Court Martial Appeal 
Court may set the sentence aside and substitute it with any other sentence.338 
 
 
 
                                               
332
 The Court Martial Appeal Court was established by the Courts-Martial (Appeals) Act 1951 (see 
Manual of Service Law (2011) 2 at 2-31-2); s 1 of the Court Martial (Appeals) Act 1968. 
333
 Manual of Service Law (2011) 2 at 2-31-2; Rant & Blackett at 294. 
334
 Section 273(4) of the Armed Forces Act 2006; r 56 of the Court Martial Appeal Rules 2009. 
335
 Section 273(1) of the Armed Forces Act 2006 read with part 9 of the Court Martial Appeal 
Court Rules 2009. 
336
 Section 273(6) of the Armed Forces Act 2006. 
337
 Rule 57 of the Court Martial Appeal Court Rules 2009. 
338
 Section 273(5) of the Armed Forces Act 2006; Manual of Service Law (2011) 2 at 2-31-5.  This 
power is similar to the power of the Director of Public Prosecutions in South Africa to appeal a too 
lenient sentence but it is not afforded to the Director: Military Prosecution Counsel of the SANDF. 
  
473 
7.7.1.8 Referral by the Criminal Cases Review Commission 
 
The Criminal Cases Review Commission is an independent public (civilian) body 
that has the power to refer cases to an appropriate court of appeal to be 
heard.339 The Commission reviews possible miscarriages of justice in criminal 
cases, heard at the Magistrate’s court or Crown Court, including courts martial, in 
England, Wales and Northern Ireland, brought to their attention by the accused.   
The Commission may refer matters to the Court of Military Appeal on the finding 
or sentence of a court martial with or without the application by the person to 
whom it relates.340  Whenever a matter is referred by the Commission, the matter 
is treated as if the accused applied for the appeal.  The Commission will only 
refer a case to the Court Martial Appeal Court where there is a real chance that 
the conviction or sentence will not be upheld.341  Cases may be referred where 
an argument or evidence was not raised during the proceedings, where an 
argument on a point of law or information was not raised during sentencing or the 
appeal was dismissed or leave to appeal was refused. 
 
7.7.1.9 Application by person convicted by court martial 
 
An accused may only appeal to the Court Martial Appeal Court with the leave of 
the court.342  The accused may appeal the finding or the sentence, except where 
a mandatory sentence is imposed.343 
 
Where the Court Martial Appeal Court hears an appeal on finding, the appellant 
will only be successful with the appeal if the Court is of the opinion that the 
finding made by the court martial was “unsafe”.  In all other instances the appeal 
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will fail.344  Where the Court sets the finding aside, the accused will be treated as 
if he had been acquitted by the court martial.  The Court may authorise a retrial 
on the same or different charges than those of which the accused had been 
convicted.345  It is however up to the Director Service Prosecution to decide 
whether a retrial would be appropriate.346 
 
Where the appeal is directed at the sentence, the Court Martial Appeal Court 
may substitute the sentence with any other sentence it deems appropriate and 
may not impose a more severe sentence than the one originally imposed.347  The 
substituted sentence generally takes effect at the time that the court martial 
imposed the sentence, unless ordered otherwise by the Court Martial Appeal 
Court.348  Upon dismissal of the application the court may order that the sentence 
imposed must begin to run anew from the day on which the court dismissed the 
application if the court holds the opinion that the application has been 
frivolous.349 
 
The prosecution may appeal a ruling of a judge advocate at a court martial.  In 
the event of the prosecution being unsuccessful in its appeal, the accused is 
acquitted of the charges to which the ruling relates.  Proceedings will then 
continue against the other charges not subject to the appeal.  If the prosecution 
is successful the Court Martial Appeal Court may confirm, reverse or change any 
ruling to which the appeal relates.350 
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7.7.1.10 Appeal to the Supreme Court 
 
Apart from the various options within the military structures for review and 
appeal, the accused as well as the Director Service Prosecutions may appeal to 
the Supreme Court against any decision of the Court Martial Appeal Court.351 
 
The accused and the Director Service Prosecutions may only approach the 
Supreme Court with leave from the Supreme Court or the Court Martial Appeal 
Court.  Leave is only granted where the Court Martial Appeal Court certifies that 
“a point of law of general public importance is involved in the decision and it 
appears to the Court or the Supreme Court, as the case may be, that the point is 
one which ought to be considered by the Supreme Court.”352 
 
An application for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court must first be brought to 
the Court Martial Appeal Court within 28 days from the date of the decision that is 
to be appealed.  Where the Court Martial Appeal Court holds that the point of law 
is of general public importance but finds that it should not be considered by the 
Supreme Court, the appellant may apply to the Supreme Court for leave to 
appeal within 28 days of the Court Martial Appeal Court’s refusal.353  Where the 
Court Martial Appeal Court holds that the point of law is not of general 
importance, no further appeal action can be taken to the Supreme Court.354 
 
7.7.1.11 The British system: A summary of the issues 
 
The important aspects highlighted for purposes of the South African situation are 
summarised as follows: 
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The British military justice system does make provision for an automatic non-
judicial review of the summary hearing.  This review is however extremely 
limited.  The non-judicial reviewing authority can be compared to the South 
African Review Counsel at Legsato level.  Where Review Counsel opines that 
the finding should not be upheld it refers the matter to a further non-judicial entity 
– the Director: Military Judicial Reviews.  The British non-judicial reviewing 
authority however refers the matter to a court for decision.355  Courts martial are 
not subjected to the same non-judicial level of review.  Such reviews are 
conducted by a Court Martial Appeal Court, fully staffed by civilian judges under 
the control of the civilian judiciary.  This is a clear guarantee of judicial 
independence. 
 
Military accused are also given the opportunity to appeal to the civilian Supreme 
Court, although the grounds for leave to appeal are limited to “points of law of 
general public importance”.  Where the Court Martial Appeal Court does not 
grant the accused leave to appeal, the accused may approach the Supreme 
Court directly for leave to appeal.  South African military accused have no right to 
appeal to the High Court of South Africa, even where a case may be of “general 
public importance.” 
 
7.7.2 American appellate review procedures 
 
The American military justice system provides extensively for the review of court 
martial proceedings, but only to those individuals sentenced to death, punitive 
discharge and to more than one year’s confinement.356  These cases are referred 
to the various military appellate courts on automatic review.  For any other 
conviction it is extremely difficult to apply for the successful review of his case.  
Such an accused is generally only entitled to review by the convening authority 
                                               
355
 The argument followed in Cooper v The United Kingdom; Grieves v United Kingdom (2004) 39 
EHRR 8 must be kept in mind where the court held that review by a non-judicial entity is not 
contrary to an accused’s rights where a court of appeal has the final say. 
356
 Cox W T Report on the Commission on Military Justice (2009) at 6. 
  
477 
and the judge advocate.  Only in very rare circumstances will the Judge 
Advocate General refer a case for appellate review.357 
 
American military review procedures 
 
7.7.2.1 Review by the convening authority 
 
The British system of very limited review authority can be contrasted with the 
very wide jurisdiction of the convening authority in the US military justice system.  
The US military do not have permanent military courts and courts martial are 
convened on an ad hoc basis.  Certain commanders are authorised to convene 
such courts martial and it is known as the “convening authority”.  Prosecutorial 
discretion lies with the convening authority and he decides at which forum to 
prosecute the accused.358  This convening authority is then the same individual 
who, after completion of the court-martial, is responsible for the first level of 
review of the case.359  This state of affairs is however not seen as interference by 
the executive in the context of the US Armed Forces.  Byrne postulates that360  
 
[w]ith the “spotlight” of his unit’s men on him, the commander has to administer 
military justice at the highest ethical and moral level.  His decisions directly affect 
morale, good order, and discipline in his command. 
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This position still holds true today.  It was opined that the commander (as 
convening authority) carries out functions361 
 
from appointing the Article 32 investigating officer; selecting the court members 
(and maybe the trial counsel); deciding which witnesses to bring in for 
trial;…deciding who gets immunity; [to] whether the finding should be approved. 
 
Essex further states that this comprehensive involvement in the judicial process 
by the commanding officer, who is in fact a non-judicial entity, does not violate 
the independence of the trial since the “convening authority is bound by law to 
act fairly and impartially.”362 
 
No sentence by any court martial may be executed if it has not been approved by 
the convening authority.363  Once the sentence is approved it must be executed.  
This does not include a sentence of dishonourable or bad-conduct discharge, the 
dismissal of a commissioned officer, cadet or midshipman or a sentence of 
death.  Such cases automatically follow a further review procedure.   The 
convening authority performs the initial review of the case and may take any 
action with regard to the finding or the sentence which he deems appropriate.  
Any action taken is done in his sole discretion and is seen as an integral part of 
his command prerogative.364 
 
When exercising his discretion the Convening Authority must consider 
recommendations by his Staff Judge Advocate or legal officer as well as any 
representations made by the accused.  He may also, apart from the record of the 
trial and the personnel records of the accused, consider any matter he deems 
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relevant.  This includes matters outside the record that may be adverse to the 
accused of which the accused has no knowledge.  It is only required that he 
informs the accused accordingly and affords him the opportunity to make 
representations in this regard. 
 
Once he has considered the finding and sentence he may, once again within his 
sole discretion, change the finding of guilty on any charge to a guilty finding on 
any lesser charge, set aside any finding of guilty and then either dismiss the 
charge or direct a retrial of the case.365  Where the convening authority is of the 
opinion that a retrial is impractical, he may dismiss the charges.  This power is 
not only limited to this first review.  Where the Court of Criminal Appeal, presided 
over by appellate military judges, or the Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces, 
presided over by five civilian appellate judges, orders a retrial, the convening 
authority may dismiss the charges where he is of the opinion that a retrial is 
impractical. 
 
He is further not required to give reasons for or explain his decision to order or 
not to order a retrial.366  He may vary a sentence for any reason, or without giving 
any reason, may mitigate the sentence or change the sentence to a different one 
as long as it does not increase the severity of the punishment.367 
 
After review by the convening authority, the matter may be referred for further 
review and appeal to the office of the judge advocate or the Court of Criminal 
Appeals.   
 
                                               
365
 Art 60(3)(a) and (b) of the UCMJ.   
366
 Manual for Courts-Martial at II-151; RCM 1107(c).  The convening authority takes swift, 
decisive action when exercising his review authority.  There is consequently no need for a further 
review, allowing the convening authority with the means to correct errors swiftly, thereby ensuring 
discipline and complying with mission requirements. 
367
 RCM 1107(d).  Where the sentence is mandatory, the prohibition on a more severe sentence 
is not applicable (see art 60(e)(2)(c) of the UCMJ).  The convening authority must approve a 
sentence which is appropriate to the offence and the accused.  When the convening authority is 
considering a mandatory sentence, he may even approve a lesser sentence (see Manual for 
Courts-Martial at II-151). 
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7.7.2.2 Review by the Court of Criminal Appeals 
 
Where the case includes a sentence of death, a bad conduct discharge, a 
dishonourable discharge, dismissal of an officer or confinement of more than one 
year which has been approved by the convening authority, the case is 
automatically reviewed by an intermediate Court of Criminal Appeals368  There 
are four Courts of Criminal Appeals – the Army Court of Criminal Appeals, the 
Navy-Marine Corps Court of Criminal Appeals, the Air Force Court of Criminal 
Appeals and the Coast Guard Court of Criminal Appeals.  These courts are 
composed of appellate military judges.369  They review the submitted cases for 
legal errors, factual sufficiency and the appropriateness of the sentence imposed 
by the court martial.370  The Court of Criminal Appeals may only review findings 
and sentences that have been confirmed by the convening authority.  The court 
may further only confirm those findings of guilty found to be correct in terms of 
law or fact and such determination must be made on the basis of the whole 
record, in effect conducting an appeal and not a review.371  The court generally 
has the same powers as the convening authority regarding varying of the 
sentence, although it may not suspend any part of the sentence.  The court may 
however reduce the period of suspension prescribed by the convening 
authority.372 
 
                                               
368
 Clerk of the Court The United States Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces Brochure (2009) 
at 4; Inspector General United States Department of Defense Evaluation of Post-Trial Reviews of 
Courts-Martial within the Department of the Navy (2010) at 7-8; RCM 1203(b); Morris L J Military 
Justice:  A Guide to the Issues (2010) at 115; Lederer F I & Hundley B S “Needed: An 
Independent Military Judiciary – A Proposal to Amend the Uniform Code of Military Justice” 
(1994) 3 William & Mary Bill of Rights Journal 629 at 643. 
369
 RCM 1203(a).  For the composition of the court and qualifications of the judges see Art 66 of 
the UCMJ 
370
 Court of Appeals Brochure at 4. 
371
 RCM 1201.  According to Morris at 116 the Court of Criminal Appeals have wider jurisdiction in 
considering appeals than the civilian appeals court since Art 66 of the UCMJ gives the court the 
authority to “look behind the record and evaluate whether the lower court properly evaluated the 
evidence…”  The civilian courts are usually limited to question whether legal error occurred and 
have to confirm a case where no legal error occurred although the court believes that the jury’s 
finding are not sufficiently supported by the evidence. 
372
 RCM 1203. 
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In reconsidering a case, the Court of Criminal Appeals must weigh all the 
evidence, may judge the credibility of the witnesses and determine all contested 
questions of fact, but must do so while keeping in mind that the court martial in 
fact saw and heard all the evidence.373  The Court can only hold a finding or 
sentence of a court martial as incorrect on the grounds of error in law if the error 
materially prejudices the substantial rights of the accused.374  Where the court 
sets aside the finding or sentence, it may order a retrial or reassess the sentence 
where appropriate.  A retrial will not be ordered where the court finds insufficient 
evidence for a guilty finding.  The matter will be referred back to the convening 
authority for retrial but where the convening authority is of the opinion that a 
retrial is impractical he may dismiss the charges.375   
 
Decisions by the Court of Criminal Appeals only bind the relevant arm of service 
to which the court is attached.  This may result in different interpretations by the 
various service criminal appeal courts and lead to the creation of the Court of 
Appeals for the Armed Services whose rules and decisions bind all the 
services.376 
 
7.7.2.3 Review by the Judge Advocate 
 
In all other instances not falling under the automatic jurisdiction of the Court of 
Criminal Appeals, cases are referred from the convening authority to the office of 
the Judge Advocate General and each arm of service has regulations in terms of 
which their judge advocates will review the cases.377 
                                               
373
 RCM 1203. 
374
 Art 59(a) of the UCMJ. 
375:RCM 1203(c)(2). 
376
 Morris at 116. 
377
 Court of Appeals Brochure at 4; RCM 1112.  Since there is no appellate review for findings of 
summary courts-martial, the Judge Advocate will review all summary courts-martial as well as 
special courts-martial proceedings, excluding sentences of bad conduct discharge or confinement 
of more than one year.  He will also review general courts martial and special courts martial 
where the accused waived his right to appellate review in terms of RCM 1110.  Before an 
accused waives his right to appellate review he has the right to consult with legal counsel and all 
waivers must be in writing (see Art 61 of the UCMJ; Morris at 118). 
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The Judge Advocate may review courts martial decisions to determine whether 
the relevant court martial had jurisdiction over the accused or the offence in 
cases where the court martial guilty finding is approved by the convening 
authority.  He may determine if the charges and specifications constitute an 
offence and may consider the legality of any sentence imposed.  He must also 
respond in writing to any allegation of error that is alleged in writing by the 
accused.378 
 
Upon completion of the review the Judge Advocate will refer the record of 
proceedings back to the convening authority with general court martial 
jurisdiction over the accused and may recommend that certain action must be 
taken.379  The convening authority may then either approve or disapprove the 
findings or sentence in part or as a whole.  He may remit, commute or suspend 
any sentence or order a retrial on the finding, the sentence or both except where 
the Judge Advocate found insufficient evidence to support a finding of guilty.380  
Where the Judge Advocate who reviewed the case indicated that corrective 
action is required as a matter of law and the convening authority does not take 
action that is at least as favourable to the accused as that recommended by the 
Judge Advocate, the Judge Advocate may forward the record of the trial and his 
review to the Judge Advocate General for further review.381  Such a referral 
results in a mandatory review by the Judge Advocate General who may then set 
aside or vary the finding, the sentence or both on the grounds of newly 
discovered evidence, fraud on the court martial, a lack of jurisdiction over the 
accused or the offence, an error that is prejudicial to the substantive rights of the 
accused or with regard to the appropriateness of the sentence.382 
 
 
                                               
378
 RCM 1112(d); Art 64(a)(1) of the UCMJ. 
379
 RCM 1112(e); Art 64(b)(1) of the UCMJ. 
380
 RCM 1112(f). 
381
 RCM 1112(g).   
382
 RCM 1201(b)(2); art 64(c)(3) of the UCMJ. 
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7.7.2.4 Review by the Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces 
 
After review by the Judge Advocate or the Court of Criminal Appeals the matter 
may be referred to the Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces.383  Matters are 
referred to the Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces384 where a sentence of 
death was imposed,385 where the Judge Advocate refers cases reviewed by the 
Court of Criminal Appeals and all cases reviewed by the Court of Criminal 
Appeals where the accused applies for review on good cause with leave from the 
Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces.386  The review authority of the Court of 
Appeals for the Armed Forces is limited to questions of law.387 
 
The Court may only review findings and sentences that were confirmed by the 
convening authority and were subsequently either confirmed or set aside as 
incorrect in law by the Court of Criminal Appeals.388  Once the Court of Appeals 
for the Armed Forces reaches a decision, it may direct the Judge Advocate 
General, where appropriate, to return the record to the Court of Criminal Appeals 
for further proceedings as may be in accordance with its findings.  The court may 
also direct the Judge Advocate General to return the record to the convening 
authority where the matter is completed and who is then instructed to take 
appropriate action in accordance with the Court’s decision.  This does not include 
cases where the decision of the Court is subject to review by the Supreme Court 
or where further action is required by the Secretary or the President, such as 
                                               
383
 Court of Appeals Brochure at 4; art 67 of the UCMJ; RCM 1203(c)(2).  This is the final court for 
most of the military convictions (see Morris at 117). 
384
 RCM 1204(a); art 67(a) of the UCMJ.  For the composition of the court see art 67(a) of the 
UCMJ. 
385
 RCM 1203(c)(3). 
386
 Article 67(a) of the UCMJ.  Where the accused has a right to apply to the Court of Appeals for 
the Armed Forces for review, the accused is supplied with a copy of the Court of Criminal 
Appeals’ decision with an endorsement informing the accused of his right to apply for review (see 
RCM 1203(d)(2)).  The accused may apply for review on any matter except where the case was 
referred to the Court of Criminal Appeals by the Judge Advocate General in terms of RCM 
2101(b)(1), where the Court of Criminal Appeals set aside the sentence and where the accused 
was sentenced to death.  Review of a death sentence is mandatory and the accused need not 
apply for review. 
387
 Article 67(c) of the UCMJ; RCM 1203(c)(1). 
388
 Articles 67(d) and (e) of the UCMJ. 
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death penalty cases.  Where the Court ordered a retrial and the convening 
authority finds a retrial impractical he may dismiss the charges.389 
 
American military appeal 
 
7.7.2.5 Appeal to the Supreme Court of the United States 
 
The accused does however have the right to approach the Supreme Court of the 
United States on appeal regarding a case under the Uniform Code of Military 
Justice.390  Decisions of the Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces may only be 
reviewed by the Supreme Court by a writ of certiorari which is a decision by the 
Supreme Court to hear an appeal from a lower court.391  This is allowed where 
the Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces conducts a mandatory review in death 
penalty cases or where the appellant is granted leave to appeal.  Where the 
Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces do not grant leave to review or appeal, 
the Supreme Court may be approached through an application of collateral 
review, for example on an application for a writ of habeas corpus392 but may not 
review the action of the Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces in refusing to 
grant the leave to appeal.393 
 
The Supreme Court accepts very few military cases on appeal, and has only 
done so for specific purposes, usually to make a specific point regarding an 
important aspect of the military judicial system.394 
 
After the Supreme Court has completed its review, the matter is referred back to 
the office of the Judge Advocate General who will either forward the matter to the 
                                               
389
 RCM 1204(c). 
390
 RCM 1205. 
391
 See the definition at http://www.techlawjournal.com/glossary/legal/certiorari.htm; Morris at 117. 
392
 Court of Appeals Brochure at 5. 
393
 RCM 1205. 
394
 Morris at 117-118 indicates that in the past 25 years, out of about 250 applications by the 
defence, the Supreme Court has only granted a writ of certiorari in nine cases. 
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Secretary or the President, if required, or will instruct the convening authority to 
take action in accordance with the Supreme Court’s decision.395 
 
7.8 Conclusion 
 
The non-judicial review of military trials, especially by the Director: Military 
Judicial Reviews is an untenable situation in terms of the South African 
Constitution.  The automatic review of military trials is not to the disadvantage of 
the accused and it is therefore submitted that the process should be retained.  
However, the reviewing authority should be vested in a court, higher in status 
than the CSMJ and CMJ.  Consideration should be given to the model of the 
United States regarding the intermediate Court of Criminal Appeals that lies 
between the Convening Authority and the Court of Appeals for the Armed 
Services.  Such an intermediate court in the South African context can be 
charged with the function of reviewing all guilty findings, from the CODH, the 
CSMJ and the CMJ.  Submitting all reviews, both from the CODH and military 
court environment to the CMA will place too much of a burden on the court roll of 
the Court of Military Appeal where preference is given to more serious cases.396  
Since the CMA only sits on an ad hoc basis, their time is better suited to 
attending to more serious appeals and review.  A lower level Court of Military 
Review, staffed by military judges appointed as review judges with the 
appropriate experience would address these concerns.  All guilty findings can 
then be reviewed by such a court, taking the place of the Director: Military 
Judicial Reviews. 
 
On the question of whether military accused should have access to the High 
Court of South Africa the following should be noted.  Since most military trials are 
only reviewed by the Review Counsel or at most the Director, it is submitted that 
                                               
395
 RCM 1205(b). 
396
 See S v Hola (CMA 05/07) where the CMA stated that cases where more serious sentences 
were imposed such as effective imprisonment and dismissal or discharge from the SANDF are 
given priority on the CMA court roll. 
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the military appeal and reviews procedures do not comply with section 35(3)(o) of 
the Constitution.  If the review procedures are amended, providing for an 
appellate review court as suggested above, it will address this constitutional 
concern.  However, there are other jurisdictions that allow an accused various 
levels of review and appeal, specifically appeal from the military courts to the 
civilian Supreme Courts. 
 
Although the Constitution only requires one level up for review or appeal it is not 
argued that an accused should have an unlimited automatic right to appeal a 
decision by the military court 397  It is submitted that the defence legislation 
should provide an accused the opportunity to appeal to the High Court in those 
instances where it may be in the interest of justice to do so.  Such instances may 
include important military law questions or, as is the case in Britain, where it is a 
matter of general public importance.398 
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 Currie & De Waal (2005) at 789; S v Pennington 1997 (4) SA 1076 (CC). 
398
 Limiting the grounds for leave to appeal would provide adequate safeguards against frivolous 
applications to appeal (see S v Rens 1996 (1) SA 1218 (CC); Currie & De Waal (2005) at 789). 
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CHAPTER 8 
 
SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
8.1 Introduction 
 
The research in this thesis concentrates on three main themes: (1) the status of 
the military courts, (2) military sentences, and (3) military appeals and reviews.  
Only those aspects which potentially raise constitutional concerns and their 
proposed solutions or recommendations are summarised here. 
 
8.2 The status of the military courts 
 
The status of the military courts is discussed with reference to judicial 
independence and the accused’s constitutional right to a fair trial. 
 
8.2.1 Judicial independence 
 
The judicial independence of the military courts is evaluated against the 
constitutional requirement that all courts have to be “independent and subject 
only to the Constitution and the law.”1  Judges are required to be independent 
and impartial.  In considering the independence of the courts the aspects of 
substantive or institutional2 and personal independence are investigated.  Both 
forms of independence are required before a court is considered independent for 
constitutional purposes. 
 
For institutional independence it is required that the judiciary be independent 
from the executive and the legislature.  A lower standard of independence 
suffices for the lower courts.3  Military courts are regarded as courts established 
                                               
1
 Section 165(2) of the Constitution; see ch 4 at para 4.2.1. 
2
 See ch 4 at para 4.2.1.4. 
3
 See van Rooyen v The State 2002 (9) BCLR 810 (CC) paras 27-28. 
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in terms of the Constitution.  The MDSMA provides for the independence of the 
military judiciary.  However, actual independence is not quite what it should 
ideally be.  The judiciary must also be perceived to be independent.  Two 
concerns are raised in this regard: (1) the appointment of serving members of the 
SANDF as military judges, and (2) the role of the Adjutant General. 
 
8.2.1.1  The appointment of military judges 
 
The Chairperson of the CMA is a high court judge, appointed by the Minister of 
Defence.  The Ministerial Task Team opines that the appointment by the Minister 
should not be seen as executive interference and regards the Chairperson of the 
CMA as independent and impartial. 
 
The military judges appointed to the CSMJ and CMJ are senior officers in the 
SANDF.  This creates an institutional link between the military judges and the 
SANDF.  As they are part of the executive because of their employment as public 
officials, this creates a concern about the military judges’ independence.  The 
Ministerial Task Team suggests that civilian judges should be appointed to 
counter the perception of bias.  This approach is followed by the British military 
courts in that full-time civilian judges are appointed to the military courts.  It is 
however submitted that the appointment of civilians as military judges is not 
necessarily the best solution since it may result in a loss of understanding of the 
unique nature of the military justice system.  Safeguards do exist for the 
protection of the integrity of the military courts under military judges.  These 
judges must be legally qualified, they are required to take an oath of office and 
the integrity of the trial process is protected through the process of appeal and 
review. 
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8.2.1.2  The role of the Adjutant General 
 
Even though the appointment of military members as judges does not 
necessarily undermine the independence of the military judiciary, the role of the 
Adjutant General in the administrative processes of the military courts is cause 
for concern.  The responsibility for its administrative processes rightly belongs 
with the military judiciary, yet the MDSMA does not provide the judiciary with the 
authority to administer its own processes.  As a senior officer of the SANDF 
appointed by the Minister, the Adjutant General forms part of senior management 
and therefore the executive.  Yet he plays a prominent role in the appointment of 
military judges.  In terms of the MDSMA appointments are made by the Minister 
on the recommendation of the Adjutant General and this may interfere with the 
independence of the judiciary.  It is submitted that the defence legislation should 
be amended to provide for an independent body or selection committee to 
oversee the selection and appointment of the military judges.  To this effect the 
Canadian military judicial selection committee may serve as example. 
 
It is further provided that no functionaries within the military legal division can be 
appointed by the Minister without the recommendation of the Adjutant General.  
He is also responsible for the planning of the court roll and decides which cases 
are to be heard before which CMA in the event of the Minister appointing more 
than one CMA.  This state of affairs may negatively influence the perception of 
independence of the military courts.  It is submitted that the administrative 
responsibilities of the Adjutant General as they pertain to the military judiciary 
should lie with the Director: Military Judges.  Currently the institutional 
independence of the military judiciary should be able to withstand constitutional 
scrutiny as long as the Adjutant General’s involvement is limited to the 
administrative support of the military judiciary. However, the proposal for the 
appointment of a civilian administrator to take over the administrative functions of 
the Adjutant General in this regard should be welcomed and should address the 
concerns adequately. 
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Personal independence of the military judiciary refers to the aspects of selection 
and appointment, security of tenure and the financial independence of the 
military judges4   
 
The MDSMA does not provide for a fixed period of appointment for CMA judges.  
Although it does provide for a fixed period of appointment for CSMJ and CMJ 
judges, military judges are in fact not appointed as military judges.  They are 
appointed as military legal practitioners and are then assigned to the function of 
military judge by the Adjutant General.  The MDSMA does not specify the 
duration of this assignment but the practice is that current assignments must be 
renewed annually.  It is submitted that despite the short period of assignment, 
military judges do in fact have security of tenure because of their appointments 
as officers in the SANDF.  They will consequently have security of tenure for the 
duration of their contract of employment with the SANDF.  Such employment 
contracts are usually renewed every ten years.  It is further submitted that a fixed 
period of assignment for any duration of time does not necessarily guarantee the 
judges’ independence and impartiality – at the end of the period the danger of 
aiming to please their employer exists, irrespective of how long their assignment 
was. 
 
The removal of military judges does not comply with constitutional requirements, 
since the MDSMA does not make any provision for a formal procedure affording 
a military judge a fair hearing upon removal from his post.  In addition, there is 
insufficient provision for an independent body to oversee the removal of a military 
judge.  Currently this prerogative lies exclusively with the Minister, who is to act 
on the recommendation of the Adjutant General.  It is proposed that the 
independent committee recommended above in connection with the appointment 
of military judges should also be utilised with respect to removal of such judges. 
 
                                               
4
 See ch 4 at para 4.2.1.5. 
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Although no provision is made for the separate remuneration of military judges, it 
is submitted that the remuneration adjustments and promotions as governed by 
the Personnel Management Code for law officers provide sufficient protection to 
guard against arbitrary interference by the executive. 
 
Although there is clearly room for improvement, in general the CMA, CSMJ and 
CMJ appear to be adequately protected so that they can be regarded as 
sufficiently independent and impartial to comply with the Constitution. 
 
8.2.2 Fair trial criteria and the military courts 
 
The trial must be conducted in a fair and just manner.  To this end the accused is 
entitled to certain fair trial rights.5  Fair trial rights, however, only apply to an 
“accused before criminal proceedings.”6  Although an accused appearing before 
a CSMJ and CMJ can be regarded as an “accused before criminal proceedings” 
the same does not apply to an accused appearing before a CODH. 
 
Subsequently certain fair trial rights are examined and it was found that an 
accused before a military court is sufficiently informed of the charges, has 
sufficient time and facilities to prepare a defence, receives as public hearing and 
has the right to choose and to be represented by a legal practitioner of his 
choice. 
 
The conclusion reached regarding the status of the military courts is therefore 
that the CMA, CSMJ and CMJ can be regarded as ordinary courts for the 
purposes of conducting criminal trials and affording accused persons their right to 
a fair trial.7  The CODH cannot be considered a court of law and at this level 
there is a real concern of executive interference.  It was however found that the 
voluntary nature of the accused’s choice to submit to the jurisdiction of the CODH 
                                               
5
 See s 35(3) of the Constitution; ch 4 at para 4.2.2. 
6
 See ch 4 at para 4.2.3. 
7
 See ch 4 at para 4.4. 
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and his right to appeal and review alleviates the concern.  It can therefore be 
stated that the CODH does follow fair trial procedures and that the military 
accuseds’ rights are sufficiently protected at this forum. 
 
8.3 Military sentences 
 
Military sentences are evaluated in terms of the relevant procedural aspects as 
well as the current military punishments available to the military courts. 
 
8.3.1 Procedural aspects regarding sentencing 
 
Although the military courts’ sentencing discretion is generally respected, parity 
in sentencing is regarded as an important aspect with the potential to influence 
the sentencing discretion of the military courts.8  Parity in sentence is however 
made difficult by the lack of available military court judgments.  No CSMJ or CMJ 
judgments are published and the CMA judgments are only of limited assistance.  
In many instances reasons for differences in sentences are not provided, making 
it very difficult for later military courts to apply the sentencing principles in their 
decisions.  The format of publication is further not user-friendly, hampering its 
application.  It is suggested that the implementation of sentencing guidelines, 
such as those followed by the British military justice system, would address the 
requirements set by the CMA for parity in sentencing.  This would be particularly 
helpful at the forum of the CODH. 
 
The distinction between different rank groups in the SANDF as it applies to 
sentencing has raised some concerns regarding the equal treatment of offenders 
in the military.9  An evaluation of section 9 of the Constitution shows that a 
distinction could be made between formal and substantive equality.  In 
determining whether a provision discriminates against an individual it must firstly 
                                               
8
 See ch 5 at para 5.3. 
9
 See ch 5 at para 5.7.1. 
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be determined whether the provision discriminates or merely differentiates 
between individuals.  Then it is considered whether a rational basis exists for the 
differentiation.  Finally, if the differentiation is regarded as unfair discrimination it 
must be determined whether the limitation clause of the Constitution can justify 
the unfair discrimination. 
 
The two main concerns with regard to differentiation in military sentences are (1) 
the fact that officers are sentenced to cashiering or dismissal and other ranks to 
discharge with ignominy or discharge from the SANDF, and (2) the difference in 
punishment depending on the rank and the seniority of the accused and the 
victim. 
 
It is found that the difference between cashiering versus discharge with ignominy 
and dismissal versus discharge from the SANDF is merely in name and not in 
substance.  There is no discernable difference in the treatment between officers 
and other ranks in the execution of these sentences.  It is further found that when 
evaluating the difference in treatment of officers and other ranks as it relates to 
punishment, the unique hierarchical structure of the military and the need for 
discipline must be kept in mind.  The need for a disciplined force would therefore 
constitute a legitimate governmental purpose for the different treatment of the 
different ranks. 
 
8.3.2 Military punishments 
 
All the sentences listed in section 12 of the MDSMA were evaluated10 such as 
imprisonment, discharge or dismissal from the SANDF, reduction in rank, 
reduction in and seniority and fines but only certain sentences raise possible 
concerns. 
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 See ch 6. 
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8.3.2.1  Imprisonment 
 
Although imprisonment is a sentence that may be imposed in the military court, it 
is not clearly defined in the defence legislation.  It is further unclear whether it 
includes all six forms of imprisonment found in the Criminal Procedure Act.  It 
was found that military courts may only impose determinate and life 
imprisonment.  The CMJ is limited to a maximum period of two years whereas 
the CSMJ is only limited by the penalty clause provided for the specific offence.  
Although the MDSMA does not specifically provide for life imprisonment, it was 
found that the CSMJ may in fact impose life imprisonment as a sentence.  The 
military courts do not have the authority to impose any indefinite period of 
imprisonment since only a “superior court or a regional court” has the power to 
declare any person a dangerous or habitual criminal.  Since the military courts 
are not authorised to impose correctional supervision, imprisonment which could 
result in correctional supervision is also not within the authority of the military 
court.  Periodical imprisonment is imposed to allow an offender to retain his 
employment.  As soon as a military offender is sentenced to imprisonment by a 
military court he is discharged from the SANDF and therefore periodical 
imprisonment is not a viable form of imprisonment. 
 
Of the different forms of imprisonment, determinate imprisonment is the form 
usually imposed by the military courts.  It is however not an appropriate sentence 
to impose for a disciplinary offence.  In the military context imprisonment should 
therefore only be imposed for serious criminal offences.  Where a sentence of 
imprisonment is justified, the nature of criminal offences in the military seldom 
justifies a long term of imprisonment. 
 
Imprisonment as a sentence has serious consequences for the military offender.  
An officer sentenced to imprisonment must also be sentenced to cashiering and 
a non-commissioned to discharge with ignominy.  This means that the offender’s 
employment is terminated.  The sentence of imprisonment will not commence 
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immediately upon being announced in open court.  It is subject to automatic 
review by the CMA and will only be executed once the CMA confirms the finding 
and sentence.  The accused must be kept in custody pending finalisation of the 
review but since the CMA only sits on an ad hoc basis it may take up to 18 
months for the review to be finalised.  This may result in a gross violation of his 
rights but the MDSMA provides that the local representative of the Adjutant 
General may release the accused pending the finalisation of his trial, subject to 
certain conditions specified for his release. 
 
Military members sentenced to imprisonment must serve their sentence at a 
prison of the Department of Corrections and consequently the release policy of 
the Department of Corrections applies.  It is however provided by the MDSMA 
that where an accused is already serving a sentence of imprisonment, the new 
sentence only commences after expiration of the first sentence.  Imprisonment 
can be wholly suspended for a maximum period of three years. 
 
8.3.2.2  Cashiering 
 
The sentence of cashiering means the “dishonourable dismissal of an officer” 
from the SANDF.11  The concerns identified are not with the actual dismissal of 
the officer or the dishonourable nature of the discharge.  It lies with the 
mandatory nature of the sentence for specific offences and the implementation of 
the sentence. 
 
Cashiering is mandatory under two circumstances:12 (1) when an officer is found 
guilty of conduct unbecoming an officer,13 and (2) when an officer is sentenced to 
any term of imprisonment.  Section 32 of the MDC leaves the court with no 
discretion to deviate from the sentence of cashiering.  No mitigation, aggravation 
or the culpability of the offender has any influence on the prescribed sentence, 
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 See ch 6 at para 6.2.2. 
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 See ch 6 at para 6.2.2.1. 
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 Section 32 of the MDC. 
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which may result in the arbitrary imposition of the sentence disproportionate to 
the seriousness of the crime and the blameworthiness of the offender.  It is 
submitted that the legislation be amended to remove cashiering as the only 
available punishment for the contravention of section 32 of the MDC and allows 
the court to exercise its sentencing discretion. 
 
It is found above that the manner in which the cashiering is executed infringes 
the offender’s right not to be treated in a cruel, inhuman or degrading manner.14  
Since all punishments undermine human dignity to some degree, the right to 
dignity should also be considered when evaluating cashiering as a sentence.  
Cashiering is a shaming punishment regarded as “stigmitasation shaming” and 
as such it would probably not withstand constitutional scrutiny.  Since the 
ultimate goal of cashiering is to sever the employ of the offender in a way that 
expresses the community’s condemnation of the offender’s behaviour, it is 
submitted that this aim could be achieved equally simply by dismissing the 
offender from the SANDF.  A perusal of comparative jurisdictions in Britain, 
Canada and Amercia show that dismissal with disgrace is an acceptable 
punishment in the military but nowhere is it still executed in a public humiliating 
way.  It is therefore argued that the sentence should be retained as a 
dishonourable discharge provided that the concerns regarding its execution are 
addressed. 
 
8.3.2.3  Detention 
 
The purpose of imposing a sentence of detention is to give the offender the 
opportunity to rehabilitate and remain in the employ of the SANDF.15  The 
maximum period of detention that the court may impose is two years.  Because 
of the serious consequences of loss of rank, seniority and salary, it is not a 
sentence that is lightly imposed by the military courts.  As was the case with 
                                               
14
 See ch 6 at para 6.2.2.2. 
15
 See ch 6 at para 6.2.5. 
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imprisonment, a person sentenced to detention must also be kept in custody 
pending the review of his case but may be released by the local representative of 
the Adjutant General pending finalisation of the review.  A sentence of detention 
also continues to run even where the accused ceases to be subject to the MDC 
during the time of serving his sentence.  The sentence is served in the detention 
barracks.   
 
The sentence of detention is investigated because of concerns regarding the lack 
of implementation of the UN Convention Against Torture, and Other Cruel, 
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CAT) and the Optional 
Protocol to CAT (OPCAT).16  The main problem is the fact that the detention 
barracks are not subject to any oversight and inmates’ recourse are limited to an 
internal complaints procedure.  Although the treatment of inmates at the 
detention barracks does not constitute cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or 
punishment, the SANDF must comply with its responsibility to have an 
independent oversight body.  Since no current policy exists in the SANDF 
regarding the treatment of inmates in terms of CAT and OPCAT, it is suggested 
that the SANDF utilises the SAPS documents in drawing up appropriate policy 
documents.  It is further proposed that the SANDF use the Judicial Inspectorate 
of Prisons to act as an independent oversight body for the detention barracks.  
Only minor changes need to be made to the defence legislation and the mandate 
of the Judicial Inspectorate of Prisons. 
 
A further potential problem is the use of solitary confinement as provided for by 
the regulations of the detention barracks.  The regulations provide for disciplinary 
solitary confinement which may only be imposed as a court sentence.  These 
regulations are contrary to the defence legislation which does not make provision 
for solitary confinement as a punishment at all.  The regulations however further 
provide that the superintendent of the detention barracks may conduct a trail, but 
since the ranks of the commanding officers at the detention barracks are not 
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 See ch 6 at para 6.2.5.7. 
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senior enough they will in fact not have the jurisdiction to try an offender at a 
CODH as provided for by the regulations.  Apart from a trial by CSMJ, CMJ and 
CODH, no other military forum has the jurisdiction to try the offender.  Solitary 
confinement is therefore not a punishment authorised in terms of the defence 
legislation and is currently not in use. 
 
It is further submitted that detention as a punishment is under-utilised.  With 
minor changes to the legislation to alleviate the harsh consequences of loss of 
rank and seniority, detention can be of valuable assistance in the disciplinary 
rehabilitation of military offenders.  The policy framework provided for the 
detention barracks by the military police agency in 2006 should be implemented 
as a matter of urgency.  The rehabilitation and skills development programmes 
followed by the MTCT Colchester should be benchmarked for the successful 
implementation of relevant training provided by the detention barracks. 
 
8.3.2.4  Field punishment 
 
It is recommended that field punishment as a sentencing option be removed from 
the list of options since its main components of “extra duties” and “punishment 
drill” are adequately provided for in other sentences.17 
 
8.3.2.5 Fines 
 
A fine is the sentence most frequently imposed by military courts.  The maximum 
fine that can be imposed by the CODH is R600 and for the CSMJ and CMJ it is 
R6000.  Although a fine should act as a deterrent it is doubtful whether a fine 
imposed by the military courts is sufficiently severe to be seen as a real 
deterrent.  The difficulties experienced by the civilian environment in collecting 
fines are not experienced by the military environment.  Military fines are deducted 
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 See ch 6 at para 6.2.6.2. 
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from an offender’s salary in terms of section 130 of the MDC and where 
requested by the offender, the fine may be deducted in installments. 
 
8.3.2.6  Confinement to barracks 
 
Confinement to barracks may be imposed on any offender of the rank of private 
for a maximum period of 21 days.  The punishment mainly consists of being 
restricted to the unit lines, forfeiting recreational facilities, punishment drills and 
standing inspection.  Concerns were consequently raised whether this sentence 
complies with the objectives of the UN Convention against Torture.18  This 
sentence is most effective when imposed on single living-in members who are 
undergoing training.  It must further be evaluated within its military context.  In an 
operational as well as the training environment military members are routinely 
restricted in their movements or given extra duties to do.  A high premium is also 
placed on the discipline of soldiers.  It is consequently found that confinement to 
barracks cannot be seen as cruel, inhuman or degrading punishment in the 
military context. 
 
Therefore, although there are many concerns raised, the study on military 
sentences has shown that many of these concerns are based more on the 
apparent than any real infringement of the accused’s rights.  The concerns that 
do appear legitimate can be addressed with minor legislative amendments. 
 
8.4 Military appeal and review 
 
Two processes are available to the military offender who is not satisfied with his 
trial.  The matter can be taken either on appeal or on review.  In terms of the 
review of a military trial the review authority of Review Counsel and the Director: 
Military Judicial Reviews was specifically investigated in two respects: (1) the 
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non-judicial review of the military court proceedings,19 and (2) the constitutional 
right to review by a “higher court.”20 
 
The Director: Military Judicial Reviews does not form part of the military judiciary 
yet he exercises full appeal and review authority over cases decided by the 
military courts.  In fact, he has the same powers as a CMA.  The Director: Military 
Judicial Reviews forms part of the executive.  The situation is therefore that a 
person forming part of the executive has appeal and review powers over the 
military judiciary.21  It is submitted that the review function of the Director: Military 
Judicial Reviews will not withstand constitutional scrutiny.  It is suggested that 
consideration be given to a model similar to the American Court of Criminal 
Appeals that will have the authority to review all findings by the CODH, the CSMJ 
and the CMJ.22  Such a court could be referred to as a Court of Military Review, 
staffed by military judges, taking the place of the Director: Military Judicial 
Review. 
 
In terms of the right to appeal and review the Constitution provides for the right to 
review to a higher court.  Neither Review Counsel not the Director: Military 
Judicial Reviews could be seen as a higher court.  Therefore review done by the 
Review Counsel and the Director which is not subsequently considered by the 
CMSA, does not comply with the fair trial right of appeal and review to a higher 
court.  The solution of creating a Court of Military Review should address this 
concern. 
 
The question is investigated whether a military accused has the right to review 
and appeal to the High Court of South Africa.23  There is no right to appeal from 
the military courts to the High Court of South Africa.  There is no inherent right to 
appeal to the High Court and the defence legislation does not make any such 
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provision.  The High Court of South Africa does have inherent review powers with 
respect to the cases heard by the CSMJ and CMJ as courts of the first instance.  
On the question whether the High Court has the power to review cases heard by 
the CMA there are however different decisions.24  The Transvaal Provincial 
Division found that the High Court does have the jurisdiction to review a case 
from the CMA but the Cape Provincial Division held that the High Court does not 
have such a right.  This creates a problem since no clear answer exists.  It is 
submitted that the defence legislation be amended to address this lacuna.  It is 
further submitted that specific provision should be made for the right of the 
accused to appeal to the High Court of South Africa.  This would be in line with 
other comparable jurisdictions such as Britain and the United States.  Such a 
right would address any lingering concerns and perceptions regarding the 
perceived bias of the military judiciary. 
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